Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Putnam | Rorty I 307 Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless (> de re / de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Putnam follows 3 trains of thought: 1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism. 3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers". Wright/truth/justified assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVsEquating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons: 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not. 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. E.g. idealization: an idealization is not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them. >Idealisation, >Meanging change, >Realism, >Internal realism, >Observation, >Obervation language, >Truth. --- Rorty VI 30 Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. >Pragmatism, >Dewey. PutnamVsRorty et al.: Rorty et al. ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". >Intentionality. Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed. --- Putnam I (c) 96 Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science (PutnamVsKuhn). >Truth/Peirce. If you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. >Incommensurability/Kuhn. I (e) 141 Truth/assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from Tarski's his truth-definition also follows assertibility. The probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. >Truth definition/Tarski, >Object language, >Meta language. I (i) 246 Truth/justified assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective". >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Connectives | Putnam | I (c) 87 Interpretation/Putnam: interpretation is not a representation, but production. >Logical constants. E.g. classical connectives are not represented using the intuitionistic connectives, but the classical theorems are produced. >Intuitionism. Putnam: the meaning of the connectives is still not classic, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not by truth. Change of meaning: e.g. assuming we wanted to formulate Newton's laws in intuitionistic mathematics, then we would have to limit the real numbers (for example, on the 30th decimal). I (c) 88 Then, in the classical theory, the connectives would refer to "provability in B1" and in the other to "provability in B2". Then the connectives would change their meaning when knowledge changes. I (c) 95 Realism/Putnam: the realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not solely true because it follows a (any) theory. I (c) 96 Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified reasonably. It is not used to specify any conditions for science. >>Peirce. PutnamVsKuhn: if you do not believe in convergence but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectives intuitionistically and apprehend truth intra-theoretically. >Kuhn. I (c) 97 Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the entire theory and individual statement meanings is useless. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Incommensurability | Davidson | Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presupposes the >separation scheme/content (Third Dogma). Hacking I 129 DavidsonVsKuhn: incommensurability presupposes >conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Incommensurability | Feyerabend | I 353 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: E.g. principle: there is a habit of considering an object as given when the list of its parts is complete (archaic thinking). This habit is abolished (but without contradicting a principle) by the assumption that even the most complete list does not fully describe an object! Therefore, incommensurability cannot be defined by recourse statements! Reason: If the habit is overruled, then the objects of world A are also overruled. The A-objects cannot be examined with a method of conjecture that knows no end. >Meaning change. I 354 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: it becomes clear that the contents of A and B cannot be compared. Corresponding facts cannot be juxtaposed, not even mentally: if we imagine B-facts, then it means that principles are invalidated which were part of the construction of A-facts. We can only draw B-images of A-facts in B or make B-statements about A-facts in B. We cannot make A-statements about A-facts in B. Translation/Feyerabend: it is also impossible to translate language A into language B. That does not mean that the two views could not be discussed, but the discussion cannot be based on logical relationships between the components of A and B. I 355 Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsCritics: incommensurability does not apply to all competing theories, and it only applies to theories if they are interpreted in a certain way, for example, without reference to an "independent observation language". This restriction was overlooked by most critics. I do not assert the incommensurability of all theories. Only general and non-instance-dependent theories can be incommensurable, and those only if they are interpreted in a certain way. (The "non-instance-dependent" condition excludes "theories" like "All ravens are black"). I 358 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: nor are there any mixed statements between classical and relativistic formulations. Certain universal principles are used while they are simultaneously extinguished. Incommensurability/Feyerabend: E.g. "Impetus" is suspended by Galileo and Newton and is therefore no longer a principle for the constitution of facts. I 360 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: the question whether two theories are incommensurable is an incomplete question! Theories can be interpreted differently! According to one interpretation they are commensurable, according to another they are not! >Interpretation, >Theories. I 361/362 For example, instrumentalism makes all theories related to the same observation language commensurable. Realism, on the other hand, would like to represent (and make it commensurable) the observable and the non-observable in the same way. I 367 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: emerges only in the consideration of comprehensive cosmological theories! Limited theories rarely lead to conceptual revisions. I 372 Incommensurability/Language/Feyerabend: we no longer say today that nature avoids the vacuum. Change of jargon, not of facts. I 375 FeyerabendVsKuhn/Incommensurability: his ideas are more inclined towards psychology and suggest that any scientific change a) leads to a shift in sense and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the world of perception are to be determined by research, they are not self-evident. Kuhn: An understanding between different paradigms is not possible. FeyerabendVsKuhn: Scientists from different paradigms understand each other very well. --- II 16 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: incommensurability shows that a methodology of the increase in content or proximity to the truth does not fit everywhere in the sciences. >Understanding. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Incommensurability | Kuhn | I 210 Theory/Incommensurability/Theory Choice/Kuhn: Ultimately, theories are chosen for personal and subjective reasons and not by relying on good reasons since the reasons are incommensurable. ((s) The incommensurability results from historical changes in meanings of concepts, focus on problems, interests.) I 209 Change of meaning/Concept change/Kuhn: Since the vocabularies of discussions about new theories consist predominantly of the same terms some of these expressions must be applied differently to nature. - Consequently, the superiority of one theory over another is not to be proven in the discussion. >Meaning Change/Kuhn, >Observation Language/Kuhn, >Interpretation, >Critics against Kuhn; see also >Interests. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Meaning Change | Field | II 173 Meaning Change/Meaning/Field: E.g. the expression "has the same temperature" has changed - because one now knows that differently warm objects can feel equally warm. N.B.: "means that" cannot change. - It is empirically irrevidable. Solution: "Temperature" is an explanatory term. Meanings (also as intentional entities as "mere shadows") should not be interpreted as explanatory. >Explanations. Then the attribution should be kept, no matter what discoveries we make. >Theory change. On the other hand: meaning-characterization: is explanatory - namely causal. II 177 Meaning change/Field: Thesis: with the change of theories the reference of scientific terms (TT) is indeterminate. - There is no fact that decides. - E.g.: For Newton, and in the Special Relativity Theory, "mass" had no definite denotation. >Relativity theory, >Denotation, >Indeterminacy. II 183 Theory change/meaning change/change of concept/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962(1), 101) Thesis: The referents of Einstein's terms are never identical with those of the Newtonian terms, which bear the same name. Newton's mass remains intact, Einstein's mass is convertible against energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, Einstein has shown that there is no "Newtonian mass" - Newton's concept meant something else, I do not deny that - but this does not apply to reference or denotation. Today's terms refer to a subset of what the Newtonians referred to. >Reference. FieldVsKuhn: something like "Newton's mass" has never existed - so Newton himself can never have referred to it. Problem: then the sentences are wrong. Solution: E.g. "Acceleration needs more force when the mass is larger." - This is not completely lacking denotation. The reference is simply indeterminate. II 194 Meaning change/change of concept/theory change/Putnam: thesis: the reference usually survives in scientific revolutions. >Meaning change/Putnam. 1. Thomas S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1962. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Method | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 234 Method/Lakatos: Scientists often act like sleepwalkers, they think something is right, but do something quite different. >Science/Feyerabend, >Progress/Feyerabend. --- Hacking I 191 Knowledge sociology/LakatosVsKuhn: "Mobpsychology". Vs the tracing back of the history of science to sociology. This leaves no room for the sacrosanct values of truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: this attitude does not contribute to what one should reasonably believe. It is exclusively turned backwards. >History/Lakatos. Hacking I 193 Popper/Lakatos. Setting up drawers must go much faster than collecting facts. ("Leibniz Whewell Popper Demand"). |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Relativism | Davidson | I (c) 57 Relativity is not an >indeterminateness at all. I (e) 84 Consciousness exists in the plural, nature only in the singular. The fact that everyone has his point of view in the world is a harmless relativism, since it refers to a system of coordinates, namely, the one nature. >Reference systems. >Conceptual relativism is more difficult because the common coordinate system is not easily identifiable. I (e) 84ff Davidson: for this reason the possible difference between individual and social thought systems is limited. If conceptual relativism goes so far as to assert that the conceptual schemata and moral systems, or the languages connected with them, can be fundamentally different - so far as they are incomprehensible and incommensurable to each other, I reject conceptual relativism. Cultural Relativism: There are, of course, differences between periods or between cultures, or between people, but these are opposites which we can explain and grasp with sympathy and effort. >Culture relativism, >Cultural differences. I (e) 84 f VsIncommensurability/DavidsonVsKuhn: The proceeding assumptions (of the >incommensurability) requests of us contradictorily, that we should place ourselves at a position which is outside our own thinking. I (e) 84f Relativism/Davidson: That everyone has his point of view in the world, is a harmless relativism because it refers to a system of coordinates, that is to say, a nature - conceptual relativism is more difficult because the common coordinate system is not easy to identify. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Science | Feyerabend | I 188 Science/Irrationality/Feyerabend: the "irrational" approach is necessary because of the "uneven development" (Marx, Lenin) of the different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential elements of modern science only remain alive, because in their history reason has often been overuled! I 290 Science/Feyerabend: the theoretical authority of science is much lower than one assumes, but its social authority has grown enormously. Research/Einstein: recommended to separate research and profession. I 326 Theory of Science/Feyerabend: these reflections on archaic art can be combined with science theory: 1) E.g. perspective: we might assume that it was so obvious that it could not have been missing at the time. I 327 Solution: Shortcuts are not an obvious feature of our world of perception, as long as attention is not particularly directed to them. And why should the world of perception of the Greeks be the same as ours? 2) Method: by which method were the special features of the archaic cosmology worked out? With that of the anthropologist who tried to identify the "key ideals". I 329 3) Concept: the researcher must never attempt to make a concept clearer than the material suggests (except as a temporary tool for further investigation). I 330 4) Incommensurability: the meaning of sentences is only understood incompletely. Hempel: only wants to recognize incommensurability after the concept of meaning used therein is explained. I 331 5) Logic: logicians will raise objections: the investigation of the meaning of sentences and the relations between concepts is the task of logic and not of anthropology. Logic/Feyerabend: Logic can be two things: A) the study of the structures of a particular subject (anthropology) or B) a specific logical system. Anthropology/Feyerabend: In order to recognize whether "AB v AB' equi A" is part of the quantum theory, we will have to study the quantum theory, and not logic! It is necessary to study historical records, textbooks, original papers, minutes of meetings, and so on. Admittedly, these records alone do not provide a clear solution. But also historical evidence does not provide a clear solution to historical problems! And no one thinks they should be disregarded because of that. >Quantum theory, >Logic, >Method. I 339 Science/Feyerabend: does not refer to facts and laws, but to methods and activities of the scientist! Its investigation is an anthropological one. --- II 63 Science/Einstein/Feyerabend: Einstein repeatedly emphasizes the opportunistic nature of scientific research. II 174 Science/FeyerabendVsKuhn: the delineations of traditions and subjects, on which Kuhn and Polanyi base their thesis of the untouchability of science, are transient stages of the historical process. Science today is a business that unintentionally reinforces the totalitarian tendencies of society. Thus, the objection of Kuhn is settled. >Progress, >Theories. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Theories | Field | I 249ff Theory/object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities, >Truth, >Description levels. I 262 Physics/theory/Language/ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses. >Physics, >Ontology. Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number. This distinguishes the predicates in the family. >Predicates. NominalismVs: these are too many predicates. >Nominalism. --- II 46 Theory/truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. >Axioms. Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. >Variables. Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t". II 187 Ideal theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960(1), 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. >Reference, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Idealization. Reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory. - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood onto single sentences. FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless"! Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted. >Partial denotation. FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability. >Incommensurability. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirealism | Putnam Vs Antirealism | Putnam I131 VsAntirealism/Putnam: it could be argued: someone could reasonably make the possibly true statement: A; but it could have been the case that A, and our scientific development proceeds differently so ~A becomes part of the ideal theory accepted in the long run. In those circumstances A would be the case, but A would not be true. PutnamVs: the argument is faulty: the different "scientific development" here means choosing a different version. We cannot assume that the sentence A has a meaning regardless of the version that we accept. ((s) see above: but: Theory/PutnamVsKuhn: (among others): meaning does not change from theory to theory). Metaphysical realism is facing the same problem: he, too, has to accept that there are cases where the reference of a term depends on which theory is accepted. E.g. now his two theories can be true. Then someone might say: A; but it might have been the case that A, and our scientific development proceeds differently so that T2 is accepted. In this case, A would be the case, but A would not be true. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. | V 156 Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true. V 156/157 According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail. Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there. However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so. PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same. How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual? --- V 158 Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference. V 160 Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference. --- I (c) 83 Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. I (c) 84 Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.) |
H. Putnam I H. Putnam Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Reinbek, 1993 II Putnam Repräsentation und Realität, Frankfurt/M. 1999 III H. Putnam Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie, Stuttgart,1997 IV H. Putnam Geist und Maschine (In: Zimmerli (Hrsg.) Künstliche Intelligenz, Stuttgart 1994 V Putnam Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte, Frankfurt 1995 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Black Vs Kuhn, Th. | III 75 BlackVsKuhn: his overzealous disciples draw skeptical conclusions about the possibility of science in general from their alleged knowledge of the sociological determinants. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Davidson Vs Kuhn, Th. | I (e) 85 VsIncommensurability/DavidsonVsKuhn: The further assumption (incommensurability) requires us paradoxically to put ourselves in a position that is beyond our thinking ways. >Incommensurability. The idea of a really strange scheme is incomprehensible to us. >Conceptual scheme. Glüer II 133 If others are in a state that cannot be determined using our methods, then this can not be because the methods fail (with which we determine states of consciousness precisely) but that one does not refer to those states as states of consciousness. Incommensurability presupposes separation scheme/content (3.Dogma). >Scheme/content. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Feyerabend Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 375 Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsKuhn: his ideas are more inclined toward psychology and suggest that every scientific change leads to a) a shift of meaning and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the perception of the world are to be determined through research; they are not a foregone conclusion. Kuhn: an understanding between different paradigms is not possible. Feyerabend: scientists from different paradigms can understand each other very well. II 174 FeyerabendVsKuhn: the boundaries of traditions and disciplines on which Kuhn and Polanyi base their thesis of the untouched vagueness of science are temporary stages of the historical process. Science today is business which inadvertently strengthens the totalitarian tendencies of society. That takes care of Kuhn’s objection. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Hacking Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 354 HackingVsKuhn: for his "articulation" it is the question what it is. It can be two things: the articulation of the theory or the articulation of the experiment. The former is then a proper mathematical transformation! I 402 HackingVsKuhn: of course, many experiments are planned to confirm theories, because otherwise research funding would be cut. Moreover, Kuhn and Popper are not so far apart. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Lakatos Vs Kuhn, Th. | Hacking I 32 Crucial Experiment/experimentum crucis/Kuhn: is not impossible - LakatosVs always only in retrospect (much later). I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology." Vs recycling the history of science to sociology. This leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. Rorty IV 16 LakatosVsKuhn/Rorty: degraded science to the "psychology of the mob". |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Putnam Vs Kuhn, Th. | V 155 VsKuhn/Putnam: his smart aleck readers have accused him that he had claimed such a thing that rational justification would not exist in science, only shape change and conversions. Kuhn has rejected this interpretation and introduced a new term: "non-paradigmatic rationality". Putnam: possibly the same as the above-mentioned "criterial rationality". --- I (c) 84 PutnamVsKuhn: E.g. electron: there are entities, that we call now "electrons", that behave in many ways like Bohr's "electrons". We should only say that we have a different theory of the same entity. So Bohr's term referred. I (c) 85 Reference/theory/semantic change/PutnamVsKuhn: we can only say that because the current theory asserts the existence of entities that satisfy many of the roles that should satisfy Bohr's "electrons". Question: What if we accept a theory that sees electrons as something like phlogiston? Then we would have to say that electrons do not exist. Question: What if all the entities do not exist from the standpoint of the later theory? We need to concede trust to secure reference at all. But this must not be unreasonable confidence: We cannot concede phlogiston. If Boyd's two assumptions would be wrong trust would always turn out to be unreasonable and reference would collapse. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Rorty Vs Kuhn, Th. | IV 20 Kuhn: (according to Rorty) Theses (1) While there is no way to translate the Aristotelian vocabulary into the definition of Galileo, each of the two could learn the vocabulary of the other! IV 21 (2) Accordingly, there is no way to argue against the views of Aristotle on the basis of beliefs formulated in Galileo's vocabulary, nor vice versa. (3) So both have to be considered true. Therefore, the use of the expression "true" must be relativized depending on vocabulary. (4) convictions are made true by the world. (5) but it is not possible that the beliefs of Aristotle and of Galileo are made true by one and the same world. Therefore, there must be different worlds. RortyVsKuhn: this can be refuted by either questioning the step from (2) to (3) or by disputing (4). >Incommensurability, >Theory Change, >Meaning Change, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Verschiedene Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 186 VsKuhn: it is argued that he makes a subjective and irrational business from science. He greatly appreciates the unanimity of the scholars in their binding to a paradigm. Other authors doubt that the revolutions really are preced by crises and the awareness that something was wrong. II 506 VsKuhn: it is very well conceivable that phenomena that are anomalies relative to the original paradigm, only then can ever be revealed when at the same time research is being conducted from the standpoint of an alternative paradigm. |
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| Kuhn, Th. | Scheffler Vs Kuhn, Th. | Rorty I 352 Kuhn/Rorty: for Kuhn there can be no algorithm for the course of science, unless from a winning perspective in retrospect. VsKuhn: he has often been accused of idealism. He gave his critics a point of attack by saying that there could be no "neutral language of observation" because scientists "see different things" or "live in different worlds". I 353 Rorty: that is completely harmless. I 354 Kuhn/Rorty: the dispute between competing standards can only be decided within the framework of criteria that lie outside normal science. I 355 SchefflerVsKuhn: Kuhn speaks of a second discursive level. Second order standards. Accepting a paradigm means not only accepting theories and methods, but also guiding standards and criteria. I 356 Kuhn: Choice between theories not according to rules, but according to values. Theory/criteria: "Conformity with facts, consistency, scope, simplicity and fertility". |
Schef I I. Scheffler Science and Subjectivity Indianapolis 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Lakatos, I. | Hacking Vs Lakatos, I. | I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology". Vs reduction of the history of science to sociology. That leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: contributes nothing to what you should reasonably believe. Is exclusively turned backwards. I 202 Degenerative/Lakatos: poor research programs: E.g. Instead of malnutrition a viral disease of the population was erroneously assumed. Instead of beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition through new methods of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory has not been made before but only after observations (!)!. HackingVsLakatos: does not help to choose new programs without proof of previous performance. E.g. Is the attempt to identify cancer viruses progressive or degenerative? We will know that later. I 205 Objectivity/Knowledge/Lakatos: only with hindsight! The only fixed point is that knowledge increases. His philosophy ignores the representation problem. Lakatos Thesis: regardless of our views on the truth and "reality" we can simply see to it that knowledge grows. HackingVsLakatos: there is nothing that has increased more steadily and strongly over the centuries than the comments on the Talmud. These comments are the most thoroughly thought through texts that we know! They are far better thought out than almost all the texts of the scientific literature. Is that a rational activity by Lakatos?. I 206 Instead of increasing the knowledge he should say: increasing the number of theories!. I 207 External History/Lakatos: marginal conditions of research. Internal History/Lakatos: what people have believed, is inconsequential, story of anonymous and autonomous research programs. (HackingVs). I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: falsificationism cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. HackingVsLakatos: These assumptions have now been ridiculed for 15 years, but Lakatos’ reasoning is superficial. He only has one E.g.: Galilei’s observation of sunspots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos. this could not have been merely seeing. Experiment/Proof/Lakatos: no factual statement can ever be proved by an experiment. Assertions cannot be proved on the basis of experience. That is a logical principle. HackingVsLakatos: that is shadow-boxing with the word "prove". |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 27 Modallogik/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: wir können auf ML nicht verzichten, wenn wir den Holismus präzise ausarbeiten wollen. I 61 semantischer Holismus/SH/EsfeldVsQuine: wir brauchen ein besseres Argument für ihn als da aus Two Dogmas: denn es ist noch nicht klar, ob er am besten zum Typ B (top down) gezählt werden soll. Quines einziges Argument dafür ist der von ihm vorausgesetzte Verifikationismus (Bedeutung als Methode der Verifikation). Two Dogmas: Schluß: wenn ich die Grenze zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Aussagen ablehne, verpflichte ich mit einem strikteren Pragmatismus: jeder hat einerseits sein wissenschaftliches Erbe und andereseits ist er einem unaufhörlichen Sperrfeuer sinnlicher Reize ausgesetzt. Die Anpassungen dieses Erbes sind, sofern sie rational sind, pragmatisch. I 64 Erfahrung/Quine: (seit W + O) begrifflich! Aber VsKuhn! Statt dessen: Beobachtungsaussagen stehen außerhalb des semantischen Holismus. Jede dieser Aussagen hat eine Bedeutung unabhängig von den anderen. Hier ist Bedeutung nicht eine Eigenschaft, die an Beziehungen zu anderen Aussagen oder Überzeugungen gebunden ist. EsfeldVsQuine: es ist jedoch unklar, wie eine Trennung zwischen Beobachtungsaussagen und Theorieaussagen bestehen kann. I 66 semantischer Holismus/Esfeld: folgt nur, wenn die Bedingungen dafür, Überzeugungen zuzuschreiben, zugleich die Bedingungen dafür sind, die den begrifflichen Inhalt der Überzeugungen determinieren. Quine: geht vom Bestätigungs Holismus zum Bedeutungs Holismus. VsQuine: setzt Verifikationismus voraus. EsfeldVsVs: man könnte sagen, daß das Argument für die Verbindung eine transzendentales ist. Transzendental/(nach Kant): die notwendigen Bedingungen dafür, daß man jemand Überzeugungen zuschreibt, sind zugleich die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dafür, daß der Sprecher Überzeugungen hat. Das läuft darauf hinaus: Esfeld These: von einer anderen Person interpretiert zu werden ist eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, daß eine Person Überzeugungen hat. Transzendental/Stroud: (1968): transzendentale Argumente implizieren eine verifikationistische Prämisse! I 67 Esfeld: ein Argument für die These könnte sein, daß begrifflicher Inhalt öffentlich ist. Wenn wir hier Wittgenstein folgen, reicht das aus. I 116 Kripkes Wittgenstein/Quine/"Ontologische Relativität": in der Muttersprache können wir Unbestimmtheit letztlich vermeiden, wenn wir ihre Wörter wörtlich verstehen. EsfeldVsQuine: der soziale Holismus zeigt hingegen, warum wir uns mit der Muttersprache zufriedengeben können. I 366 Bedeutung/Unbestimmtheit/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: (2.3.4, 2.3.1) inferentielle Semantik kann begrifflichen Inhalt durch normative Pragmatik bestimmen. (Keine Unbestimmtheit mehr). Überzeugungs Holismus: (4.2) außerdem Perspektive auf eine direkten Realismus. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Rationalism | Lakatos Vs Rationalism | Feyerabend I 245 Lakatos: Standards alone have no heuristic power. Reason, as it is defined by Lakatos, has no direct influence on the activity of the scientist. If one takes this reason alone and nothing else, "one can do whatever one wants. (>Rationalism). Feyerabend I 263 LakatosVsKuhn, LakatosVsAnarchism: emphasized the very different "rationality" of the everyday mind, but without making its readers aware of the shift in meaning. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Change | Kuhn, Th. | Field II 179 Referenz/Denotation/Theoriewechsel/Bedeutungswandel/Kuhn/Field: Kuhn: These der Term -žMasse-œ denotiert bei Einstein nicht mehr dieselbe physikalische Quantität, die sie bei Newton denotiert hat. Kuhn leugnet folgendes: (3) Newtons Term "Masse" denotiert Masse, d.h. Newton referierte auf dieselbe physikalische Quantität auf die wir referieren, wenn wir das Wort "Masse" gebrauchen. Field: These es keinen Sinn macht zu fragen, auf welche physikalische Quantität/Newton referierte, wenn er den Term "Masse"gebrauchte. ((s) Field These: es ist unbestimmt). Field: These wir können hier nicht entscheiden. Das Wort "Masse" war vor der Entdeckung der RT referentiell unbestimmt. Obwohl es denotierte! FieldVsKuhn: etwas wie "Newtonsche Masse" hat es nie gegeben - daher kann Newton auch selbst nie darauf referiert haben - Problem: dann sind die Sätze falsch - Lösung: Bsp ~Beschleunigung braucht mehr Kraft, wenn die Masse größer ist - das ist nicht völlig denotationslos - die Referenz ist einfach unbestimmt - ((s) heute macht nur eine Teilmenge der damaligen Referenten den Satz wahr. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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