Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Leibniz | Holz I 128 In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general". I 129 This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship). >Thing in itself/Kant. LeibnizVsKant: Leibniz insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon. >Phenomena/Leibniz. The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects. 1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective 2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances, 3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference. >Totality/Leibniz. --- I 130 Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad. Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself. The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation. Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another. >Perception/Leibniz. --- I 131 Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself. Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself). Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being. >Unity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Brain/Brain State | Bieri | I 65 Brain/Bieri: e.g. suppose there is a tour guide through our brain, who explains everything to us during a visit. "It is a principle of nature that, when certain processes take place here, the human feels certain things". Bieri: that is not our problem, we do not doubt that there are laws and necessities. What we do not understand is why they exist. We cannot see what makes it necessary in the brain for the human being to experience something. >Consciousness/Chalmers. The tour guide asks, what do you want to know? (a) why a particular happening here just brings about this experience, or (b) why there is an experience at all? Bieri: the two questions are the same problem I 69 Brain/consciousness/Bieri: our guide could give us a detailed circuit diagram of the brain. "Functional architecture". "They could also be realized with a different material". (Turing machine). >Turing machine, >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Brain. So: I 70 There is no more inner connection between the function and the quality of experience than between material structure and quality of experience. Tour guide: "one must not look at the brain in isolation from the body" Bieri: then one could say VsLeibniz: 1. the happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is legally connected to events outside, which represents it by virtue of this connection 2. by the fact that the event in question assists the whole human being in a situation-appropriate behavior. But: our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but experience content! I 71 Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: cannot we be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? >Covariance, >Dependence, >Determinism. No, if we do not reach the questionable understanding, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective in our behavior, so we do not understand our own subject-being. >Understanding, >Causal explanation, >Subjectivity, >Subjects. The physiological process is causally complete. There is no place in the clockwork where episodes of experience would be necessary for it to continue. That is, there is a complete causal explanation for everything that takes place in our brain, in which we as subjects and humans do not occur at all! Therefore, consciousness seems to be of no importance to any causation. It could just as well be missing, and we would stumble through the world just as we do. ((s) We need to recognize the consciousness on something else). Our whole behavior could be alienated. This cannot be excluded because of the causal completeness. I 72 Causation/Bieri: If we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to change somewhere on the physiological level. But then we have changed the subject! I 74 Brain/Bieri: the problem is not that we do not see something in the "factory". From this one could conclude that it is caused by something else ... Vs: but nothing else is conceivable! But that is precisely the hypothesis that we cannot think otherwise. We cannot disprove this hypothesis. But it would sound adventurous that the facts which are relevant for the experience have nothing to do with the facts which are otherwise relevant for the functioning of the brain. >Experiences. We have considered: Causal understanding, Structural understanding, Functional understanding, Understanding the whole from parts. >Understanding, >Function, >Structure, >Parts, >Causality, >Causal explanation. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Contingency | Leibniz | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: Every thing is contingent - if another thing were different, it would not be thus - all things are causally connected. Causes/Leibniz: their number can be unlimited - there is not necessarily a temporal beginning. Sufficient reason: must then lie outside the world. >Inside/outside/Leibniz. Therefore there must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof of God is based on the implicit (disproved) ontological argument. >Proof of God's existence, >World/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Cross World Identity | Hintikka | II XV Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: cross-world identity remains a crucial problem. Thesis: it is to trace an object (or its trace) in the worlds that it has in common. >Possible worlds, cf. >Centered worlds. That is, it boils down to a re-identification, between time slices of the same event development. It is a matter of continuity. The problem corresponds to the stability theory of sets of differential equations. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time, >Identification. II XVI Catastrophe Theory/René Thom/Hintikka: the problem is closely related to the catastrophe theory. Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: Quine considers cross-world identity to be a hopeless problem. HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke underestimates the problem and considers it to be guaranteed. He cheats. Worldline/cross-world identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow that some objects not only exist in certain possible worlds, but that their existence is unthinkable there! That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: this is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (religious logic). 2. World lines can be drawn in two ways: A) object-centered or B) agent-centered. Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and description. --- II 78 Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: problem: e.g. the problem can be an intentional (opaque) context (belief contexts). Here, the existential generalization (EG) fails. That is, if a sentence A[b] is true for a subject, we cannot conclude that there is an object from which the sentence A is true (Ex) A [x]. II 79 Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the solution is to accept different individuals in different worlds. If the semantics of possible worlds is right, we somehow manage to determine the cross-world identity. Knowledge/knowledge-who/knowledge-what/semantics of possible worlds: e.g. (4) (Ex) Victoria knows that Lewis Carroll is x. Model-theoretically, this means that "Lewis Carroll" picks out the same individual in all the worlds that are compatible with Victoria's knowledge. This is synonymous with: (5) Victoria knows who Lewis Carroll is. II 80 Possible Worlds/universe/cross-world identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: problem: when worlds are whole universes, the framework between them changes too often that it is questionable how to re-identify individuals. II 80 Cross-World Identity/cross-world identification/Hintikka: normally we hold a large part of the world fixed when we identify two individuals. Comparability/Hintikka/(s): thus, alternatives become comparable. To make alternatives to different parts comparable, we extend them. The extensions should have a part in common. In an extreme case, they share their story. Identical: two individuals are indentical when their story coincides. This leads to the fact that cross-world identification is partially reduced to re-identification. That is, it becomes the problem. How space-time can be traced back to a common basis. Advantage: we do not have to consider every single possible world. II 81 Cross-World Identification/cross-world identity/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: thesis: Causation plays an important role. II 205 Cross-World Identification/cross-identification/perception/Hintikka: here, we have to assume a situation when it comes to perceptual identification. There must be someone or something that perceives in them, and the different situations (worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Semantics of Possible Worlds/perception/HintikkaVsSemantics of Possible Worlds: Hintikka has overlooked this point. Situation/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: furthermore, the semantics of possible worlds should investigate relations between smaller and larger situations. II 206 Descriptive Cross-World Identification/descriptive/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world that are larger than the actual perceptual cross-identification, i.e. a comparison between "bigger" and "smaller" situations. >Situations. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descriptions | Hacking | I 162 Description/StrawsonVsLeibniz: monads: a "complete description" is pointless! VsPutnam: internal realism requires the idea of a "full description" because of ideal acceptability. >G.W. Leibniz, >Internal Realism, >Completeness, >Description, >Acceptability, >Assertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Dissimilarity | Democritus | Adorno XIII 202 Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. Cf. >Totality/Ancient philosophy, >Unity/Aristotle, cf. >Unity/Plotinus, XIII 203 Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: Atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. XIII 204 AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: The objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. >Nature/Aristotle. Natural science: Modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside. This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff. Scientific camp: Leibniz, Wolff per Aristotle. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Formalization | Wolfram | Brockman I 275 Formalization/language/Wolfram: In the late 1600s, Gottfried Leibniz, John Wilkins, and others were concerned with what they called philosophical languages—that is, complete, universal, symbolic representations of things in the world. >G. W. Leibniz, >Formal language, >Ideal language, cf. >Formal speech, >Understanding, >Logical Formulas, >Formulas. It’s interesting to see how a philosophical language of today would differ from a philosophical language of the mid-1600s. It’s a measure of our progress. In mathematics, for example: Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica in 1910 was the biggest show off effort. There were previous attempts by Gottlob Frege and Giuseppe Peano that were a little more modest in their presentation. >G. Frege, >B. Russell. WolframVsRussell/WolframVsFrege/WolframVsPeano/WolframVsLeibniz: Ultimately, they were wrong in what they thought they should formalize: They thought they should formalize some process of mathematical proof, which turns out not to be what most people care about. >Proofs, >Provability, >Systems, >Computer languages, >Computer programming. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Ideal Language | Gadamer | I 419 Ideal Language/Gadamer: Leibniz: (...) in the combinatorics of a (...) performed system of signs - this was Leibniz's idea - new truths could be obtained which would be of mathematical certainty, because the "ordo" I 420 portrayed by such a sign system would have a correspondence in all languages.(1-3) >Ideal Language/Leibniz, >G.W. Leibniz. GadamerVsLeibniz: In truth, this ideal makes it clear that language is something other than a mere sign system for designating the objective whole. The word is not only sign. >Words, >Signs. In a sense that is difficult to grasp, it is also almost something like an image. One only needs to consider the extreme counter-possibility of a pure artificial language to recognize a relative right in such an archaic theory of language. The word is mysteriously bound to the "depicted", belonging to the being of the depicted. >Representation, >Image, >Image theory, >Word meaning. I 421 [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. Cf. >Formal language, >Formal way of speaking. Gadamer: The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But this does not mean, on the other hand, that the word is ahead of all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subject to itself. The experience is not, at first, wordless and is then, through the naming, made an object of reflection, for instance in the manner of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. 1. Cf. Leibniz, Erdm. p. 77. 2. Leibniz, De cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) Erdm., p. 79ff. 3. As is well known, already Descartes in his letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, which Leibniz knew, developed the idea of such a sign language of reason, which contained the whole of philosophy, on the model of the formation of number signs. A preform of this, admittedly in platonizing restriction of this idea, is already found in Nicolaus Cusanus, Idiota de mente Ill, cap. VI. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Ideal Language | Leibniz | Gadamer I 419 Universal Language/Ideal Language/Leibniz/Gadamer: The fundamental survey of the contingency of historical languages and the indeterminacy of their concepts would only be possible through mathematical symbolism: in the combinatorics of such a performed sign system - this was Leibniz's idea - new truths could be gained, which would be of mathematical certainty, because the "ordo" Gadamer I 420 depicted by such a sign system would have an equivalent in all languages.(1) >Language/Leibniz. Gadamer: It is probably clear that such a claim of the characteristica universalis to be an ars inveniendi, as Leibniz claims, is based precisely on the artificiality of this symbolism. It enables us to calculate, i.e. to find relations from the formal laws of combinatorics - regardless of whether experience leads us to corresponding contexts in things. Leibniz: For human reason, there is no higher adequacy of recognition than the notitia numerorum(2), and all calculation is based on the same pattern. GadamerVsLeibniz: [1.] But it is generally true that the imperfection of man does not permit adequate knowledge a priori and experience is indispensable. [2.] Knowledge through such symbols is not clear and distinct, because the symbol does not mean a vivid given. Such knowledge is "blind" in so far as the symbol takes the place of a real knowledge, indicating its availability alone. Leibniz: The ideal of language, which Leibniz pursues, is thus a "language" of reason, an analysis notionum, which, starting from the "first" concepts, would develop the whole system of true concepts and achieve the representation of the Universal of Being, as it would correspond to divine reason. GadamerVsLeibniz: In truth, this ideal makes it clear that language is something other than a mere sign system for designating the objective whole. The word is not only sign. In a sense that is difficult to grasp, it is also almost something like an image. One only needs to consider the extreme counter-possibility of a pure artificial language to recognize a relative right in such an archaic theory of language. The word is mysteriously bound to the "depicted", belonging to the being of the depicted. 1. Cf. Leibniz, Erdm. p. 77. 2. Leibniz, De cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) Erdm., p. 79ff. 3. As is well known, already Descartes in his letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, which Leibniz knew, developed the idea of such a sign language of reason, which contained the whole of philosophy, on the model of the formation of number signs. A preform of this, admittedly in platonizing restriction of this idea, is already found in Nicolaus Cusanus, Idiota de mente Ill, cap. VI. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identity | Quine | I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Identity | Wessel | I 220 Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. >Singular terms, >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 220f Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time. >G.W.F. Hegel. WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged. I 221 Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. >Identity/Leibniz, >Leibniz Principle. I 227 Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact. >Identity/Russell. I 335 Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? Def diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = def E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) ((s),Tthere are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.). Identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. ((s) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.) I 379f Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact). Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time. >Temporal identity. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Justice | Rawls | I 3 Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems. Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. >Injustice, >Laws. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter) >Utilitarianism, >P. Singer. I 4 The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Cf. >Human Rights, >Fundamental Rights. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice. >Society/Rawls. I 5 Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. I 6 Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. I 54/55 Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. >Principles/Rawls. I 237 Natural justice/Rawls: the principles of natural justice are intended to ensure the integrity of the legal process.(1) >Natural justice. I 310 Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness"(2)(3). >G.W. Leibniz. I 311 What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. 1. Cf. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 21,26-28,57f. 2. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) ed. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353. 3. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) Hrsg. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), S. 353. Gaus I 94 Justice/Rawls/Waldron: Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(2): 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn , and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1, C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(1): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2, … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1, and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Language | Gadamer | I 383 Language/Gadamer: Gadamer Thesis: The fusion of horizons, which happens in understanding, is the actual achievement of language. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 388 Understanding: Understanding a language is not really understanding in itself and does not include a process of interpretation, but an execution of life. One understands a language by living in it - a sentence that, as is well known, applies not only to living languages but even to dead languages. I 408 Language as form: (...) it is undeniable (...) that linguistics and philosophy of language work under the premise that the form of language is their sole subject. But is the concept of form even relevant here? The language that is alive in speech, that encompasses understanding everything, I 409 also that of the interpreter of texts, is so much involved in the execution of thought or interpretation that we have too little in our hands if we want to disregard what languages pass on to us in terms of content and only think of language as form. The language unconsciousness has not ceased to be the actual mode of being of speaking. Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: It had no word for what we call language. I 421 Ideal Language/GadamerVsLeibniz: [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But, on the other hand, this does not mean that the word precedes all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subservient to itself. The experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. I 449 Language/Gadamer: Language [has] its actual being only in conversation, that is, in the exercise of communication (...). This is not to be understood as if the purpose of language is indicated. >Communication/Gadamer. I 453 In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world presents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of existence, because it comprises all being-for-itself I 454 in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language. I 461 Language/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: "Centre of the language": (...) we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon. But its all-determining reason is the finiteness of our historical experience. In order to do justice to it, we took up the trace of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reproduced, but in whose paths the order and structure of our experience itself is first and forever changing. Language is the trace of finiteness, not because there is the diversity of human language construction, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, the more it expresses its experience of the world. We have questioned important turning points in Western thought about language, and this questioning has taught us that, in a much more radical sense than Christian thought about what is finite, what happens in language corresponds to the finiteness of man. Cf. >Language/Christianity. It is the centre of language from which our entire experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds. >Experience/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. I 462 "Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word, therefore, as the event of its moment, also makes the unsaid, to which it refers to in responding and waving, be present. I 465 The important thing is that something happens here. Neither is the interpreter's consciousness mastering that what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of Tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and which we have to listen to, really strikes us as if it were addressing us and meant I 466 ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its respective new possibilities of meaning and resonance, newly acquired by the other recipient. >Object/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Lebensphilosophie | Dilthey | Gadamer I 230 Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey/Gadamer: For [Dilthey], meaning is not a logical concept, but is understood as an expression of life. Life itself, this flowing temporality, is designed to create lasting units of meaning. Life itself lays itself out. It has a hermeneutic structure itself. Thus life forms the true basis of the humanities. Hermeneutics is not merely the romantic hereditary material in Dilthey's thinking, but results logically from the foundation of philosophy in "life". DiltheyVsHegel: Dilthey tinks of himself fundamentally superior to the "intellectualism" of Hegel precisely because of this. DiltheyVsLeibniz: Neither could the romantic-pantheistic concept of individuality coming from Leibniz be sufficient for him. The foundation of philosophy in life also resists a metaphysics of individuality and sees itself far away from the Leibnizian aspect of windowless monads that unfold their own law. For them, individuality is not an original idea rooted in appearance. Dilthey rather insists that all "mental vitality", is under certain circumstances(1). Force/Dilthey: There is no original force of individuality. It is only what it is by asserting itself. Limitation by the course of action belongs to the essence of individuality - as to all historical concepts. Also terms like purpose and meaning do not mean ideas in the sense of Platonism or Scholasticism for Dilthey. They are also historical terms, as far as they refer to the limitation by the course of action. They must be terms of energy. Dilthey refers for this to Fichte(2) who was also of decisive influence just as Ranke. In this respect his hermeneutics of life wants to remain on the ground of the historical view of the world(3). Philosophy provides him only with the conceptual possibilities to express the truth of this view. >Force/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 266. 2. Vll, 157; 280; 333. 3. VII, 280. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Leibniz Principle | Adams | Millikan I 261 VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. >Leibniz principle, Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling. Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry. >Space curvature. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting possibilities: >Indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. >Nonfactualism. N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both! N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account. Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactuals. Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity. >Natural laws. I 263 Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx ⇔ Fy] ⇔ x = y} NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances. >Necessity, >Possible worlds. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Leibniz Principle | Millikan | I 259 Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y] Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic). Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state. Quantification/properties/2nd order logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates. Second order logic, >Quantification, >Properties. False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property). If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties). Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category. How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent? I 260 Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties". Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington" N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington". Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle. MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property. Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to... I 261 ...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus there ist the question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category. VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place. >Identity, >Indistinguishability. ((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below). Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!) Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half. Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling. Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting possibilities: >indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism). N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both! N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account. Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double. Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity. I 263 Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y} Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances. Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true. This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Order | Leibniz | Holz I 76 Order/structure/world/Leibniz: the assumption of an invariable lawfulness of the material world presents us with the task of a priori establishing the being of nature as a whole before a single natural being. The whole must be certain before the formulation of its partial course rules, so that the intelligibility of the individual is guaranteed. Thus the axiom "Only one being is necessary" gains its importance. >Necessity/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Axiom/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Identity/Leibniz. I 77 For it follows from it: "The necessary being contains in itself all the conditions of things." A finite being cannot be understood from within itself. But the whole is absolutely necessary because there is nothing else besides it. I 95 World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: precisely the specificity of the context of the world remains unclear in Leibniz, since the "unmoved mover" must be thought of as located outside. Leibniz/Holz: they develop a unity of metaphysics and physics. I 96 Order/World/God/Leibniz: God does nothing except order. It is not even possible to devise events that are not according to the rule! The mechanism is sufficient to explain the emergence of all animals. Organic preformation in the seed. Mechanism, however, must be presupposed, and this can only be determined a priori by means of metaphysical reasoning. >Metaphysics/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz. I 97 The world is from the beginning a system of interactions. The principle of the particularity of each individual is at the same time the principle of the universality of the connection of all beings. Universal Harmony/Leibniz: universal harmony is the structural title for the system of substances. Not later, but from the nature and concept of the monads. Pre-stabilized harmony/Leibniz: pre-stabilized harmony is in contrast to a widespread misunderstanding the special case of consistency between physical and mental aspects of substantial being. I 98 Thus between "body" and "soul", between material processes in the res extensa and representations in the res cogitans. Holz: one could also speak of pre-stabilized harmony between extensional and intensional aspects of the logical mapping of ontological relationships. For the world concept, the more general version of the universal harmony is decisive. >Intension, >Extension. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Possibilia | Hintikka | II 40/41 Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. >Possible worlds. Possible Worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds. The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole. >Possible worlds/Leibniz. Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and might be missing in another possible world. World Line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem, the problem is rather being well-defined. >World lines. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then? II 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary (unrealized possibilities, HintikkaVsQuine). Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. >Possibilia. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory. >Possible world semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possible Worlds | Hintikka | II 74 Possible Worlds/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: problem: possible worlds seem to take the worlds and complete sets of possibilia as self-evident. Possible Worlds/Leibniz: thesis: there is a determined set of worlds among which God makes a selection. >Possible worlds/Leibniz. HintikkaVsLeibniz: that is extremely doubtful. Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios. II 75 We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: one can build a theory of questions and answers on the semantics of possible worlds. >Questions/Hintikka, >Answers/Hintikka. II 76 This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this, we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/semantics of possible worlds: here it is not enough to accept only the referents which have our expressions in the actual world. II 196 Possible World/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could make them different. Possible Worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience. And then separation cannot be ruled out. >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possible Worlds | Leibniz | Hintikka I 74 Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful. Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios. I 75 We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. >Possible world/Hintikka, >Conceivability. --- Holz I 120 Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity. Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity). I 122 One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. Cf. >Counterpart theory. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence. World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals. Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one. Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of! Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds. It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds. Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking. >Necessity/Leibniz, >Thinking/Leibniz. I 122/123 Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing. This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter. The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!) Nothing/Leibniz: that there is nothing is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out. >Minimum/Leibniz. Cf. >Nothingness/Heidegger, >Nonexistence, >Impossible world. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Schopenhauer | Pfotenhauer IV 26 Possible World/Voltaire/SchopenhauerVsLeibniz/Schopenhauer: (A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. II 4th book, p. 669): I cannot concede to de Theodicee, this methodical and broad unfolding of optimism, in such a property, any merit other than that it later gave rise to the immortal "Candide" of the great Voltaire; as a result of which, however, Leibnitz's often repeated and lame excuses for the world's evils, namely that the bad sometimes brings about the good, receive an unexpected evidence. Even Leibniz's palpable, sophistical proofs that this world is the best and the most possible can be seriously and honestly proved to be the worst among the possible. (p. 669). >Theodicy, >The Good, >Reason (Justification), >World, >Reality, >Life, >Ultimate justification, >Leibniz. |
Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Proofs | Vollmer | I 234 Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be proven logically - that have seen KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff. >Provability, >Physics, >Proofs, >Natural laws, >G.W. Leibniz. But it also cannot be empirically verified - Kant had learned that from Hume. >I. Kant, >D. Hume. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Rationalism | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Def evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. >Identity principle/Leibniz, >Necessity/Leibniz. Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final justification leads to a different epistemological level. Danger of an irrationalistic change. >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proving them from the "evidence of identity" (with themselves). >Provability/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz, >Axiom/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Realism | Kant | Strawson V 230 Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. Kant: we may only speak of terms instead. >Thing in itself/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant; ((s) Cf. >Semantic ascent/Quine). Stroud I 134 Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before. Stroud I 135 Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 136 It is not about lack of generality. ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3). Stroud I 162 Def Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists. >Representations/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Reality | Leibniz | Holz I 61 Reality/Leibniz: what is possible to think of is reasonable and could be, purely logical, possible as well. >Possibilty/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. I 125 Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility. >Principles/Leibniz. Reality/Leibniz: reality always has the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio". Best world/best of all possible worlds/Leibniz: that is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which results from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not mutually prevent each other. To this extent, this world is by no means accidently the same as it is. Translating this into theology, it means that God has created the world neccessarily according to his own rationality because it is the optimization of the processes caused by this rationality. >Possible world/Leibniz. VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Ironization of Leibnizian Theory. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Review | Schurz | I 128 Verification/strict case/Mill/Schurz: (not statistical): consists of two activities: 1. method of agreement: truth/falsity, verification/falsification. 2. method of difference: relevance/irrelevance. >Relevance, >Truth, >Verification, >Falsification. 1st Method of matching/Mill: A sample, "experimental group". I 129 This is a selection of individuals from a range for which just the property A is valid and not an arbitrary property, Ex "All ravens are black" should not be compared with nails, flowers, and gorillas. 2nd Method of difference/mill: to check the relevance, one chooses an A control sample (control group) to which also A applies. Representativeness/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in some qualitative property. Now, if we vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance of finding falsifying individuals in the A sample (sufficient reason). >Sufficiency. Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had considered this as metaphysical necessity. >Necessity, >Essence, >Essentialism. Principle of sufficient reason/SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to the strict scrutiny so called by Popper: one should not examine the expansion under heat only on metals. I 131 Methodical induction/law hypotheses//Schurz: a) when testing a given strict hypothesis, one first tests for truth and then for relevance. b) if one searches for an unknown cause or law hypothesis for a given effect, one proceeds in reverse. I 134 Statistical case: Check for presumptive truth/Statistics/Schurz: method of Acceptance intervals: Ex law hypothesis: p(Kx I Ax) = 80 %.AG out of 100 trees examined, 75 were diseased. How do you infer the plausibility of the population frequency hypothesis p(K I A) from the sampling frequency hn(K I A)? According to Fisher (1956)(1), one can calculate the statistical probability that the sampling frequency has a certain size, or lies in a certain size interval, given the hypothesis is true. This is based on the binomial distribution. (...). I 137 Check for presumptive relevance/statistical/Schurz: A control group: in the simplest case, consists of individuals who do not have trait A. I 141 Statistical representativeness/criterion/definition/Schurz: difference from strict case: now the representativeness requirement says not only that the accompanying circumstances should vary as much as possible, but more specifically that all other relevant factors in the A sample should be distributed as equally as possible in frequency. Bsp factors other than car exhaust that make trees sick, e.g., pest infestations. Representativeness/definition: if all relevant characteristics in the sample are equally distributed as in the population. The assumption that this is the case is of course based on induction and cannot be guaranteed by any method. Criterion: to make this possible at all, it must be ensured that the criterion of representativeness is obtained independently of the definition of representativeness. Or rather, its fulfillment must be able to be guaranteed independently of the inductive generalization step. Solution: the criteria are derived from the method of sample generation. Method: most important: random sampling. The probability distribution of deviation from the population is then statistically calculable. Random selection implies universal accessibility. narrow random selection: completely blind. wide: with equal chances of getting into the selection. I 175 Testing/Schurz: a theoretical hypothesis can be tested against not just one, but as many as possible equally plausible indicators. I 176 Indicator: for each one, it is necessary to check whether and which hidden variables are introduced by it. 1. Fisher, R.A. (1956). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. New York: Hafner Press, (New edition Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Science | Kant | Vollmer I 234 Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be logically proved. - That had KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff realized. >Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz. But it cannot be empirically verified. That Kant had learned from Hume. >Hume, >Verification. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Space | Kant | I 85 Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. >Chirality. --- Strawson V 28 Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. >Antinomies/Kant. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. V 48 Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. >Subject/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant. V 49 Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space. >Time/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Substitution | Quine | VII (b) 29 Substitutability/substitution/QuineVsLeibniz: the strength of this requirement varies with the richness of the language - we need both, single- and multi-digit predicates, truth functions (not, and, or, etc.), classes, classes of classes, descriptions, singular terms. >Classes, >Descriptions, >Truth functions, >Predicates, >Richness, >Expressiveness, >Singular terms. This language is then extensional: any two predicates that match extensionally (are true for the same object) are substitutable salva veritate - but that does not secure cognitive synonymy. >Extensionality, >Extension. --- VII (c) 56 Substitutability/Quine: question salvo quo? Something is always changed. --- IX 9 Replace/substitution/Quine: if in a statement that has been substituted for "Fx" free variables other than "x" occurr, then they may not be such that fall under the scope of quantifiers that occur in the scheme in which the substitution was made. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Thing in itself | Kant | I 17 In itself/Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? --- Strawson V 33/34 Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. V 95 Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz). >Subjectivity/Kant, >Reality/Leibniz, >Objects/Leibniz. V 168 Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism/Kant). - But Kant does not accept this! Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. --- Adorno XIII 40 Thing in itself/VsKant/Adorno: it has been argued against Kant that if the things in themselves, and with this the causes of the phenomena, are wholly unknown, how can we then speak of them at all, and know about them. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Ultimate Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 50 Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category. Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin. Logic/Husserl: Husserl has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content. >Content/Husserl. I 52 Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. I 75 Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Reason/Leibniz. Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series. Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all I 83 Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient: 1. Principle of contradiction 2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking. >Principles/Leibniz. HolzVsLeibniz/HolzVsHegel: This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form. Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted. Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate. I 123 Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles: 1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself) 2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all. One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place). I 124 But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths: Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first. According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz. In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible). A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions). From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Kant | Leibniz Vs Kant | Frege III 31 Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1, one can prove it, in a way: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2, 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains. Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 Leibniz I 83 Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient. 1. Principle of contradiction 2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality). as panlogically as Hegel's system. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form. Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created. Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate. I 128 Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation". The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential. In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines": The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes). I 129 The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.) LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance. The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways. 1. as a whole but each time under another perspective 2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances, 3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference. I 130 This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes]. The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation. This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other. I 133 Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else. I 134 The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Kant | Quine Vs Kant | Danto I 132 QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear. Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant. Quine IV 407 Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans." c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here. Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! Quine VII (b) 20 Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and Relations of facts. Leibniz: distinguishing Truths of fact and Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!) VII (b) 20/21 QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form 2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level. Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts. Quine XI 72 Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation. Stroud I 210 Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge. Stroud I 211 Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world. All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference). Stroud I 214 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here. Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct. Stroud I 215 Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem. Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc. Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings. Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon. Stroud I 248 Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and b) what is true or false about the world on the other side would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above). StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true. Stroud I 249 QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts? StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else. Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces. Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge). Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Berkeley Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Ber I 228 BerkeleyVsInfinitesimal Calculation/BerkeleyVsLeibniz: consequence of his denial of divisibility beyond the perceptible. But Berkeley had to admit, that mathematics led to useful results. Solution/Berkeley: the mathematicians do not make only one mistake, but two, which cancel each other out by chance. The idea of error compensation was later taken up by Lagrange. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g. (DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history. (DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Fraassen Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 209 FraassenVsLeibniz: we have learned to acknowledge the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" as illegitimate. But we still consider to be legitimate to ask I 210 "Why is the world like this and not different?" But both of these questions may not be answered with "by chance", or "because that is the way it is". |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 31 Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1 one can prove it, in a way.: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true. I 44 Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc. Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing. (see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant) FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable. Leibniz I 38f Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences". Contrast: Prove by reason. I 46 "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones. I 48 "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning? |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Heidegger Vs Leibniz, G.W. | II 87 VsLeibniz: legitimizes metaphysics as subjectivity. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 139 Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic. Descartes I 142 KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion". Kant I 34 Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made the subject of metaphysical teachings. I 85 Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. Strawson V 227 Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist. V 228 KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist. V 228 Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning. V 229 Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But: V 230 KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. I 234 Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Locke Vs Leibniz, G.W. | II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: is linked to its namability for him. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Quine Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 209 Identity/QuineVsLeibniz: confusion of characters and object: When Leibniz explains the relationship betw characters instead of as a relationship btw the named object and itself "Eadem sunt quorum potest substitui alteri, sava veritate". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Russell Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 183/184 RussellVsLeibniz: his metaphysics has the same consistency as fairy tales: these also claim to be true. --- Russell VI 72 Syllogism/Mode Darapti/Russell: E.g. All chimeras are animals All chimeras breathe flames, So some animals breathe flames. --- VI 73 Mode Darapti: All A is B All B is C So some B are C. RussellVsLeibniz: he could not eliminate this fallacy out of respect for Aristotle, although he has seen it. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Hacking I 162 Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! --- VII 116 StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Verschiedene Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Metz II 70 Bieri: you could say VsLeibniz: 1. what is happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is lawlike linked to events outside, it represents by virtue of this link, 2. the fact that the events in question give the whole person an adequate behavior in a certain situation. But our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but content of experience. Leibniz I 125 Perfection/Existence/Leibniz: for example, assuming that A,B,C,D are of equal rank, but D is incompatible with A and B, but the others are all compatible with each other except with D, then it follows that A,B and C exist to the exclusion of D. This is the principle of compressibility. Reality/Leibniz: in each case the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio". Best world/best of all possible worlds/possible world/Leibniz: this is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which follows from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not exactly hinder each other. In this respect, it is not by chance that this world is the way it is. Translated into theology this means that God necessarily created the world according to his own rationality, because it is the optimization of the processes conditioned by this rationality. VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Kripke I 9 Leibniz' Principle of the Indistinguishability of the Identical/Kripke: always seemed evident to me. VsLeibniz: when some philosophers doubted it, it always turned out that areas were confused that do not express real properties in contexts, or it concerned the collapse of individuals, with which identity was confused between individuals. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Poundstone Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 343/344 Leibniz: E.g. enlargement of the brain to walk-in dimensions, or machine with gears and pistons, etc. PoundstoneVsLeibniz: the example is not mandatory. Modern versions: Office building full of employees talking on the phone, different states which correspond to feelings of motivation and disinclination would be impossible to determine. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Hintikka Vs Leibniz, G.W. | II 40/41 Non-existent Objects/Possible Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/Hintikka: But are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: Thesis: Yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona Fide Object/Hintikka: can exist in one Possible World and be absent in another. World Line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-definedness. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object exists in several possible worlds. Question: if residents of two different possible worlds may then be identical, when are they? II 74 VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: problem: it seems to absolutize possible worlds and complete sets of possibilia ((s) takes them for granted). Possible Worlds/Leibniz: Thesis, there is a fixed set of possible worlds, under which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful. II 80 Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: if possible worlds are entire universes, the frame between them changes too strongly so that it is questionable how individuals should be re-identified. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Berka Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Berka I 7 Leibniz/Logic/Berka: three requirements: 1. characteristica universalis: a system of signs whose basic signs are characters of basic concepts and whose combination should result in the characters of all other concepts. 2. calculus ratiocinator: calculus which allows a purely mathematical treatment of all statements expressed in the characters of the characteristica universalis. 3. ars iudicandi: a decision-making procedure to determine from the statements whether they are true or false. This corresponds today to: "Leibniz Program"/Modern: 1. Establishment of a system of definition rules 2. Logic Calculus 3. Decision Procedure VsLeibniz: the program is not realizable, i.e. not in application to an entirety, an area understood as totality, but only to partial areas. ((s) Otherwise circles, paradoxes). I 84 FregeVsLeibniz: his project of the calculus philosophicus (ratiocinator) was too huge. He underestimated the problems. Solution: his project can be realized for single areas: e.g. geometry, chemistry, arithmetic. Begriffsschrift(1) (Concept-Script): should then fill the gaps. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Hegel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 47 Leibniz: model of the organism as mechanism. HegelVsLeibniz: organic models > romantic philosophy of nature. Prehistory: Descartes: movement emancipates itself, space geometrizes itself. The concept of space is then detached from the bodies that behave towards each other in space. Newton: "Absolute space" as a prerequisite of classical physical theory. |
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| Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm Vs Leibniz, G.W. | III 86 Incompatibilities/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: E.g. "being red excludes being blue" ChisholmVsLeibniz: that leads to problems of a different nature than the ones above: some philosophers have tried to make it look analytical, but they failed. Paranormal/Solution/Leibniz/Chisholm: "Paranormal element in knowledge": certain ethical sentences. Leibniz: "... because the senses could not bring to the knowledge what is supposed to be or could not be otherwise." This would then have to be synthetic a priori: |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Holz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Leibniz I 50 Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final justifications leads to another epistemological level. Danger of the irrationalistic turnover. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz insists, however, that they must be proved from the "evidence of identity" (with oneself). I 95 World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: especially the specificity of the connection of the world remains unclear with Leibniz, because the "unmoving mover" (Aristotle) has to be thought outside. Leibniz/Holz: develops a unity of metaphysics and physics. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Meixner Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 27 Property/Meixner: according to Quine ("no entity without identity"), it could happen that it is found that there are no good identity conditions for properties and, as a consequence, the expression "property" is incomprehensible. But then we cannot judge that he "applies to nothing"! Identity/Identity Conditions/Meixner: there should be no too far-reaching conclusions drawn from the non-answerability! After all, every entity in each category is identical with itself and with nothing else. Identity/Meixner: can be conceived as "maximum similarity"! Distinctness/Meixner: at least minimal dissimilarity. (Leibniz) VsLeibniz: even maximum similarity is not conceptually sufficient for identity. Def "Naked Distinctness"/Black: distinctness without even minimal dissimilarity. Identity/MeixnerVsVs: The objection VsLeibniz is based on the non-consideration of the fact that the degree of similarity between the similars is not based only on aspects intrinsic to them (Leibniz: assumed that it was based only on intrinsic aspects), but also on extrinsic relational aspects. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Genz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a beam scale can also be stable in an inclined position! - The equilibrium is indifferent. LeibnizVs: e.g. Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, none will occur -Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantialism: there can be no independent space - otherwise the universe in it could be shifted (senseless) - today: VsLeibniz - Solution: spontaneous symmetry calculation. Sentence of the sufficient reason/Leibniz: for example Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation to the right or left, none will occur. VIII 59 Leibniz: there is never an indifferent balance. (today: wrong! (see above)) E.g. (Leibniz) If two incompatible things are equally good, God will not create either of them. VIII 60 Space/Leibniz: so there can be no independent space, independent of things, because otherwise the world could be settled in it here and there. The same applies to the time and time of the creation of the world. Spontaneous symmetry calculation: e.g. the pencil does not stand on its tip, but falls to one side. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Saussure Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 21 SaussureVsLeibniz: the meaning of a language expression can be produced with the help of the elements of a grammar, but not by them alone and without the intervention of a speaker. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Schurz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 129 Representativity/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in a qualitative property. If we now vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance to find falsifying individuals in the A sample. (> sufficient reason). Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had regarded this as a metaphysical necessity. SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to Popper's so-called strict verification: the expansion during heat should not only be investigated on metals. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent! World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning! Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world! IV 389 He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? 2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself? If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason! KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes). IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency. Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different. The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible. Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist. IV 392 This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either: 1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them. 2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed! Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world. Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through. MackieVs: that is not true at all! IV 393 We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Thomas Aquinas Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 395 Cause/Chain/Thomas AquinasVsLeibniz/ThomasVsLeibniz: the chain of causes cannot be endless. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 221 Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228 Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate. x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged! Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229 In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Peirce, Ch.S. | Wessel Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | I 228 Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "Its principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially burdened. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Phenomenalism | Smart Vs Phenomenalism | Fraassen I 209 Regularity/Fraassen: we can then perceive them a) as accidental, then we cannot know them at all as regularities! Because then they would not have to happen at all. b) as of underlying reasons. But we know about certain regularities, so there must be underlying reasons. Scientific Realism/Peirce/Smart/Fraassen: Peirce: ~ confidently predict that the stone will fall to the ground if I let it go. Theoretical Entities/SmartVsPhenomenalism: if he were right (disbelieving in theoretical entities), everything would be a cosmic coincidence. Then statements about electrons are only instrumentalistically useful. FraassenVsLeibniz: We have learned to recognize the question "Why is there something and not nothing?" as illegitimate. But we still consider it legitimate to ask: I 210 "Why is the world like this and not rather different? But both questions must not be answered with "by chance" or "because it is so". ("as a matter of fact"). |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas | Stegmüller IV 394 proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!: VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future. 2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap. IV 395 VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance. 3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists." Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything. HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence). If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them, Cf. Round Square/Frege). Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing. Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other. But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things. IV 396 For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause. MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one. Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes! VsVs: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain. Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on... Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member. IV 397 Thomas Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi). Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself. Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything. Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back. MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas. IV 398 Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason. Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Thomas' argument. Conclusion: MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause). IV 399 "Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception? Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Tradition | Simons Vs Tradition | I 291 Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: thesis: integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected (> Microstructure, MiSt). Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle (1960,98). Object/thing/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia. Individual/Leibniz: an individual must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz). I 306 Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident may very well exist. This applies to accidents that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious. I 342 Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition is delivered according to the tradition of the copula: Copula/VsTradition: the copula occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion. Solution/Frege: a solution is offered by the unsaturated parts of a sentence. Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection simply is a common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection. Unsaturatedness/Simons: unsaturatedness perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others! |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Various Authors | Mackie Vs Various Authors | Stegmüller IV 399 "Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds! MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy. IV 400 Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason? 2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable! God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems: 1. Has God simply emerged with the time? 2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced! 3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again. Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume: a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. IV 401 Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not. a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses. b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself! Stegmüller IV 447 Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole. MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act. IV 472 Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive. Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent. MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all. IV 271 Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic. Stegmüller IV 502 Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition! When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe. Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life. IV 503 Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct. Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld. The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing. IV 504 According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume. Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions. Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense. IV 504/505 Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes! PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood! IV 506 MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism. Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference! |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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