Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conventions | Turiel | Upton I 126 Conventions/Turiel/Upton: (Turiel 1983(1)) Thesis: morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness. In contrast, actions that are matters of social convention have no intrinsic interpersonal consequences. For example, in school, children usually address their teacher using their title and surname (…). However, there is no intrinsic reason that this is any better than addressing the teacher by their first name (…). Only social convention (…) makes ‘Mr Smith’ more appropriate than ‘Joe’. These conventions are arbitrary in the sense that they have no intrinsic status, but are important to the smooth functioning of the social group as they provide a way for members of society to coordinate their social exchanges. Understanding of convention is therefore linked to the child’s understanding of social organisation. Recent research into children’s beliefs about social exclusion suggests that children are able to separate these two aspects of moral reasoning, but that their ability to tell the difference between morality and social convention increases during adolescence (Killen and Stangor, 2001(2); Killen. 2007(3)). >Morality/Kohlberg, >Morality/Turiel; (TurielVsKohlberg). 1. Turiel, E (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kilien, M and Stangor, C (2001) Children’s social reasoning about inclusion and exclusion in gender and race peer group contexts. Child Development, 72: 174-86. 3. Killen. M (2007) Children’s social and moral reasoning about exclusion. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16: 32-6. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Equilibrium | Rawls | I 456 Equilibrium/Rawls: I use the term intuitively(1). The term stability, which I use for this purpose, is actually one of the quasi-stability: when an equilibrium is stable, all variables return to their equilibrium after a disturbance. In terms of quasi stability, there are only a few(2). Quasi-stable society: is a well-ordered society that is quasi-stable in terms of its institutions and the sense of justice of its citizens. If, for example, certain circumstances mean that institutions can no longer be regarded as fair, they should be able to be reformed as the situation requires, and justice has been restored. >Justice/Rawls. I 457 Three conditions must be fulfilled for a society in an equilibrium: 1. The system is to be identified and internal and external forces must be distinguishable. 2. Different states of the system and their characteristic features are to be identified. 3. The laws linking the different states shall be specified. Depending on their nature, some systems do not have a state of equilibrium, others have many. I 458 Sense of justice: the sense of justice of citizens in a society plays a decisive role. Moral learning/tradition: we can distinguish between two main currents: 1) One originates from Hume to Sidgwick and can be found today in social learning theories. Thesis: missing social motives are gained through learning. >D. Hume, >H. Sidgwick. A variant of this thesis assumes that moral standards are acquired before any understanding. >Morals, >Emotivism. I 459 2) The second traditional thesis comes from Rousseau and Kant, it is rationalistic and is sometimes represented by J. St. Mill and, more recently, by J. Piaget: Moral learning is therefore not so much a question of filling gaps as a free development of our innate and intellectual abilities after natural disposition. >Morality/Rousseau, >Morality/Kant, >Morality/Mill, >Morality/Piaget, >Innateness. I 460 See footnotes 3-7. 1. See W. R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, 2nd. Ed. (London, 1960), chs. 2-4,19-29. 2. See Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New York, 1957), p, 18. 3. See J.-J. Rousseau, Emile (London, 1908) esp. pp. 46-66 (in bk. II), 172-196 (in bk. IV); 4. See also Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, Pt. II, The Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. 5. See also J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment oft he Child (London, 1932). 6. See also Lawrence Kohlberg, „The Development of Moral Thought“, Vita Humana, vol. 6 (1963). 7. For VsPiaget see: M. L. Hoffman, „Moral Development“ (1970) pp. 264-275, and for VsKohlberg: pp. 276-281. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Kohlberg | Psychological Theories | Slater I 167 Kohlberg/Morality/psychological theories: [An] important critique was offered by Shweder (1991)(1) who criticized the model for focusing too narrowly on questions of justice and failing to capture a range of moral concerns, such as divinity and community, that are highly salient in non-Western cultures. (ShwederVsKohlberg). (See also GilliganVsKohlberg: >Morality/Gilligan). Kohlberg’s approach has been further criticized for its reliance on hypothetical situations. As Krebs and Denton (2005)(2) noted, real-life moral dilemmas tend to differ from Kohlberg’s dilemmas in a number of ways that can have implications for moral reasoning. (KrebsVsKohlberg, DentonVsKohlberg) For example, when individuals are considering hypothetical dilemmas they are unlikely to consider the possibility of interacting with the targets of their judgments in the future. However, empirical evidence does not seem to support this criticism. For example, work by Walker and colleagues (Walker, 1989(3); Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987)(4) showed that hypothetical and self-generated moral dilemmas result in similar moral stage classifications for both children and adults. (WalkerVsKohlberg). Slater I 168 ShwederVsKohlber/DentonVsKohlberg: Kohlberg’s model (…) emphasizes moral reasoning to the exclusion of moral behavior. Krebs and Denton (2005(2), p. 645) argued, “What people do is more practically important than what they say, and the study of what people do is better equipped to elucidate morality than the study of what they say.” They asserted that moral reasoning accounts for only a small proportion of the variance in moral behavior, and noted that correlations between moral behavior and performance on Kohlberg’s reasoning tasks tend to be around .3, and even lower after controlling for factors such as socio-economic status (see also Blasi, 1980(5)) and Gibbs, 2006(6), for a counter-argument). Slater I 171 Xu et al. (2010)(7) found that (…) children who falsely claimed to like [a] gift were more likely to express a favorable view of lie telling in politeness situations. A study by Fu, Evans, Wang, and Lee (2008)(8) examined the relation between children’s reasoning about lying and their actual lie-telling behavior. The results of these studies indicate that children’s moral reasoning can have significant implications for their moral behavior when the reasoning and behavioral contexts are constructed in a highly parallel manner. The findings suggest that Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas may be indeed too abstract to offer useful insights into children’s moral understanding, moral behavior, and the linkage between the two (Krebs & Denton, 2005)(2). 1. Shweder, R. (1991). Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2 Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: A critical evaluation of Kohlberg’s modeL Psychological Review, 112,629—649. 3. Walker, L. J. (1989). A longitudinal study of moral reasoning. Child Development, 60, 157—166. 4. Walker, L. J., de Vries, B., & Trevethan, S. D. (1987). Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Child Development, 58, 842—858. 5. Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45. 6. Gibbs, J. C. (2006). Should Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach be replaced with a more pragmatic approach? Comment on Krebs and Denton. Psychological Review, 113, 666—671. 7. Xu, F., Bao, X., Fu, G., Taiwar, V, & Lee, K. (2010). Lying and truth-telling in children: From concept to action. Child Development, 81, 581—596. 8. Fu, G., Evans, A. D., Wang, L., & Lee, K. (2008). Lying in the name of the collective good: A developmental study. Developmental Science, 11, 495—503. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Kohlberg | Cultural Psychology | Slater I 170 Kohlberg/cultural psychology: VsKohlberg: [The] evidence of contextual and cultural differences in moral judgments about lying (>Honesty/cultural psychology, >Honesty/Kohlberg, >Morality/Kohlberg) strongly challenges the moral universality assumption of Kohlberg’s theory. It is clear that even young children are highly sensitive to contextual factors when making moral judgments about dishonesty, and that there are cross-cultural differences in social norms about lying. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Morality | Kohlberg | Slater I 165 Morality/Kohlberg: Like Piaget (>Morality/Piaget), Kohlberg (1963/2008)(1)) asked children to reason about situation. E.g., the Heinz dilemma. Def Heinz dilemma: Mr. Heinz, the husband of a woman with cancer, broke into a pharmacy to steal a drug after the pharmacist refused to give him the drug at a reduced price or on credit. The children, (boys aged from 10 to 13 years) were then engaged in extended discussions about this problem. Stages/Kohlberg: 6 stages of morality grouped into three levels: First Level: the Pre-Moral Level, judgments are characterized by self-interest. Stage 1 orientation focuses on avoiding punishment and demonstrating obedience for its own sake, Stage 2 orientation focuses on what Kohlberg called “naive instrumental hedonism” which is often characterized as “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.” Second Level: the Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity, in which judgments are characterized by an emphasis on social relationships and an appreciation of norms and conventions. Stage 3 orientation focuses on maintaining positive relations with others by following expected societal standards for being good, and a Stage 4 orientation focuses on respecting laws in order to maintain social order. Third Level: Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles, with judgments characterized by a focus on the internally held moral principles. Stage 5 orientation focuses on coordinating the interest of the group with important universal values such as the need to preserve life, and Stage 6 focuses on acting according to conscience in relation to basic principles of fairness such as equality and human rights. Kohlberg Thesis: it is necessary for individuals to pass through the stages in sequence, and the pattern of intercorrelations (…) supported the notion that the higher levels of moral reasoning replace the lower levels as children develop. Prior to Kohlberg and Piaget, the dominant views of moral development were the behaviorist approach, which focuses on how behaviors are acquired through conditioning, the socialization approach, which emphasizes the internalization of social norms, and the psychodynamic approach, which emphasizes the role of unconscious motives in human behavior. Each of these approaches depicts children as passive recipients of values and norms that are imposed on them either externally, or internally via unconscious processes. In contrast, Kohlberg characterized children’s moral reasoning as evolving as they interact in complex social environments and gain experience with social roles (Turiel, 2008)(2). Kohlberg argued that even young children have the mental and emotional capacity to make sense of their social environment and reflect upon the moral implications of their behavior. >Stages of development, >Morality/Turiel. 1. Kohlberg, L. (1963/2008). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I: Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 51, 8—20. 2. Turiel, E. (2008). The development of children’s orientations toward moral, social, and personal orders: More than a sequence in development. Human Development, 51, 21—39. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Upton I 124 Post-conventional Morality/Kohlberg/Upton: Kohlberg (1958(1) suggested that most adolescents reach level II [conventional morality] and most of us stay at this level of reasoning during adulthood. Only a few individuals reach the post-conventional level of reasoning; indeed, Kohlberg found stage 6 to be so rare that it has since been removed from the theory. >VsKohlberg. 1. Kohlberg, L (1958). The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago. |
Kohlb I Lawrence Kohlberg The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice New York 1981 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Morality | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 124 Morality/Developmental psychology/Upton: While Piaget distinguishes between heteronomous and autonomous morality (>Morality/Piaget), Kohlberg (1958)(1) speaks of three stages of development of moral thinking: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional morality. >Morality/Kohlberg. Post-conventional Morality/Kohlberg: Kohlberg (1958(1) suggested that most adolescents reach level II [conventional morality] and most of us stay at this level of reasoning during adulthood. Only a few individuals reach the post-conventional level of reasoning; indeed, Kohlberg found stage 6 to be so rare that it has since been removed from the theory. VsKohlberg: Evidence supports the view that children and adolescents progress through the stages Kohlberg suggested, even if they may not reach the level of post-conventional reasoning (Flavell et al., 1993(2); Walker, 1989(3)). Cross-cultural studies also provide some evidence for the universality of Kohlberg’s first four stages (Snarey et al., 1985)(4). However, this theory is not without its critics and Kohlberg’s model has been accused of both cultural and gender biases. Cultural psychologyVsKohlberg: It has been suggested that Kohlberg’s theory is culturally biased because it emphasizes ideals such as individual rights and social justice, which are found mainly in Western cultures (Shweder, 1994)(5). Miller and Bersoff (1992)(6) showed that Americans placed greater value on a justice orientation (stage 4) than Indians. In contrast, Indians placed a greater weight on interpersonal responsibilities, such as upholding one’s obligations to others and being responsive to other people’s needs (stage 3). In the same way, it has been noted that women are more likely to use stage 3 than stage 4 reasoning. Gender studiesVsKohlberg: According to Gilligan (1982(7), 1996(8)), the ordering of the stages therefore reflects a gender bias. Placing abstract principles of justice (stage 4) above relationships and concern for others (stage 3) is based on a male norm and reflects the fact that most of Kohlberg’s research used male participants. Gilligan therefore argues that these orientations are indeed different, but that one is not necessarily better than the other. However, there is some debate about the extent of the evidence to support Gilligan’s claims of gender differences in moral reasoning; a meta-analysis of the evidence by Jaffee and Hyde (2000)(9) found that gender differences in reasoning were small and usually better explained by the nature of the dilemma than by gender. The evidence now seems to suggest that care-based reasoning is used by both males and females to evaluate interpersonal dilemmas, while justice reasoning is applied to societal dilemmas. 1. Kohlberg, L (1958) The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago. 2. Flavell, JH, Miller, PH and Miller, SA (1993) Cognitive Development(3rd edn). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 3. Walker, U (1989) A longitudinal study of moral reasoning. Child Development, 60: 157-66. 4. Snarey, JR, Reimer, J and Kohlberg, L (1985) The development of social-moral reasoning among kibbutz adolescents: a longitudinal cross-cultural study. Developmental Psychology, 20:3-17. 5. Shweder, RA and Levine, RA (eds)(1994) Culture Theory: Essays on mind, self and emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Miller, JG and Bersoff, DM (1992) Culture and moral judgment: how are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved? Journal of Personality and Social Psychol0ogy, 62(4): 541-54. 7. Gilligan, C (1982) In a D4fferent Voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 8. Gilligan. C (1996) The centrality of relationships in psychological development: a puzzle, some evidence and a theory, in Noam, GG and Fischer, KW (eds) Development and Vulnerability in Close Relationships. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 9. Jaffee, S and Hyde,JS (2000) Gender differences in moral orientation: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 126: 703-2 6. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Morality | Cultural Psychology | Upton I 124 Morality/Cultural Psychology/Upton: Cultural psychologyVsKohlberg: It has been suggested that Kohlberg’s theory is culturally biased because it emphasizes ideals such as individual rights and social justice, which are found mainly in Western cultures (Shweder, 1994)(1). >Morality/Kohlberg. Miller and Bersoff (1992)(2) showed that Americans placed greater value on a justice orientation (stage 4) than Indians. In contrast, Indians placed a greater weight on interpersonal responsibilities, such as upholding one’s obligations to others and being responsive to other people’s needs (stage 3). In the same way, it has been noted that women are more likely to use stage 3 than stage 4 reasoning. >Morality/Gender Studies, >Morality/Kohlberg. 1. Shweder, RA and Levine, RA (eds)(1994) Culture Theory: Essays on mind, self and emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Miller, JG and Bersoff, DM (1992) Culture and moral judgment: how are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved? Journal of Personality and Social Psychol0ogy, 62(4): 541-54. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Morality | Gilligan | Slater I 167 Morality/GilliganVsKohlberg/sex differences//Gilligan: Gilligan (1982)(1) argued that because Kohlberg’s data (Kohlberg 1963/2008)(2); >Morality/Kohlberg) were obtained from male participants only, his model does not appropriately characterize the moral reasoning capacities of females. VsVs/VsGilligan: However, subsequent studies with female participants have shown that male and female participants reason about Kohlberg’s dilemmas in highly similar ways. The only consistent gender differences that have been found in this domain concern adults’ reasoning about real life dilemmas in the context of social relationships (e.g., whether to tell a friend that her spouse is having an affair or to send one’s father to a nursing home against his will; Walker, 2006)(3). 1. Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Kohlberg, L. (1963/2008). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I: Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 51, 8—20. 3. Walker, L.J. (2006). Gender and morality. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds), Handbook of moral development (pp. 93—115). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Morality | Gender Studies | Upton I 124 Morality/Gender Studies/Upton: Gender studiesVsKohlberg: According to Gilligan (1982(1), 1996(2)), the ordering of the stages therefore reflects a gender bias. Placing abstract principles of justice (stage 4) above relationships and concern for others (stage 3) is based on a male norm and reflects the fact that most of Kohlberg’s research used male participants. Gilligan therefore argues that these orientations are indeed different, but that one is not necessarily better than the other. However, there is some debate about the extent of the evidence to support Gilligan’s claims of gender differences in moral reasoning; a meta-analysis of the evidence by Jaffee and Hyde (2000)(3) found that gender differences in reasoning were small and usually better explained by the nature of the dilemma than by gender. The evidence now seems to suggest that care-based reasoning is used by both males and females to evaluate interpersonal dilemmas, while justice reasoning is applied to societal dilemmas. >Morality/Kohlberg, >Morality/Cultural psychology. 1. Gilligan, C (1982) In a D4fferent Voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Gilligan. C (1996) The centrality of relationships in psychological development: a puzzle, some evidence and a theory, in Noam, GG and Fischer, KW (eds) Development and Vulnerability in Close Relationships. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Jaffee, S and Hyde,JS (2000) Gender differences in moral orientation: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 126: 703-2 6. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Morality | Turiel | Upton I 125 Morality/Turiel/TurielVsKohlberg/Upton:. In his domain theory, Turiel (1983)(1) argues that the child’s concepts of morality and social convention develop from the recognition that certain actions or behaviours are intrinsically harmful and that these are therefore different from other actions that have social consequences only. For example, hitting another person has intrinsic effects (the harm that is caused) on the well-being of the other person. Such intrinsic effects occur regardless of any social rules that may or may not be in place concerning hitting. The core features of moral cognition are therefore centred around thinking about the impact of Upton I 126 actions on well-being, and morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness. In contrast, actions that are matters of social convention have no intrinsic interpersonal consequences. Cf. >Morality/Kohlberg, >Conventions/Turiel. 1. Turiel, E (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morality | Kohlberg, L. | Graeser I 193 Kohlberg, Lawrence / Graeser: (Educational Psychologist): thesis: in a sense, there is a natural moral development. I 194 In specific cases, it is no longer important whether we are sufferers or doer of an action. GraeserVsKohlberg: it remains a mystery, how are we supposed to know beforehand. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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