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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Group Rights | Kukathas | Gaus I 256 Toleration/society/group rights/Kukathas: Kukathas (1997(1); 2001(2); 2003b(3)), in particular, has argued vigorously that toleration is so important a liberal virtue that a liberal order will tolerate a diversity of cultures even if some of them are highly illiberal. What a good society protects is freedom of association, not autonomy. And for as long as individuals are free to exit the arrangements or communities or groups within which they find themselves, that order is legitimate - even if it might be one in which many groups or communities are highly illiberal in as much as they are themselves intolerant of diversity. Group rights/KukathasVsKymlicka: This view, however, gives no particular rights to groups as such, and denies them the external protections advocated by Kymlicka and others; though it also denies outside authorities any right to intervene to lift internal restrictions imposed by such communities upon their members. >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Minority rights/Political philosophy, >Minorities/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (1997) 'Cultural toleration'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 69—104. 2. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98. 3. Kukathas, Chandran (2003b) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Minority Rights | Kymlicka | Gaus I 251 Minority rights/Kymlicka/Kukathas: according to Kymlicka, minority rights could not simply be subsumed under human rights because 'human rights standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural minorities' (1995a(1): 4). Official language/education: these included questions about which languages should be recognized in the parliaments, bureaucracies and courts; whether any ethnic or national groups should have publicly funded education in their mother tongue; Internal boundaries: whether internal boundaries should be drawn so that cultural minorities form majorities in local regions; whether traditional homelands of indigenous peoples should be reserved for their benefit; and what degree of cultural integration might be required of immigrants seeking citizenship (1995a(1): 4—5). >Human rights/Kymlicka. Gaus I 252 The theory ultimately advanced by Kymlicka distinguished three kinds of minority or group- differentiated rights that were to be accorded to ethnic and national groups: 1) self-government rights, 2) polyethnic rights, and 3) special representation rights. 1) Self-government rights: Self- government rights require the delegation of powers to national minorities, such as indigenous peoples, but these rights would not be available to other cultural minorities who had immigrated into the country. 2) Polyethnic rights: The latter would be eligible for polyethnic rights, which guarantee financial support and legal protection for practices peculiar to some ethnic or religious groups. 3) Special representation rights: Both indigenous peoples and immigrant minorities might also be eligible for special representation rights which guarantee places for minority representatives on state bodies or institutions. Minorities: Central to Kymlicka's account of group-differentiated rights is a distinction between two kinds of minorities: national minorities and ethnic minorities. National minorities are peoples whose previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures have been incorporated into a larger state. Examples include 'American Indians', Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and native Hawaiians in the United States; the Quebecois and various aboriginal communities in Canada; and the Australian Aborigines. Ethnic minorities, however, are peoples who have immigrated to a new society and do not wish to govern themselves, but nonetheless wish to hold on to their ethnic identities and traditions. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Culture/Kymlicka. Societal culture/groups/Kymlicka: (...) 'liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices' (1995a(1): 37). What group-differentiated rights are granted, then, Gaus I 253 depends on whether the particular multinational, polyethnic, or special representation rights in question provide 'external protections' , or enforce 'internal restrictions'. VsKymlicka: for criticism and counterarguments against Kymlicka see >Minority rights/Political Philosophy. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Multiculturalism | Taylor | Gaus I 255 Multiculturalism/Charles Taylor/Kukathas: TaylorVsLiberalism: (...) in his influential essay 'The politics of recognition' (1994)(1). Taylor rejects as inadequate what might be called the liberal theory of multiculturalism, for liberalism, in his view, is incapable of giving culture the recognition it requires. Liberalism offers to recognize individuals as the bearers of rights and the possessors of dignity as equal citizens, regarding each person as essentially the same. >Culture, >Cultural relativism, >Liberalism. Individualism/distinctness/diversity//Taylor: But what many cultural groups want is recognition not of their sameness, but of their distinctness. Out of such desires, according to Taylor, grew a philosophical alternative to liberalism: the politics of difference. VsNeurality: This view is sceptical about the pretensions of liberalism to offer neutral or difference-blind principles that are more than simply reflections of the standards of the dominant culture. TaylorVsKymlicka: Taylor thus rejects the efforts of Kymlicka to develop a liberalism that might accommodate difference by granting individuals differential rights to enable them to pursue their particular cultural ends. For him, the problem with this solution is that it works only 'for existing people who find themselves trapped within a culture under pressure, and can flourish within it or not at all. But it does not justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generations' (1994(1):62). It cannot, for example, justify the collective goals of the Québecois, whose aim is the long-term survival of the French- speaking community in Canada. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism/Liberalism, >Minorities/Multiculturalism. 1. Taylor, Charles (1994) 'The politics of recognition'. In Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nationalism | Moore | Gaus I 259 Nationalism/Margaret Moore/Kukathas: Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, is 'a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe' (2002(1): 5). In her account, nations are moral communities characterized by bonds of solidarity and mutual trust, and the attachment people feel to such communities is reason enough to recognize national identity. This very recent account of nationalism takes issue with a number of prominent theories - such as Ernest Gellner's, which argued famously that 'nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (1983(2): l). The problem with this view is that it implies that every nationalist movement seeks independence and political separation. Yet there are many groups which are nationalist in character but do not demand statehood, and would be content with greater freedom from external control within the existing state (Moore, 2002(1) : 4). Solidarity: In Moore's view, nations are moral communities marked by bonds of solidarity and mutual trust. Thus they are not grounded in culture, for national identity should not be confounded with a common culture. While nationalists seek to preserve political communities, this does not mean that they seek to preserve their cultures. >Culture, >Cultural tradition. MooreVsKymlicka/MooreVsMargalit/MooreVsRaz: In this regard, Moore's account is at odds with the arguments of liberal nationalists such as Kymlicka, Margalit, Raz, and Yael Tamir who see nationality as grounded in culture (Kymlicka, 1995a(3); Raz, 1994;(4) Margalit and Raz, 1990(5); Tamir 1993(6)). 1. Moore, Margaret (2002) The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 3. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Raz, Joseph (1994) 'Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective'. In his Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Clarendon, 155—76. 5. Margalit, Avishai and Joseph Raz (1990) 'National self- determination'. Journal of Philosophy, 87:439—61. 6. Tamir, Yael (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nationalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 259 Nationalism/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: Margaret Moore: Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, is 'a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe' (2002(1): 5). >Nationalism/Moore. MooreVsKymlicka/MooreVsMargalit/MooreVsRaz: In this regard, Moore's account is at odds with the arguments of liberal nationalists such as Kymlicka, Margalit, Raz, and Yael Tamir who see nationality as grounded in culture (Kymlicka, 1995a(2); Raz, 1994;(3) Margalit and Raz, 1990(4); Tamir 1993(5)). Goodin: It has perhaps more in common with Goodin's (1997)(6) suggestion that group attachment is best explained in Bayesian terms, as conventions arising out of an unwillingness of people to expend scarce resources to question the prejudices and presuppositions they grow up with inside their own groups (for a similar analysis see Kukathas, 2002)(7). Definition/roots:The definition, and also the sources, of nationalism are much disputed, some seeing it as the prod- uct of modernity and others as its cause. (See the differing historical accounts of Gellner, 1983(8); Greenfeld, 1992(9); and Anderson, 1993(10).) >Individualism, >Community, >Society. Justification/justifiability: Similarly, the question of the justifiability of nationalism has been much argued about among political theorists. Liberalism: Among liberal theorists in particular, nationalism is viewed with suspicion, since its emphasis on community and belonging puts it at odds with liberal commitments to individual rights and to freedom and equality as universal values. >Liberalism. Often, they are inclined to give it only a qualified endorsement (see McMahan, 1997(11); Hurka, 1997(12); Lichtenberg, 1997(13)). Increasingly, however, liberal theorists (though not only liberal theorists) have begun to look more sympathetically at nationalist aspirations (Tamir 1993(5); Kymlicka, 1995a(2); Kymlicka, 2001(14): 203-89). Kukathas: This has led to a reconsideration of the claims of nationality in two respects. 1) (...) there is the claim for national self-determination, often associated with demands for independence or secession. 2) (...) there is the claim for the importance of the principle of nationality for the coherence of the state and the pursuit of liberal values in particular. >Citizenship. Both kinds of arguments in defence of nationality reveal important conflicts of value with which political theory - and liberal theory in particular - continues to grapple. >Self-determination/Political Philosophy. 1. Moore, Margaret (2002) The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Raz, Joseph (1994) 'Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective'. In his Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Clarendon, 155—76. 4. Margalit, Avishai and Joseph Raz (1990) 'National self- determination'. Journal of Philosophy, 87:439—61. 5. Tamir, Yael (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Goodin, Robert E. (1997) 'Conventions and conversions, or why is nationalism sometimes so nasty?' In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88—106. 7. Kukathas, Chandran (2002) 'Equality and diversity'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 1 (2): 185-212. 8. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 9. Greenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 10. Anderson, Benedict (1993) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 11. McMahan, Jeff (1997) 'The limits of national partiality'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107-38. 12. Hurka, Thomas (1997) 'The justification of national partiality'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 139-57. 13. Lichtenberg, Judith (1997) 'Nationalism, for and (mainly) against'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158-75. 14. Kymlicka, Will (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Toleration | Kukathas | Gaus I 256 Toleration/society/group rights/Kukathas: Kukathas (1997(1); 2001(2); 2003b(3)), in particular, has argued vigorously that toleration is so important a liberal virtue that a liberal order will tolerate a diversity of cultures even if some of them are highly illiberal. What a good society protects is freedom of association, not autonomy. And for as long as individuals are free to exit the arrangements or communities or groups within which they find themselves, that order is legitimate - even if it might be one in which many groups or communities are highly illiberal in as much as they are themselves intolerant of diversity. Group rights/KukathasVsKymlicka: This view, however, gives no particular rights to groups as such, and denies them the external protections advocated by Kymlicka and others; though it also denies outside authorities any right to intervene to lift internal restrictions imposed by such communities upon their members. >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Minority rights/Political philosophy, >Minorities/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (1997) 'Cultural toleration'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 69—104. 2. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98. 3. Kukathas, Chandran (2003b) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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