Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 76 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Actuality | Stalnaker | I 28 Actuality/Stalnaker: actuality is a relation that a world has to itself and only to itself. Problem: any other world can also have it to itself. That means actuality is contingent. >Contingency, >Self-identity. LewisVsErsatz World: (moderate modal realism): an ersatz world represents the real world as a special one because it represents it as a "way". >ersatz world. StalnakerVsLewis: but it represents it specifically only from its own point of view, not from any. Stalnaker: there is no neutral position outside of each possible world but there is an objective one: the one from the real world. >Actual world, >Perspective. I 31 The thesis that only the real world is actual only makes sense when "actual" means something different than the totality of all that, that is there. >Totality, >Wholes. StalnakerVs: and it does not mean that. I 31 Way a world can be: is an abstract object, abstracted from the activity of the rationally acting. Cf. >Centered worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Assertibility | Lewis | V 139 Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142 Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Causal Explanation | Bigelow | I 320 Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases. >C. Hempel. Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e)(1) need not to be explained according to Hempel's style. >Single case causation. Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies: a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely. BigelowVsProbabilistic Explanation (see above). Instead. Approach by Lewis: Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e)(1) 5 stages: 1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals. I 321 2. Used counterfactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency. 3. Used counterfactual dependency to explain causation by two principles: (1) Thesis: Counterfactual dependency is causation (2) the cause of a cause is a cause. Causes/Lewis: is transitive. 4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause.) 5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactual dependency, >Natural laws, >Events, >Causation, >Causes, >Causality, >Transitivity. I 322 Causal explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar to that of D. Lewis, but also has differences: Lewis: used laws to explain counterfactual conditionals. Bigelow/Pargetter: we use degrees of accessibility for both. >Accessibility, >Degrees/Graduals. Lewis: needs counterfactual conditionals to explain causation Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not. For that, we assume forces - Lewis does not. >Forces. Transitivity: causation: Lewis pro, BigelowVs. Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: because we do not recognize any transitivity, the causal history will not be traced back to the past. Otherwise, Adam and Eve are an explanation for everything. Somewhere the causal connection has to be broken. BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: the main difference is that for Lewis information about the causal history is sufficient for a causal explanation, but for us only information about causes and thus about forces. Appropriateness/causal explanation/pragmatic/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: The adequacy of an explanation must be decided pragmatically. Bigelow/Pargetter dito. >Science, >Arbitrariness, >Acceptability, >Objectivity. I 323 Why-explanation/why/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: no explanation can do entirely without a why-explanation. This in turn needs a how-explanations. >Why-questions. 1. Lewis, D.K. (1986e). Causal Explanation. In: Philosophical Papers Vol. II. pp. 214-40. New York Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causal Explanation | Lewis | V 214 Causal story/causal explanation/Lewis: not everything in a causal story is a cause - E.g. sharp curve is not a cause in itself - it causes uncontrolled turning of the steering wheel) - there are several, convergent causal chains - they can have a tree structure. - Causal chains are dense. Cause/everyday language: unclear - depending on the context. - Overall cause/Mill: Lewis Pro: is a cause. >Explanation/Lewis, >Context. V 217 Closed: everything on which an event in the (pre-)history depends is itself an event in (pre-)history - but not vice versa: a causal history needs not to be closed - explanation: Information about causal story. >Information/Lewis. V 230f Causal explanation/explanation/coincidence/why-question/Lewis: both are legitimate: a) explaining random events - b) denying that we can explain why this provides one result instead of another - this is not about relative probability - the actual causal story is not different from the unactual one which would have had the other result, if it had happened - there are no properties that distinguish the actual story from the unactual one. >Actuality/Lewis. V 327 Causal counterfactual conditionals/Lewis: can belong to patterns of causal dependence or independence - we get them when we pass from language to propositions. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. --- Bigelow I 320 Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases. Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e)(1) need not be explained according to Hempel's style. Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies that a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely. BigelowVsProbabilistic Statement. Instead: Approach by Lewis: Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e)(1) 5 stages: 1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals. --- I 321 2. Uses contrafactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency. 3. Uses contrafactual dependency to explain causation by two principles: (1) Thesis: Contrafactual dependency is causation (2) The cause of a cause is a cause. Causation/Lewis: is transitive. 4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause. 5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. Information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel. --- I 322 Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar but also has differences. See Causal Explanation/Bigelow. 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causes | Bigelow | I 267 Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect. Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect. I 268 If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect. Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature. >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Anomalous monism. Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b(1), 1986d(2), 1979(3)). >Necessity, >Conditions, >Sufficiency. Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals. >Cause/Mackie. Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(4) Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. >Counterfactual conditional. 1.Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67. 2. Lewis, D.K. (1986d). Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. 4. Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, pp.245-255. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causes | Mackie | Bigelow I 268 Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he comes to similar results as Lewis, but with strict conditionals. C: is a conjunction of conditions c: cause e: effect. I 268 Counterfactual Conditional/Lewis: c would happen > e would happen c would not happen > e would not happen Mackie: strict conditionals: N(C applies and c happens > e happens) N(C applies and c does not happen > e does not happen). Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(1) Thesis: not sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both assume a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditionals Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup System/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis will treat the cause as the cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: ditto, because the deviating cause is part of a sufficient condition. >Cause/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. 1. J. L. Mackie (1965). Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly2, pp. 245-55, 261-64. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Change | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 103 Change/object/substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the objects are retained. - That is the substance of the world. - Changes are changes from a possible world to another. ((s) This is not about physical motion). - ((s) WittgensteinVsLewis)/LewisVsWittgenstein) - the simple objects are non-temporal. - ((s) not its configurations) - ((s)> Wittgenstein per S4, not pro S5: see > S4/S5; > Systems), >Substance. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Content | Lewis | Schwarz I 161 Content/DavidsonVsLewis: depends on the language that we speak - LewisVsDavidson: Content is a class of possible individuals that e.g. get the desire fulfilled - Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. --- Schwarz I 169 Mental Content/Content/Lewis: class of possible situations where it rains, not class of possible worlds where it rains - What kind of worlds should that be? - It would have to be somewhere it rains here and now. Possible situations are centered worlds with a designated here and now. >Situations, >possible worlds. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Conventions | Bennett | I 155 Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement. 170 Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity. >Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions. I 167f Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge. Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection. David Lewis: only actions are coordinated. BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning I 189 Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression. >Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle, >Meaning/Searle. I 191 Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning. >Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold". >Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein. SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention. Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance. >Circumstances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Lewis | Walker I 464 Convention/Lewis/Walker: is present only when alternatives are also conventions - something is only not a c if the parties cannot imagine that other kinds of speech are possible - Convention/Walker: in individual cases you cannot figure out whether the context between antecedent and consequent is secured conventionally or conversationally. --- Lewis II 222 Convention/Lewis: not just assignment of meaning, but detour over action/expectation. A convention in the sense we have defined here is a regularity of conduct. (And belief). It is essential that the regularity on the part on others is a reason to behave yourself compliantly. VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. Which alternatives might be there to general truthfulness - untruthfulness perhaps? ((s) Background: Conventions must be contingent.) II 232 LewisVs: The Convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust absolutely. It is in a particular language. Its alternatives are regularities in other languages. II 233 Therefore a convention persists, because everyone has reason to stick to it if others do, that is the commitment. >Action/Lewis. --- Walker I 479 ff Definition conventions/Lewis: a practice is only a convention, if it has alternatives, which in turn are conventions. Something can only be no convention, if the parties cannot imagine that other, less natural ways of speaking are possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Field | Counterfactual conditionals/FieldVsCounterfactual conditional: the counterfactual conditional is too vague for physical theories or geometric terms. DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: they cannot be "just right" (barely true). - They need ascertainable facts as truth-makers (without counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual conditionals, cf. >Implication, >Conditionals, >Counterfactuals, >Theories, >Method, >Measurements, >Truth, >Truth conditions. Substantivalism/Field: can guarantee that situations where distances differ also differ in non-counterfactual aspects. . >Substantivalism. FieldVsRelationism: Relationism cannot. >Relationism. FieldVsCounterfactual Conditionals: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot be defined non-counterfactually as well. - (This is why they cannot be "barely true"). >Bare truth. Counterfactual conditionals cannot be derived from counterfactual statements about points in the plane. - Therefore, we must take them as the naked truth. - That would be no problem if you only needed a few of them. I 233 Counterfactual Conditional/explanation/Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on the non-contigent. - E.g. counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. - Nothing sensible can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. - Since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem here. FieldVsLewis: not all facts in mathematics are necessary - e.g. number of planets. >Mathematics, >Physics, >Necessity, >Facts, >Contingency. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Lewis | V 5 Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones. >Possible world/Lewis. V 5f Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent. V 10 Counterfactual conditionals: Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __". Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one. A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world. "Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds. V 8 Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part - E.g. ~(A were>>would C) ↔ A were>>could ~C. ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok. V 14 Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones. V 18 Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing: a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C, b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because". Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid. Centering assumption: if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world). Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true. Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds. >Truth value, >Impossible world/Lewis. V 25 Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB > were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable. Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent. V 95/96 Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world. V 179 Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive. - Therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain. V 284 Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else". V 288 Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Putnam | III 93 Counterfactual Conditionals/Putnam: what possible situations are relevant? >Relevance. --- I (g) 187ff Counterfactual Conditionals/PutnamVsLewis: but there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. --- II 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause, e.g. identical twins: it is true that both always have the same hair color but the hair of one is not the cause of the hair of the other. Lewis cannot separate that. Counterfactual Conditionals/Mackie: counterfactual conditionals depend on the knowledge level. Statement with conclusions from it are allowed. Knowledge: only "the match was lit" nothing more. Counterfactual conditionals/Sellars: counterfactual conditionals have assertibility conditions, no truth conditions. Counterfactual conditionals/Lewis: (follows Stalnaker): we need truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals with possible worlds and similarity metrics. >Similarity metrics, >Possible world. Putnam: an ontology with possible worlds is not materialistic. PutnamVs: the similarity metrics must not be intrinsic (with mind-independent decision on relevance), otherwise the world would be like a mind itself. PutnamVsLewis: this is idealism, and that might not only be gradually true. False: it is false to say "it's all physical, except this similarity metrics". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Counterpart Relation | Bigelow | I 192 Ramified/branched Time/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we allow the time to be branched, i.e. to every past there are several futures. We should also allow such development to be possible within one. That is, two parts could have the same origin. Likewise, fusion and temporary joining together of parts. Problem: it is surprising that such parts would then have at least a temporal part in common. Suppose we meet Jane from another part of the same possible world. Let us look at this: Counterfactual conditional: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed. >D. Lewis, >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals. BigelowVsLewis: according to him, that must be true. Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us, it is clearly wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world in which Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world must contain us all and Jane, although there is no connection between us. LewisVsVs: he would then have to assume any other connection and a corresponding counterfactual conditional: "... an ancestor or descendant of us could have met an ancestor or descendant of her," etc. BigelowVsLewis: that is still wrong in the questionable world and less plausible than the above counterfactual conditional. This shows the fallacy of the temporal theory. BigelowVsLewis: he is in a dilemma: either he takes the world-companions-relation as a primitive basic concept or he allows modal basic concepts. >Basic concepts, >Modalities, >Modal logic. I 193 Counterpart Relation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: However, Lewis still relies on a more important relation, the counter-relation: it is also not a good candidate for an unanalyzed basic concept, but nevertheless it also needs modal basic concepts. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity because it presupposes modal concepts. That is, it cannot justify modal logic. >Circular reasoning. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Counterpart Theory | Plantinga | Schwarz I 57 Counterpart/Counterpart theory/PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart theory: (1974(1),115f,1987(2),209): According to Lewis, then all things strictly speaking would have all their properties essential, since there is no possible value in which they (not just any substitutes) have other properties. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Properties, cf. >Contingency, >Possible worlds. For example, if it were one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then another world would be real, and none of us would be there. >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation. Similar to Kripke: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, when we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we're not talking about Humphrey, but someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(3),44f). Counterpart/counterpart theory/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections are misunderstood by Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands exactly for the quality that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. Humphrey has this trait by virtue of his character. (1983d(4),42). >Modal properties, >Counterfactuals. The real problem is how does Humphrey win the election in the world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won, if the corresponding world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with the intuitions Kripke and Plantinga refer to. >States of affairs, >Situations, >Facts. 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| de se | Lewis | Frank I 16ff Definition de se/Lewis: the self-attribution of individuating properties occurs with a belief de se (of oneself) - this cannot be analyzed as a belief de dicto - but vice versa: Belief de dicto and de re can be analyzed as a belief de se - narrower sense: self-attribution of properties that locate the individual in space and time - Castaneda: indexical references are not reducible to each other - VsLewis: therefore, apart from the belief de se, we actually also need a "de te", "de nunc", "de ibi" etc. >de dicto, >de re, >Attribution, >Self-ascription. --- Lewis IV ~ 121 Attitudes de se/Lewis: the attitudes that you irreducibly have about yourself are not propositional - but they can also be expressed by sentences - but they are not propositions - e.g. one considers oneself a fool - then you express more a property than a proposition. >Property/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis. IV 145 De se/Wish/Lewis: objects of wishes are often properties, not propositions - must not be shared by all the inhabitants of the same world - Proposition/Lewis/(s) is true or not true in a possible world - then it applies to all, not in relation to certain persons. IV 145/146 De se/Lewis: certain role (localization in a certain way) in possible world e.g. being the "winner" oneself (equivalent to property) - de dicto: only wish for world with winners and losers (equivalent to proposition) - E.g. Two omniscient gods: the two do not differ with respect to any proposition - when it comes to sitting on the highest mountain and throwing Manna they can do it or leave it. >Two omniscient Gods. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Determinism | Inwagen | Pauen I 273 Determinism/Peter van Inwagen/Pauen: determinism is not an implication of physicalism. The principle of causal closure refers to the fact that only physical explanations may be used. This does not mean that the cause/effect ratio must always be deterministic. The principle of physical determination does not make a statement about the necessity of certain causal chains but only requires that there is a physically describable change for every change that can be described in a higher level. van Inwagen: determinism thus stands for the thesis that the state of the world can be derived anytime later from a complete description and knowledge of the state of affair. >Initial conditions. Pauen: it is more than controversial that the determinism applies to our physical reality. --- Lewis V 296 Determinism/VsSoft determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against the soft determinism which I pretend to represent): E.g. supposed to reductio that I could have lifted my hand, though determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises which I cannot deny that I could have produced a false conjunction HL from a proposition H over a time before my birth and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: if so, then I could have falsified L. Premise 6: but I could not have falsified L (contradiction). LewisVsInwagen: 5 and 6 are not both true. Which one is true depends on what Inwagen means by "could have falsified". But not in the ordinary language but in Inwagen's artificial language. Even there it does not matter what Inwagen himself means! What is important is whether we can give a sense to this at all, which makes all premisses valid without circularity. Inwagen: (verbally) third meaning for "could have falsified": namely, and only if the acting person could have arranged things the way that his/her acting plus the whole truth about the prehistory together imply the nontruth of the proposition. Then, premise 6 says that I could not have arranged things the way that I was predestined not to arrange them like that. Lewis: but it is not at all instructive to see that soft determinism has to reject premise 6 that was interpreted in that way. V 297 Falsification/action/free will/Lewis: provisional definition: an event falsifies a proposition only if it is necessary that in the case that the event happens, then the proposition is false. But my act of throwing a rock would not itself falsify the proposition that the window in the course remains intact. Everything that is true, is that my act invokes another event that would falsify the proposition. The act itself does not falsify any law. It would falsify only a conjunction of prehistory and law. Everything that is true, is that my act precedes another act - the miracle - and this falsifies the law. Weak: let us state that I would be able to falsify a proposition in the weak sense if and only if I do something, the proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily by my act and not necessarily by any event evoked by my act). (Lewis pro "weak thesis" (soft determinism)). Strong: if the proposition is falsified either by my act itself or by an event which has been evoked by my act. Inwagen/Lewis: the first part of his thesis stands, no matter whether we represent the strong or weak thesis: If I could lift my hand although determinism is true and I have not lifted it then it is true in the weak and strong sense that I could have falsified the conjunction HL (propositions on the prehistory and the natural laws). But I could have falsified the proposition L in the weak sense although I could not have falsified it in the strong sense. Lewis: if we represent the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we represent the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: represents both premises by considering analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I believe that the cases are not analogous: they are cases in which the strong case and the weak case do not diverge at all: Premise 6/Inwagen: he asks us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than the light. LewisVsInwagen: but that does not help to support premise 6 in the weak sense,... V 298 ...because the rejected presumption is that the physicist could falsify a natural law in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: here we are to reject the assumption that a traveler might falsify a conjunction of propositions about the prehistory and one about his/her future journey differently than by falsifying the nonhistorical part. LewisVsInwagen: you can reject the assumption completely which does nothing to support premise 5 in the strong sense. What would follow if one could falsify the conjunction in the strong sense? That one could falsify the non-historical part in the strong sense? This is what premise 5 would support in the strong sense. Or would only follow (what I think) that the non-historical part could be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveler does not help here because a proposition about future journeys could be falsified in the weak as well as the strong sense! Cf. >Strength of theories. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Developing Countries | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 258 Developing Countries/dual economy/Arthur Lewis/Acemoglu/Robinson: The “dual economy” paradigm, originally proposed in 1955 by Sir Arthur Lewis(1), still shapes the way that most social scientists think about the economic problems of less-developed countries. According to Lewis, many less-developed or underdeveloped economies have a dual structure and are divided into a modern sector and a traditional sector. A. The modern sector, which corresponds to the more developed part of the economy, is associated with urban life, modern industry, and the use of advanced technologies. B. The traditional sector is associated associated with rural life, agriculture, and “backward” institutions and technologies. Backward agricultural institutions include the communal ownership of land, which implies the absence of private property rights on land. Labor: Labor was used so inefficiently in the traditional sector, according to Lewis, that it could be reallocated to the modern sector without reducing the amount the rural sector could produce. For generations of development economists building on Lewis’s insights, the “problem of development” has come to mean moving people and resources out of the traditional sector, agriculture and the countryside, and into the modern sector, industry and cities. E.g., South Africa was one of the clearest examples, split into a traditional sector that was backward and poor and a modern one that was vibrant and prosperous. Even today ((s) 2017) the dual economy Lewis identified is everywhere in South Africa. Acemoglu I 259 AcemogluVsLewis, Arthur: According to this perspective, then, economic development should simply be about ensuring that the Transkei ((s) the less developed part) eventually turns into Natal. This perspective has much truth to it but misses the entire logic of how the dual economy came into existence and its relationship to the modern economy. The backwardness of the Transkei is not just a historic remnant of the natural backwardness of Africa. The dual economy between the Transkei and Natal is in fact quite recent, and is anything but natural. Causes: It was created by the South African white elites in order to produce a reservoir of cheap labor for their businesses and reduce competition from black Africans. The dual economy is another example of underdevelopment created, not of underdevelopment as it naturally emerged and persisted over centuries. Acemoglu I 270 The dual economy of South Africa did come to an end in 1994. But not because of the reasons that Sir Arthur Lewis theorized about. It was not the natural course of economic development that ended the color bar and the Homelands. Black South Africans protested and rose up against the regime that did not recognize their basic rights and did not share the gains of economic growth with them. After the Soweto uprising of 1976, the protests became more organized and stronger, ultimately bringing down the Apartheid state. It was the empowerment of blacks who managed to organize and rise up that ultimately ended South Africa’s dual economy in the same way that South African whites’ political force had created it in the first place. >Development economics. 1. Lewis, W. Arthur (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour.” Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22: 139–91. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Developing Countries | Lewis | Acemoglu I 258 Developing Countries/dual economy/Arthur Lewis/Acemoglu/Robinson: The “dual economy” paradigm, originally proposed in 1955 by Sir Arthur Lewis(1), still shapes the way that most social scientists think about the economic problems of less-developed countries. According to Lewis, many less-developed or underdeveloped economies have a dual structure and are divided into a modern sector and a traditional sector. A. The modern sector, which corresponds to the more developed part of the economy, is associated with urban life, modern industry, and the use of advanced technologies. B. The traditional sector is associated associated with rural life, agriculture, and “backward” institutions and technologies. Backward agricultural institutions include the communal ownership of land, which implies the absence of private property rights on land. Labor: Labor was used so inefficiently in the traditional sector, according to Lewis, that it could be reallocated to the modern sector without reducing the amount the rural sector could produce. For generations of development economists building on Lewis’s insights, the “problem of development” has come to mean moving people and resources out of the traditional sector, agriculture and the countryside, and into the modern sector, industry and cities. E.g., South Africa was one of the clearest examples, split into a traditional sector that was backward and poor and a modern one that was vibrant and prosperous. Even today ((s) 2017) the dual economy Lewis identified is everywhere in South Africa. Acemoglu I 259 AcemogluVsLewis, Arthur: According to this perspective, then, economic development should simply be about ensuring that the Transkei ((s) the less developed part) eventually turns into Natal. This perspective has much truth to it but misses the entire logic of how the dual economy came into existence and its relationship to the modern economy. The backwardness of the Transkei is not just a historic remnant of the natural backwardness of Africa. The dual economy between the Transkei and Natal is in fact quite recent, and is anything but natural. Causes: It was created by the South African white elites in order to produce a reservoir of cheap labor for their businesses and reduce competition from black Africans. The dual economy is another example of underdevelopment created, not of underdevelopment as it naturally emerged and persisted over centuries. Acemoglu I 270 The dual economy of South Africa did come to an end in 1994. But not because of the reasons that Sir Arthur Lewis theorized about. It was not the natural course of economic development that ended the color bar and the Homelands. Black South Africans protested and rose up against the regime that did not recognize their basic rights and did not share the gains of economic growth with them. After the Soweto uprising of 1976, the protests became more organized and stronger, ultimately bringing down the Apartheid state. It was the empowerment of blacks who managed to organize and rise up that ultimately ended South Africa’s dual economy in the same way that South African whites’ political force had created it in the first place. >Development economics. 1. Lewis, W. Arthur (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour.” Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22: 139–91. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Endurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Events | Kim | Schwarz I 132 Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(1): a triple of a thing, a time and a property. LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile: Schwarz I 133 This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense. Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects: Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified? >Identity, >Identification, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Classification. Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. >Counterfactual conditionals. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on. Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). >Cause, >Effect. Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! >Temporal identity, >Parts, cf. >Continuants, >Person. But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261). Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q". Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant. >Facts, >Space-time regions. 1. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton (ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177 4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Kim I J. Kim Philosophy of Mind 2010 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Events | Meixner | I 167 f Event/Davidson/Meixner: from the true sentence "Hans laughed loudly" follows logically "Hans laughed" but not according to predicate logic. >Propositional Logic, >Predicate Logic. How can we receive a in conclusion predicate logic? Solution: We must assume that there are events as entities. ((s) for the quantification): "For at least one current event applies it is noisy and a laugh from Hans". (Ditto for the two part-state of affairs loudness and laughter). >"Adverbial analysis", >Quantification, >States of affairs. Event/ontology/Meixner: however, it is not even decided whether they are objects or functions. >Ontology, >Objects, >Function. Event/LewisVsDavidson: as properties they are functions. >Properties/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. DavidsonVsLewis: as individuals they are objects. >Events/Davidson. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Excluded Middle | Bigelow | I 117 Conditional of the excluded middle/conditionally excluded middle/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: could be considered as an axiom: (A would be > would be b) v (a would be > would be ~ b) >Counterfactual conditional. Lewis: Thesis: this is not always true. StalnakerVsLewis: (1968(1), 1981(2)) defends the conditional sentence from the excluded middle against Lewis: I 118 We must consider cases of the following kind: there is a temptation to say that it can be wrong to assert: "If I had gone to the movies yesterday, I would have watched The Fly." And it can also be wrong to say: "If I had gone to the movies yesterday, I would not have watched The Fly." ((s) Do not omit the front link for the second time!) Bigelow/Pargetter: we might rather say: "If I had gone to the movies yesterday, I could have watched The Fly (or not)." Logical form: (a would be > could be b) u (a would be > could be ~ b). That is, we deny something of the form (a would be > would be b) And we also deny something of the form (A would be > would be ~ b). So we deny both sides. Therefore, it seems that we must deny the conditionally excluded middle. Conditionally excluded middle/Pargetter: these were intuitive reasons for his rejection. Now we must also consider some of its formal consequences: Problem: would it be accepted, the difference between "would" and "could" would collapse. Would/could/Bigelow/Pargetter: normally it is clear that (a would be > would be b) entails a would be > could b) ((s) "would" implies "could"). Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept the conditional sentence of the excluded middle (conditionally excluded middle), the inverse implication is also valid! For (a would be > could be b) is by definition ~ (a would be > would be ~ b) and this is the negation of one of the two disjuncts in the conditionally excluded middle. Then we must assert the other disjoint, thus the assumption of (a would be > could be b) implies that (a would be > would be b). I 119 According to this "would have been" and "could have been" would be equivalent and we do not want that. 1. Stalnaker, R. C. (1968) A theory of conditional. In: Studies in logical theory (Ed. N.Rescher), pp. 98-112. Osxofrd: Blackwell Publishers. 2. Stalnaker, R. C. (1981) A defense of conditional excluded middle. In: Ifs (Ed. Wl.L.Harper, R. Stalnaker and G.Pearce), pp. 87-104. Dordrecht. Reidel. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Existence Statements | Armstrong | Martin III 182 Negative existential statements/Truthmaker/Lewis: E.g. Lewis: "there are no penguins in the Arctic" is also true without truth makers - because there is no existing counter-example.- "Deficiency" as truth maker or "lack of false makers" is just random idioms. >Truthmaker. MartinVsLewis: a de-ontologization is superfluous. - It is enough to know what we have to watch out for - instead of "how things are" better: "how the world is" - e.g. "search the hole" is completely understandable - VsHacking, Vs "manipulation" as a criterion of existence: does not work with celestial bodies. >Realism/Hacking, >Reality/Hacking. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Explanation | Railton | Lewis V 233 Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws. 2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place. If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability. >Deductive-nomological. Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining: 1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws) 2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions. >Sufficiency. LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach. But that is not available! >Covering laws. V 233/234 Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered. Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted! 2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events. 3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause! 4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause. 5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. >Explanation/Lewis. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model. Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it? Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws. If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments. But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little. But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions. "Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient. Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of. Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused. Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs. >Causal dependence, >Causality, >Causes, >Causal explanation. |
Railt P. Railton Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Lewis | Schwarz I 25 Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: The time operator shifts the range: E.g., „In 1642 there were no cuckoo clocks“ is like e.g., „there are no cuckoo clocks in Australia“. The sentence about 1642 is true if there are no cuckoo clocks in this area (part of reality). Intrinsic change/time/four-dimensionalism: Problem: e.g., I make the sentence true: "Last night there was someone in my bed" but I am sitting here at the table. Cf. >Truth maker/Lewis. Schwarz I 26 Intuitive Answer: (some representatives): Having slept last night is not at all incompatible with being awake now. The things seem to instantiate only incompatible properties, these are in reality merely time-relative. Objects about which we quantify with "last night" are in themselves neither sleeping nor sitting nor anything else. They also have neither shape nor color. Correct: you are "awake at t" etc. Properties: According to this view, simple properties are actually relations between strangely featureless things and times. Cf. >Properties/Lewis. Time-relative properties/LewisVs: This is unacceptable. Form/Lewis: A form is a property and not a relation! Properties, intrinsic/SchwarzVsLewis: Lewis misstated the problem; it is not about intrinsic properties, but about single-digit properties. Properties/Relation: Question: Whether form predicates express disguised relations similar to e.g. "famous" and "far". It is meaningless to say someone is famous without reference to anything. Lewis: But I guess it makes sense without reference to anything else to say something is red or round. Intrinsic change/Lewis: Lösung: Solution: According to the analogy of time and space: e.g., a long wall is high and red in some places, low and gray in others. As a whole, it is neither high nor low, neither red nor gray. Solution: It is simply composed of different parts. Schwarz I 27 Change/Lewis: Ordinary things have different properties at different times by being composed of parts with those properties. >Change/Lewis. Identity/time/temporal identity/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: Then past things are not strictly identical with present things. The thing that used to be asleep and the thing that is sitting here now are not strictly identical. The different temporal parts are different things after all.(1976b(1) >Temporal Identity. MellorVsLewis:That is absurd. When we talk about someone, we are not talking about his parts. LewisVsVs: E.g., surely the whole man was Hillary on Mt. Everest. Solution: Hillary has a past temporal part that is on a past part of Everest. Edmund Hillary as a whole meets this condition. Problem: E.g., Then I am strictly speaking as a whole neither waking nor sitting. But as a whole I am not formless because of that. Lewis/Solution: I have a complex four-dimensional form. There are always temporal parts which are ignored. I/Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: "I" often refers only to a single temporal part of me. Ted Sider: (1996(3), 2001a(4), 188-208): Ted Sider elaborated: Names always refer to temporal parts. I tonight was a temporal counterpart of me now. 1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. In [Lewis 1986f]. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. 4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Free Will | Lewis | V 291 Freedom of Will/Laws of Nature/violate Laws of Nature/Lewis: the fact that we apparently can violate the Laws of Nature depends on the assumption of an intermediate determinism. >Determinism/Lewis. The thesis that we sometimes willingly do what we are predetermined to do and that we might act differently in such cases, although the history and the laws of nature determine that we will not act differently. Compatibilism: thesis that the soft determinism might be true, but there may be a physical foundation for a predetermination. - E.g. I could have raised a hand. Then I would have a violated a Law of Nature. Soft determinism: this is assumed here only for the sake of the argument of soft determinism. V 292 Important argument: it does not follow, however, that there is something that is both a law of nature and broken. - For broken laws of nature are a contradiction in adjecto. >Law of nature/Lewis. V 293 The assumption here serves the differentiation of two theses: weak thesis: an actually unbroken law could have been broken. - Strong: I can break laws of nature. - Important argument: if no act of mine is a law of nature breaking event, then it could not be true that I had broken a law of nature. - ((s) not "as long as ..."). V 295 Freedom of will/break laws of nature/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I raised my hand 10 minutes ago, although it was predetermined that I should not raise it. - Then there was a time before that when the laws were broken. - Important argument: then the causation is the other way around. - The breaking of the laws caused the raising of the hand. - (See "miracle"). - But the act itself is not the miracle - therefore you do not need any supernatural powers for moderate determinism. - Problem: the effect would precede the cause. - Nevertheless, right counterfactual dependence pattern. >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. V 296 InwagenVsLewis/Determinism, moderate. V 297 Lewis: distinction act/event. - It is the act that causes the event of breaking laws. - The act does not falsify a law but only a conjunction of history and law. >Event/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Functionalism | Chalmers | I 15 Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some. >D. Lewis, >D. Armstrong. ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake like Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal. >ChalmersVsDescartes, >R. Descartes, >Consciousness, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience, >Knowing how. E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience. >Stimuli, >Qualia, >Colors, >Color Words, >Causal Role, >Experience. I 15 Functionalism/Consciousness/ChalmersVsFunctionalism/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: There is no mystery about whether any state plays a causal role, at most there are a few technical explanatory problems. Why there is a phenomenological quality of consciousness involved is a completely different question. >Introspection. Functionalism/Chalmers: he denies that there are two different questions. ((s) Also: ChalmersVsDennett). I 231 Functionalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: two variants: Functionalism of the 2nd level: Among these, Rosenthal's approach of thoughts of the second level about conscious experiences and Lycan's (1995) (1) approach about perceptions of the second level. These theories give good explanations for introspection. Functionalism of the 1st level : thesis: only cognitive states of the 1st level are used. Such theories are better in the explanation of conscious experiences. Since, however, not all cognitive states correspond to conscious experiences, one still needs a distinguishing feature for them. Solution/Chalmers: my criterion for this is the accessibility to global control. I 232 Kirk: (1994) (2): Thesis: "directly active" information is what is needed. Dretske: (1995) (3): Thesis: Experience is information that is represented for a system. Tye: (1995) (4): Thesis: Information must be "balanced" for purposes of cognitive processing. >Information. I 250 Functionalism/VsFunctionalism/Chalmers: the authors who argue with inverted Qualia or lacking Qualia present the logical possibility of counter-arguments. This is sufficient in the case of a strong functionalism. The invariance principle (from which it follows that conscious experiences are possible in a system with identical biochemical organization) is a weaker functionalism. Here the merely logical possibility of counter examples is not sufficient to refute. Instead, we need a natural possibility of missing or inverted qualia. >Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra. Solution: to consider natural possibility, we will accept fading or "dancing" Qualia. I 275 Functionalism/Chalmers: the arguments in relation to a lacking, inverted and dancing Qualia do not support a strong, but the non-reductive functionalism I represent. Thesis: functional organization is, with natural necessity, sufficient for conscious experiences. This is a strong conclusion that strengthens the chances for > artificial intelligence. See also Strong Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers, >Artificial Consciousness, cf. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. 1. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 2. R. Kirk, Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford 1994. 3. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 4. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Identity | Parfit | Lewis IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Parfit: when it comes to survival, both answers (continuity and identity) cannot be correct, so we must choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connection) (e. g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one and gradual. >Continuity. Parfit: therefore, it is the continuity and connection that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). >Temporal identity, >Personal identity, >Person. c) what is important for survival is not identity therefore! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problematic cases do not occur. >Relations, >Identity/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Individuation/Lewis. LewisVsParfit: someone else might just as well represent the argument in the other direction, and put identity as relevant. And of course, identity is that what counts in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connection are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Borderline case/Parfit: Problem: borderline cases have to be decided arbitrarily. Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it is definitely about identity. Namely, literally identity! IV 58 Definition R-relation/identity/continuity/person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? IV 59 I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: the two are identical because they are coextensive! >Coextension. IV 61 Identity/Fusion/Split/Person/State/Lewis: is one to one, in the sense that a thing is never identical with several things. However, this does not apply to the I and R relations. Many of their other states are states of the same person and related to this and also to each other. But that is not what Parfit means when he says that R relations are one to many. Parfit: means that there can be several states to which a state is related, but which are not related to each other. (fusion and splitting of the person). That means the R relation would not be transitive. Split: the forward-related R relation is one many, backward: many one, simpliciter: transitive. IV 65 Methuselah example/Person/Identity/Lewis: (Original passage): Connectivity/mental states/Parfit: thesis: the connection of mental states disappears with time. IV 67 Person/Fusion/Parfit: For example, if you merge with someone very different, the question is of who survives. But there is no specific, hidden answer. Rather, the important point is that the R-relationship is only available to a very small degree. IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: one should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. IV 74 Lewis: I had written, what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually Ir to states in the distant future such as S2, namely over the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But is that not the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants to survive (C1), then this wish is not fulfilled. LewisVsParfit: but I do not think he can have that wish at all! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought he has must be shared. He cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. On the other hand, if C1 and C2 are supposed to share something every day, then it must be a "plural" wish, "Let's survive". IV 75 Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both of us knew before the split that there would be a split. Now: Variant: both do not know about the coming split. Question: cannot we share the wish: "Let me survive!"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the same desire is due to the wrong presupposition that they are one person. Meaning the "me" is a false description. It cannot refer to C1 in C1's thoughts and not to C2 in its thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least the one of C2 and the one of C1 is not differentiated. Then their wish cannot consist only in the unfulfillable singular wish. They both must also have the weak plural desire, even if they do not know the split beforehand. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Identity Theory | Kripke | Frank I 32 Identity Theory/mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the identity theory teaches the diversity of the logical subjects of the physical and the psychic. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalistic one (semantic structures). >Physical/psychic, >Naturalism, >Mentalism. Frank I 32 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: the identity theory will not go further than that an identity between syntactic and semantic structures would, if at all, be based on the fact that the semantic is not without the syntactic, but this does not sufficiently determine it through the syntactic - which is a variant of the supervenience thesis. >Supervenience. Frank I 114 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: it is conceivable that a psychic event (e.g. pain) occurs without a physical event - hence the two are not identical. It is not an essential property of the sensation of pain to be a psychic event - it is rather only an accidental property. >Pain/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke. Frank I 123 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: identity theory asserts a contingent identity - however, as it is necessary, we cannot speak of a deception if we try to imagine that the identity statement is false! It could have turned out that pain is not C fiber stimulation: this is no analogy to heat/molecular motion. We pick out heat because of its contingent property that it feels a certain way. We pick out pain by the necessary property to feel like pain. KripkeVsLewis: the causal role suggests the misconception that the cause of pain is contingent. >Contingency/Kripke, >Causal role. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Implication Paradox | Wessel | I 129 C.I.Lewis VsParadoxes of the implication: "strict implication": modal: instead of "from contradiction any statement": "from impossible ..." >Implication, strict, >Modalities, >Modal logic. WesselVsLewis, C.I.: circular: modal terms only from logical entailment relationship - 2.Vs: strict Implication cannot occur in provable formulas of propositional calculus as an operator. >Consequence, >Operators. I 140ff Paradoxes of implication: strategy: avoid contradiction as antecedent and tautology as consequent. >Tautologies, >Antecedent, >Consequent. I 215 Paradoxes of implication/quantifier logic: Additional paradoxes: for individual variables x and y may no longer be used as any singular terms - otherwise from "all Earth's moons move around the earth" follows "Russell moves around the earth". Solution: Limiting the range: all individuals of the same area, for each subject must be clear: P (x) v ~ P (x) - that is, each predicate can be meant as a propositional function - Wessel: but that is all illogical. >Logic, >Domain. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Impossible World | Lewis | IV 21 Impossible world/Impo.wo./LewisVs: does not exist. - Problem: describe the impossible things in it. - 1) consistent truths about them. 2) false contradictions about them. a) truth about pigs that can fly and cannot b) contradictory falsehood that they can fly there, although it is not so that they can fly there. >Actuality/Lewis, >Conterfactuals/Lewis. Lewis: such a distinction cannot be made. VsLewis: at best one could argue with something like "truth in fiction". LewisVs: but that does not help. >Possible world/Lewis, >Possibility/Lewis, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. --- V 15 Impossible world/Lewis: If we cannot find a most similar possible world among the similar possible worlds - (e.g. 7 foot + e for shrinking e finds no limit) - then we can still assume impossible worlds - S be any maximum number of sentences, so that for every finite conjunction of C sentences in S wA>>wC is applicable in i - S is then a complete description of a. Possible or impossible - way of how the facts could be if A was the case (seen from the position of i). - Then we must postulate an impossible world where all sentences from S apply - it should be accessible from i alone (!). >Accessibility. It should be closer to i than every possible world. Important argument: but not closer to i than any possible world which in turn is closer than all possible A-worlds. Impossible worlds here accessibility and comparable similarity are undefined. The limiting assumption is obviously fulfilled. - The sentences in an impossible world may be incompatible. - But you cannot derive any contradiction from them - because there may be consistency subsets. E.g. I am more than 7 feet tall - our borderline worlds will be impossible worlds where A is true, but where ..7.1 foot .. ..7.01, .. 7.001, etc. is wrong. Important argument: this is not the same as the possible world where I am infinitesimally more than 7 feet tall: because there are such worlds, where physical quantities can take non-standard values, which in turn differ infinitesimally from their natural numbers. Numbers/Measuring/Physics: e.g. physical quantities are never non-standard values. >Measuring. V 16 That is false in any possible world where I am infinitessimally larger than 7 feet, but true in the impossible closest A worlds. >Impossible world. LewisVs: it is bad to assume such a thing, but it can be reduced to less problematic sets of propositions or sentences. V 18 Impossible frontier worlds: here, impossible, but consistent endless combinations of possible true propositions become true. V 15 Impossible world/Lewis: is assumed if infinitesimal approach does not deliver a definitely last most similar possible worlds. >Similarity metrice/Lewis. Vs: we should assume sets of propositions or sentences instead of impossible worlds. >ersatz world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Incorrigibility | Sellars | I XVI Incorrigibility/AustinVsLewis, CL.I.: you cannot be fooled about your own ideas. Sellars: But you can describe them incorrectly. >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Evidence/Sellars, >Facts/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Individuals | Meixner | I 56f Def INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: individual-like objects: Example "the round square", but also e.g., Sherlock Holmes, fictitious persons and their parts of the body, of which it cannot be said whether they have certain properties or not - "the man who knew that he knew nothing": not Socrates, but INDIVIDUAL (overdetermined: knowledge/ignorance). >Fiction, >Knowledge, >Predication, >Attribution. I 52ff INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: set of all properties (instead of individual): n.b.: if one element is missing, completely different set (identity of sets through identity of the elements). Therefore all properties are necessary. >Extensionality, cf. >Identity/Henrich. ((s) E.g. determined person at a particular point in time.) Example Meixner: "george w.bush" is necessarily President (not in the case of Bush). >Necessity, cf. >Identity/D.Lewis. I 58 INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: apart from an individual, whose properties are at least partly contingent, there is an INDIVIDUAL assigned to it, which simply consists of the set of the same properties (at that point in time). Since a set loses its identity when an element changes, all properties are necessary here. Cf. >Contingency. MeixnerVsLewis: confuses individual with INDIVIDUAL: counterpart needs its properties, because it is individuated by the set (because it is only even singled out by it). >Counterpart/Lewis, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Intention-Based Semantics | Habermas | III 369 Intention-Based Semantics/Action Theory/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Causality, >Intentionality, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors is not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >Semantics. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Interpretation | Geach | I 195 Interpretation/logic/GeachVsLewis/VsLangford: we do not get "any things" when we allow moves instead of truth. - .g. here: Inheritance of lawfulness requires something like "sire" or "mother animal". ((s) Not truth is inherited but rules and validity.) >Rules, >Validity. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Lawlikeness | Schurz | I 237 Laws of nature/natural laws/Schurz: Laws of nature do not refer to specific physical systems but express what is valid for any systems in all physically possible universes. E.g. Newton's nuclear axioms (E.g. total force = mass times acceleration, E.g. force = counterforce, E.g. gravitational force is proportional to the product of masses). Only if they are used system conditions, which explicitly list the present forces, we get a concretely solvable differential equation. There are only a few fundamental ones and they are found only in physics. However, most of the laws of physics are: Def system laws/Schurz: involve concrete contingent system conditions. Therefore they are not physically necessary but contingent. Example law of fall, example law of pendulum, example law of planets etc. Law-likeness/law-like/Schurz: a) in the broad sense: the law-like character of spatiotemporally limited general propositions is gradual. In this sense not only the laws of nature but also all system laws are law-like. Counterfactual conditionals: if we would agree to them are an indication of law-likeness. Problem: the counterfactual conditional also characterizes spatiotemporally bounded laws Ex "All ravens are black". Counterfactual conditionals/Schurz: on the other hand: we would not say Ex "If this apple had not been in the basket, it would not be green." >Counterfactual conditionals, >Laws of nature, >Laws. I 237 Similarity-metris/Possible Worlds/Counterfactual Conditional/RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b(1)): for philosophy of science, Lewis' logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals yields little, because the substantive interpretation of the similarity metric between Possible Worlds presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969(2), 320-334). I 238 Law-like/law-like/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness resp. graduality of the broad term). Problem: Not all spatiotemporally unrestricted laws are law-like in the narrow sense. Universal but not physically necessary: Ex "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometer". Universality: is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for law-likeness. E.g. the universal proposition "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if one replaces it by its contraposition: Ex "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965(3), 341). Strong Hume-thesis/Hume/Schurz: universality is a sufficient condition for law-likeness. SchurzVs: this is wrong Weak-Hume thesis/Schurz: universality is a necessary condition for law-likeness. >Causality/Hume. Stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than that it is necessary. BhaskarVWeak Hume-thesis. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell conditional/law-like: laws of nature or nomological predicates must not contain an analytic reference to particular individuals or spacetime points (spacetime points). This is much stronger than the universality condition. >Stronger/weaker. Ex "All emeralds are grue": is spatiotemporally universal, but does not satisfy Maxwell's condition. >Grueness. I 239 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Thesis: Laws of nature are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. >Laws of nature/Armstrong, >Causality/Armstrong. Maxwell-Conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): represent a physical symmetry principle: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry principles/principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! >Symmetries/Feynman, >Symmetries/Kanitscheider. Maxwell-condition/Schurz: is too weak for law-like character: e.g. "no lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km" also this universal theorem fulfills it. Law-likeness/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis/Schurz: proposal: all those general propositions which follow from those theories which produce the best unification of the set of all true propositions. (Lewis 1973b(1), 73). Vs: problem: it remains unclear why one should not add the proposition Bsp "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km". Because many true singular propositions also follow from it. Solution/Schurz: we need a clear notion of physical possibility. Problem: we have no consistent demarcation of natural laws and system laws. 1. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 3. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Materialism | Chalmers | Stalnaker I 242 Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996(1), 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. >Supervenience. 1. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers I XIII Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. Chalmers I 41 Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. >Supervenience/Chalmers. I 42 Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism: Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994)(1): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364). >F. Jackson, >Possible Worlds. I 123 Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world 2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world. 3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts. 4. Therefore, materialism is wrong. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 124 The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. >Inverted spectra. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain. The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism. >Dualism, >Property dualism. I 139 MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989 (1).) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities. ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility). >Modality, >Possibility, >Necessity. E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color. I 144 Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990)(3) and Nemirov (1990)(4): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible. I 145 Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities. Loar: (1990)(5) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this." DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991)(6) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment. ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge. >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. 1. F. Jackson, Finding the mind in the natural world. In: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White, eds. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 2. C. McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98, 1989: pp.349-66 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 5. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 6. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Meaning | Fodor | Cresswell II 56 Meanings/Fodor/Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: thesis: meanings are in the head. >Putnam: "meanings ain't in the head", >Twin earth. CresswellVsFodor: problem with the ascription, I will have to have the same representation in the head. It must have the same belief as the one he has (meanings are not representations). >Representations, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. --- IV 57 Meaning/Quine: meaning does not arise from speaker meaning, no acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean. It cannot distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later. So there are no analytic sentences, there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning”. >Speaker meaning, >Analyticity/syntheticity. IV 117 Meaning/truth/Davidson: a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his/her belief. So we cannot conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we cannot do it the other way around. IV 121 Belief ascription/attribution of meaning/Davidson's theory: information about the shape of the words which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here. The adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning. We need information either about his/her belief or about the meanings. Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: then the primacy thesis is implausible (primacy thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription"). >Attribution, >Belief ascription. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning | Lewis | II 197 Meaning/Name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds in truth value - of generic names: function from worlds to quantities. II 213 Putnam: meanings not in the head - Lewis pro: mental state does not determine the meaning - meaning cannot be found out through mental state - mental state contains too little information about causation and situation. II 213/14 Carrier of meaning: speech acts - not sounds or characters! -> Intentionality, > meaning (intending). --- IV 194 Meaning/Lewis: Here’s a function that provides as output an appropriate extension for given combinations of factors provides as time, place, context, speaker, world - intension/Lewis: function that leads from indices (time, place, speaker, world) to appropriate extensions for a name, sentence, or general term - intensions are extension-determining functions - Carnap’s intension: provides truth value for sentences or things, for names and quantities, for general terms. IV 200 Intension/meaning/Lewis: E.g. "Snow is white or not" differs finely in the meaning of "Grass is green or not" - because of the different intensions of the embedded sentences. - (Intension: Function of indices on extensions). - Meaning/Lewis: semantically interpreted phrase markers minus the top nodes of the structure treeS - synonymy: sameness of intension. Meaning/BenacerrafVsLewis: how can you ever "choose" meaning? - Lewis: this is a general objection Vs quantity-theoretic approaches. IV 202 Definition phrase structure rules/Lewis: = semantically interpreted phrase markers - Definition meaning: a structure tree ... - we often talk about meanings as if they were symbolic expressions, although they are not - the category meaning is simply the top node - intension: is the second component of the top node. --- Schwarz I 216 Meaning/object/word/Lewis: thesis: our words are merely linked to conditions to be fulfilled by a potential reference - so it may be that something fulfills them of which we did not think beforehand that it would fulfill them. >Reference, >Words, >a posteriori. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Inwagen | Schwarz I 27 Metaphysics/being/essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing about contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. >Necessity, >a posteriori necessity, >necessity de re. Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2). A posteriori necessity/metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. You can learn e.g. that Blair is premier or e.g. that the evening star corresponds to the morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: other cases (which cannot be empirically found) do not exist. LewisVsStrong Necessity: strong necessity has no place in his modal logic. >LewisVsTelescope Theory: worlds are not like distant planets of which one can learn which ones exist. >Possible worlds. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Realism | Bigelow | I 165 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds. >Possible worlds. Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true. >Truthmakers. Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong. >Realism. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,... I 166 ... and not exploratory. >Representation. Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds! >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds. Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties: 1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books". 2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects). Substitutes: David Lewis. >David Lewis. 3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world. There are three sets of truthmakers here: (a) set of sentences (b) set of propositions (c) sets of beliefs. Cf. >Ersatz worlds. I 173 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance. There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism. Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way. Representatives: Lycan 1979(1), Plantinga 1974(2), 1976(3), 1987(4), van Inwagen (1984(5): some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.) BigelowVsModalism. Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts. Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes: a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts. Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must". >Modal logic. Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds. >Correspondence theory. I 174 Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue: For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again. >Descriptions, >Names. Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory. (Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?) Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g. Conchita can play guitar is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world. >Basic concepts. The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro). Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties. >Supervenience, >Humean Supervenience/Lewis. I 175 Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms! >Definition, >Definability. Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms. Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases. Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist. >Humean supervenience. I 187 Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either. >D. Lewis, >Counterpart theory. VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies: 1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above) 2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal. Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory. LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma: (1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says. (2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says (3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,... I 188 ... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said. Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely. >Rationality. Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised. Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach. BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,... I 189 ...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable. >Bayes-Theorem, >Bayesianism. 1. Lycan, W.G. (1979). The trouble with possible worlds. In: The possible and the actual. (ed. M.J. Loux), pp. 274-316. Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press. 2. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Plantinga, A. (1976). Actualism and possible worlds. Theoria 42, pp. 139-60. 4. Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality. Modal realism and modal reductionism. Philosophical Perspectives Vol I: Metaphysics (ed. J. E. Tomberlin). pp.189-231. Atascadero, Calif., Ridgeview. 5. van Inwagen, P. (1985). Two concepts of possible worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp.185-92. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Modal Realism | Inwagen | Schwarz I 42 Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "concretism", Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism". >Possibility, >Possible worlds, >Possibilia, >Modalities. Schwarz I 64 Modal Realism/possible worlds/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible worlds would have to be part of reality because "actuality", "world" and "reality" are synonymous terms for the totality of all things, (Plantinga 1976(1), 256f Lycan 1979(2), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/world/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "actual world" means only a small part of all things (reality includes world, world is only part of reality). This resolves the contradictions. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what does the reality of space-time maximal objects deal with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: here it is about how our world could have been, not about how any of us isolated things are. (1985(3), 119,1986(4), 226), Plantinga 1987(5)). LewisVsVs: modal operators are just quantifiers about such things. >Modal operators. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: e.g. there are exactly 183 space-time maximal objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. >Rigid designator. Schwarz I 65 It could be true or not. Lewis appears to assert that there are as many space-time objects as there are sets. VsLewis: thus the totality of the worlds has become contingent! 1. Alvin Plantinga [1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979]. 2. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316. 3. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel. 4. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001]. 5. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modalities | Quine | VII (a) 4 Modality/Quine: is limited to whole sentences. VII (h) 143 Modality/QuineVsLewis, Cl.I./QuineVsStrict Implication: the concept of strict modality is based on the analyticity. VII (h) 144 Modality/Quine: the contexts with "necessary" and "possible" are referentially opaque. X 107 Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: Problem: extension-like (coextensive) predicates are no longer interchangeable salva veritate. This is not a problem, but it complicates the logic. >Modal Logic/Quine. X 109 Logical Truth/Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: the modalities here give more than the settings: we can get valid schemes here: example "~(~p . notw p)" In addition, we receive another schema from each valid one by prefixing "necessary" e.g. "necessary (p or ~p)" from "p or ~p". X 126 Ontology/Quine: the real ontology is with the quantifiers of the standard language. The condition that this applies is very important. If modalities or other constructions are allowed in addition to truth functions and quantifiers, they increase the strength and thus the content of the theories incomparably. > Strength of theories. XI 175 Singular Term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other hand: i.e. between expressions that have a reference and expressions that have an extension. >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. I 337 Logical modality has nothing to do with personal attitude. The modal logic as we know it begins with Clarence Lewis' "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap later formulated even more sharply is as follows: Def Necessity/Carnap: A sentence beginning with "it is necessary that" is true only if the rest of the sentence is analytical. I 343 Church's system is different: he indirectly limits quantification by reinterpreting variables and other symbols in modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence, to which a modal operator is superior, is a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. I 422 Modality/Quine: the possible concrete objects, the unrealized possibilities represent another category of dubious objects. They can also be described as defective, because there is a complete lack of clarity as to identity, even more conspicuous than with intensions. II 121 Empirical modaltities: (what could have happened): These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. through ignorance, refrain from details. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ontology | Lewis | IV 40 Ontology/Lewis: for me it consists in iterative set theory with individuals - the only unorthodox strait is my view of what individuals there are - part-whole relation: for me, it relates to individuals, not sets. >Individual/Lewis. Sets/possible worlds: therefore there is no set in a world in the sense of being part - sets: E.g. numbers, properties, propositions, events - even a sequence of possible individuals (all from the same world) is strictly speaking not itself (as a quantity) in this world. Nnumbers: are sets - they are not more localized in the logical space than in spacetime. They even exist from the perspective of all worlds. Properties: are sets (of individuals). Propositions: are sets Events: are sets. >Event/Lewis, >Properties/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis, >Numbers, >Sets/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis, >Terminology/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 232 Ontology/Lewis/(s): all attributed to the distribution of properties instead of objects: "a priori reductionism of everything". Schwarz I 233 Ontology/explanation/theory/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): Analysis/ |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Castaneda | Frank I 329ff Possible world/Lewis: Possible world have only publicly accessible physical objects, no premises, no propositional knowledge, extensional (E.g. 2 omniscient Gods). >Two omniscient gods, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge. CastanedaVsLewis: but private items and indicator phrases ("I", "here", "now") are individuable in possible worlds (intensional). >Intensions, >Intensionality. Lewis: if access to possible worlds is limited perspectively, then worse: we no longer know what we believe propositionally, because propositions would no longer be transparent as sets of possible worlds. >Accessibility, >Opacity. Frank I 357 Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: not suitable as accusative of thinking: as sets too much extended - not intensional. >Content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Thoughts. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Field | I 41 Possible World/difference/differentiation/Field: E.g. we cannot postulate a possibel world which is isomorphic to ours and in which only Nixon is like Humphrey (here) and Humphrey like Nixon (here) - (throughout the whole story). >Cross world identity, cf. >Centered worlds. I 75 Possible Worlds/Lewis: (Counterfactuals, Section 4.1): possible Worlds are 4-dimensional slices of a broader reality, like other possible world. All together form the actual universe. FieldVsLewis. NominalismVsPossible Worlds: these are abstract entities. I 222 Problem of quantities/Possible World/Field: with possible world and cross-world-congruence we could avoid the possibility operator. FieldVs: we exactly wanted to avoid the ontology of the space-time regions. Possible World/Field: are only heuristically harmless. I 223 Possible World/StalnakerVsLewis: (Stalanker 1976)(1): Alternative to Lewis: Speech of possible worlds should be understood as a speech about a property Q, so it is necessary that if the universe has Q, then there is x*, y*, z*, w* and u*, so that F (x*, y*, z*, w*, u*). Problem: How should we understand the cross-world congruence? The last incidents of x* are not bound by quantifiers during the comparison. FieldVsStalnaker: Problem: interpretation of the expression "spatial relation". --- II 89 Possible world/Quantities of/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of states of the mind is that they form a Boolean algebra. N.B.: then the elements themselves need not be a possible world - any other kind of elements are then just as good for a psychological explanation. They could simply be everything - e.g. numbers. Numbers: do not pretend to represent the world as it is. II 90 Intentionality/Possible world/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: The wit of the possible world assumption is the Boolean Algebra, the boolean relation that prevails between possible worlds. Problem: then the empty set of possible worlds which contains the trisection of the angle, which is a subset of the set of the possible world, in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Problem: what fact does that make? - Without it the approach is meaningless. >Nonfactualism. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker, 1976. Possible Worlds. ous 10, 65-75. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Inwagen | Schwarz I 41 Def Possible Worlds/Lewis: early definition: possible worlds are ways how things could be. Van InwagenVs: these are rather properties than concrete universes (StalnakerVsLewis, RichardsVsLewis: ditto). Lewis: later: worlds correspond to ways how things could be. Schwarz: but we do not necessarily have to create special entities for it. They could also be grammatical illusions. Even if one considers possible worlds as entities, one does not determine for a long time what kind of entities they are. >Modal realism/Inwagen. Literature: Peter van Inwagen [1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001]. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118. Robert C. Stalnaker [1976]: “Possible Worlds”. Noˆus, 10: 65–75. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Lewis | IV 147 Centered possible worlds/De re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, Propositional Objects): E.g., A cat that is being chased by a dog wants to get onto the roof to be safe - de dicto: it wants a state that is the class of all possible worlds where it reaches the roof. Problem: cross-world identity: Question: which of the many counterparts in many possible worlds is the cat itself? Solution/Quine: centered world: Pairs of a world and a designated time-space point in it, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds - no centered world belongs to two classes (desired and dreaded possible worlds). >Centered world, >Counterpart/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. QuineVs: ultimately better divided theory: here are the objects of simple settings, classes of stimulus patterns that are more complex are linguistic. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more specifically to a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. IV 148 Possible world/Quine/Lewis: Lewis: large particulars (concrete) - Quine: abstract entities - certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers - (space-time points) - Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to our everyday language: What it could have been like. IV 149 Situation/Possible world/Lewis: Thesis: there can also be alternatives within a possible world - thus distinction situation/Possible world - LewisVsStalnaker: not propositions as belief objects (objects of desire) but attitudes de se - E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds out in the book that there are two people who could be identical with him - a) on the 6th floor at Stanford - b) in the basement of a different library 3km away - two possible situations (possibilities) in the same possible worlds - solution: property instead proposition - the propositions apply to both people in the same way. >Properties/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis. --- V 42 Centering assumption/Possible world/Lewis: If it was violated, worlds that differed in a non-observed way would be considered to be the same as the actual world. V 262 Possible world/Equality/Identity/Lewis: it is an independent and difficult question whether two possible worlds that exactly match their history also match in all other aspects - e.g. in their probabilities, laws, modal truths, counterfctual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. Lewis: this is not of interest here. Overall history/Supervenience: supervenes on the history of events, whatever else may in turn supervene on the overall history. >Supervenience/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 216 Possible world/Lewis: no set of ordinary sentences - of which there are not enough in the language. Lewis: counterparts, possible worlds are real (KripkeVs) (PutnamVs). --- Lewis I 59 Possible world/Lewis: you can speak pretty freely and metaphysically guileless and without special ontological reservations about possible worlds. --- II 214 Possible world save separation of object/meta languange - Truth and analyticity cannot be defined in the same language. II 214 Definition Possible World (VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can be explained even by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical sentences of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. II 214 LewisVs: possible worlds cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1) Such a replacement does not work properly: two worlds that are indistinguishable in the representative language are (falsely) assigned one and the same representation. >ersatz world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Putnam | III 177 Possible wWorld/PutnamVsLewis: another way needs not to be another world, otherwise a property of being a state description of the whole world would follow from the fact that the Eiffel Tower had a different height > Properties/Putnam. ((s)> Stalnaker/Properties ditto). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Possible Worlds | Quine | Dennett I 140 Possibility/Possible objects/Quine: the possible fat man in the entrance, and the possible bald man in the entrance: are they the same possible man, or are they two different possible men? Are there more possible thin men than possible fat men standing in the entrance there? Or would their resemblance make them one? Are no two possible things equal? Or is the concept of identity not applicable to possibilities? >Possibility/Quine, >Identity/Quine. Quine II 149 Possible World/Quine: is vivid way to make a point for essentialist philosophy. In order to identify an object in a possible world essential properties are needed. (>Essentialism). II 158 And what would the analog values be in other worlds? Simply the sums of physical objects in all worlds, whereby the inhabitants are connected indiscriminately. Example: One of these values would be "Napoleon with his counterparts in other worlds" another would consist of Napoleon with various completely different dissimilar inhabitants of other worlds. Therefore, quantification by means of objects across worlds in no way requires that we make any sense of the term "counterpart". Just as any momentary objects at different times form time segments that belong not only to one, but to countless temporally extended objects. (QuineVsLewis). >Counterpart theory, >Counterparts. Quantification over one area is no more difficult than over several areas, unless there are additional difficulties with regard to the possible world. This exists indeed: not in quantification but in the predicates. >Predicates/Quine. II 159 By means of an arbitrary series of worlds, you can transform anything into anything via easy to take steps. The devastating difference is: that the series of momentary cross sections is imposed on us by our real world in a unique way, while they are placed in possible worlds of fantasy. Example: How does quantification in modal contexts depend on cross-world identitfications? We are looking at: "(Ex)QFx". The problem does not lie in quantification as such: "x" extends across all worlds, but "Fx" requires that the predicate "F" is fulfilled in all worlds. >Quantification/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker | I 17 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of actually existing worlds there are better ways how the world might have been. I 14 Possible Worlds/Time/Stalnaker: there are many analogies between times and worlds. >Actualism. Actualism: actualism corresponds to presentism. Def presentism/(s): only the present exists and only the current point in time. Four-dimensionalism/Stalnaker: four-dimensionalism corresponds to modal realism. >Four-dimensionalism. Def modal realism/(s): modal realism means that other worlds exist literally. Representative: a representative is David Lewis. >Modal realism, >David K. Lewis. Stalnaker: very few are realists in terms of possible world and times, but most are realists in terms of space. >Realism, >Space, >Time. I 27 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of something like "I and my surroundings" we assume a way how the world is, that is a property or state. >States, cf. >Situations. Important argument: properties may exist uninstantiatedly. >Instantiation. I 38 Possible Worlds: a possible world is no thing of a certain kind, nor an individual. A possible world is that to which truth is relative or what people differentiate in their rational actions. >Possibility, >Actions. I 52 Possible world: r: it is pointless to ask whether possible worlds satisfy certain conditions, e.g. is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? This is pointless, the answer will always have the form of a necessary sentence: P-or-not-P. - But doubt about that will be a doubt about the content of the sentence and not doubt about a possible world. The same applies to the problem that you might not believe a necessary truth. Possible worlds/conditions: it is pointless to ask whether a possible world meets certain conditions. Possible world/necessary/Stalnaker: if it is true, e.g. that water is necessarily H2O or e.g. that there are unattainable cardinal numbers, then these assertions express exactly this proposition, and the sentences that express these propositions tell us nothing about the nature of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Kripke. Stalnaker: therefore it is impossible to characterize the entire range of all the possibilities. For then we would know the way how the range of all possibilities is different from that how it could be -> Wittgenstein: you should remain silent about things that you cannot talk about (Tractatus). StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not help, because pointing also must have a content - therefore Ramsey says: "What you cannot say, you cannot whistle either". I 84/85 Possible worlds/Stalnaker: possible worlds are not just an exercise of our imagination, but part of our actions, e.g. scientific explanations. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Predicates | Lewis | Schwarz I 121 Predicate/Lewis/Schwarz: singles out properties - which ones depends on possible worlds. --- Schwarz I 228 Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: names can name anything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-ness" predicates are not names and designate nothing. Predicate/(s): Not singular terms. >Singular term, >Name/Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis/RussellVsFrege: assuming that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell’s paradox follows -> heterology: no property corresponds to some predicates such as E.g. "is a property that does not apply to itself". Also, nothing that can be named with a singular term corresponds to predicates such as E.g. "is a class" E.g. "is part of" and E.g. "identical with". ((s) Predicates can always be invented, whether the world contains adequate properties is an empirical question.) |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Private Language | Lewis | II 227 VsLewis: E.g. Assuming a person who lives isolated throughout his life could spontaneously begin to use a language one day due to his brilliant talent, e.g. to write a diary. Private Language: This would be a random private language, it would not be subject to the verdict of Wittgenstein. And here no convention would be involved. Cf. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Convention/Lewis. --- II 227/28 LewisVs: Even the isolated living person adheres to a certain regularity. He also knows that he adhered to this regularity in the past and has an interest to behave equally all the time. >Regularity/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Properties | Putnam | III 177 Properties/LewisVsPutnam: properties must be something simple. If one follows from another, then that would be a necessary relationship between two simple properties. Putnam: that would be incomprehensible. Wrong solution/Lewis: then properties would have to be interpreted as complexes in turn. LewisVs: properties must be simple - from what should they be composed? PutnamVsLewis: this is not an analytical style - why should something simple not make any relations? --- V 119 Properties/identity/Putnam: synonymy is necessary for identity of predicates, not properties - temperature is not synonymous with molecular motion. >Synonymy, >Predicate, >Identity. --- I (g) 195 Functional Property/Putnam: a functional property (instead of a physical property) for a computer is e.g. to have a program. >Software, >Funcional role. Non-functional properties: non-functional properties are e.g. inputs and outputs. Functional Properties: functional properties are defined by cause and effect. >Cause, >Effect. I (g) 195 Reference/Lewis: reference is a functional property. N.B.: that should undermine the distinction physical/non-physical. Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system. >Reference/Lewis. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Qualia | Jackson | Pauen I 179 Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum. E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space. Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences. 2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism). >Epiphenomenalism, >Mary-example, >Monism, >Knowing how. I 180 Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand. JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people. What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not. Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities. I 181 LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected. A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson. I 182 Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all. N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states. LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities. Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions! I 183 This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible". Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios. In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity. VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena. 1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties. I 184 2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable. >Qualia/Chalmers. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reference | Lewis | Horwich I 437 Elite classes/nature/natural reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis: there are certain classes of things -out there- (elite classes) which are intrinsically different, while it is a natural condition for reference (integrated in nature) that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. - PutnamVs: that’s spooky. --- Schwarz I 149 New theory of reference/Putnam: Reference has nothing to do with associated description - so pain might actually be joy. (Kripke ditto) - LewisVsPutnam: Solution: Role: pain cannot play the role of Joy. --- Schwarz I 217 Reference/description theory of reference/Lewis: Thesis: expressions such as possible worlds, meanings, pain, objective probability are associated with roles that determine what they refer to. --- Putnam II 195 f Reference/Lewis: is a functional property. (See properties/Putnam). - Important argument: to be distinguished in physical/non-physical. Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system. Then the commonality of references is just as abstract as a program, but does not require any fundamental quantities. PutnamVsLewis: Reference is no functional property, no causality or causality is nothing physical. >Reference/Putnam. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Set Theory | Lewis | Schwarz I 75 Set theory/Mereology/Lewis: (Parts of Classes, 1991)(1): are sets simply mereological sums? Set theory proves to be mereologically extended arithmetic, with successor relation, a set relation between thing A and its unit set {A}. Through a structural analysis of this relationship Lewis finally leads the whole mathematics back to the assumption that there are many things. >Mereology/Lewis. Schwarz I 78 Classical set theory/Schwarz: sets form a hierarchical structure (cumulative or iterative). lowest level: things that are not sets "individuals", "primal elements". pure set theory: here the lowest level is empty (no individuals, nothing outside sets, nothing is not a set!) >Individual/Lewis. Omega/ω/Set theory/Schwarz: on ω all sets are located whose elements occur on one of the finite levels. On ω+1 there are sets whose elements are on ω or below etc. up to ω + ω (=ω * ω) followed by ω * 2 + 1 etc. A set that contains itself/Russell's paradox/Schwarz: is excluded by the hierarchy: it must already have occurred at a level below the level at which it occurs for the first time. Then there are also no quantities of all quantities that do not contain themselves, because that would be nothing other than the quantity of all quantities. Cf. >Russellean paradox. Schwarz I 79f Non-naive set theory/Schwarz: here things only form a set if they are not too many, i.e. if they do not correspond one-to-one with all sets. This motivates the selection axiom and the replacement axiom. Schwarz I 79ff Classical Set Theory: set and element (member) are undefined. Schwarz I 80 Set theory/Mereology/Lewis: (Parts of Classes(1), Part 1): Thesis: sets and classes are mereological sums. But the parts are not elements but subsets. >Mereological sum/Lewis. Main thesis: (MT): x is subclass of y, gdw. y is a class and x is part of y. (1991(1),§1,3) Schwarz I 93 Set theory/Properties/VsLewis/Schwarz: Lewis has a similar problem: according to his set-theoretical structuralism, an expression like "{A,B,C}" does not refer to a particular thing, the class of A, B, and C. Classes are relative to single set relations and single set relations are very numerous. According to Lewis, statements about classes - and thus also about properties - are actually plural quantifications about single set relationships (2002a(4), §5, (1986e(2), 52 Fn 39). Quantification via properties would then be plural quantification via ED. For example that a thing is red: that it is one of the red things. Schwarz I 94 SchwarzVsLewis: does not say how this should work for relations. V 346 "Nominalistic Set Theory" (1970d)(3) Nominalistic set theory/Lewis: if one assumes the individual calculus and a relation of the neighborhood between atoms as basic concepts, it is possible to define a pseudo element relation between individuals. 1. David Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1970d]: “Nominalistic Set Theory”. Nous, 4. 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Similarity | Bigelow | I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: Accessibility between possible worlds: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. >Accessibility, >Possible worlds. Similarity/possible worlds/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is the one concerning certain laws! This presupposes laws in the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1),1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(3): Causality instead of similarity) >Relevance. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example 3 worlds 1. World u: Darwin asks his father for permission to sail away, receives it and writes his book, of which we have all heard 2. World w: Darwin does not get permission, does not sail away and does not write his book. 3. World e v: Darwin does not get permission to sail away, but still sails off... and his father forgot what he said. Accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our semantics (and that of Lewis) the corresponding counterfactual conditional is only true in w, if possible worlds like u are the most accessible of w (next world most similar possible world). >Similarity metrics. Lewis: so u has to be more similar than w v is similar. u and w must be closer to each other. If v and w were closer together, the following counterfactual conditional would be true: If Darwin's father had not given permission, Darwin would not have obeyed and his father would have forgotten. And that is not true in w. So u w is closer than v u is close. >Counterfactual conditional. I 229 Similarity/possible worlds/relevance/Bigelow/Pargetter: what kind of similarity is the relevant one? It cannot be about certain facts (as in this story). That would not be enough. Solution/Lewis: Def Similarity/similarity metrics/possible world/Lewis: by fewer exceptions in a possible world with laws that apply in the other possible world. > Miracles. For example, Darwin: "Miracles" would be the false acoustic transmission of the father's statement and the forgetting through the father. >Miracles. Miracles/Lewis: but also world u could contain miracles: the prehistory is the same as in v, but the father's decision is different, but the causal situation would be the same and the miracle of the other decision would perhaps be just as great as that of erasure of memory and mishearing. I 230 Natural Laws/Worlds/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it could be that other laws apply there as well. Obey/Laws/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also say that a world obeys the laws of another possible world to a certain extent. For example, there might be a possible world z that obeys the laws of w better than u? z: assuming there are laws here that make the refuse of the permission probable. Suppose the father has heard of a conflict with France in the sea area. This does not require any change in the laws. Then we would be forced to assume that the following counterfactual conditional is true in w: (according to our semantics and that of Lewis): If Darwin's father had refused, war would have broken out between England and France or there would have been another factor that would have led to rejection. However, it is wrong in w in at least one way of reading. Similarity metrics/relevance/similarity/Lewis: this shows that similarity of laws is not the only relevant factor. Solution/Lewis: Similarity between worlds must be explained a) by similarity in terms of laws, b) by similarity in relation to certain facts. Weighting/Lewis: For example, the same facts over a long period of time have more weight than obeying the same certain laws. But compliance with laws has more weight than certain consistent facts. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: VsModal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: we explain laws by accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility by law. Bigelow/Pargetter: if Lewis is right, our theory is circular. >Circular reasoning. Solution/Lewis: see above. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The easiest accessible world does not have to be the most similar world! This is shown by the above examples (Darwin's father). But even if it were not the case, it would not refute the modal theory of the laws of nature. Similarity/Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are challenged to construct a better theory than Lewis. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the plurality of worlds,. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3. Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity Metrics | Logic Texts | Read III 104ff Similarity Metrics/Stalnaker: smallest possible revision - i.e. the most similar world. Selection function: f(A, w) - "If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship" is true if the world in which you receive a scholarship is most similar to the world in which you are getting a one. Possible world view: deviates from the probability function if the fore-link is wrong". - Because all combinations can be realized in a possible world. >Possible world, >Similarity. III 105 Similarity Metrics/possible world/conditional sentence/Read: some classical logical principles fail here: e.g. contraposition that "if B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not B" - the similar world in which it rains, can be very well one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world in which it rains violently cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. >Conditional. III 106 Another principle that fails: the reinforcement of the if-sentence: "If A, then B. So if A and C, then B." - For example, when I put sugar in my tea, it will taste good. So when I put sugar and diesel oil in my tea, it will taste good. In the most similar world in which I put diesel oil like sugar in my tea, it tastes horrible - further: the results of the conditionality principle are invalid: - If A, then B. So if A and C, then B - and if A, then B. If B, then C. So if A, then C - Reason: the conditional sentence has become a modal connection. We must know that these statements are strong enough in any appropriate modal sense - to ensure that the most similar A and C world is the most similar A-world, we must know that C is true everywhere. III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the sentence of the conditionally excluded middle: one or other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. This corresponds to the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - (Stalnaker pro). >Conditionally excluded middle. LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi - All combinations are false. Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar world. LewisVs: the set of possible world in which Lewis is 2 m + e tall, whereby e decreases appropriately, this has no boundary. Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: Lewis proposes, that "if A then B" is true in w if there is either no "A or non-B"-world, or any "A and B"-world that is more similar than any "A and not-B"-World. III 110 Bizet/Verdi-example: where there is no unique most similar world, the "would" conditional sentences are wrong because there is no most similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are compartiots, where Bizet has a different nationality. >Bizet/Verdi case. E.g. If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship: will be true, if there is for every world in which you get a one and do not receive scholarship, is a more similar world in which you get both (without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). III 115 Similarity metrics/similarity analysis/possible world/ReadVsLewis: problem: e.g. (assuming John is in Alaska) If John is not in Turkey, then he is not in Paris. - This conditional sentence is true according to the "similarity statement", because it only asks, whether the then-sentence is true in the most similar world. >Conditional, >Counterfactual conditional. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Social Theory | Habermas | III 460 Social Theory/Habermas: their main problems are: 1. the extension of the teleological concept of action, 2. the relativization of the purpose activity to a model of understanding that not only presupposes the transition from consciousness to the philosophy of language, but the communication-theoretical development and radicalization of language analysis itself. >Speech Act Theory, >HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory, HabermasVsGrice, HabermasVsBennett, HabermasVsAustin, HabermasVsLewis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subjunctive Conditionals | Lewis | Goodman II VIII (Foreword, Putnam) Subjunctive Conditionals/Counterfactual Conditionals: Much discussed problem today. David Lewis: has developed formalist scheme that assumes a totality of possible worlds and a "similarity metric" that measures their similarity in degrees. GoodmanVsLewis: these are not solutions that give us principles for deciding which of the possible worlds are more or less similar to the actual one. >Counterfactual conditionals/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Sugar Trail Example | Cresswell | II 183 Supermarket-Example/Sugar trail example/Perry/Cresswell: Perry Solution: Proposition/Perry: a set of triples of persons, times and worlds. Respectively as a function of people and times to sets of worlds. Problem: this proposition does not explain the stopping of the shopping cart! Solution/Lewis: the object of belief is not a sentence, but rather a property which is the meaning of "I m making a mess." (Self-attribution). >Belief objects, >Objects of thought, >Belief state/Perry. Boer/LycanVsLewis: self-ascription is an unclear term. >Self-ascription. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Terminology | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Guise Theory/Castaneda: "Theory of ontological formations". Draws ontological consequences from the semantic discovery that private references have uneliminable meaning (non-substitutability) and from the intensionality conditions - not between thinking and the world, but primarily reference of thinking - because the private must no longer be excluded from the object area - furhtermore to thinking and world can remain typically propositionally structured. (VsLewis/VsChisholm). I 337f "Doxastic Accusative"/Castaneda: avoids facts as objects - thinking episodes are individuated by their accusatives - accusative: an attribute, not a thing. I 386ff Doxastic Accusatives/Castaneda: Problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too big - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle road: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 463ff Guise/CastanedaVsFrege: consubstantiation: sameness of Oedipus' father and Oedipus' predecessor on the throne - VsFrege: every singular term, denotes an object in each use - no varying denotation - designs one-dimensional, not like Frege: two-dimensional: purpose and object. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Time | Bigelow | I 192 Branched Time/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we allow the time to be branched, i. e. there are several futures for each past. We should also allow something like this to be possible for development within one. That is, two parts could have the same origin. Also fusion and temporary joining of parts. >Mereology, >Cause, >Origin. Problem: it is surprising that such parts would have to have at least one temporal part in common. For example, suppose we meet Jane from another part of the same possible world. Let's consider the Counterfactual conditional: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed. >Counterfactual conditional. BigelowVsLewis: according to him it must be true Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us it is obviously wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world in which Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world must then contain all Janes and us, even though there is no connection between us. LewisVsVs: he would then have to accept any other connection and corresponding counterfactual conditional: "... an ancestor or descendant of ours could have met an ancestor or descendant of her" etc. BigelowVsLewis: this is still wrong in the world in question and less plausible than the above mentioned counterfactual conditional. This shows the falseness of temporal theory. >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis: he is in a dilemma: either he takes the world companion relation as a primitive basic concept or he allows modal basic concepts. >Cross world identity. I 193 Counterpart relation/GR/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis still counts on a more important relation, the counterpart relation: it is not a good candidate either for an unanalysed basic concept, and yet it also needs modal basic terms. >Counterpart relation, >Basic concepts. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity because it requires modal concepts. >Circular reasoning, >Modalities. This means that it cannot justify the modal logic. >Modal logic. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Truthmakers | Armstrong | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Truthmakers | Martin | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. Armstrong II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Truthmakers | Place | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. Armstrong II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Castaneda | Frank I 356 f Two omniscient gods/Example/ Lewis: omniscient: only through knowledge of all propositions. - But incapable of self-ascribtion of the decisive properties, since properties (attributes) are not propositional. >Propositions, >Attributes, >Self-identification. CatanedaVsLewis: his notion of the unique counterpart fits more to the part-subject areas of private objects. The overlapping structure would be a total world, and each extension would be "my World" for every person in the world. Therefore, Lewis' example of the two Gods is not evident, even not if we equate propositions with sets of possible worlds. >Possible Worlds, >Possible Worlds/Lewis, cf. >Possible Worlds/Cresswell. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Utilitarianism | Lewis | Rawls I 187 Utilitarianism/Individuals/C. I. Lewis/Rawls: classical utilitarianism in a sense ignores the distinction of individual persons the principle of rational choice of a human being is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. N.B.: this makes this ideal person identical to the >ideal compassionate observer! I 188 Classical utilitarianism then culminates in the - impersonal - bringing together of all desires into a single system of desires. (Siehe C. I. Lewis, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 1946; J. C. SmartVsLewis: An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, p. 26.). Cf. >desires. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Utilitarianism | Rawls | I 20 Utilitarianism/Sidgwick/Rawls: I take here the strictly classical doctrine of utilitarianism as best illustrated by Henry Sidgwick(1) to use this utilitarianism as a counterpoint to my contract theory. RawlsVsUtilitarianism. > I 24 Utilitarianism/Rawls: Utilitarianism assumes that the principle of inviolability, which is based on justice for us,... I 25 ... is only a Common Sense command, and has only subordinate importance as a secondary rule, as has the concept of natural law, as far as it benefits the majority of society. >Common sense. Principles of Social Election and Justice/Rawls: we assume the principles of social election and justice in our contract theory as an object of an initial agreement, while utilitarianism simply expands it to the idealization of society as an ideal total person. I 26 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: that is to take the plurality and particularity of individuals not seriously. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: our contract theory is also not teleological, as utilitarianism is. However, we also consider - like any serious ethical theory - the consequences. I 27 But the theory of justice as fairness never considers the maximization of utility. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Justice as fairness accepts from the outset the principle of equal freedom, without knowledge of its purposes, while utilitarianism wants to take into account whether the discrimination of individuals may increase the overall benefit. Justice as fairness: does not accept inclinations as given in order to then fulfil them, but these are limited from the beginning by the principles of justice. >Justice/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. I 28 That the right takes precedence over the good is a central principle. It should ensure that institutions remain stable. >Good/Rawls. Utilitarianism/Rawls: is strongly based on natural properties and coincidences of human life, while the theory of justice as fairness is based on the first principles of ethical theory. I 184 Utilitarianism/Rawls: his most important principle is the average principle. However, this is rejected by Sidgwick(2). I 187 Utilitarianism/Individuals/Rawls: the classical Utilitarianism ignores in a certain sense the distinction of individual persons. The principle of rational choice of a human being is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. N.B.: this makes this ideal person identical to the ideal sympathetic observer! >Ideal observer, >Observation. I 188 Classical utilitarianism then culminates in the - impersonal - merging of all desires into a single system of desires(3)(4). 1. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, London, 1907. 2. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, London, 1907, pp. 415f. 3. See C. I. Lewis, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 1946. 4. J. C. SmartVsLewis, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, p. 26. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Utilitarianism | Smart | Rawls I 187 Utilitarism/Individuals/J. C. Smart/Rawls: In a sense, classical utilitarianism ignores the distinction of individual persons. The principle of rational choice for one person is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. >rational choice. Thus, this ideal person becomes identical with the ideal compassionate observer! >Observation, >Ideal observer, >Method. I 188 Classical utilitarianism then culminates in the - impersonal - amalgamation of all desires into a single system of desires. >Generalization, >Generality. Further reading: See C. I. Lewis, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 1946; J. C. SmartVsLewis: An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, p. 26 |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Values | Lewis | Graeser I 190 Value/Validation/Lewis: These values should be considered as feeling, believing, desiring - ultimately desire of desire. HarmanVsLewis: 1) intrinsic desire of a higher level misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is, just like any intention, already self-referential. >Ethics/Harman. I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: risk of blurring the distinction between the goal (s) and the means, and thus committing oneself to the assumption that goals are equipped with means in a certain way and that’s how we come across them. --- Schwarz I 185 Value/ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: values are not inherent in the validated events, but in us. In our wishes - Problem: just because you want something, it’s not necessarily good - Solution: Wishes 2nd stage: desire not to want to smoke - best theory: dispositional - Problem: latent relativism. Schwarz I 187 LewisVsUtilitarism: neglects perspective. >Utilitarianism, >Centered world, >Relativism/Lewis, >Desire, >Disposition/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armstrong, D. | Kripke Vs Armstrong, D. | Frank I 121 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: Does not fulfill this easiest requirement: Pain must be felt as pain, otherwise it is not a pain! Causal role: e.g. intention elicits action, pain, behavior when in pain. Identity theories/KripkeVsLewis/KripkeVsArmstrong: Usually assume that stimuli and causal roles change a particular brain state to a particular psychological state. This suggests erroneously that the representatives claim that this causation is contingent. Or that the identity of this brain state with different mental states is random. Identity theory: 1. X is a brain condition 2. The fact is contingent that pain is being caused by a particular stimulus. (This sounds quite plausible after all) and evokes a certain behavior. The brain state can now also exist without causing the appropriate behavior. Thus, it seems that 1) and 2) claim that a certain pain could have existed without having been pain. Identity/KripkeVsIdentity theory: if x = y, then x and y share all their properties. Including their modal characteristics. E.g. if x is the pain and y is the brain state, it is an essential property of x to be a particular pain and an essential characteristic of y to be a particular brain state! If the relationship between the two is indeed identity, then y needs to correspond to a particular pain, and x needs to correspond to a particular brain condition, namely y. Both statements, however, seem to be wrong. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Armstrong, D. | Wright Vs Armstrong, D. | I 153 VsBasis Equations/WrightVsLewis/WrightVsArmstrong/WrightVsCounterfactual Conditionals: counterfactual conditionals have hardly been conspicuously successful in the history of philosophy. Problem: the following sentence can always be nullified if it is possible that the realization of Q could causally interfere with a fact that actually exerts influence on the truth value of P itself: P then and only if (would it be the case that Q), it would be the case that R (P = statement, Q = "light on", R = reaction). Example Johnston: a chameleon sits in the dark on a green billiard table. Then the creation of "standard" conditions can cause a change, which we can see from the skin color of the chameleon. But if the truth conditions were correctly captured by the subjunctive conditional, then we would have to say, "The chameleon is green until the lights go on". I 154 Conditional fallacy: here the class of judgments in which we are interested participates in the causal order. It cannot therefore apply a priori that the truth conditions for P are captured by the statement to be analysed. Vs: when we consider a counterfactual conditional sentence, we certainly only have to consider relevant, not absurd possible situations! VsVs: but that is so, in the case of the e.g. chameleon. The objection misses the point: the kind of equivalence we are interested in must be valid a priori. I 155 It must be possible to know a priori that the implementation of antecedence will not materially affect those relationships that may affect the actual truth values of the analysandum. But how could one know this without collateral empirical information about the peculiarity of the world one actually finds oneself in? Thus: a priori correct subjunctive conditional markings of the conditions of truth (in the discourse that interests us) are not to be obtained. The basic equation is to be rejected. Instead: "Provisional Equations"/Wright: the problem with the e.g. chameleon could not have happened if we had determined that its color is at stake under standard conditions that a standard observer has to check. Changing the truth values should not be a problem if it is the truth value of P under C conditions (no other circumstances) that S is to judge under C conditions. Provisional Equation: If CS, then (It would be the case that P then and only if S would judge that P). So we do not concentrate on bi-conditionals with conditional parts to the right, but on conditionals with bi-conditional consequences. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Armstrong, D. | Stalnaker Vs Armstrong, D. | I 9 Def Universals/Armstrong/Lewis: repeatable entities that are fully present when a single thing instantiated them. StalnakerVsLewis: what shall the difference between "fully present" and "partly present" be? That is too obscure. I 10 Properties/universals/StalnakerVsArmstrong: I do not want to be nominalistic but the model of property space does not suggest things like the ones Armstrong favored. E.g. if the property red is a region in space property (prop.sp.) then it would be like to say that the c is part of the rose as to say that Texas is a complete part of George W. Bush when he is in Texas. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Armstrong, D. | Wessel Vs Armstrong, D. | I 305 Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law when true unreal conditional statements correspond to it. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong). In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects. Laws like that of the coil also apply to specimens brought to earth by aliens during the Stone Age. I 306 It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional theorem depends on the real statement. Legal statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa! Example ... "Even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "true anyway". Everyday translation: For example "It is not like it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain". |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Attribution Theory | Castaneda Vs Attribution Theory | Frank I 322 Attribution theory/Terminology/Castaneda: his expression of the theory of Chisholm/Lewis, self-attribution. Theory/Terminology/Castaneda: represents what he called dia philosophy: alternative theories can be evolved tgether. CastanedaVsChisholm: VsAttributionstheorie: does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem (SB). I 323 "Unsustainable Fichteanism": Fichte: no consciousness without self-consciousness. I 329 Proposition/Belief/Sself-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2. Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but it lacks a convincing justification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Barcan, R. | Cresswell Vs Barcan, R. | Hughes I 150 Existence/Modality/Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: there are versions of T, S4 with and without BF (but not of S5). Question: Can we provide an analysis of the validity that matches the versions without BF, namely PK + T and PK + T S4? Barcan formula/Camps: VsBarcan: Prior (1957), Hintikka (1961), Myhill (1958) Defense: Barcan (1962) Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: for our purposes we best consider it in this form (x) Lfx > L(x)fx (notation: (x) L phi x > L(x) phi x). Everyday language translation/Hughes/Cresswell: if everything necessarily has a certain property phi, it is necessarily the case that everything has that property. ((s) i.e. not: "there is necessarily".) VsBarcan/Hughes/Cresswell: because of the fact that everything that exists is necessarily phi the possibility is not excluded that there might be things (or might have been) that are not phi, and in this case it would not be a necessary truth, that everything is phi. Hughes/Cresswell: This objection is based on the assumption that in different possible worlds ) objects may not only have properties that are different from those they have in the real world , but that there may even be objects that do not exist in the real world at all. Semantics of possible worlds/Semantics/Predicate calculus. Modality/Hughes/Cresswell: now it is at least plausible to assume that the semantics that we have given for the modal predicate calculus implicitly negates this condition, since we assumed in each model a single individuals range which is the same for all possible worlds the validity of the BF indeed depends on this property of the semantics. ((s)> LewisVsKripke, KripkeVsLewis). I 151 Then we can gain a semantic in which BF is invalid by allowing models where different possible worlds are assigned different ranges. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Behaviorism | Lewis Vs Behaviorism | I (a) 15 LewisVsBehaviorism: My principle (that events are defined by their >causal roles) is better: 1. Events can become real. 2. It also allows us to include other events to typical causes and effects, through which an event is defined. ((s)VsLewis: one can can interpose as many descriptions as one wants between catalyst and effects. But it is not possible to do so for as many phenomenons as one wants. 3. We are not forced to define an event by stating all causes and effects of every one of his occurrences. (The typical ones are sufficient). I (a) 15 > I (a) 15 LewisVsBehaviorism: He does not acknowledge that the event is something different because of its defining causes and manifestations. By using his criteria, he can only partially explain what an event is. It always leads to an assumption. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Bigelow, J. | Lewis Vs Bigelow, J. | Big I 222 Laws of Nature/LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be described adequately in a non-modal language. And this because NG is not only a regularity. logical form: i.e. a NG cannot only be represented in this form: (x)(Fx > Gx) logical form : a NG will often be a universal generalization (Gen)[universelle Generalisierung (UG)]. But it may also be a different generalization or a different form of sentence. But we are assuming here that laws of nature involve universal generalizations, and will therefore have the following form: I 223 natL(x)(Fx > Gx). (x) Fx would > would Gx) ((s) If something were an F, it would be a G). LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view on NG which we defend. LewisVsBigelow (1979): the theory is circular. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: Vsmodal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: We explain laws through accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility through laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: If Lewis is right, our theory is circular. Lösung/Lewis: s.u. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: We deny that accessibility must be explained through similarity. The world that has the easiest access is not necessarily the world which resembles the other one the most. >Similarity metrics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Austin Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Sellars I XVI Uncorrectability/AustinVsLewis, Cl.I./AustinVsChisholm: it is wrong to believe that statements about how a speaker conceives something are excluded from error. One cannot deceive oneself with regard to his own ideas, but mistakes can occur in the description of one's own ideas, recognition and memories. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm I 43 CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist. Frank I 330 Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution. I 332 Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting. I 333 Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought. I 338 Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window. I 375 Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax. Fra I 380 Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Lycan Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Cresswell II 183 Self-Attribution/Boer/LycanVsLewis/LycanVsChisholm: (Boer/Lycan (1980, 445)) the term is anything but clear. Self-Reference/Lakoff/Cresswell: (Lakoff 1972, 639): Example "I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed myself". (Stechow 1982, 43-45). |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Fraassen Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 115 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.co./Causation/Cause/Lewis/Fraassen: Under certain circumstances, after all, it is logically correct to say: whenever "A is the cause of B" is true, it is also true that if A had not existed, B would not have existed either. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsLewis: Problem: E.g. Assuming, if the alarm had not gone off, David would have not woken up; we will concede that, however: if he had not slept the night before, he would not have woken up! Problem: it should not be the cause of his awakening that he went to sleep. Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual conditional sorts out the nodes in the causal network, while "because" points to specific factors. Relevance: E.g. falling asleep is not relevant for waking up at a certain time, even though it is a necessary condition. Not every necessary condition is relevant. Context-Dependent/Fraassen: every theory of causality must explain what is discarded as unimportant. And this is done in relation to context. This, in turn, is objective. That much context dependency must always be. Problem: there is still much more of it if we are dealing with counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FrassenVsLewis: in science, there is nothing that corresponds to counterfactual conditionals with their extreme context dependence: Science is not context-dependent. Ceteris Paribus/Fraassen: the factors that are held fixed are in the mind of the speaker! They are speaker-dependent! And it depends on the broader context, whether what I silently presume collides with the situation or not. E.g. The match is dry. I 118 E.g. Danny is interested in women. Would he be a lesbian if he were a woman? Solution: the content of "ceteris paribus" is not only determined by the one sentence and the specific situation, but also by factors of context. FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditional (if they are, as I believe, context-dependent). Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/LoN/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is or at least a law-like statement. Because only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals. FraassenVsCounterfactual Conditionals/FraassenVsGoodman: this idea needs to be reversed: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, then, because they are context-dependent. Law/LoN/Fraassen: the concept of law does not point to any objective distinction in nature. Counterfactual Conditionals/Explanation/Fraassen: nevertheless, I believe that counterfactual conditionals are suitable for explanations, but that means that explanations are crucially context-dependent. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz Vs Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz I 131 Similarity criteria/VsLewis: but even so a counterfactual dependence without causality would be possible: E.g. the halting problem would be solvable, were the PL decidable (because counterfactual conditionals with a false antecedent is always true with Lewis) but that one is not the cause of the other. Vs counterfactual conditional/Vs co.co: Problem: after the previous analysis every event would also cause itself: it would not happen, then it would not have happened! E.g. Jaegwon Kim (1973(1), 1974(2)): if Socrates had not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow, e.g. had I not turned the window handle, I would not have opened the window, e.g. had I not written "rr", I would not have written "Larry". Everything counterfactual relations without causality. Solution/Lewis: we must limit the Relata A and B: they may neither be mathematical truths nor be identical to each other. Allowed are only contingent, non-overlapping single events. Overlapping/Schwarz: "Non-overlapping" is weaker than "not identical". ((s) "overlapping" can also be "not identical". This excludes that e.g. a football match caused its first half..) ((s)> Hume: Only between non-identical events causality can be effective). LewisVsKim: so also its examples are done: partly the entities Kim considered, are no events (e.g. Xanthippe) partly it is a single event, described by two identifiers (e.g. window), or two events that are not completely separated (E.g. Larry). (1981c(3), 124). 1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572 2. Jaegwon Kim [1974]: “Noncausal Connections”. Nous, 8: 41–52. In [Kim 1993] 3. David Lewis [1981c]: “Nachwort (1978) zu ‘Kausalität’ ”. In Güuter Posch (ed.), Kausalität: Neue Texte, Stuttgart: Reclam, 124–126 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Counterpart Theory | Bigelow Vs Counterpart Theory | I 168 VsCounterpart theory/cth/Bigelow/Pargetter: can also be avoided differently. By conceiving properties as relations. Because properties are subject to change, we can consider them as a relation between an individual and a point in time. I 193 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity, because it presupposes modal concepts. That means it cannot justify modal logic. I 195 Counterpart theory/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his cth has two components that must fulfil the counterparts (CP): 1) sufficient similarity with an original in the actual world, i.e. there is a "threshold" value. 2) the world companions have to resemble the actual thing at least in the same way as the cp. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory: Problem: the threshold value again conatains presupposed modal concepts ((s) option to deviate from the real world). Ad 2) That excludes options that we do not want to exclude. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Counterpart Theory | Plantinga Vs Counterpart Theory | Black I 57 Counterpart Theory/C.Th./PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory: (1974(1), p. 115 f, 1987(2), p. 209): According to Lewis, strictly speaking all things would then have all their properties essentially, because there are no possible worlds in which they themselves (not just any placeholders) have different properties. E.g. if it was one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then a different possible world would be real, and none of us would be there. Kripke similar: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: E.g. if we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And he could not care less. (Kripke 1980(3), 44 f). 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell Schwarz I 100 Properties/VsCounterpart Theory/Schwarz: if we reject counterparts and temporal parts, we have to conceive all properties as masked relations to times and possible worlds. Then there are obviously many more fundamental relations. Stalnaker I 117 Identity/Stalnaker: ...these examples remind us of what an inflexible relation identity is. Our intuitions about the flexibility of possibilities contradict this rigid constitution of identity. Counterpart Theory/C.Th./Stalnaker: tells us "Relax!". We should introduce a more flexible relation for the cross-world identity that allows intransitivity and asymmetry. Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: the 3rd motivation for them is the one that is closest to the phenomena and makes the least metaphysical presuppositions. Vs: actualism and the representative of a primitive thisness may have difficulty with that. I 118 PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory/Nathan SalmonVsCounterpart Theory/Stalnaker: Counterpart Theory/Plantinga/Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1) Metaphysical Thesis: that the realms of different possible worlds do not overlap ((s) >Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2) Semantic Thesis: that modal predicates should be interpreted in terms of counterparts instead of in terms of the individuals themselves. Ad 1): seems to suggest an extreme essentialism, according to which nothing could have been different than it actually is. Extreme Essentialism/Plantinga: would the thesis that "~if a leaf had dropped a day earlier in the mountains of the Northern Cascades in October 1876 than it actually did, I would either be non-existent, or a person who is different from me. And that is certainly wrong". (Plantinga 1974)(4). can ad 2): Can the semantic part of the doctrine solve that? 4. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press Plantinga/Salmon: it cannot. It can only mask the metaphysical consequences. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Descriptivism | Lewis Vs Descriptivism | Stalnaker I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: Is simply a way to describe a part of the language vi another part.((s) The only possibility,according to Lewis and Stalnaker.) The broader paradigm of Kaplan corresponds to: Def Global Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: (Lewis 1984, 224) The entirety of a speaker's language is taken as a description of the world. (Theory). All terms of the language are interpreted at the same time, and statements on the world are made by establishing the theory. i.e. the terms refer to "whatever things", characteristics and relations render the theory true, as much as it is possible. LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: This cannot work because it is then impossible to explain how statements can be wrong. This is Putnam's Paradox. Def Putnam's Paradox/Stalnaker/(s): If a language is taken as a whole in order to explain all terms (and to set all its references) at the same time, then statements refer to "whatever things". And then relations and characteristics are always going to be what renders the theory the most truthful. Language/Thinking/World/Reality/Lewis/Stalnaker: Additional condition for global descriptivism: The easy terms must split the word "at its joints". ((s) But this is not given with one language.) LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism. StalnakerVsGlobal Descriptivism/StalnakerVsLewis: Such a metasemantic theory is not going to work, but if it were, the theory would give us quite a different depiction of our thoughts' contents. 1. Were the theory holistic, whatever somebody thinks depends from everything else he/she is thinking 2. Were the theory solipsistic, causal relations would depend on the use of the person. Then "Tullius" would mean something different for each person using it. Problem: We would then only speak about the language in the highest degree of generalization. We would not only be unable to refer to singular things which are different from the others, we would also describe the things not by their basic characteristics, but only in terms of characteristics and relations which fit the best, in order to render our theory, which is not interpreted, true. Vs: Representatives of the broader paradigm of Kaplan (semantic, not meta-semantic) could reply: The built-in two-dimensional frame in language allows us to express propositions which convey more direct statements on the world because Secondary propositions: which are set by our thoughts and utterances, are singular propositions and propositions which express basic characteristics and relations. However: primary propositions: they represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic//broader frame of Kaplan: based on him, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. ((s) mentioned, not used/Mention/Use). Secondary proposition/semantic: they are clearly set as a function of the facts. Problem: we do not have a cognitive access to them. Bsp Propositions, which we only know because of descriptions: "The sentence which is cited in Frank Jakson's "From Metaphysics to Ethics"on page 26, lines 3-4". E.g. The content of the first sentence Napoleon spoke to Josephine after his coronation. However: these propositions cannot be claimed by saying, e.g. "I hereby claim the proposition which fulfills the following condition." Secondary Proposition/semantic/Stalnaker: By semantically (not meta-semantically) interpreting the two-dimensional frame, the secondary propositions seem to be like these examples. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Endurantism | Stalnaker Vs Endurantism | I 135 Vague identity/time/possible world/poss.w./Stalnaker: I ask with some examples for temporal and for cross world identity whether Salmon refuted vague identity with his argument. E.g. in Philadelphia, there are two prominent fish restaurants named "Bookbinder's". They compete with each other. B1: "Bookbinder’s classic fish restaurant" B2: "The old original Bookbinder's". B0: The original, only restaurant from 1865. Today's two restaurants may go back to the old and have a entangled history. Question: does Salmon's argument show, I 136 that there must be a fact (about the history) that decides on which restaurant is the original? One thing is clear: B1 unequal B2. Transitive identity/transitivity/Stalnaker: then due to the transitivity of the identity B0 = B1 and B0 = B2 cannot exist at the same time. Semantic indeterminacy/Stalnaker: but one is tempted to say that there is a certain semantic indeterminacy here. Question: can we reconcile this with Salmon's argument (SalmonVsVague identity)? Stalnaker: I think we can do so. Perdurantism/perduration/Stalnaker: e.g. if we say the name "B0" dates back to the time of 1865 when there was a certain restaurant "Bookbinder's" this is the most natural way. Endurantism/enduration/Stalnaker: e.g. but we can also say B0 is one of the today existing two restaurants "Bookbinder’s". StalnakerVsEndurantism. Endurantism/Stalnaker: here it is similar to vague descriptions: example "B0" is ambiguous! It is unclear whether he refers to B1 or to B2. (Indefinite reference). Perdurantism/Stalnaker: here the reference is clear. ((s) Because the original restaurant does not exist anymore. B0 therefore clearly means the original restaurant because it cannot be confused with one of the two today existing) Also, of course "B1" and "B2" are unambiguous. Question: given Salmon's argument: how can it then be indefinite if B0 = B2? Stalnaker: that just depends on if we understand continuants as endurant or perdurant. continuant/perdurantism/endurantism/Stalnaker: Perdurantism/Stalnaker: can understand continuants e.g. as four-dimensional objects (four dimensionalism) which are extended in time exactly as they are extended in space. Then the example of the restaurants corresponds to the example of buildings (see above). Example buildings: the indeterminacy is there explained by the indeterminacy of the concept "building". One building is maybe a part of another. Example restaurants: according to this view each has a temporal part in common with the original. It is indeterminate here which of the temporal parts is a restaurant and which is a composition of multiple temporal parts of different restaurants. I 137 Therefore, it is indefinite to which of these different entities "B0" refers (indefinite reference). Perdurantism/continuant/Stalnaker: one might think, but we have a specific reference, like in the example of the building through a demonstrative with a ostension: when we say "this building". But that does not work with the perdurantistic conception of restaurants. ((s) As an institution, not as a building. This should be perdurant here that means not all temporal parts are simultaneously present and anyway not as material objects). Four dimensionalism/Stalnaker: therefore has two possible interpretations: perdurantistic (here) and endurantistic (see below). Endurantism/four dimensional/four dimensionalism/continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. That means they are at any moment with all their (only spatial) parts present. Nevertheless, they exist in time. LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense. StalnakerVsLewis: that may not be quite so because the representatives acknowledge that some things e.g. football matches, wars, centuries indeed have temporal parts. Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an obscure doctrine some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend nor fight him. Endurantism: example restaurants: In 1865 there is only one restaurant "Bookbinder's" there are no other candidates for this description. Even if our criterion for "restaurant" is unclear. It seems that we have a definite reference for an endurant thing B0. Also for the today existing restaurant B1 we seem to have definite reference. Salmon/Stalnaker: if we accept his argument again, there must then be a fact which decides whether B0 is identical to B1 or not? StalnakerVs: here the semantic indeterminacy may be subtle but it still exists. We show this like that: Identity in time/Stalnaker: example statue/clay: yesterday there was the pile, today the statue, so both can not be identical. They have different historical properties. This known argument does not require four dimensionalism. Four dimensionalism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: statue and pile as four dimensional objects: here only parts of them exist today. Endurantism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: if we say both - Statue and pile - are at today "fully present" (it would have to be explained how) Salmon's argument still shows that both are (now) different. The argument does not depend on the fact that they have different parts. It requires only that they have different historical properties. Endurantism/Stalnaker: example restaurants: suppose the concept Restaurant is indefinite. After some arbitrary clarifications B0 = B1 will be, after others B0 = B2. Disambiguation/Stalnaker: then B0 has after some disambiguations temporal properties it would not have after other disambiguations. Semantic indeterminacy/reference/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: the reference of "B0" is then dependent on the way of our arbitrary assumptions for disambiguation. SalmonVsStalnaker/Stalnaker: accuses me of some inconsistencies but I have shown indeterminacy of reference while Salmon refers to indeterminacy of identity between certain objects. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Ersatz World | Lewis Vs Ersatz World | Schwarz I 69 Linguistic Ersatzism/Schwarz: LewisVs: If possible worlds (poss.w.)are a set of propositions, why is the actual world not a set of propositions? (1973b(1),16,90) Schwarz I 70 VsVs: Because it is ersatzism which actually denies that things of the same form are like the actual world.(> ersatz worlds/Lewis). LewisVs Ersatzism: natural languages do not have enough sentences at their disposal in order to build a poss.w. for each mode how a world could be: Language/Infinity/Lewis: If propositions are finite chains of signs from a finite alphabet,there are at the utmost Aleph 1 of a set of propositions, as many as real numbers. But there are many more modes how a world could have been. (see above paragraph 3.2), at the least Aleph2.(1973b(1),90,1986e(2), 143) Schwarz I 71 Possibilia/LewisVsErsatzism/Schwarz: 4. (Inhabitants of poss.w.): persistent problem: singular statements about them are something akin to descriptions or open sentences in linguistic ersatzism. Problem: as such, things, which are described in exactly the same way, cannot be differentiated. ((s) e.g. A particles, which is different than above: we were talking about identical characteristics, not identical things.) e.g. two dragons may live in a symmetrical world which can be described in an identical way (as long as there are no haecceities). Then, descriptions are identical, but not the dragons. (1986e(2),157f). VsErsatzism/linguistic/Lewis/Schwarz: 5. Not every set of propositions corresponds to a possibility, e.g. if Kripke necessarily is a human, and cannot be totally red and totally green at the same time, sets of propositions which state the contrary need to be excluded as well as sets in which the elements are incompatible. E.g. particular propositions regarding the distribution of microphysical structures are incompatible with the statement that there is a donkey. Problem: How can this be determined without using modal terms, e.g. purely syntactical. 1. D. Lewis [1973b]: Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell Stalnaker I 28 Ersatz World/LewisVsErsatzism/LewisVsModerate modal realism: This is why every moderate theory stumbles: it sees possible worlds as ways which represent the actualized [ersatz] world as a special one. This world shall be special because it is the only one to represent the concrete one. And as such it is shall not only be special from the own point of view, but from each and every one. So, not contingent special (extraordinary). ((s) Ersatz world/((s): an ersatz world is a set of propositions.) ((s) As such, it is necessary that the world has exactly the elements it has in the set, because if not, it would be a different set. It is not contingent that the set {0,1} (as an example)has the elements which it has. But it is contingent that the poss.w. has some of its objects.) StalnakerVsLewis: The cursive sentence ("...from each and every [point of view]) is wrong. But this is a special fact about the actual world: it alone corresponds to the only concrete world. But this is a contingent fact, i.e. it is not even a fact from the point of view of other possible worlds. Problem: Does it not mean that only from an objective point of view possible persons and their surroundings are as real as we are? Only if the objective or absolute point of view is identified with a neutral point of view outside of all possible worlds. Such a point of view does not exist. I 29 Objectivity/absolute/Stalnaker: the absolute, objective point of view is the view from our actual world. Fiction: We concede that fictional characters have, from their point of view, exactly the same right to determine their reality, as we do. But their point of view is fictional. Semantic thesis: Is the thesis that the deictic analysis of "actual" is the correct one. Metaphysical thesis: defines that the actual world's actuality is nothing more than the relation between the actual world and the things that exist in it. The semantic thesis can therefore be accepted, and exclude any universes from the ontology. I 63 …naturally, there are inconsistent sets of propositions. Metaphysics: Metaphysics cannot be obtained by calling such sets of propositions poss.w. ((s) > LewisVsErsatz Worlds). Possible worlds/Louis: Our main contentious point is about the role of poss.w. in the explanations of possibility, and more generally, in the explanation of propositions and relations Question: Should we analyze possible worlds with the terms of propositions or analyze them the other way round? VsErsatz worlds/Lewis/Louis: We should not identify poss.w. with sets propositions, since I believe, that propositions are sets of possible worlds. I 64 Content: It deals with a term of content which is not tied to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar idea that the intentional content of a sentence or a thought are the truth conditions (tr.cond.). It is about a concept of content that is not at all bound to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar thought that the intentional content of a sentence or thought is the truth conditions. tr. cond.: are the ways how the world should be in order for the sentence to be true. It is known what the sentence means if it is known which poss.w. makes it true and which one does not. Possible/Possibility/Louis: If one has a term of a possible world which, if realized, would render the proposition true, then it will be shown that the proposition is possible. Then the following will be true,regardless which metaphysics one follows: Modal operator/Quantification/Louis: If there is one domain of all poss.w., all the modal operators can be interpreted in terms of unrestricted quantification in this domain. Necessity is truth in all poss.w., possibility in at least one. metaphysical necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: this is what I mean when I say "metaphysical possible". (Quantification of the set of all possiible worlds). This is also possible with unrestricted quantification without ruining the terms "possible", "could", etc. Restriction: It should be known what the basis of the restriction should be. Impossible world/imposs.w./LouisVsImpossible world: In any case the conclusion will inevitable come that at least some impossible statements are impossible because they are not true in any possible world. And this because of compositionality, which you will surely agree to as well. This is why there are propositions that are neither true in all the possible worlds nor in all the impossible worlds. Possibility/Error/Not knowing[Unwissen]/Louis: Naturally,one can be wrong what is possible in this unrestricted sense. One can also be wrong whether a possibility has been rightly conceived. Solution: Statements complexly represent possibilities. I 65 As such, it is possible to discover that a proposition is impossible. It would be wrong to state that a term creates a situation that renders a statement true, and then judge afterwards that this sort of situation does not fulfill a metaphysical condition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Extensionalism | Verschiedene Vs Extensionalism | Lewis IV 256 Lewis: I really do not know what the Intensionalist (I) Vs Extensionalism (E) should say! I know several unsatisfactory arguments. ("I" in the English text also for "I, Lewis") (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 1. one could say that the extensionalism is more complicated. It needs two more categories and one more lexicon object. VsVs: this is bad for two reasons: a) Extensionality itself is generally regarded as an important dimension of simplicity. b) I agree with E that a complete approach must also take into account the speaker's pause at the beginning of the sentence. E has already done this with its syntax and semantics! The intensionalist still has to find a place for it. (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 2. One could object that it goes against our paradigm that extensions must be shared: Example "Boston" simply names Boston and not instead a function of indices. Problem: this paradigm applies to English, Polish, German, etc. but not necessarily to unexplored indigenous languages. Even if the intensionalist suspected that the language is very related to ours, one cannot expect E to agree that the paradigms are applicable! For E and I do not agree which language is theirs! Tarski's convention W: does not help here: because the native language does not correspond by the way not uncontroversially to our metalanguage of their language. Therefore the only versions of these principles that are applicable are stated in translations of these terms. Example E and I may agree that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form "_____ designates ___ in their language" or IV 256/257 "_____ is a name that has ____ as an extension in your language." should be true whenever the first blank space is filled with a name (in our language) with a name of the native language and the second with a translation of into our language. But that does not lead us anywhere, because we do not agree at all about names and what their correct translations are! (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 3. I could try to argue that native language cannot be extensional because in it some inference patterns are invalid that are valid in any extensional language. For example, identity: inferences with Leibniz's identity (Leibniz' Law) or existential generalization lead from true premises to false conclusions in native language. Extensionalist/VsLewis: should agree that Leibniz's law receives truth in every extensional language and that it is not preserved in my counter-examples (which?). But he should not agree that such inferences are cases of Leibniz identity! Identity/Leibniz/Lewis: an inference with Leibniz' law needs an identity premise and how to identify it? Not by looking at three or four horizontal lines! Semantic: an expression with two gaps expresses identity, if and only if 1. the result of inserting names into the gaps is a sentence, 2. the sentence thus formed is true if the names are coextensive, otherwise false. Def Identity Premise: is a sentence thus formed. Problem: since E and I disagree on what the coextensive names are, they disagree on what the expressions are that express identity, which propositions are the identity premises, and which inferences are real instances of Leibniz's law. We are ignoring the difference of opinion here about whether a phrase S must be introduced by a pause to be a sentence at all. To be precise, if ",/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Li, then " ,/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Le. The original version without is no inference at all in Le, because its "premises" and "conclusions" are S names and not sentences. ((s) Extensional Language/(s): how is it possible at all, if no predicates (properties) are allowed - then is not the form subject predicate at all?) Vs: the form is then: a is an element of the set B. (in vain) VsExtensionalism: 4. I could argue ad hominem that E has not really escaped intentionality because the things he takes as extensions are intensional entities. Functions of indices to truth values are usually identified with propositions (especially if the indices consist of possible worlds and little more). And these functions are identified equally with individual terms. How can such intensional entities then be extensions? LewisVsVs: this is just a mix-up! Intension is relational! ((s) It depends on the consideration whether something is an intension or an extension). Intensions are things ((s) entities) that play a certain role in semantics and not things of a certain sort. E and I agree that in a suitable language the same thing that is the intention of one expression is also the extension of another. For example, when we speak technical English in a fragment that is suitable as the meta-meta-language of a smaller fragment, we agree that one and the same thing is both, the intention of expression in the object language "my hat" IV 258 and the extension of the metaphorical expression "intension of "my hat"". ((s) The same thing, not the same expression). Lewis: the thing itself is neither extension nor intension. It is true that some entities can only serve as extensions, while other functions of indices can serve as both. But there is no thing that would be unsuitable to be an extension. Ontology/(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 5. one might think that the extensionalist attributes an extravagant ontology to the natives: For example, if the intensionalist says that a word of the natives designates a concrete material mountain, then E says he designates something more esoteric: a set-theoretical object, formed from a realm of individuals that includes unrealized possibilities. But also E and I believe in esoteric things if they do not want to contradict themselves. We have no doubt that we can name them. We agree that the natives have names for even more far-fetched things like gods (according to the Intensionalist) or functions of indices to such gods (according to the Extensionalist). Ontology/Vs Extensionalism: I should perhaps argue better that certain unesoteric things are missing! Ontology/Kripke: (conversational, 1972): it is wrong to attribute to someone an ontology that contains sets without elements or functions without arguments and values, etc. LewisVsVs: this is a plausible principle. But did E violate it by saying that the names of the natives are functions of indices and not names of concrete things? I do not think so. The ascribed ontology is not the same as the ascribed set of name carriers. For example, if our language is attributed an ontology, it contains all natural numbers, not just the small minority of them that actually bear names! It is not significant that the amount of name carriers violates Kripke's closure principle unless it can be shown that this is the totality of the attributed ontology. But it is difficult to say what ontology, if any, is attributed by the use of Le. One should look at the range of quantifiers, but Le has no quantifiers at all! Quantifiers: make sentences. But in Le only the predicate does that and that is not a quantifier. The transformation Lp of Parsons is different: it has a range. The set D, so that we get intended truth conditions for the propositions of Lp that transform the propositions of Li, then and only when D is included in the range of bound variables. (This assumes that the predicates of Lp have intended interpretations). The set D is the same as the set of extensions of expressions in Le. It violates Kripke's closing principle ((s) that no empty sets should be attributed, see above), so it cannot be attributed to anyone as ontology. ((s) because there are no bound variables in Le.). I.e. if an extensionalist claims that the native speaks Lp, veiled by transformations, we have a remedy against him. But E himself does not represent that! Perhaps one can show that if it is bad to attribute the use of Lp, IV 259 that it is also bad to attribute the use of Le? But I do not see that yet. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Fine, Kit | Lewis Vs Fine, Kit | V 41 Analysis 2: a counterfactual conditional "If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C" is true then and only when a (accessible) world where A and C are true is everywhere more similar to our actual world than a world where A is true and C is false. V 43 Kit FineVsLewis/VsAnalysis 2: e.g. the counterfactual conditional "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust" is true or can be imagined as being true. According to Lewis' analysis the co.co. is then probably wrong because by imagining just a slight change in reality, the effects will not exist. >Counterfactual conditional. LewisVsFine: Surely the event or not of an atomic holocaust will strongly contribute to a basing relation or not. But the similarity relation (s.r.) which rules over the counterfactual conditionals is not one of those! Still, s.r. can be a relation for similarity everywhere, but not because it determines explicit judgments, rather because it is a result of many single similarity relations according to particular priorities of evaluation. V 44 w0: e.g. Nixon pushed the button at the time t. w0. This can but does not need to be in our actual world. This world could have deterministic laws, and the world is sufficient for our darkest visions of buttons that are pushed. A nuclear holocaust happens because all connections of the button do work. There are now all possible worlds where Nixon pushes the button, but those worlds are different from our actual world. Which world resembles our the most? Some are simply squib loads or the missile is simply filled with confetti. e.g. w1: w1 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. In the last moment both worlds diverge: In w1 the deterministic laws of w0 are violated. Lewis: Supposing a minuscule little miracle happens: Maybe some extra neurons in Nixon's brain. As a result, Nixon pushes these extra neurons. The holocaust happens. As such, both worlds are quite different from each other, at least regarding the surface of the planet. ((s) It was only counterfactual in w0 : If he pushes, the holocaust would happen.) Lewis: so w1 is sufficient for analysis 1 (asymetry by postulate.) (We assume that we are in w0.) It should appear that worlds, like w1 in the basing relation, have more resemblance than all the other worlds in which Nixon would have pushed the button. Miracle/Lewis: I simply mean the violation of laws of nature. But the violated laws are not in the same world! This would be impossible! V 45 Miracle: Relation between possible worlds because the laws of a single world are not violated! w2: A second class of candidates of worlds that resemble w0 the most: without any miracle, the deterministic laws of w0 are followed exactly. Difference to w0: Nixon pushes the button. Determinism: After this, both worlds are either always or never the same. This is why both are never exactly the same for any period of time. They are even different in the past of a long time ago. Problem: It cannot be stated what can be done in order to make the difference in recent past disappear. It is difficult to imagine how two deterministic worlds an actually be only slightly different over a long period of time. There is too much probability for small differences, which become a big sum. Naturally, worlds like w2 are not the most similar world for a world w0 in which Nixon pushes the button. This would lead to infinite backwards arguments. Bennett: counterfactual conditionals would also be rendered senseless. We do not know enough to know which of them would be true. To conclude: what we learn by comparing w1 to w2: in the basing relations, a small miracle is needed in order to have a perfect concordance of single facts. w3: begins like w1: w3 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. Then a small miracle happens, Nixon pushes the button, but there is no war! This is because a second small miracle happens immediately after the push. It can as localized as the first one. The fatal signal is erased. Still, Nixon's action has left its marks: his fingerprints on the button, an empty bottle of gin, etc. V 46 There are numerous differences between w3 and w0, but no one is particularly important. w3: There is more than only small differences, e.g. Nixon's memoirs have no influence on later generations, etc. But even if it is unclear whether the differences will have strong repercussions it is not important. Schwarz I 51 Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./FineVsLewis: His analysis clearly gives wrong results even with our vague intuitive similarity standards, e.g. "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear war". Problem: A possible world, in which Nixon pushed the button and an atomic war was started, must then resemble our actual world more than a world, in which he pushed the button, the mechanism failed and nothing happened. But an undestroyed world should surely have more similarities with our world? LewisVsFine: Here wrong resemblance criteria were used. The important categories are those in which his analysis is proven correct. We need to find out what we now about truth and wrongness of the co.co. in order to ascertain whether we can find a sort of basing relation.[ (1979b(1),43, 1986f(2),211). Lewis/Schwarz: this is why his theory of counterfactual conditionals is more a frame for such theories. Analysis tells us which sort of facts make co.co. true, but it does not tell us for which specific conditionals in specific contexts they are. 1. D. Lewis [1979b]: “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. Nous, 13: 455–476. 2. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Dennett Vs Fodor, J. | I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive Barrier/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings. >Intelligence. Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today. I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret. Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. eye of the frog: reports about meaning too vague if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Dennett. I 571 Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply cannot distinguish what was the selectioning environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says. Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the uncertainty that Fodor criticizes is in reality the material with which evolution works, its condition. (the "borderline cases"). I 571 Meaning/Meaning/Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the view that there must be something in particular which the frog’s eye "means" is simple essentialism. I Lanz 299 DennettVsFodor: denies Fodor’s assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing personal states. Thus, Dennett denies their feature: Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). Rorty I 279 DennettVsFodor/Rorty: two subjects can absolutely believe the same thing, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Accordingly, no conclusions are required from the propositions of the processors to the propositions which the subject believes. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricists, the causal process does not need to comply with any conclusion chain, which justifies the opinions of the person. Explanations may have their private character, justification is public in as far as disagreements of different people on the functioning of their tricky minds neither refer nor should refer. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Folk Psychology | Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology | Schwarz I 147 Analytical Functionalism/Terminology/Schwarz: this is how Lewis's position is sometimes called because of its holistic characterization. (Block, 1978(1), 271ff). Schw I 148 "Analytical": because the characterization of causal roles in Lewis is supposed to be analytical. But if functionalism is to be understood as Vs Identity theory, then Lewis is not a functionalist, but an identity theorist. Standard objections Vs functionalism do not affect Lewis at all: e.g. mental states: Mental states/Lewis: for their characterization it also needs an essential connection to the perceived environment etc. Therefore there is no danger that we would have to attribute feelings to the Chinese economy. (>DennettVsSearle?). On the other hand, it does not only depend on input-output relations, so that machines that behave externally like us, but are internally completely different (E.g. Blocks (1981)(2) "Blockhead", Searle: e.g. Chinese Room (1980)(3), would have desires, pains and opinions (> E.g. Martian pain). Pain/VsLewis/VsFolk Psychology: if we want to know what pain is, we should ask pain researchers and not the man on the street. Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Schwarz: Thesis: that we interpret the behavior of our conspecifics with the help of an internalized set of rules and principles and not, for example, through mental simulation. This is completely wrongly attributed to Lewis. He never expressed his opinion on it. Everyday Psychology/Lewis: is not a special "theory". It only assumes that we have opinions and expectations about mental states but not necessarily about conscious ones. (1997c(4): 333, early: "Collection of Platitudes" (1972,§3)(5). LewisVsPsychology: that would be a change of subject. We want to know whether a biological state plays the role we associate with "pain". Schw I 149 SchwarzVsLewis: the contrast may be less strong, some pain researchers might know better what pain is. E.g. depression. 1. Ned Block [1978]: "Troubles with Functionalism". In C.W. Savage (Hg.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2 .Ned Block [1981]: “Psychologism and Behaviourism”. Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43 3. John Searle [1980]: “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417– 457 4. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 5. David Lewis [1972]: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Mellor Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Schwarz I 25 Vierdimensionalismus/Lewis: Zeit-Operator;: verschiebt den Bereich: Bsp „1642 gab es keine Kuckucksuhren“ ist wie Bsp „in Australien gibt es keine Kuckucksuhren“ Der Satz über 1642 ist wahr, wenn es in diesem Bereich (Teil der Realität) keine Kuckucksuhren gibt. Intrinsische Veränderung/Zeit/Vierdimensionalismus: Problem: Bsp ich mache den Satz wahr: „letzte Nacht lag jemand in meinem Bett“ aber ich sitze hier am Tisch. Schwarz I 26 intuitive Antwort: (einige Vertreter): letzte Nacht geschlafen zu haben, ist doch gar nicht unverträglich damit, jetzt wach zu sein. Die Dinge scheinen nur unverträgliche Eigenschaften zu instantiieren, diese seien in Wirklichkeit bloß zeit relativ. Gegenstände, über die wir mit „letzte Nacht“ quantifizieren, sind an sich weder schlafend noch sitzend noch sonst etwas. Sie haben auch weder Form noch Farbe. Richtig: sie sind „wach zu t“ usw. Eigenschaften: nach dieser Ansicht sind einfache Eigenschaften in Wirklichkeit Relationen zwischen merkwürdig eigenschaftslosen Dingen und Zeiten, zeit-relative Eigenschaften/LewisVs: das ist inakzeptabel. Form/Lewis: ist eine Eigenschaft und keine Relation! Eigenschaften, intrinsisch/SchwarzVsLewis: dieser hat das Problem falsch benannt, es geht nicht um intrinsische, sondern um einstellige Eigenschaften. Eigenschaften/Relation: Frage: ob Formprädikate ähnlich wie Bsp „berühmt“ und „fern“ verkappte Relationen ausdrücken. Es ist sinnlos ohne Bezug auf etwas zu sagen, jemand sei berühmt. Lewis: es ist aber wohl sinnvoll ohne Bezug auf etwas anderes zu sagen, etwas sei rot oder rund. Intrinsische Veränderung/Lewis: Lösung: nach der Analogie von Zeit und Raum: Bsp eine lange Mauer ist an manchen Stellen hoch und rot, an manchen niedrig und grau. Als ganzes ist sie weder hoch noch niedrig, weder rot noch grau. Lösung: sie setzt sich eben einfach aus verschiedenen Teilen zusammen. Schwarz I 27 Veränderung/Lewis: gewöhnliche Dinge haben zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschiedene Eigenschaften, indem sie aus Teilen mit jenen Eigenschaften zusammengesetzt sind. Identität/Zeit/zeitliche Identität/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: dann sind vergangene Dinge nicht streng identisch mit jetzigen Dingen. Das früher schlafende und der jetzt hier sitzende Ding sind nicht strikt identisch. Die verschiedenen zeitlichen Teile sind doch verschiedene Dinge! (1976b(1),68,1986e(2):204) MellorVsLewis: das ist absurd. Wenn wir von jemand reden, reden wir nicht von seinen Teilen. LewisVsVs: Bsp sicher war der ganze Mensch Hillary auf dem Mt. Everest. Lösung: Hillary hat einen vergangenen zeitlichen Teil, der auf einem vergangenen Teil der Everest ist. Edmund Hillary als ganzes erfüllt diese Bedingung. Problem: Bsp dann bin ich strenggenommen als ganzes weder wachend noch sitzend. Aber als ganzes bin ich deswegen nicht formlos. Lewis/Lösung: ich habe eine komplexe vierdimensionale Form. Es gibt immer zeitliche Teile, die ignoriert werden. Ich/Vierdimensionalismus/Lewis: “ich“ bezieht sich oft nur auf einen einzelnen zeitlichen Teil von mir. Ted Sider: (1996(3),2001a(4),188 208) hat das weiter ausgeführt: Namen beziehen sich immer auf zeitliche Teile. Ich heute Nacht war ein zeitliches Gegenstück (counterpart) von mir jetzt. 1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145– 152. In [Lewis 1986f] 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453 4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press |
Mell I D. H. Mellor Properties (Oxford Readings in Philosophy) Oxford 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Lewis Vs Frege, G. | Schwarz I 228 Predicate/Characteristic/SchwarzVsLewis/VsFrege: The assumption that for each predicate a name can be clearly allocated for a corresponding characteristic. But is nothing less than Frege's ominous axiom V(Frege 1893-1903(1),§20). RussellVsFrege: Russell's paradoxy. Some predicates, for example "_ is a characteristic that does not apply to itself" do not correspond to a characteristic. (>Heterology). Predicate/Characteristic/Lewis/Schwarz: In Lewis' metaphysics predicates as, for example, "_ is a class", "_ is a part of" and "is identical with _" do not correspond to anything that can be named with a singular term. 1. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Functionalism | Verschiedene Vs Functionalism | Münch III 338 Functionalism/Holenstein: its obvious limit refers to the phenomenal qualities. Phenomena are functionally not identifiable. It can be decided whether the property of a thing that two persons assign the adjective "red" to is functionally equivalent for them. However, it is undecidable whether both perceive the same color. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 James I 102 VsFunctionalism,VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be understood arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with probation: it can never be established whether an observation is correctly translated. (Basic sentence problem, also Quine). Schwarz I 155 VsRoll/VsLewis: a special feature of our mental states is their familiarity. We do not identify them through causal roles. LewisVsVs: integrates introspection into the causal role without further ado. The causal role of conscious experiences includes the fact that (under appropriate circumstances) they produce opinions about their own existence. (1966a(1), 103). 1. David Lewis [1966a]: “An Argument for the Identity Theory”. Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. Mit Erg¨anzungen in David M. Rosenthal (Hg.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentica-Hall, 1971 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Gadamer, G. | Block Vs Gadamer, G. | Avra I 149 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind). I 150 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Grice, P.H. | Jackson Vs Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Haecceitism | Lewis Vs Haecceitism | IV 140 LewisVsHaecceitism: Haecceitism/Possible World/poss.w./VsLewis: Followers of haecceity are not persuaded by the example of the two gods. Variant: e.g. 2 gods: both live in world W, two other gods live in world V, which differs from W because both gods have swapped their seats. The god on the highest mountain in W and the god on the coldest mountain in V are linked by a simple bond which somehow makes them one. (The same is valid for the other two.) If the god on the highest mountain in W does not know whether he sits on the hightest or the coldest mountain, then he cannot know for sure which one of the worlds is his. He may know everything about the qualitative state that can be known about his world, but he does not know whether his world is W or V. If he knew, he would know every proposition that is valid in his world. But it seems that he does not know one proposition: The one which would correspond to the sentence "I sit on the highest mountain." I/Haecceitism: If his pronoun "I" is accurate for both, his brother and him, in haecceitas on the coldest mountain, then the proposition is indeed valid in W, but not in V! IV 141 If he were to know this proposition, would he then not know that he sits on the hightest mountain? 2 gods/LewisVsHaeccetism: I would love to discover what I should know about the objects of belief, and leave the followers of haeccetism to themselves. But I cannot resist to barge in. If you were a follower of haecceitism, I would recommend you to not believe the analysis written above. Haecceitism or not, there is a kind of not knowing which cannot be healed by some sort of self-localization in the logical space. E.g. supposing that both gods have swapped their places, and it shall be conceded that the god on the highest mountain knows that his world is W and not V! He shall be all-knowing with regards to all propositions, not only the qualitative ones. Is this helpful? Do not occupy yourself with V of which he knows that he does not live there. Does he know the proposition: "I am on the highest mountain"? Naturally, he does! He knows all the propositions, and this is one of them. Does he therefore know that he sits on the highest mountain? No! Because this does not follow from it. Since he is the one on the highest mountain, his sentence expresses a particular proposition which is true in W but not in V. It is one he knows to be true. Had he been the god on the coldest mountain (which he could be for all he knows), the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W. It would be one of which he knows that it is wrong. He would know the proposition which would indeed by expressed by "I am on the highest mountain". But that does not mean that he knows whether he is on the highest mountain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 |
| Hempel, C. | Lewis Vs Hempel, C. | V 232 Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences: 1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all 2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. I prefer Peter Railton's model: Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.). We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances. Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument! LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument. V 233 Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises. 2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place. If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability. Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation: 1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws) 2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach. But this cannot be achieved! V 233/234 An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones. e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded! 2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified. 3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause. 4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause. E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. 5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model. Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them? Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.) If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments. But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough. But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions. "Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form. Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree. Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things. Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Humean Supervenience | Verschiedene Vs Humean Supervenience | Schwarz I 114 Vs Humean Supervenienz/HS/VsLewis/Schwarz: more serious: considerations to show that nomological and counterfactual truths do not supervene on the distribution of local properties. Suppose there is a basic law of nature, according to which when X and Y particles meet, there is always a Z particle. Purely by chance, however, X and Y particles never meet. The world w1, in which this law of nature exists, would then look exactly like the world w2, in which it does not exist. Both worlds agree in the distribution of local properties. But they differ in their laws of nature and above all in their counterfactual truths. (In w1 a collision would produce a particle). (Tooley 1977(1), 669 671, 2003,§4,Armstrong(2) 1983, §5.4, Carroll(3) 1994,§3.1) 1. Michael Tooley [1977]: “The Nature of Laws”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 667–698 2. David. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 3. John Carroll [1994]: Laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Jackson, F. | Schwarz Vs Jackson, F. | Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kim, Jaegwon | Lewis Vs Kim, Jaegwon | V 249 Character/Naming/Event/Lewis: one could think that the following is sufficient: "the F en from A to T". f is the property expressed by the predicate f, a is the individual designated by A, t is the time denoted by T. The designations do not have to be rigid! >Rigidity. "Constitutive triple." (Kim, "Causation, Nomic Subsumption and the Conept of Event", 1973)(1) Furthermore, the occurrence of the event is somehow connected to the fact that the property f belongs to the individual a to t. Property/Question: how does a property belong to an individual to t? Perhaps because it really is a characteristic of time sections or a relation of individuals at times. LewisVs: then it would be all too easy to attribute a character simply by setting up a triple. I.e. "the F-en from A to T" denotes the event, so that it is necessary, if and only if f belongs to a to t. ((s) For example, it rains necessarily on Tuesday if it is necessary that it rains Tuesday). >Events/Lewis. LewisVsKim: this does not satisfy the needs of counterfactual analysis of causation. Sometimes an event can actually be caused by a constitutive property, V 250 an individual and a time can be substantially specified. But not in general for events that we call by naming. Problem: if the being is too rich, it is too fragile. It's hard to modify without destroying it. It cannot occur anywhere except in its constitutive time. Our everyday causes and effects are more robust. ((s) it would be incomprehensible to have an individual, which can only occur once in one place at a time, because one would have no language use for it, i.e. the meaning of something that only occurs once cannot be determined by predicates, which can also be assigned to other things, if these predicates are to come essentially only to this individual. Schwarz I 132 Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(2): a triple of a thing, a time and a property. LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile: Schwarz I 133 This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense. Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects: Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified? Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on. Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! (see above 2.3). But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261). Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q". Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant. 1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572 2. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton (ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177 4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. | V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Verschiedene Vs Lewis, C.I. | Berka I 168 Modality/BeckerVsLewis, C.I.: Problem of the infinite number of composite modalities arising (impossibly) and (not arising) from the iteration and composition of the signs. VsLewis: his system is here (apparently) not complete. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Hazen Vs Lewis, C.I. | IV 45 Gegenstück-Theorie/GT//Kripke/HazenVsLewis: fordert, einige logische Prinzipien aufzugeben. LewisVsKripke/VsHazen: ich bin nicht der Meinung. Bsp (1) ist ein klassisches logisches Schema der Logik mit Identität und Quantifikation. Auf der anderen Seite ist (2) ungültig in der qML, weil die Übersetzung in GT kein Theorem ist. (1) (x)(y)(x = y >. __x__ ↔ __y__) (2) (x)(y)(x = y >. M x ungl. y ↔ M y ungl. y). Wie kann (2) falsch sein? Würde seine Leugnung bedeuten, dass wir zwei verschiedenen Dinge haben, die kontingent identisch sind,? Oder vielleicht dass ein Ding kontingent selbstidentisch ist? Nein, nichts so sinnloses. Die GT Übersetzung sagt: nichts in der wirklichen Welt hat mehr als ein GS in irgendeiner anderen Welt. Dann sagt seine Leugnung, dass etwas in der aktualen Welt mehr als ein GS in einer einzelnen Welt hat. Bsp im Fall von Dee, Dee1 und Dee2 , wenn Dee aktual ist. Problem: entsteht durch die doppelte de re Frage, aus der doppelte GS resultieren. Trotzdem bleibt (1) wahr, weil (2) gar keine Instanz von (1) ist. Wir können also (2) alleine ablehnen. Bsp ein anderer ungültiger Satz: (3) als Instanz von (1) (3) (x)(y)(x = y >. (Ey)y ≠ x ↔ (Ey)(y ≠ y) Aber: damit das eine Instanz von (1) wäre, müsste das letzte Vorkommnis von "y" an das anfängliche "(y)" gebunden sein, aber das ist es nicht, es gehört zum nähergelegenen "(Ey)". IV 136 Einstellungen/Lewis: ich hoffe Sie davon zu überzeugen, dass es eine willkürliche Einschränkung ist, dass Objekte von Einstellungen Mengen von Welten (MöWe) sein sollen. Subjekt/Lewis: Subjekte von Einstellungen sind verteilt über Zeit und Raum, einige sind in Neuseeland, einige im Mittelalter. Auch sind sie über den logischen Raum verteilt: einige leben in der WiWe, andere in anderen MöWe. Zugegeben: wenn wir über sie quantifizieren, lassen wir oft alle anderen aus, bis auf die Mitbewohner der WiWe. Aber nochmals: das ist eine willkürliche Einschränkung, die wir fallen lassen können. Lewis: jedenfalls ich kann es, einige sagen, sie können es nicht. HazenVsLewis: das Verständnis ist begrenzt auf das, was durch Modalität und weltbezogene Quantoren ausgedrückt werden kann. LewisVsVs: denen kann ich nicht helfen. Es ist bekannt, dass die Ausdruckskraft einer Sprache, die querweltein quantifiziert, die Art Sprache übersteigt, die jene verstehen. Subjekt/MöWe/Lewis: jedes Subjekt einer Einstellung bewohnt nur eine einzige Welt. (s.o.). Ich möchte mich nicht mit denen streiten, die sagen Bsp Adam ist ein großes Aggregat, teilweise in jeder von vielen Welten. IV 137 Vs: aber dieser Adam - wenn wir ihn so nennen können - besteht aus vielen kausal isolierten Teilen, von denen jeder eigene Einstellungen hat. MöWe/Quantifikation/Lewis: wenn wir also diese Beschränkung der Quantifikation auf eine Welt fallen lassen, haben wir eine riesige (über Zeit und Raum) verteilte Bevölkerung. Bsp was passiert nun, wenn einer aus dieser über mehrere Welten verteilten Bevölkerung einen Glauben in Form einer Proposition hat, z.B. dass Cyanoacrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst? Pointe: er lokalisiert sich selbst in einer Region des logischen Raums. (Durch seine Glaubenseinstellung einer Proposition, (nicht Eigenschaft)). Es gibt Welten, in denen Cyanoacrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst und Welten, in denen er es nicht tut. Er hat einen Glauben über sich selbst ((s) dann hat er immer zwei Überzeugungen): denn dass er Einwohner einer der Welten ist, wo der Leim das tut. Damit schreibt er sich selbst eine Eigenschaft zu. (MöWe/Naturgesetze/Mathematik/Lewis/(s): Lewis gesteht MöWe mit geänderten physikalischen Bedingungen oder anders sich verhaltenden Substanzen zu, (wobei nicht explizit von geänderten Naturgesetzen die Rede ist) aber keine Welten, wo die Mathematik geändert ist). Glauben/Lewis: kann man allgemein als Selbstzuschreibung einer Eigenschaft ansehen. Diese Eigenschaft ist allen und nur den Bewohnern einer bestimmten Region im logischen Raum gemeinsam. Man kann auch etwas anders denken: eine Proposition teilt die Bevölkerung: in privilegierte Bewohner einer Welt in der Cyanoycrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst, und Unglücklichere, die nicht in einer solchen Welt leben (wie leider ich). |
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| Lewis, C.I. | Wessel Vs Lewis, C.I. | System SI/C.L.Lewis/Wessel: here all axioms are tautologies and the reasoning rules inherit the tautological character. But: p -> (q -> p) assumes at p = 3 and q = 3 the non-marked value 4, thus is not derivable and thus no theorem of SI: Also no theorem: ~p -> (p -> q). The "classical" paradoxes are avoided, but: ~p u p -> q and q > ~(~p u p) are provable! ((s) other representation of contradiction or impossible statement) So: 1. From a contradiction follows an arbitrary statement. 2. A logically true statement follows from an arbitrary one. ((s) excluded by SI) Since in the original variant of SI a contradiction ~p u p was defined as an impossible statement and its negation as necessary, one can reformulate: I 131 Modal: 1. From an impossible follows any arbitrary one, 2. A necessary statement follows from an arbitrary one. ((s) excluded by SI) ("Paradoxes of Strict Implication"). Implication/WesselVsLewis(C.L.): has not satisfactorily solved the paradoxes. Although he saw the necessity of a contextual connection, he did not specify it. (see below: same variables must appear twice!). Lewis: new: for A > B ↔ ~(A u ~B) "A u ~B" must not only not apply, but must be impossible. I 131 WesselVsLewis,C.L.: he tries to define the subsequent relationship using modal terms. A -> A = def ~M(A u ~B). 1. This is circular: a definition of the subsequent relationship is necessary to be able to introduce modal terms in the first place. 2. The paradoxes of Principia Mathematica(1) are excluded, but not the "classical" ones. (Ajdukiewicz/(s) EFG or true from any). 3. The strict implication is understood as an operator. So it can never occur in provable formulas of propositional logic! 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Lewis, D. | Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. | Armstrong III 70 Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals. Lewis: then there is no third law. ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong. III 71 The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis: Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept". ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws. Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But: This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN. ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN. Schwarz I 94 Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Armstrong 1978a(1), 2,5,2,7) Schw I 95 LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c(2), 1980b(3)). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a(4), 6,1983c(5): 20 24,1998b(6), 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc. 1. David M. Armstrong [1978a]: Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism & Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 3. David Lewis [1980b]: “Mad Pain andMartian Pain”. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Bd.1, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 216–222 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. David Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Bennett Vs Lewis, D. | I 168 Meaning: Problem: what is thus coordinated? Lewis: always only actions! BennettVsLewis: this only hides certain cracks: to give meaning to an utterance is no action! |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Lewis, D. | Block Vs Lewis, D. | I 188 Lewis: Pain can be characterized functionally. FodorVsLewis: thus seems to be set to an identity theory of functional properties. In my view, this amounts to an identity theory of functional states. (I 213) Solution: Lewis: Proposal: not conjunction of all banalities, but "a bunch of them through a disjunction of conjunctions of most of them (in that case, it does not matter if some are wrong) BlockVsLewis:. But that can exacerbate the problem of distinction (1), as there may be pairs of different mentalities, which are the same with respect to most of the banalities. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Lewis, D. | Chomsky Vs Lewis, D. | Black I 200 Language/Semantics/Convention/Psychology/Lewis/Schwarz: the psychology behind the intentions and expectations does not interest Lewis. ChomskyVsLewis: denies the mechanism LewisVsVs: that is wrongly attributed to him. In the present state of neurophysiology, he considers it idle to speculate about it. It would also be possible that beings without internal grammar use the German language, or that different speakers of the German have different internal grammars. Therefore, we should not focus on cognitive implementation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Davidson Vs Lewis, D. | I (e) 114 Davidson: conventions and rules do not explain the language, the language explains them. >Conventions/Davidson. Fodor/Lepore IV 84 note T-sentence/Davidson: T-sentences have the form and function of laws of nature! 25th Language/DavidsonVsLewis: it is not useful to describe it as a system of conventions. >Language/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Dennett Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 299 DennettVsFodor: Fodor denies the assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing persons states. Therefore Dennett denies their feature. Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233 Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem. FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns: 1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234 of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers). (D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object. Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235 2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple. Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition. Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236 Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not. FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that. I 237 3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238 4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197 Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom". E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together. Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198 The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire). FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution. Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Fodor Vs Lewis, D. | Block I 163 Pain/FodorVsLewis: if you say that pain in humans and Martians is different, you are not stating on the basis of which properties both of them perceive pain. Any disjunction of physical conditions which used to mean pain in the history of the universe, is not a solution. Because that does not cover what the individuals have in common. I 215 Pain/FodorVsLewis: since the property of having the state is a functional one - and not only a functionally characterized property, Lewis is still bound by the functionalism discussed here. Pain/VsLewis: the functionalism presented here asserts a state Z that is defined as a state with such and such a causal role, and the functionalist assertion becomes: "Pain = Z". Here, Z itself is not a functional state (> Ramsey-functional Correlate). I 217 FodorVsLewis: the contrast to Lewis (functional characterization of a state rather than a functional state) can be made clearer: e.g. assuming, a condition type is a specific type of property. Namely, the property which each token of this condition has because it is a token of this type. Then, the pain condition would be identified with the property of being a pain (not of being in pain). I.e. in terms of the pain and not of the organism. Lewis: defines pain as the state that has a certain causal role ("ix"). Functionalism/Block: pain as the property of playing a certain causal role ("lx"). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 107 Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: the radical interpretation is governed by fundamental principles that tell us how belief and meanings are usually related to each other, as well as to behavior and sensory input. IV 108 These fundamental principles are nothing but a lot of platitudes of common sense. E.g. that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. But that can only be true if the speaker has several propositional attitudes. Holism/Fodor/Lepore: then holism can be derived from the conditions for the intentional attribution! Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: (he might perhaps agree): it is not clear that anything metaphysically interesting follows from the fulfillment of conditions for the intentional attribution. IV 114 Meaning Holism/MH/belief/Fodor/Lepore: if according to Lewis’ thesis belief has primacy over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, for example, the following would have to be assumed: Def Thesis of the "Primacy of Belief"/PT/Lewis: thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions of belief attribution. Therefore: if the former is holistic, so must be the latter." Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that semantic holism might follow from this thesis (belief holism seems plausible). Primacy of Belief/Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: the thesis is so strong that semantic holism emerges even without the principle of charity. Even without any theory of interpretation! But we do not believe that the thesis is true. RI/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: his version of radical interpretation does not endorse the thesis of the primacy of belief (PT) and we do not say that he accepts it at all. We believe that the PT is not true. Holism/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: but if Lewis does not represent the primacy thesis, his arguments in favor of holism are limited. They can show that belief qua belief is holistic, but not that they are holistic qua intentional. IV 121 VsLewis: the primacy thesis is implausible. IV 131 Fodor/LeporeVsDavison/VsLewis: it could be said: because the semantics of representations is atomistic, it follows that intentional attribution as such is not determined by constitutive principles like the principle of rationality! Allowing the attribution of irrational propositional attitudes would simply be a "change of subject". That would be no intentional states! I.e if we attribute irrational things to the speaker, we change our opinion on the content of his mental states. Vs: 1) It could be made stronger, not only epistemically, by saying that even God would change the content of his attribution, before violating rationality. IV 132 2) Assuming the point was metaphysical and not only epistemic: nevertheless it does not follow from the atomistic approach to mental semantics that the principle of rationality could be ignored in the attribution. You cannot believe simultaneously that p and that not p. These principles are constitutive of belief, and also for wishes, etc. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Lewis, D. | Fraassen Vs Lewis, D. | Black I 117 Laws of Nature/LoN/Theory/van FrassenVs Lewis: (1989, § 3.3): 1) Lewis does not explain the model force of LoN: E.g. if "all Fs are Gs", then they have to be so in a good sense. Signs for this are counterfactual conditionals, which are connected to LoN (Dretske 1977, 255, Armstrong 1983, §4.4 and 69f). Schw I 118 VsLewis: 2) his analysis does not indicate why LoN play such a large role in explanations (Dretske 1977, 262, van Fraassen 1989 §3,4, Armstrong 1983 §4.2). Is it possible to explain why this F is a G by indicating that all Fs are Gs? LewisVsVs: why should the theorems of the best theories not meet the conditions? Systematic regularities are an important property of the actual world. Therefore, similarity is assigned special weight in the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Goodman Vs Lewis, D. | Goodman II Putnam Preface p VIII irreal conditional clauses. Much discussed issue today. David Lewis: has developed a formalist scheme that presupposes a totality of possible worlds and a "similarity metrics" that measures their similarity in degrees. GoodmanVsLewis: these are not solutions that give us principles at hand to decide which worlds are actually more or less similar. p IX There are no "possible but not actual" worlds! Putnam I 198 Possible Worlds/GoodmanVsLewis: not many worlds, but many versions of our world. They are correctable, relative to each task, and not subjective! |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Lewis, D. | Kaplan Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 43 Possible World/Schwarz: one can perhaps imagine possible worlds as a kind of contingent extension of reality. Kaplan: Possible World/Telescope/KaplanVsLewis/Schwarz: (1979(1),93) for possible worlds we need special modal telescopes: Def "Verneoscope" (terminology), also: "modal intuition". This may tell us that there are universes with talking donkeys, but none where Kripke has other ancestors. (Plantinga 1987(2),212, Skyrms 1976(3)). Possible World/LewisVsKaplan/LewisVs Telescope Theory: possible worlds cannot be any different than they are, (i.e. not contingent) they cannot be explored with verneoscopes. 1. David Kaplan [1979]: “Trans-World Heir Lines”. In [Loux 1979], 88–109 2. Alvin Plantinga 1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Brian Skyrms [1976]: “Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics”. Philosophical Studies, 30: 323–332 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Kripke Vs Lewis, D. | I 55 Possible Worlds/Kripke: If someone demands that any world must be described in a purely qualitative manner, we cannot say "suppose Nixon had lost the election"; we must rather apply a prescription: "suppose a man who looks like an incarnation of David Frye and who has a dog named Checkers is located in a specific possible world and loses the election." An example of this Counterpart Theory is David Lewis. Possible world/Lewis: Counterparts, not the same people - Kripke: Then it is not about identification but similarity relation. KripkeVsLewis: His possible worlds are like foreign countries. Strictly speaking, his view is not a conception of "identification of possible worlds". He is rather of the opinion that the similarities between possible worlds determine a counterpart relation that is neither symmetric nor transitive. The counterpart is never identical to the object. When we say "Humphrey could have won the election if he had done something else" then we do not talk about something that could have happened to Humphrey. We are talking about something, a "counterpart" that could have happened to somebody. KripkeVsLewis: his conception seems to be even more bizarre than the usual terms of the identification in possible worlds to me. I 90/91 Counterpart/Lewis: Representatives of the theories that a possible world is given to us only qualitatively ("Counterpart Theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle or his counterparts can be "identified in other possible worlds" with the things who resemble the most to Aristotle’s most important characteristics. KripkeVsLewis: Aristotle’s main characteristics are in his works, Hitler in his murderous political role. But both could have lived without having had these characteristics at all. There is no logical destiny hanging over them which would make it inevitable that they would possess the characteristics which are important for them in our opinion. Important characteristics do not need to be essential. I 181 Counterpart (Lewis) is qualitatively defined - KripkeVs: Possible world is not qualitatively defined but determined. V XIII KripkeVsLewis: E.g. a round plate of homogeneous material. The question whether this plate rotates or not is a characteristic of the world which does not supervene on the arrangement of qualities(AoQ)! We could have two possible worlds, one with a rotating and the other with a rotating plate, and the arrangement of qualities would be exactly the same. |
Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Quine Vs Lewis, D. | II 15 Possible Worlds/Quine: Most methods are body oriented, they do not concern the concept of identity, but that of the body. Most predicates designate bodies, derive their individuation from them. Moment-to-moment identification. The dollar example seems rather forced We put our liberal ontology of physical objects up to the stubborn fixation on the body. All objects form values of my variables (in case of quantification) II 158 And what would the analog values be in other worlds? Simply the totals of physical objects in all possible worlds, where the residents indiscriminately are connected. Example: One of these values was "Napoleon, with his counterparts in other worlds", another would consist of Napoleon together with various disparate dissimilar inhabitants of other worlds. Therefore, the quantification over objects across possible worlds does not require in the least that we derive any sense from the term "counterpart"! Like any instantaneous objects form time segments at different times which belong not only to one, but to countless protracted objects. (QuineVsLewis). Quantification over one area is no more difficult than over several areas if there are no additional difficulties with respect to possible worlds. They do exist indeed: not in the quantification, but in the predicates. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Lewis, D. | Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. | Metz II 274 Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge. Lewis I 9 ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts! II 213 LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation. II 214 ++ 2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself. II 216 Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar II 221 VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help! II 222 Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it! II 223 VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule. II 224 VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language. II 225 VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action. II 226 VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought. II 227 VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention. II 227 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity. II 228 VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences. II 229 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population! II 229 E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L". II 232 VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages! II 233 + VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement? II 234 VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products. II 235 VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated. II 237 VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust! II 238/239 VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible. II 240 VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, D. | Martin Vs Lewis, D. | Arm II 182 Abwesenheit/Lewis: wie Quines "Anbetrachten" nur eine facon de parler eine "happenstance of idiom". MartinVsLewis/MartinVsQuine: das muß man überhaupt nicht deontologisieren. Anbetracht/Martin: ("sake"): ist der angenommene Nutzen von etwas, durch Instantiation eines Zustands oder einer Bedingung durch eine Aktion oder Unterlassen. Es genügt, daß wir ungefähr wissen, nach was in der Welt wir Ausschau halten sollen, wenn von "Anbetracht" die Rede ist. Auch wenn meistens herauskommt, daß es in Begriffen der theoretischen Physik nicht darstellbar (zu vervollständigen) ist. Aber auf der Ebene, wo wir über die beobachtbare Welt reden ist solche Vollständigkeit unnötig. Abwesenheit/Löcher/MartinVsLewis: auch hier ist eine Deontologisierung überflüssig. Lösung: statt "wie die Dinge sind" sollte man besser sagen: "Wie die Welt ist" oder "Wie es ist" entweder zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, oder auch ganz allgemein. Dann werden "Dinge" gar nicht erwähnt. Arm II 183 MartinVsLewis: aber der Satz "Es gibt keine Falschmacher für "es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine"" ist genauso ein negativer Existenzsatz. Lösung/Martin: es ist kein negativer Existenzsatz über Dinge, sondern es geht um einen Zustand einer Raumzeit Region. Der Satz über die Abwesenheit von Falschmachern braucht einen Satz über einen Weltzustand als Wahrmacher. Problem: und zwar genauso wie "Es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine". Daher kann er auch nicht gebraucht werden, um zu zeigen, dass der letztere Satz keinen Zustand als Wahrmacher braucht. II 186 Leere/Abwesenheit/MartinVsLewis: dieser will immer den Doughnut ansehen und nicht das Loch. Das kann man aber durchaus konkreter fassen: Bsp wenn wir ein Hemd ohne Flecken aussuchen, dann halten wir nicht nach dem reinen Nichts Ausschau, sondern nach der Abwesenheit von Flecken. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Lewis, D. | Bigelow Vs Lewis, D. | I 91 Perfectly natural property/PNP/BigelowVsLewis: even that is black magic, if such classes are compared with heterogeneous classes; our theory of universals avoids it. I 192 Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/BigelowVsLewis: Problem: it is surprising that such parts would then at least have to have a temporal part together. (see above) E.g. assuming we meet Jane from a different part of the same possible world Let’s consider the counterfactual conditional/Co.co.: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed. BigelowVsLewis: according to him, this must be true Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us, it is clearly wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world where Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world would have to contain all of us and Jane, even though there is no connection between us. I 197 Representation/Bigelow VsLewis: E.g. assuming there are twins in the real world (actual world), Dum and Dee, who are absolutely identical, but could have been different. That means that in other possible worlds there are twins, Tee Dum and Tee Dee, who differ more from one another, but are sufficiently similar to ours to be accepted as a counterpart. Then it is possible that a counter part,e.g. Tee Dum is more similar to Dum, than Tee Dee Dee is to Dee. Lewis: his theory implies that of the non-actual twins Tee Dee is more similar, and so he is Dees’s counterpart, which we also hope. Problem: Tee Dee is also closer to Dum than any of his world companions, so that he is also a counterpart of Dum. Tee Dee is the counterpart of both Dee and Dum, and Tee Dum is cp of neither of them! And the fact that Tee Dum cannot be a c.p. is due to the properties of his brother and has nothing to do with its own intrinsic properties. BigelowVsLewis: nevertheless, it is not plausible to say that, because that is equivalent to the modal statement that one of the twins could not have been different if the other one had not been different as well. This is unacceptable. I 199 Rivals theory/VsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: the rival theory asserts, thesis: that the counterparts are in fact numerically identical to the corresponding individual in the actual world. The rival theory uses the relation of numerical identity. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Lewis, D. | Blackburn Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 57 Counterpart/cp/RosenVsLewis/BlackburnVsLewis: the counterpart theory turns our emotional attachment to the counterfactual facts into a mystery. Why should we, worry about things that happen to other people in other universes? LewisVsVs/Schwarz: why should we care about the elements of maximum consistent sentence quantities or the counterfactual properties of abstract facts? Counterfactual/Bennett/Schwarz: one reason why the K interests us is that we want to avoid future mistakes. (Bennett, 1988(1), 62). Existence/SchwarzVsLewis: imprecise formulation: for Lewis Humphrey only exists in the real world, but in a broader sense - as a cp - he exists in many possible worlds, of course. KripkeVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis: deny that there are possible worlds which include Humphrey as a real part. Kris McDaniel/Schwarz: is the only one who ever claimed that the possible worlds e.g. contain Humphrey as a real spatio-temporal part. (2004)(2). 1. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2. Kris McDaniel [2004]: “Modal Realism with Overlap”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–152 |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Schiffer Vs Lewis, D. | I 30 Covering Law/Solution/Lewis: they are implicated in the attribution of individual belief, while the mechanism of this implication is revealed by the definition of belief and desires in terms of folk psychology. Covering Law/SchifferVsLewis: I still believe that we cannot find the covering laws. Then the corresponding explanatory model can also not be correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Lewis, D. | Peacocke Vs Lewis, D. | EMD II 169 Lewis: Chomsky: Thesis: it could be that we have far fewer conventions than is generally assumed. But as long as there are at least two possible human languages, there must be a convention according to which the choice is explained. PeacockeVsLewis: that is funny: in the borderline case where there is no other equally rich language, can this fact prevent a possible language from being the actual language? Then it might seem as if it were a matter of convention whether L1 is an actual language of P1, but not a matter of convention whether L2 is an actual language of P2. Ipso facto, the actual language relation (see above II165, application to the world ) is not analyzed in terms of the conventions. II 187 Truth/Actual Language/Peacocke: but we can explain the concept of truth "true in L" that only related to the language (unlike the general W concept) to someone by total recursion: we can teach its use (like winning). For this we do not need to presuppose the general concept of truth (in this case). (Conditions of use) Here, no specific starting point is required, it is only necessary that you start somewhere. PeacockeVsLewis: (conventions) he avoids this current point, but at the price that he has to introduce a quantification over possible worlds, or at least over conditions or propositions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Lewis, D. | Montague Vs Lewis, D. | I 10 Erlebnis: nicht identisch mit der Eigenschaft, die man jemandem dadurch zu spricht, dass man sagt, er habe dieses Erlebnis. Erlebnis: derjenige Zustand, der eine gewisse definierende kausale Rolle innehat. Eigenschaft: eben die Eigenschaft, sich in dem Zustand zu befinden. Bsp Schmerzen sind nicht identisch mit der Eigenschaft, Schmerzen zu haben! »Schmerz« ist ein kontingenter Name., das heißt, der hat in verschiedenen möglichen Welten verschiedene Denotationen. (Nicht starr). »Die Eigenschaft, Schmerzen zu haben«, ist demgegenüber ein nicht kontingenter Name. (Starr, in jeder möglichen Welt das gleiche).( I 11 +: MontagueVsLewis, LewisVsMontague). |
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| Lewis, D. | Cresswell Vs Lewis, D. | I 23 Performance/Competence/Semantic/Cresswell: what relationships are there between the two of them? Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust: in L: thesis: most language use is based on it. --- I 24 We assume that the speakers are trying to express true sentences and we expect the same from others. Important argument/CresswellVsLewis: this may be the case, but to me it seems to be more a matter of empirical investigation than a definition that it should be so. And therefore: --- I 33 Language/Bigelow/Cresswell: John Bigelow tells me, thesis: that one of the earliest functions of language was storytelling. Then it is more about imagination than everyday communication! ((s)VsCresswell: 1) How does Bigelow know that? 2) Why should one draw such far-reaching conclusions from that). CresswellVsLewis: even if it should turn out that there was a logical link between the convention and the use of language, it seems better to me not to include this in a theory of semantics from the start. Anyway, we do not need a connection of competence and performance. --- II 142 Fiction/Belief de re/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1981, 288): E.g. In France, children believe that Papa Noel brings gifts to all children; in England, Father Christmas only brings them to the good children (and these get twice as many gifts, as Pierre calculates). De re/Fiction/Lewis: this cannot be an attitude de re, because there is no such res in both cases. Fiction/CresswellVsLewis: here you can also have a reference de re, even if the causal connection is not direct. Solution/Devitt: storytelling. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Lewis, D. | Stalnaker Vs Lewis, D. | Bigelow I 117 StalnakerVsLewis: (1968(1), 1981(2)) defends the conditional proposition of the excluded third against Lewis. Lewis V 183 "hidden property"/LewisVs: "My opponent": thinks that no real probability but a "fake" probability is in play. (see above) E.g. 88%,3%). (s) A "given variation" which then comes into force if c is withdrawn. Lewis: if this is true then it would be okay, then e would be somehow predetermined. It would be so to speak easier for the counterfactual conditional (co.co.). LewisVs: but we still have to accept real probability. Opponent: sounds like Stalnaker if he says: e would have happened either with c or without c. But his position is not the same although he accepts the same disjunction of co.co. and Stalnaker's defenses do not help him. Opponent: thinks that there are two relevant ways how the world could be, one would make a co.co. true, the other way the other. Thus the disjunction is in any case true. StalnakerVs: (Lewis pro): there is only one relevant way of how the world is and it makes none of the co.co. definitely true or false. Ontology/semantics/StalnakerVsLewis: the two co.co. are true or false relative to alternative arbitrary resolutions of a semantic indeterminacy. ((s) Semantic assumptions shall make ontological assumptions superfluous). V 184 What causes that the co.co. does not determine the truth is that different solutions involve different approaches. But any solution makes the one or the other true, the disjunction is certainly true despite the complementary vagueness of the disjoint. This alleged semantic indeterminacy is not a real property in the world. Stalnaker differs with me in a small semantic question, with my opponents in a great ontological question. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.theory/counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you already allow almost any relations as counterpart relation you could also use non-qualitative relationships. (Stalnaker 1987a)(3): then you can reconcile the counterpart with Haecceitism: if you do not stumble against the fact that at Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is false, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always only has one GS per possible world (poss.w.). >Counterpart Theory. Stalnaker/Schwarz: that does not work with qualitative counterpart relation as it is always possible that several things - e.g. in a fully symmetrical world - are exactly equally similar to a third thing in another poss.w.. LewisVsStalnaker: Vs non-qualitative c.p.r.: all truths including the modal truths are to be based on what kind of things exist (in act.wrld. and poss.w.) and which (qualitative) properties they have (> "Mosaic": >Humean World). 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (Hg.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2. Robert C. Stalnaker [1981]: “Indexical Belief”. Synthese, 49. 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Plantinga Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 168 Content/Proposition/TraditionVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis/Schwarz: This construction does not meet all the traditional requirements of propositions and content: (Plantinga 1987(1), 208 f): we must be in an interesting relation with the object (acquaintance or grasping), content must be directly causally implicated in acts. Classes of possible situations don't do that. Lewis (1983b(2), 375 Fn 2) compares them with figures in the indication of physical quantities. 1. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Simons Vs Lewis, D. | I 282 Event/possible worlds/poss.w./SimonsVsLewis: it seems too restrictive, that an event should not be able to occur in several possible worlds. The identity of a possible world depends mainly on what exists and what can be found in them, I 282 And we can, however, imagine e.g. two possible worlds that are exactly the same in terms of a specific event and its causal precursors, but which differ in regard to something causally completely independent of this event. Time/possible worlds/SimonsVsLewis: there could also be two possible worlds that are identical up to a certain time but diverge later. Then there is no reason to deny the identity of events up to this point. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Lewis, D. | Castaneda Vs Lewis, D. | Frank I 329 Proposition/Belief/Self-attribution/CastanedaVsAttribution theory/CastanedaVsLewis: 1) Lewis defines the belief objects extensionally (from quantities). This violates Castaneda’s second intentionality condition for the objects of intentional attitudes. (see above). Possible Worlds are unsuitable as primary objects of belief because of their infinite extension (infinitely many aspects) and properties cannot be individuated by sets of objects, because the creation of sets presupposes the predication of properties. (>Individuation). 2) Lewis’ thesis that self-attribution can be explained only by a non-propositional knowledge depends on the premise that there could be no indexical proposition or related related to private issues. CastanedaVsLewis: but there is no convincing justification for that. Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: considers it conceivable that a possible world does not only consist of public physical objects, but also contains subjective referees like I representations and indexical representations. This world could then also include its subjectively colored ways of the circumstance (intension). Then a subject that knows all the propositions would also be able to recognize its own position (propositional knowledge). I 356 Propostional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. "Two omniscient Gods": (slightly abridged original quote): they are omniscient, because they know every proposition. But I can imagine that they suffer from one ignorance: neither of them knows which one he is. There is nothing else to know, they would merely attribute more of the properties they have to themselves. He has this property and his world comrade does not have it, so the self-attribution of this property does not depend on him knowing which one is his world. Thesis: sometimes there are property objects, while propositional objects are not available. Some beliefs and some knowledge cannot be understood as propositional, but can be understood as self-attribution of properties. CastanedaVsLewis: that depends on the relevant meaning that one associates with "property" and "proposition". Therefore, he defines them in his spirit, and creates counter-intuitive premises. I 358 6) CastandedaVsLewis: It also does not readily apply that perceptual knowledge is not propositional. To the extent that demonstrative references take place, it is about the question of whether possible worlds contain volatile and private particulars. 7) the idea that Is, nows and this’s are objects of private knowledge is well founded. CastanedaVsLewis: but they do not have to be inexpressible. It is just the function of quasi indicators to capture the indexical references of other persons by means of interpersonal and non-volatile references. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Lycan Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 66 Reductionism/Modality/LycanVsLewis: it has no reductive explanation of modality because it can only say "all possible" when asked what possible worlds there are. Recombination Principle: only explains what kinds of possible worlds there are if there are certain others. For example: if there are possible worlds with unicorns and possible worlds with gods, then there are also possible worlds with both ((s)) Problem/Lycan: whether there are the starting worlds ((s) thus whether the premises are true), we do not find out. (Lycan 1991a(1),1991b(2),224f,Divers/Melia(3) 2002,§3). LewisVsVs/Schwarz: that does not matter, because modal realism is not a decision-making procedure to answer questions about possible worlds. Not all questions can be answered: e.g. Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Lewis: no answer about the existence of different, but qualitatively identical possible worlds. (1986e(4),2214,114). Decision Procedure/d.p./Schwarz: e.g. is also not used by the behaviorist: he simply says that statements about mental properties can be reduced to statements about dispositions. For example mathematical platonism: does not need a decision procedure for arithmetic. 1. William G. Lycan [1991a]: “Pot bites Kettle”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69: 212–213 2. William G. Lycan [1991b]: “Two – No, Three – Concepts of PossibleWorlds”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91: 215–227 3. John Divers und Joseph Melia [2002]: “The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism”. Mind, 111: 15–36 4. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Jackson Vs Lewis, D. | V 152 Indicative Conditional/IC/JacksonVsLewis: better theory (Lewis pro): both theories have the following in common: 1) The IC has the truth conditions of the truth-functional conditional A>C. 2) nevertheless, assertibility goes with the conditional subjective probability 3) there is a discrepancy between truth and assertibility-preserving inferences involving indicative conditionals. V 152/153 4) our intuition about valid inference with conditionals may be applied to the conditionals, but are also meager evidence of validity. 5) The discrepancy between the assertibility of P(C I A) and the probability of the truth of P(A > C) is due to one or the other Gricean implicature. 6) The right approach to do this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C . V 154 Lewis Thesis: "Assert the stronger" theory for conditional probability. Jackson Thesis: "Implicature of robustness": theory for conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: E.g. "Fred will not study and even if he does, he will fail." If (according to Lewis) the conditional is only assertible if the antecedent cannot be denied, how can it be that yet both are asserted together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of the robustness. Even if you believe that I am mistaken in thinking that Fred does not study, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 |
| Lewis, D. | Benacerraf Vs Lewis, D. | IV 201 Meaning/BenacerrafVsLewis: it looks as if we have chosen too arbitrarily. How can you choose meanings at all? They are simply meanings! This is a fundamental objection to set-theoretical approaches. Lewis: if that bothers you, you can also assume that meanings are sui generis. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 |
| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lewis, D. | Inwagen, Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 227 Metaphysics/being/essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2). 1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Bowie Vs Lewis, D. | V 42 Ähnlichkeit/Ähnlichkeitsrelation/sim.r./Ähnlichkeitsmetrik/Mögliche Welten/MöWe/Lewis: Problem: man sollte nicht denken, dass irgendeine spezielle Ähnlichkeitsrelation (sim.r.) an die man gerade denkt, in einer allgemeinen Ähnlichkeit ein bestimmtes Gewicht haben sollte. Bsp Grueness trägt nichts zur Ähnlichkeit vor dem Zeitpunkt t bei! (>grue). Bsp was für eine Ähnlichkeit der Schriften von Wittgenstein und Heidegger sollte irgendwie zählen? Die Zahl der Vokale? Absurd. BowieVsLewis: wenn einige Vergleichsaspekte aber gar nichts zählen sollten, dann wäre die "Zentrierungsannahme" verletzt: d.h. Welten die in einer nicht beachteten Hinsicht abweichen, müssten als identisch mit unserer wirklichen Welt zählen. LewisVsVs: es gibt keine Welten, die sich nur in solchen Hinsichten von unserer unterscheiden, die nichts zählen, auch wenn sie sich unter anderem in solchen Hinsichten von unserer unterscheiden. Die Hinsichten mögen auch nicht völlig trennbar sein. Weiteres Problem: es ist allzu leicht, Unterscheidungen zu treffen und dann anzunehmen, dass sie allen Zwecken genügten! Wir müssen unterscheiden zwischen ganz verschiedenen sim.r., solchen, die offensichtliche Urteile beeinflussen, und solchen, die kontrafaktische Urteile beeinflussen. Wenn wir das nicht unterscheiden, gibt es ein Argument: VsA 2: manchmal scheint ein solches Paar von kontrafaktischen Konditionalen (KoKo) wahr zu sein: "Wenn A, wäre die Welt sehr verschieden von unserer, aber wenn A und B, dann nicht sehr verschieden". Lösung: man muss sim.r. für explizite Urteile von sim.r. für kontrafaktische Urteile unterscheiden! V 43 Es könnten sogar in der Interpretation eines einzigen Satzes solche ganz verschiedenen sim.r. auftauchen. Wir sollten uns nicht zuerst für eine Ähnlichkeitsart entscheiden und dann anschließend A2 damit testen. Damit würden wir bloß eine Kombination von A2 mit einer absurden Annahme über die Konstanz von Ähnlichkeit testen. Stattdessen müssen wir die richtige sim.r. dadurch finden, dass wir unser Wissen über Wahrheit und Falschheit von KoKo benutzen, um zusammen mit A 2 die richtigen Wahrheitsbedingungen zu finden. Diese Kombination kann dann entgegen unserem Wissen über KoKo unabhängig getestet werden, nicht A 2 allein. |
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| Lewis, D. | Levy Vs Lewis, D. | V 117 Isaac LeviVsLewis: + V 118 Selbst wenn wir Fluktuationen der Rahmenbedingungen zulassen, werden wir doch nicht erlauben, dass es so dramatische Auswirkungen haben wird, wie, dass 0 oder 1 als Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk) für Münzwürfe herauskommt. Lewis: wie bringe ich dann also die Annahme von 50 % zusammen mit der Tatsache, dass es auch Null oder 1 oder etwas in der Nähe davon sein kann? Ich bringe das nicht zusammen! Wenn die Chance bei Null oder 1 oder in der Nähe ist, kann sie nicht bei 50 % liegen. Auf die Frage, wie Zufall mit Determinismus vereinbart werden kann oder wie weit auseinander liegende Chancen zusammengebracht werden können muss ich antworten, sie können nicht zusammengebracht werden. Wschk/Lewis: im Aufsatz hatte ich nur ein "hypothetisches Sie" angenommen, für jemand, der eine Chance von 50 % zuschreibt! Ich selbst würde auch eine geringe Menge von Überzeugungen für die Extreme zuschreiben! ((s) nur verständlich als Subjektivismus: mehrere Propositionen gleichzeitig nebeneinander aufrechterhalten). Zufall/Determinismus/Lewis: ich gebe den Extremen eine kleine Chance, das spiegelt meine Ungewissheit wider, ob die Welt überhaupt Zufall zulässt. Aber zum größten Teil bin ich doch überzeugt davon, dass in der Mikrophysik eine Menge Zufallsprozesse ablaufen. LewisVsLevi: er schafft eine künstliche Situation, wo der Münzwurf von solchen Prozessen abgekoppelt ist, das ist kaum möglich. |
Levy I I. Levy Gambling With Truth an Essay of Induction and the Aims of Science Cambridge 1974 |
| Lewis, D. | Collins Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 141 Verursachung/CollinsVsLewis: (2000,230f): Inflation von Verursachungen! Schw I 142 Damit wird das Thema gewechselt! Sicher kann ein Ereignis kausalen Einfluss haben, ohne selbst Ursache zu sein. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Shaffer Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 142 Causation/Creator VsLewis: (2001a(1):15f) Causation without influence: E.g. the push of a button of a railway employee sets the switch wrong, two hours later the accident happens. Problem: if the push of the button had been a little different, a little harder, a little later etc. nothing would have changed. Solution/Lewis: Influence in which only two variations of the cause are accompanied by two variations of the effect. Variation: Absence of the button press. SchwarzVsLewis: but then this is not a "not too much variation". And besides, according to Lewis absences do not exist at all. Absence/Lewis: corresponds to a negative statement of existence. SchwarzVsLewis: unfortunately he does not adhere to it! Constantly absences appear, which are not easy to get rid of with negative existential statements. Should then be quantified by negative existential statements? Schwarz I 183 Knowledge/Evidence/SchafferVsLewis: (Schaffer 2001c)(2): the model is too simple. For example, I am watching a DNA analysis of a fungus. The evidence I have implies that it is an xxx. Therefore I do not need to know that the fungus is an xxx. This is the old problem of logical omniscience: we do not know all the consequences of everything we know. Lewis' knowledge analysis now provides a determination of our epistemic alternatives, the possible individuals who, for all we know, could be us. Semantics of knowledge attribution: is now on a different page: it is more complicated: e.g. when we are asked from the kitchen whether the candidate of the quiz show had the right answer, it does not matter whether the answer was really justified (Ernst 2002(3),83 113). He could have just guessed. In other contexts, however, the demands are much stronger, so that we can ask ourselves if we know anything at all. >Skepticism. 1. Jonathan Shaffer [2001a]: “Causation, Influence, and Effluence”. Analysis, 61: 11–19 2. Jonathan Shaffer [2001c]: “Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues”. Analysis, 61: 202–208 3. Gerhard Ernst [2002]: Das Problem des Wissens. Paderborn: mentis |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Menzies Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 136 Def kontrafaktische Abhängigkeit/Lewis: (1986f(1),184): Modifikation: neu: B ist kontrafaktisch abhängig von A, wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk), dass B eintritt (relativ zu einer Zeit nach dem tatsächlichen Eintreten von A) ohne das Eintreten von A deutlich niedriger gewesen wäre. Schwarz I 137 Peter MenziesVsLewis: (1989(2),1996(3)): das hat noch mehr Probleme mit ausgeschalteten Ursachen: Bsp eine Verbindung zwischen Neuron A und Neuron C ist sehr verlässlich, nicht aber die zwischen B und C. Bs Erregung blockiert As Signal, wenn A und B gleichzeitig aktiv sind. Wenn nun zufällig die Verbindung B C einmal funktioniert, wird C erregt. Die Erregung ist durch Bs Erregung verursacht, nicht durch As. Ihre Wschk wird aber durch die Erregung von B gesenkt und durch die von A erhöht. Daher ist Lewis’ Bedingung weder hinreichend noch notwendig für indeterministische Verursachung. Lewis dito, das ist aber keine Lösung. Ursache/VsLewis: viele Autoren stören sich an der Transitivität von Lewis’ Ursachen Begriff. Bsp (Kvart 1991)(4): ein Mann verliert bei einem Unfall seinen Finger, der erfolgreich wieder angenäht wird und drei Monate später wieder funktioniert. Nach Lewis verursacht der Unfall die Funktionsfähigkeit. LewisVsVs: manche Ereignisfolgen sind eben intuitiv merkwürdig, obwohl sie (wie hier) stimmen. (2004a(5): 98 100). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Peter Menzies [1989]: “Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes”. Philosophy of Science, 56: 642–663 3. Peter Menzies [1996]: “Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-emption Problem”. Mind, 105: 85–117 4. Igal Kvart [1991]: “Transitivity and Preemption of Causal Relevance”. Philosophical Studies, 64: 125–160 5. David Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Meixner Vs Lewis, D. | I 58 Description/Properties/Necessary/Contingent/Individual/INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: E.g. "the President of the USA in 2002" denotes the individual George W. Bush. I 59 The same description can also be conceived for a initial-property maximally consistent individual, namely for "george w. bush". Bush and bush have exactly the same initial properties (but "have" in a different sense). Point: while Bush might very easily not have had the property of being president, bush needs to have this property! Meixner: This can be easily confused and has been confused at least twice in the history of philosophy: 1) in Leibniz. 2) MeixnerVsLewis: Confusion of individual and INDIVIDUAL in his counterpart theory: the individual has its properties contingently ((s) a singled out counterpart needs its properties as such, because it is individuated by the set of these properties.) INDIVIDUAL/Leibniz/Meixner: For the Leibnizian, the individual Bush is identical with the INDIVIDUAL bush ((s) because the two (in that particular moment) are indistinguishable). PoWo: but Leibniz says the reason why Bush might as well not have been president is that his counterpart bush is not president! --- I 139 Part/Constituent/Meixner: E.g. we are not parts, but indeed constituents of facts. MeixnerVsLewis: therefore, he cannot consider possible worlds (PoWo) as facts. I 144 Actuality Relativism/AR/Meixner: is forced to consider PoWo as individual-like entities (see above), one of which is highlighted by the fact that it is the only PoWo of which we are parts. This one therefore advances to become the absolutely actual world and all other entities that are absolutely actual are so by being actual within it. MeixnerVs. Vs: Problem: no counterfactual conditionals like "UM (= Uwe Meixner) could also have studied geography in his life" possible due to our fixation to the real world (actual world). The fact that UM is a also constituent of another PoWo than w* contradicts the AR, which says that he can only be a constituent of the only actual world w*. I 145 Because in the individual-like entity of the PoWo (as assumed by the AR), constituents of individual-like entities are only when they are parts of them. To be able to be a constituent also of another PoWo UM would also have to be part of another PoWo than w* and this is impossible according to the AR. Solution/Lewis: (AR): a counterpart of UM studied geography in a different PoWo. MeixnerVsLewis: that misses the point of the sentence that UM could have studied geography. It's not about anyone else but me in a PoWo. KripkeVsLewis/Meixner: Kripke also suggested to Lewis depart from his interpretation, but he never did. Leibniz pro Lewis: (Letter to Antoine Arnauld): For example, could Adam also have had a different progeny? This can only be affirmed in the following sense: God was free to create another Adam (counterpart). That would then have been another PoWo (certainly not the best of all worlds). Nevertheless, Leibniz is not an AR. II 146 Absolute Actuality/Leibniz: is something lent by God and around it there is one single matching PoWo. Meixner: Absolute actuality is then not a matter of a mere place in "logical space," not a matter of mere positioning within the possible, but The possible does not bring forth from itself everything real, it does not shine out of itself in the light of reality everywhere, where it shines in this light, rather it is largely on its own "reality darkness". |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Lewis, D. | Rescher Vs Lewis, D. | Schurz I 237 Similarity Metrics/Possible Worlds/p.w./Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b): Lewis's logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals is not very useful for the theory of science, because the interpretation of the similarity metrics between possible worlds in terms of content presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969, 320 334). |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Lewis, D. | Hausman Vs Lewis, D. | Schurz I 240 Umstände/Kausalität/Schurz: Umstände müssen analytisch unabhängig sein. Singuläre Kausalrelation/individual causation/Schurz: hier brauchen wir nicht nur die Ursache, sondern auch die Wirkung (im Gegensatz zum allgemeinen Fall). probabilistische Kausalität: hier ist (im Gegensatz zur strikten) das Eintreten der Wirkung wesentlich. EellsVsHausman: (VsHausman’s "Principle G"): in indeterministischen Situationen folgt daraus, dass F in Umständen U G generell verursacht und dass Ereignis Fa unter Umständen Ua eingetreten ist, nicht zwingend, dass auch die Wirkung Ga eingetreten ist, sondern nur mit erhöhter Wahrscheindlichkeit. Individual Causation/Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973a): durch Rekurs auf similarity metrics zwischen möglichen Welten: ein Ereignis Fa verursachte ein anderes Ga, wenn zutrifft: wäre Fa nicht eingetreten, so wäre auch Ga nicht eingetreten. HausmanVsLewis: Problem unter anderem: Deutung der similarity metrics. I 244 interventionistischer Ansatz/probabilistisch/Kausalität/Handlungstheorie/Schurz: der interventionistische Ansatz geht von der Handlungstheorie aus (von Wright, 1974, 73, Menzies, Price 1993): danach ist A die Ursache von B, wenn durch Realisierung von A mit Hilfe einer Handlung H die Wirkung B herbeigeführt werden kann. Das erscheint zirkulär, weil die Herbeiführung durch eine Handlung unerklärt ist. HausmanVsAction theory: (1989): sie sollte durch eine abstrakte kausale intervention theory ersetzt werden. (+) |
Hausm D. M. Hausman The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology Cambridge 2008 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Lewis, D. | Wessel Vs Lewis, D. | I 304/305 Unreal conditional sentences/Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: the claim to be a general condition theory is generally not fulfilled. Example (1) If Peter had not come, Paul and Peter would not have come. (2) If now a current would flow through the coil... (3) Even if the shaman danced the rain dance, it wouldn't rain. (4) If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did. (5) If .....hadn't shot, ... would have... (6) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. (7) ...Verdi would be French. (1) Is dependent on the system of the logical subsequent relationship (here FK). (2) Hypothetical state of affairs: Such statements are used to explicate the term "empirical law". Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law if it corresponds to true unreal conditional statements. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong). In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects. Laws like that of the coil also apply to copies brought to earth from extraterrestrials during the Stone Age. I 306 It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional sentence depends on the real statement. Law statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa! ad (3) "even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "anyway true". Everyday translation: Example: "It is not the case that it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain". I 307 Unreal conditional sentences/Wessel: E.g. Oswald/Kennedy (4) is undoubtedly true and (5) undoubtedly false. How can this be explained? Possible worlds/many authors: one must put oneself in a context that is as close as possible to the current course of history. The similar context (next possible world) is the one in which another one shot Kennedy. ad (5): here the most similar world is the one in which, if Oswald didn't shoot, nobody shot and Kennedy is still alive. Therefore, (5) be wrong. WesselVsPossible World/WesselVsLewis: Disadvantage: the choice of the most similar world must be justified! I 307 Unreal Conditional Sentences/Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Similarity Metrics/Wessel: (5) is a hidden "even if" statement: "Even if Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, Kennedy would have been shot. The truth of such statements, which are common in political and historical contexts, is difficult to establish. (6)/(7): Bizet/Verdi-Example/Wessel: Solution: the reason for the emergence of the paradox lies in the uncontrolled use of the predicate "compatriots", and not in conditional logic. If both were compatriots, nothing would follow about the concrete nationality of both, except: it is the same. With the same right both could be Japanese! Instead of the two-digit predicate "compatriots" one should use the one-digit predicates "compatriot of Verdi" and "compatriot of Bizet". ((s) Then unambiguous: Bizet as a compatriot of Verdi should be Italian.) I 308 "Whenever someone is compatriot of Bizet, he is French." That is no longer a problem. Unreal conditional sentences/conditional/conjunction/Wessel: every occurrence of an unreal conditional sentence can be replaced by conjunctions in which real conditionals occur. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Mellor, D.H. | Armstrong Vs Mellor, D.H. | Arm II (b) 34 Strength/Objective opportunity/ArmstrongVsMellor/ArmstrongVsLewis: I believe that the concept of a prop that can only be described as that which constitutes a chance to have a lower level prop, is incoherent. But even if that is not the case, the postulation is a piece of unwanted metaphysics. Saving the ailing regularity theory with this is a weak motif. It has also greatly veered from the original regularity theory. II (b) 35 MellorVsArmstrong/RamseyVsArmstrong: Mellor follows Ramsey: laws of nature should not be understood as a relation of universals. ArmstrongVsVs: one should not feel too ontologically sure about the introduction of objective opportunities, they are mysterious. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Realism | Verschiedene Vs Modal Realism | Schwarz I 61 VsModal Realism/VsLewis/Ontology/Schwarz: (many authors: he mistakes the essence of modality, creates a basis for skepticism, nihilism and moral decay.) Real existence of all these "parallel universes" is completely implausible. LewisVsVs: the problem with common sense is to be taken seriously, but the methodological advantages of theory prevail. (1986e(1): vii) Solution/Lewis: Limitation of quantifiers: because we limit ourselves to our world, it is right to say that there are no talking donkeys. VsLewis: his possible worlds (poss. w.) are epistemically inaccessible. How do we know they exist? In principle, we could never learn anything about them! LewisVsVs: the objection presupposes that knowledge is acquired causally (causal theory of knowledge) ((s) that possible worlds are not researched logically). If that were correct, we would have no mathematical knowledge either. (1986e(1):109). Schw I 62 VsLewis: this applies only to mathematical Platonism (Group: Lewis: mathematical Platonist - FieldVsLewis). Sv I 64 Modal Realism/Possible World/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible world should be part of reality, because "world" and "reality" are synonymous expressions for the totality of all things. (Plantinga 1976(2), 256f Lycan 1979(3), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "real world" refers only to a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). Thus the contradictions dissolve. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what should the reality of maximum objects in space-time have to do with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: this is about what our world could have been like, not about what any of our isolated things are like. (1885(4), 119,1986(5), 226, Plantinga 1987(6)). LewisVsVs: Modal operators are quantifiers about such things. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: For example, suppose there are exactly 183 spatiotemporal maximum objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. Schw I 65 So it might be true or it might not. Lewis seems to claim that there can be as many space-time maximum items as there are sets. VsLewis: with it the whole of the worlds has become contingent! Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: he has to avoid this, because he wants to analyze contingency over possible worlds. ((s) i.e. contingency means that there are deviating possible worlds, i.e. not first the set of the Possible World (= maximum objects in space-time) and then say that this is the contingency, because then the contingency is not contingent, because it would be a non-contingent limit, if there are only 183 possible worlds. (van InwagenVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis). ((s) if it were contingent, one could not simply say "there are 183 possible worlds". In other words: "how many possibilities there are depends on the possibilities": circular - but: e.g. "how long it takes depends on the possibilities: e.g. how many attempts you make. Different and also correct: e.g. how many possibilities there are, depends (not on the possibilities) but on the properties, e.g. how wearable the object is. (Lewis ditto). Contingency/Schwarz: means that there are different possible worlds. But the totality of all possible worlds does not exist in single worlds. Therefore the totality itself cannot be different than it is! (s) The totality is not the object of consideration in a possible world.) Totality/Modal Logic/Lewis/Schwarz: unrestricted statements about possible worlds are unrestricted modal statements ((s) shift of the range then not possible! see above). Schwarz: as such, they elude the influence of modal operators: Example: "There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak" is equivalent to "there is a possible world in which donkeys can speak": "N There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak". And with "M There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak." (s) Logical form: Mp > NMp. (S5). Mp > MMp. (neither T nor S4, reduction law, > Hughes/Cresswell(7) p. 34)). Modal Realism/VsLewis/Schwarz: Problem: how the non-contingency of the possible world fits with its characterization as parallel universes. Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: either we talk about the totality of reality: then the number of the possible worlds is not contingent - or we talk about reality ((s) Real World), then there is necessarily only one universe (because in every world there is only one, the world itself). Contingency/Schwarz: empirical problem: according to the relativity theory, two universes could be connected by a wormhole. But it is contingent whether this occurs. LewisVs: that is absolutely impossible! ((s) Problem: one would have to claim before the wormhole that there are two universes that can be connected, and that would be a statement about (further) reality and not about (narrower) reality (=Real World) (in which there can only be one universe). (1986e(1):71f) Note: this is the "island universe" (Richards 1975(8),107f, Bigelow/Pargetter 1987(9)). Island Universes/Bricker: (2001(10),35 39): (completely different version: recombination principle: there is a possible world w, which contains a duplicate of the mereological sum of Hume and Lewis and nothing else - also no space-time between the Hume duplicate and the Lewis duplicate. Consequently, w contains two spatially isolated parts. SchwarzVsBricker: this assumes that space-time relations necessarily require substantial space-time. ((s) >Substantivalism). Solution/Lewis/Schwarz: (1986e,72) Replacement Possibility: his theory allows worlds in which several four-dimensional universes are connected only along an additional fifth dimension, but are isolated in the four normal dimensions. If this is not possible, we must loosen the criterion of spatio-temporal connectedness. Schwarz I 66 Two alternatives: (1986f(11), 74f) a) Worlds are connected by relations analog to space-time relations. b) The inhabitants of a possible world stand in any perfectly natural external relation to each other. Schwarz: However, the spatial-temporal distance is the only clear example of this. SchwarzVsLewis: that does not solve the general problem: that things (totality of the possible worlds) could also be different. Schwarz I 68 VsModal Realism/Schwarz: ontological overload. Alternatives: a) "ersatz worlds" - b) fictionalism. Def ersatz world/Ersatzism/Terminology/Lewis: tries to replace possible worlds with sentence sets or facts. Def Fictionalism/VsModal Realism/Schwarz: here no special entities come into play when interpreting sentences about (possible worlds). 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] 3. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316 4. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel 5. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001] 6. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 7. Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York, NY: Routledge. 8. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118 9. John Bigelow und Robert Pargetter [1987]: “Beyond the Blank Stare”. Theoria, 53: 97–114 10. Phillip Bricker [2001]: “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality”. In [Preyer und Siebelt 2001], 27–55 11. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Realism | Bigelow Vs Modal Realism | I 203 Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: BigelowVs concrete modal realism. But there are many things that can be done with possible worlds in any case, whether they concretely exist or not. I 187 Modal realism//Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter. His extremely concrete MR has the advantage that it would explain a lot of things if it were true. And most also agree on that. Why has the incredulous look not disappeared then? His theory has nothing irrational either. VsLewis: in order to refute him one of two strategies would have to be assumed: 1) the initial probability is 0 (instead of slightly above) 2) even if the prob. grows in the course, the increase would be infinitesimal. Ad 1): prob. can just not increase starting from 0. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a prob. of 0. In particular, not Lewis’ theory: LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma: (1) the opponents might recognize that a greater intelligence than themselves thought about it for a longer period of time and therefore the prob. is> 0 and that he means what he says (2) They might assume that he does not mean what he says (3) They could say that it is sometimes rational, I 188 Attributing a prob. of 0 to something which a serious and intelligent entity has said. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Modal Realism | Stalnaker Vs Modal Realism | Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/closeness/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any at all, there are also sets of them. And for each set of propositions it is definitely true or false, that all of its elements are true. And this is of course again a proposition. (W5) Closeness-condition: for each set of propositions G there is a proposition A so that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: that means that for each set of propositions there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. So I suppose that the world-stories-theorists wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s) > hyperintensionalism/ hyperintensionality): propositions that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, VsPossible worlds semantics). I 40 modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: by Lewis the actual world (act. wrld.) is only a real part of a reality which consists of many parallel universes which are spatially and temporally separated. Actual world/Lewis/Stalnaker: is then indexically defined as the part that is related to us. Unrealized possibilities/Possibilia/Lewis/Stalnaker: then actually exists, but in another part of the reality. Its non-actuality only exists in its localisation somewhere else. ((s) This is only a polemical presentation: Localization must be more than "somewhere else". Localization may be not carried out by us for areas that do are not related to us because we have then no knowledge.) Modal Realism/MR/Stalnaker: divides into 1. semantic thesis: assertions about what is possible and necessary, should be analyzed in concepts about what is true in some or all parts of reality 2. metaphysical thesis: about the existence of possible worlds (poss.w.). Semantic MR/Stalnaker: problem: VsMR it could be argued that it is not possible to know the metaphysical facts about it even if the semantic part was true. I 41 Lewis: there is a parallel here to Benacerraf's dilemma of mathematical truth and knowledge. I 42 EpistemologyVsModal Realism/Stalnaker: the representatives of the epistemological argument against the MR reject the parallel between mathematical objects and realistically construed possibilia. They insist that reference and knowledge require causal relation of concrete things even if that does not apply for abstract things (numbers etc.). Knowledge/LewisVs: why should the limit between what for knowledge and reference requires a causal relation to be made in concepts of the distinction abstract/concrete? Knowledge/Lewis: instead we should say that reference and knowledge require a causal relation of contigent facts but not the one of modal reality (knowledge about what is possible and necessary). Modal Realism/knowledge/Lewis: thesis: in the context of MR, we can say that indexical knowledge requires causal relation, but impersonal knowledge does not. I 43 Platonism/mathematics/Stalnaker: pro Lewis: here knowledge does not have to be based on a causal relation. Then Benacerraf's dilemma can be solved. EpistemologyVsModal realism/Stalnaker: but I still feel the force of the epistemological argument VsMR. Reference/knowledge/Stalnaker: problem: to explain the difference between knowledge and reference to numbers, sets and cabbages and so on. I 49 Possible worlds/pos.w./MR/Vsmodal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist can cite no verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot say on the one hand that poss.w. things are of the same kind (contingent physical objects) like the real world and say on the other side that poss.w. things are of what we know in the same kind as of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) The latter are not "real" things). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Modalities | Lewis Vs Modalities | Schwarz I 228 Modalities/Strong necessity/Metaphysics/Chalmers/VsLewis/Schwarz: Supporters of strong necessities separate between metaphysical possibilities and "epistemic" or "doxastic" modalities. Possible Worlds/Lewis: for the tasks that Lewis assigns to the possible world, there must be a possible world for every way we know things could be. But only some of these modalities are really possible metaphysically. Metaphysical Modality/Schwarz: is a limited one compared to Lewis modality. LewisVsStrong Necessity/Schwarz: their supporters do not explain where the dividing line should run. For example, if someone wanted to defend the metaphysical necessity of the existence of egg cups by applying "metaphysically possible" only to possible worlds with egg cups, that would not be interesting. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Montague, R. | Lewis Vs Montague, R. | I 10 Experience: not identical to the property that one assigns to someone by saying that they have this experience. >Experience/Lewis. Experience: the state that has a certain defining causal role. >Causal Role/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. Property: the property of being in this state. For example, pain is not the same as the property of having pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, which means it has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Non-rigid). >Rigidity. "The ability to have pain," on the other hand, is a non-contingent name. (Rigid, the same in every possible world).( I 11 + MontagueVsLewis,LewisVsMontague). V 37 Def Determinism/Possible Worlds/Lewis: if two possible worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly equal throughout the whole time or in no two periods of time. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of nature are deterministic. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but deviates from him in two points: LewisVsMontague: 1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatz worlds ((s) elsewhere: = sets of sentences). 2. I temporarily take equality of worlds as a simple relation. Instead, Montague takes the relation of having the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecific. My definition assumes that we can identify different periods of time from one world to another. V 246 Def Event/Richard/Montague/Lewis: (1969) certain properties of time. The event occurs at a certain time in a certain possible world if and only if the event belongs to the world and the time. This means that the event is identified by the property of being a time when the event occurs. LewisVsMontague: I think my approach has two minor advantages: 1. in the theory of relativity it is not always clear what time is, 2. Suppose a Montague event happens at a certain time in a certain possible world, then we have to find the place first. With my approach, the region is given immediately. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Nominalism | Lewis Vs Nominalism | Schwarz I 94 Heterology/Properties/Set theory/Lewis/Schwarz: Advantage: the set theory approach provides a solution for properties that apply to exactly those properties that do not apply to themselves. Solution/Set theory: bypasses these paradoxes (of >heterology) by prohibiting certain classes. For example, there is no class for all non-cats, there is no class that contains the pair (A,A) for every thing A, and there is no class that contains the pair (A,B) for all things A,B with A ε B. So if properties are classes, there is no property to be non-cat, no identity, and no elementness ((s) as a property! (1990(1),163,Fn 15,2002a(2),8) Properties/Set theory/Lewis/Schwarz: how is it then to understand that identity is transitive but not the property of being an element? Lewis has to reinterpret that: Identity/Lewis: that it is transitive only means that whenever A = B and B = C, then also A = C. SchwarzVsLewis: thus LewisVsNominalism falls: he wants to "somehow reinterpret all the sentences about properties" - this accusation falls back on Lewis himself. Schwarz: but anyone who wants a consistent theory of properties is faced with this problem. For example, it does not help to understand properties as irreducible abstract entities: even then the Russell property ((s) cannot apply to itself) cannot exist. Cf. >transitivity, >identity. 1. David Lewis [1990]: “Noneism or Allism?” Mind, 99: 23–31. In [Lewis 1999a] 2. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Parfit, D. | Lewis Vs Parfit, D. | IV 55 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Lewis: Problem: we asked a question and got two answers: a) Identity: can only be total identity. b) Continuity: can be gradual. Which of these two should be relevant for survival? If we had to choose, we should prefer everyday platitude to philosophical subtlety. The only hope is that identity view and continuity version are somehow reconcilable. That I would like to defend VsParfit. IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Person/Parfit: Thesis: not both answers (continuity and identity) can be right, so we have to choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connectedness) (e.g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one as well as gradual. Parfit: therefore it is the continuity and connectedness that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). c) what is important for survival is not identity! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problem cases do not occur. LewisVsParfit: someone else could just as well represent the argument in the other direction and make identity relevant. And of course, identity is what matters in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connectedness are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Border case/Parfit: Problem: Border cases have to be decided arbitrarily somehow. Identity/continuity/survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it's definitely about identity. It is literally about identity! Def Identity/Lewis: the relation in which everything stands to itself and to nothing else. ...+.... R-relation, I-Relation IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connectedness among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the previous ones? But of course there are also I-Relations between the individual states! IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: we should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. For example, shortly after the split, one of the two dP (continuants) dies, the other lives for a very long time. S is the state divided to t0 (before the split), but after it is known that the split will take place. Then the thought that we found in S is the desire for survival, and extremely like common sense and quite unphilosophical. Since S is a shared state (stage), it is also a shared desire. Problem: C2 has the survival he desires and he depends on mental continuity and connection. (RR) but what about C1 (the prematurely dying continuant)? IV 74 Lewis: I had written that what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually IR to states in the distant future such as S2, namely via the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But isn't that the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants him to survive (C1), then that wish is not fulfilled. (Lewis, however, deals with the more difficult problem): LewisVsParfit: but I don't think he can have this wish! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought it has must be shared. It cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. If, on the other hand, C1 and C2 are to share something that is understandable in everyday life, then it must be a "plural" wish, "let us survive". Here we must now distinguish between two pluralistic wishes: a) weak: lets at least one of us survive b) strong: lets us both survive. Because these desires are plural and not singular, they are not common sense. This is because everyday psychological survival is understood in terms of survival of dP rather than of relations of states. The weak desire of C1 corresponds to the desire for IR for future states. Then the IR also corresponds to the RR. and the corresponding wish. If C1's wish is strong, he will not be satisfied. Then it does not correspond to the "philosophical wish" either. IV 75 After RR for future stages and parfit is right VsLewis. LewisVsParfit: but should we say that C1 even has this strong desire? I don't think so. Because if C1 can have it, C2 can also have it. Example Suppose (according to Justin Leiber): a wish is recorded from time to time, but deleted after a certain time. This corresponds to the weak desire for survival, but not the strong one. Suppose the recording takes place at the time of the split, C1 dies shortly afterwards due to an accident. C2, survives. Additional complication: C" then undergoes a body transplant. If his desire to survive is to be fulfilled, then it is predominantly the weak desire. Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both knew before the split that there would be a split. Now Suppose (variant): both do not know about the coming split. Question: can we not perfectly share the wish: "Let me survive"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the desire is based on the false presupposition that they are one person. I.e. the "me" is a wrong identification. It cannot refer to C1 in C1' thoughts and not to C2 in his thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least that of C2 and that of C1 is not different. Then their wish cannot only consist in the unfulfillable singular wish. They must both also have a weak pluralistic desire, even if they do not know the division beforehand. N.B.: that then also applies to all of us, although we are not often divided, many of our current desires are not current occurrences: E.g. The desire to be spared unimaginable pain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Plantinga, A. | Lewis Vs Plantinga, A. | Bigelow I 181 Representation/Proposition/Structure/LewisVsPlantinga: his (unstructured) propositions make representation something magical. Solution/PlantingaVsLewis: Representation is taken as a basic term and is completely understandable and not magical. Bigelow I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. Similarity/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is that in relation to certain laws! Thus laws are already presupposed with the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1), 1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(1): Causality instead of Similarity) I 231 BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The most accessible world needs not to be the most similar world. Schwarz I 68 Def Possible world/Plantinga: as maximum possible facts (st.o.a.). ("magic substituteism") Schwarz I 69 Maximum possible facts as abstract entities, about whose structure there is not much to say. In any case, they are not real universes or constructions of real things. Existence/"exist"/Plantinga: (>"there is"): is a basic property that cannot be further analyzed. Other maximum possible facts do not exist, but could exist. Def maximum/maximum possible facts/Plantinga: a maximum possible fact is at its maximum if its existence for any other maximum possible fact implies either its existence or non-existence. Possible World/Plantinga: are maximum possible facts. Example: that "in" a possible world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the maximum possible fact had the quality of existence. VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of speaking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor an image or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys. LewisVsPlantinga: 1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality, although there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities? 2. Plantingas maximum possible facts make a reduction of modal truths to truth about what things with what characteristics there are, impossible. Plantinga thus requires modality in the characterization of the possible world. (1986e(2),§3,4) 3. We also want to talk not only about possible worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(3),262 272). This is a non qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. So if we have countless merely possible things in modal realism, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things. 1. Frank Jackson [1977]: “Statements about Universals”. Mind, 86: 427–429 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possibilia | Lewis Vs Possibilia | Schwarz I 87 Possibilia/Possible World/possible worlds/possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: (1991(1),1993d(2)) here Lewis assumed, thesis: that there are clearly less inhabitants of possible worlds (Possibilia) than sets. Set theory: so for them additional entities had to be accepted besides the Possibilia. These additional entities should then contain the sets (and classes) required by the 5th condition (see above). Lewis later: accepts that there are at least as many Possibilia as sets. Then one could do without the additional mathematical entities (Lewis pro). Then we delete condition five. Then "many" inhabitants of possible worlds must be sets. Schwarz I 88 Because Lewis assumes that there are more sets than individuals. Because if there are "many" individuals, then also "many" individual atoms, atoms of individuals exist. But there are more sums of individual atoms than individual atoms. Then there are also more individuals than atoms at all and then, according to conditions (1) and (3), more units than atoms, in contradiction to (2). Possibilia/Lewis/Schwarz: if they have no cardinality, not all Possibilia can be individuals. Def possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: mathematical statements are not only about mathematical entities anyway, but partly also about Possibilia. Then why not just these? Pro: not only does he get along without primitive mathematical vocabulary, but also without primitive mathematical ontology. Questions about their origin and our epistemic approach are thus resolved. If mathematical statements are about Possibilia, it results in a modal state from the logic of unlimited modality: For unlimited modal statements truth, possibility and necessity coincide.(see section 3.6 above). Lewis: can't just delete the mathematical entities. (LewisVsField): Problem: mixed sums. For example, if some atoms in Caesar's brain are classified as single sets and others as individuals, then Caesar is a mixed sum. Mixed Sum/Mereology/Lewis: is neither individual nor class. Class: Sum of single sets. Schwarz I 89 Mixed sums: are not elements of sets in Lewis' original system either. Schwarz: that is unmotivated in terms of set theory: according to the iterative view, absolutely everything has a single set. Lewis usually ignores mixed sums anyway. Problem: not under every single set relationship is there a single set of Caesar. Solution: a) also allow a mixed sums single set. Vs: there are more mixed sums than single sets, so that doesn't work. b) Requirement: that all "small" mixed sums have a single set. c) More elegant: settle mixed sums by forbidding individuals. If you identify classes with ordinary Possibilia, you could treat each atom as a single set. For example, Caesar is then always a class, his single set is the object of pure set theory. LewisVs: this does not work in his set theory (unlike ZFC). Because we need at least one individual as an empty set. Single set/Lewis/Schwarz: since a single individual atom is sufficient, instead of (1) (3) single set relationships, one could also determine arbitrary unambiguous images of small things in all atoms except one. This one atom is then the empty set relative to the respective single set relationship. (> QuineVsRussell: several empty sets, there depending on type). Solution/Daniel Nolan: (2001, Kaß 7, 2004): VsLewis, VsZermelo: empty set as real part of units: Def "Esingleton" by A/Nolan: {A} consists of 0 and a thing {A} - 0 . (Terminology: "Singleton": only card of one color). Esingleton/Nolan: similar assumptions apply to them as in Lewis' single sets. Mixed Sum/Nolan: this problem becomes that of sums of 0 and atoms other than Esingletons. In Nolan, these are never elements of sets. Object/Nolan: (2004.§4): only certain "big" things can be considered as 0. So all "small" things are allowed as elements of classes. Individual/Nolan: many "little" things are individuals according to him among all Esingleton relationships. Empty Set/Schwarz: all these approaches are not flawless. The treatment of the empty set is always somewhat artificial. Schwarz I 90 Empty Set/Lewis/Schwarz: set of all individuals (see above): There is a good reason for this! ((s) So there are no individuals and the empty set is needed to express that.). Subset/Lewis/Schwarz: is then defined as disjunctive: once for classes and once for the empty set. Possibilistic structuralism/Schwarz: is elegant. Vs: it prevents set-theoretical constructions of possible worlds (e.g. as sentence sets). If you reduce truths about sets to those about Possibilia, you can no longer reduce Possibilia to sets. 1. David Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 2. David Lewis [1993d]: “Mathematics is Megethology”. Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 3–23. In [Lewis 1998a] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Verschiedene Vs Possible Worlds | Schwarz I 41 Def Possible World/poss.w./Lewis: early: ways how things could be. Van InwagenVs: These are characteristics rather than concrete universes. (StalnakerVsLewis, RichardsVsLewis: ditto). Lewis: later: possible worlds correspond to ways how things could be. Schwarz: but we do not necessarily have to introduce special entities for it. They could also be grammatical illusions. Even considering possible worlds as entities does not determine what kind of entities they are. E.g.: Def Possible World/Stalnaker/Schwarz: the determination as (maximum) ways how things could be: then they are special properties or propositions. (Stalnaker 1976(1), Robert Adams, 1974(2)). Def Possible World/Plantinga: (1974(3), Chapter 4) Maximum circumstances. According to this, a distinction must be made between the existence and existence of a state of affairs. Example: The state of affairs that donkeys could speak exists, but it does not exist. (Existence: Possibility - Existence: Reality? - rather reality (as another term): contains possibilities). Schw I 42 Def Possible World/Decision Theory/Richard Jeffrey: (1965(4),196f): maximum consistent sentence sets. Since the phrase "donkeys can speak" is consistent, there is a maximum consistent set of sentences that contains it. We express this when we say that there is a possible world... Def Surrogate Four-Dimensionalism/Schwarz: These positions correspond to the facts of the philosophy of time (see above 22), which perceives other times as abstract entities of a different kind from the present. LewisVs: other times are just as real. Def Co-Existence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible Worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is no causality between them. No event in one possible world causes another in another possible world. This means further that possible worlds just were not created by us! We also cannot see, measure or visit them from here. (1986e(5),3,80f). Lewis does not care if you call your possible world concrete or abstract. This has no clear meaning (1986e(5),§1,7). Real World/Lewis: what makes it different from the other possible worlds? Not its concreteness, but the fact that we live in it. Objectively, the real world is as little excellent as any other, or as the present. "Actual"/Lewis: is an indexical expression like "here" or "now". Therefore, we cannot meaningfully ask whether we live in the real world or in a possible one. Likewise, we cannot ask whether we live in the present or perhaps in the future. Reality/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis's analysis of "real" is also shared by opponents of modal realism: Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "Concretism". Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism". Lewis IV 85 Meaning/Reference/Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: if we have the denotation of theoretical terms, what about its meaning? But we already have it! Because we have specified its denotation in every possible world. Def Sense/Lewis: Denotation of an expression in each possible world. I.e. in every possible world the theoretical terms must name the components of whatever the theory T realizes uniquely in this world. If there is no realization in the world, they do not name anything. Def Sense/Lewis: therefore we can say, the sense is a function (of all or some) possible worlds on named entities. VsPossible Worlds/VsPossible Worlds/Lewis: some call them occult, VsVs: but they are not more occult than e.g. infinite amounts, which we can handle very well. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1976]: “Possible Worlds”. Nous, 10: 65–75 2. Robert M. Adams [1974]: “Theories of Actuality”. Noˆus, 8: 211–231 3. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University P 4. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reductionism | Physicalism Vs Reductionism | Schwarz I 156 Physicalism/Vs Reductionism/VsLewis. other authors: Physicalism is not at all fixed on the a priori derivability of mental from physical truths, only on supervenience of mental on physical facts. But this does not have to be a priori. It can be a posteriori necessity. For example, the relationship between H2O-truths and water truths. (This is non-reductive physicalism). LewisVs: this is a misunderstanding about a posteriori necessity: e.g. Assuming that "water is H2O" is necessary a posteriori: this is not because there is a modal fact, a necessity that we can only discover a posteriori, but rather because the meaning of certain words depends on contingent, empirical factors: according to our conventions, in all possible worlds "water" picks out the substance that fills our lakes and streams. "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because you first have to find out that the material that fills streams and lakes in our country is H2O. This is a contingent fact that usually requires chemical analysis, no excursions into modal space. The H2O-truths therefore a priori imply the water truths. If pain a posteriori is identical with a physical state, then this must also be due to the fact that the reference to "pain" depends on contingent facts, on what kind of state plays the and the role with us ((s) not what kind of linguistic convention we have). (see 1994b(1),296f). 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Semantic Value | Verschiedene Vs Semantic Value | Schwarz I 198 Def Semantic Value/Lewis/Schwarz: in the next step semantic values are assigned: from these at the end the truth conditions (truth con.) of sentences (functions of possible situations on truth values) should emerge. Schw I 199 Category N: these expressions are assigned a function in intensional semantics from possible situations to things. The values for other categories then result again from their syntactic role: For example, since "laughs" is an expression of the category (S/N), its semantic value together with the value of an N expression must supply the value of an S expression. For example the semantic value of "laughs" is thus a function of N-values (functions of possible situations on individuals) on S-values (functions of possible situations on truth values). For example the adverb "loud" has as semantic value a function of (S/N)-values on (S/N)-values (So a function of functions of functions of situations on individuals on functions of functions of situations on truth values on functions of functions of situations on individuals on functions of situations on truth values). Meaning/Vs Semantic Value/VsLewis: Question: is the meaning of "Frieda" really a function of situations on individuals, and not simply Frieda herself? Lewis/Schwarz: Such concerns do not stop him: to say what meaning is, we must first ask what meaning does and then find what it does. (1970b(1),193). 1. David Lewis [1970b]: “General Semantics”. Synthese, 22: 18–67. In [Lewis 1983d] |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Swoyer, Chr. | Armstrong Vs Swoyer, Chr. | Armstrong III 160 Properties/Swoyer: (1982)(1) thesis: prop. must have "essential characteristics". But they are not phenomenal and do not consist in prop of prop. They are the relations of the "nomic implications" which they have for other prop. VsSwoyer: (elsewhere: PutnamVsLewis: prop cannot simply exist): Why should prop have essential characteristics at all? Perhaps their identity is simple. Otherwise one would have to give up Leibniz’s principle of the indistinguishability of the identical (in terms of prop.). E.g. prop. may be different, such as: most of us would say that particulars (P) can be different, although they have all features in common. ((s) ultimately distinguished by local prop?) (> Lit.: Armstrong, Universals, 1978(2), Chapter 9.1). SwoyerVs: these "simple" distinction must be grounded in something: its spatiotemporal localization. ArmstrongVsSwoyer: But suppose, as it seems conceivable, that there are Ps that are not spatio-temporal. Pace Thomas Aquinas: E.g. Two angels could not be different, even though they have all features in common. Armstrong: Why not just a "simple property" that has no essential characteristic, but simply is "itself"?. 1. C. Swoyer, The Nature of Natural Laws, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1982). 2. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Truth-conditional Sem. | Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem. | Cresswell II 145 Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 and many other articles). KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics: 1. (Katz 1982): all other approaches except Katz's own reduce meaning to something else, including truth conditions. VsKatz: his own critique depends on the fact that he already knows that truth conditions are something other than meaning. ((s) So the approaches he criticizes cannot be circular). CresswellVsKatz: his semantics are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Semantics/Cresswell: "semantic data": e.g. meaning of sentences, e.g. synonymy of pairs of sentences, etc. Cresswell II 146 KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: 2. it results in all logically equivalent propositions having the same meaning. Especially in the version of possible world semantics. (1982, 190): Katz acknowledges that there are attempts at a solution. Example Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz's approach seems to demand structured meanings. Lexical Decomposition/Katz/Cresswell: this is used by Katz to trace meanings back to semantic basic concepts. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Possible World | Versus | Field I 205 possible worlds FieldVs / FieldVsLewis: worlds are dubious entities - FieldVsLewis: E.g. a sentence of the form "MS" is not, as Lewis says, an abbreviation for a set without modal operator, claiming the existence of a world. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Functionalism | Versus | Field II 30 Field: per materialism, per physicalism -FieldVsFunctionalism / FieldVsLewis: not sufficient for Brentano s problem - FieldVsInstrumentalism: belief ascriptions can be literally true and they are not just useful tools. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Values | Harman, G. | Graeser I 190 Value / Valuation / Lewis: values should be regarded as feeling, belief, desire - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1 intrinsic desire of a higher level is misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is like any intention, already self-referential. I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: in danger of blurring the distinction between purpose and agent, and thus committed to the assumption that targets are to some extent equipped with means. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Cond. Prblty | Jackson, F. | Lewis V 154 Jackson Thesis: "Implicature-of-Robustness" theory for the conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: Example "Fred will not learn and even if he does, he will fail". If (according to Lewis) here the conditional is only claimable, if the antecedence cannot be denied, then how can it be that nevertheless both are claimed together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of its robustness. Even if you think I am wrong, if I think Fred doesn't learn, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Four-Dimensionalism. | Lewis, D. | Meixner I 51 Spacetimes/Four-Dimensionalism/Lewis: "Argument of intrinsic change": a change that does not consist in changing the relationship to something outside the object. Intrinsic changes often occur. Thesis: They can only be understood if one assumes that objects have temporal parts. A preceding temporal part of the object has the shape A and a following one the shape B. MeixnerVsLewis: but one can also simply say that the object - completely without temporal parts - first has this shape, and then that other one (whereby the two shapes are universals, which as such can be determined quite independently of the object and the time). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Possible Worlds | Lewis, D. | IV 149 Situation / possible worlds / Lewis: there can also be alternatives within a possible world. - V 347 "Counterfactuals" (1973) possible world / Lewis: no two worlds differ in only one respect. (see above): the smallest change takes infinitely many others. If there are no similar A-worlds, we should consider whether any A-worlds where B is true, are more similar to our actual world than worlds where B does not apply. Sw I 13 possible worlds / Realism / Lewis: there are beyond our universe countless other, merely possible worlds. Virtually all other authors VsLewis. Lewis: this is justified because of the benefits of the underlying theory. |
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| Content | Lewis, D. | Schw I 161 Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. Content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. Schw I 171 Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990). |
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| Names | Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 223 Names/Description/References/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): for names and species expressions, there is no common description that defines what the expression refers to. Descriptions are completely irrelevant to the reference. Description Theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed that are necessarily attributed to the referent. Schwarz I 228 Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: Names can name everything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-dom" - predicates are not names and name nothing - predicate(s): no singular term - SchwarzVsLewis/ RussellVsFrege: if you assume that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell's paradox follows. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Satz-Bedeutung | Lewis, D. | Grover II 158 Meaning / Lewis / Grover: (Lewis 1972): truth conditions that are mapped by the pictures of circumstances (possible worlds) and contexts to truthe values, grasp the sentence meaning. Schw I 161 mental content / Lewis: is determined by the causal role, through the typical causes and effects. Content / DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language that we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning / LewisVsDavidson: what sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, desires and beliefs. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Values | Lewis, D. | Graeser I 190 Value/Evaluation/Lewis: Thesis: values should be seen as feeling, believing, desiring. - Ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1. intrinsic desire of a higher level is misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and, like any intention, is already self-referential. I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: in danger of blurring the distinction between purpose(s) and means, and thus committing to the assumption that goals are, so to speak, endowed with means and thus encounter us. Schw I 185 Appreciate/Evaluate/Evaluation/Value/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis is a realist and naturalist about normative facts: Value judgements can be true or false. Their truth is based on natural physical circumstances of the real world. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| TheoreticalTerms | Papineau, D. | Schurz I 215 PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories have existence and uniqueness assertions for the reference of the theoretical terms is even doubtful if it is interpreted realistically. In an instrumentalist sense it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6, Fn 5). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| personal Identity | Perry, J. | Lewis IV 71 PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the R-relation (> Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states) is not the same as the I-relation (between states of an individual) in this case (split). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are I-r, but because of the split not R-r. Perry thesis: every person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable to that time. It should be noted that persons can share stages: Splitting: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity-to-t is somewhat counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual. Condit. | Reichenbach, H. | Fraassen I 118 Counterfactual Conditional/Natural Law/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is, or at least a law-like statement. For only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals. Wessel I 306 It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: thesis: the unreal conditional theorem depends on the real statement. Legal statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa! |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Continuant | Stalnaker, R. | I 137 Endurantism/Four Dimensional/Four Dimensionalism/Continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: Thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. I.e. they are present in every moment with all their (only spatial) parts. Nevertheless, they exist in time. LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense. StalnakerVsLewis: that cannot be quite so, because the representatives admit that some things like football matches, wars, centuries have quite temporal parts. Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an unclear doctrine, some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend it nor fight it. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Values | Frankfurt, H. | Graeser I 190 Value / Validation / Lewis: values should be regarded as feeling, belief, desire - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1. intrinsic desire of a higher level is misleading. - "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is just like any intention, already self-referential - I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: he is at risk, to blur the distinction between the object and means, and thus commits himfelf to the assumption that targets themselves are to a certain extent equipped with means. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Werte | Watson, G. | Graeser I 190 Gary Watson: These Verlangen und Werten separat. "motivational system"/"valuational system". - VsLewis |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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