Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communitarianism | Dagger | Gaus I 167 Communitarianism/republicanism/Dagger: Communitarianism and republicanism are closely related schools of thought - so closely related that friend and foe alike sometimes conflate them. CommunitarianismVsLiberalism/RepublicanismVsLiberalism: Both the emergence of communitarianism and the revival of republicanism in recent years stem from an uneasiness with liberalism. In both cases the fiundamental complaint is that liberalism is guilty of an excessive or misguided emphasis on the rights and liberties of the individual that 'nurtures a socially corrosive form of individualism' (Newman, 1989(1): 254). Some communitarians and republicans advance their theories as alternatives to liberalism, while others take themselves to be restoring or reviving the concern for community or civic life that once informed liberal theory and practice. Communitarianism/Dagger: communitarians (...) seem to be joined more by a common impulse or longing than by agreement on shared principles. As a result (...) communitarians have been vulnerable to three charges: 1) that their objections to liberal theory are largely misconceived; 2) that they have no clear alternative to offer, largely because they fail to define 'community' in a precise or useful way; and 3) that the vague alternative they do offer runs the risk of imposing stifling conformity, or worse, on society. There is, in addition, the embarrassment that some of the most prominent scholars to wear the communitarian label have either abandoned communitarianism or denied that the label ever truly fitted them. >Republicanism/Dagger, >Communitarianism/Political Philosophy. Gaus I 173 Reactions on criticisms: Sandel (...) has decided that 'republican' better defines his position than 'communitarian' and MacIntyre has denied, quite forcefully, that he is or ever was a communitarian. Others have embraced the communitarian label, but their rejoinders to 'liberal' criticisms stress their desire to strike a balance between individual rights and civic responsibilities (Etzioni, 1996)(2) in order to 'move closer to the ideal of community life' - a life in which 'we learn the value of integrating what we seek individually with the needs and aspirations of other people' (Tam, 1998(3): 220, emphasis added). Political communitarianism: In contrast to MacIntyre, Sandel, Walzer, and Taylor, these 'political communitarians' (Frazer, 1999)(4) are less concerned with philosophical criticism of liberalism or individualism than with moving closer to the ideal of community life by reviving civil society. They hope to do this, in particular, by calling attention to shared values and beliefs, encouraging active and widespread participation in civic life, and bringing politics down to the local, properly 'human' level (Frazer, 1999(4): 41-2). The key question for these 'political' communitarians is whether 'the ideal of community life' is precise and powerful enough to do the work they want it to do. VsCommunitarianism: Whether 'philosophical' or 'political' , communitarianism is too vague to be helpful and too accommodating to be acceptable. Communities take a great many forms, including some - such as fascist or Nazi communes - that communitarians themselves must find unpalatable or intolerable. >Communitarianism/Sandel, >Communitarianism/Political Philosophy. 1. Newman, Stephen (1989) 'Challenging the liberal individualist tradition in America: "community" as a critical ideal in recent political theory'. In A. C. Hutchinson and L. J. M. Green, eds, Law and the Community: The End of Individualism? Toronto: Carswell. 2. Etzioni, Amitai (1996) The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in Democratic Society. New York: Basic. 3. Tam, Henry (1998) Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 4. Frazer, Elizabeth (1999) The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Communitarianism | Lamont | Gaus I 233 Communitarianism/Lamont: Communitarians and feminists have (...) questioned the nature of persons and autonomy that is the celebrated core of liberalism. Communitarians see individuals as largely the products of culture, rather than as autonomous individuals who choose freely by exercising an objective capacity to reason (Mulhall and Swift, 1996(1); Taylor, 1985a(2); 1985b(3)). >Subjects, >Free will, >Actions, >Individuals, >Individualism, >Liberalism. The dialogue growing out of the communitarian critique, along with the response of Rawls and other liberals, has coincided with political movements in Western democracies to respond to the myriad of issues raised by the realities of multiculturalism and feminism Lsee further Chapter 191. This body of literature discusses justice as much in terms of cultural recognition as in terms of resource distribution (Taylor, 1994(4); Willet, 1998(5)). Method/content/principles: Communitarians oppose the methodology, but not necessarily the content, of liberalism. They represent a range of positions that specify a methodology, a style of justification, and a theory of the nature of persons. nature of persons. Relativism: Communitarians, along with Marxists, emphasize the relevance of the particular history, culture, class struggles, and community interests to the content and justification of distributive principles. Hence, they tend to be moral relativists. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism. Walzer: A communitarian liberal, then, such as Michael Walzer (1983)(6), is someone who, for some particular society, will argue for liberal institutions on communitarian grounds. CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: One clear strand in the communitarian critique is the claim that whatever principles are proposed from a liberal-style methodology will be too vague and abstract to be of any practical use, and at the same time, that they will tend to be oppressive in so far as they ignore the ideals actually arising from real political and cul- tural histories (Fisk, 1989(7); Walzer, 1983(6); Willet, 1998(5); Young, 2000(8)). Theorizing about distributive justice, for these thinkers, must be largely empirical and relativistic. 1. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift, eds (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Cambridge: Blackwell. 2. Taylor, Charles (1985a) Human Agency and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. Taylor, Charles (1985b) Philosophy and the Human Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4. Taylor, Charles (1994) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universtiy Press. 5. Willet, Cynthia, ed. (1998) Theorizing Multiculturalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 7. Fisk, Milton (1989) The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Young, Iris Marion (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democratic Theory | Barber | Brocker I 681 Democratic Theory/Democracy/Barber: Barber understands democracy not only as a decision-making process, but as an overarching way of life that a self-governing political community is able to support. Thus, his work Strong Democracy (1) is an attempt to re-found a participatory theory of democracy. 1. BarberVsLiberalism: Barber criticizes liberal concepts of democracy 2. Barber pro Pluralism, Barber pro Individualism 3. Thesis: a "strong democracy" ((s) participatory democracy) can be achieved in a targeted manner in contemporary society. See Democracy/Barber. Brocker I 682/683 Def Anarchist Disposition of traditional Democratic Theory: this reflects the power-critical side of liberalism, e.g. Locke and Robert Nozick. Def Realistic Disposition: can be found in Machiavelli and Hobbes in particular: it is domination affine because it assumes that politics cannot bind people by inner beliefs, but rather requires external sanctions and incentives. BarberVsLiberalism: the conflict between power-critical-anarchistic and power-affinity-realistic disposition leads to schizophrenic features (2) Def Minimalist disposition: (e.g. Rawls and Mill): aims to resolve this disunity by advocating a "policy of tolerance". (3) Solution/Rawls/Mill: Protection against intolerant majorities and goods distribution on the basis of reciprocity. Barber pro Minimalism: in this way beyond liberalism, but without revealing the view to "more creative forms of politics" (4). >Terminology/Barber. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994. 2. Ibid. p. 47 3. Ibid. p. 49 4. Ibid. p. 55. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Distributive Justice | Feminism | Gaus I 234 Distributive justice/Feminism/Lamont: [e.g., Susan Moller] Okin(1) demonstrates, (...) that women have substantial disadvantages competing in the market because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equally shared with men. As a consequence, any Gaus I 235 theory relying on market mechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems which result in women systematically having less income and wealth than men. Cf. >Liberalism, >Income. FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997(2): 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987(3): 36). Liberalism: in the distribution of domestic labour, for example, classical liberal philosophers would view these decisions as largely non-political, to be made by individuals. So long as government laws do not dictate unequal roles for men and women - if men and women in their par ticular cultural contexts choose roles that in the long run create unequal economic positions for men and women - the liberal view would ordinarily permit the outcome as not unjust. FeminismVsLiberalism: The feminist point is that the choices are not necessarily free, and do not preserve equality, but a liberal government is powerless to change the situation. Similar points can be made about the unequal impact of other cultural views, such as those that are racist or in other ways work against minorities (...). >Minorities, >Racism. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Harper Collins. 2. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 3. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Equal Opportunities | Pettit | Brocker I 854 Equal Opportunities/Pettit: Pettit emphasizes the primal equality of all individuals, to whose protection the political sphere and the interventions of the state must contribute.(1) For Pettit, this does not mean that all individuals should be treated equally. On the contrary: unfavorable starting positions Brocker I 855 and lack of equal opportunities must be compensated as far as possible. This can also include deep interference in the unimpeded material self-development of particularly privileged citizens, i.e. making group-specific restrictions on freedom necessary. Equality does not mean individual freedom of choice in every respect. (PettitVsLiberalism.) >Liberalism. 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 110f Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equality | Pettit | Brocker I 854 Equality/Pettit: Pettit emphasizes the primal equality of all individuals, to whose protection the political sphere and the interventions of the state must contribute.(1) "In order to be a free citizen, one must enjoy lack of control in such a spectrum of choice and on the basis of such state resources and protection that one is on an equal footing with others" (Pettit 2015 (2) and Pettit 2012 (3)). >Society, >Community, >Civil Rights, >Interventionism. It does not follow for Pettit that all individuals should be treated equally. On the contrary: unfavourable starting positions Brocker I 855 and lack of equal opportunities must be compensated as far as possible. This can also include deep interference in the unimpeded material self-development of particularly privileged citizens, i.e. making group-specific restrictions on freedom necessary. Equality does not mean individual freedom of choice in every respect. (PettitVsLiberalism.) >Liberalism, >Equal Opportunities. Pettit himself describes this pattern of reasoning as "consequentialist". The conceptualisation of the granted state's regulatory potential is measured by the consideration of the consequences it will have for the creation of the greatest possible equality for each individual.(4) >Government Regulation. 1.Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 110f 2. Philip Pettit Gerechte Freiheit. Ein moralischer Kompass für eine komplexe Welt, Berlin 2015, S. 98, vgl. S. 112 3. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 2012. S. 90 4.Pettit 1997, S. 113 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Good | Sandel | Brocker I 677 Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. (1) Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. (2) 1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975) 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Government Debt | Policy of Hungary | Krastev I 65 Government debt/policy of Hungary/Krastev: One effect of the perceived Imitation Imperative in Hungary was the widespread tendency of low-income families to borrow money denominated in Swiss francs. They did so, it seems, in order to imitate the consumption patterns they observed in the West. >Imitation/Post-communist/countries, >Imitation/Krastev. Household debt soared in a heedless and futile attempt Krastev I 66 to catch up with and replicate Western living standards. Unfortunately, after a radical devaluation of Hungary’s currency, the incautious borrowers had to make skyrocketing monthly payments in depreciated Forints. According to government statistics almost a million people took out loans in a foreign currency and 90 per cent of the foreign currency loans were in Swiss francs. OrbánVsLiberalism: This is what Orbán has in mind when he remarks that ‘the liberal Hungarian state did not protect the country from indebtedness.’ Liberal democracy, he concludes, ‘failed to protect families from bonded labour’.(1) Such crushing burdens reinforced the sense that integration into the global economic system was degradation and impoverishment, not freedom and prosperity, as had originally been promised by its liberal cheerleaders. Krastev I 68 Reading Orbán’s historic speech of 26 July 2014, in which he reaffirmed his militant commitment to building an illiberal state in Hungary, one feels his palpable contempt for those who try to blur the border between victory and defeat.(2) He would agree completely with Robert Frost’s scoffing definition of a liberal as ‘a man who cannot take his own side in an argument’. Orbán was not only disappointed with liberalism and its spirit of compromise; he wanted to defeat it decisively. 1. ‘Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014’, The New York Times (29 July 2014). 2. Ibid. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Income | Okin | Gaus I 234 Income/family/politics/feminism/Okin/Lamont: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. There are many versions of this criticism, but perhaps the best developed is Susan Moller Okin's (1989(1): 128—30), which documents the effects of the institution of the nuclear family. She argues that the consequence of this institution is a position of systematic material and political inequality for women. Okin demonstrates, for example, that women have substantial disadvantages competing in the market because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equally shared with men. As a consequence, any Gaus I 235 theory relying on market mechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems which result in women systematically having less income and wealth than men. FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997(2): 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987(3): 36). 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Harper Collins. 2. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 3. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Individualism | Kelsen | Brocker I 139 Individualism/KelsenVsIndividualism/Kelsen: Kelsen's criticism of individualism is amazing. In "Wesen und Wert"(1) Kelsen assumes a transformation of the individual to the collective freedom of the individual. >Freedom/Kelsen. KelsenVsLiberalismus: in statements before the First World War he certifies that contemporary liberalism has an apolitical basic attitude, which is explained by its individualism.(2) For Kesen, economic liberalism does not necessarily belong to democracy. >Democracy. 1. Hans Kelsen, cy»Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981). 2. Hans Kelsen »Politische Weltanschauung und Erziehung«, in: Annalen für soziale Politik und Gesetzgebung 2, 1913, S. 7 Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Individuals | Liberalism | Gaus I 116 Individuals/traditional liberalism/Gaus/Mack: The liberty tradition is normatively individualist, affirming the separate value of each individual. This normative individualism underlies an insistence on the illegitimacy of actions and policies that impose losses on some individuals in the name of providing more extensive benefits to others (Nozick, 1974(1): 28–35). UtilitarianismVsLiberalism: It might seem that utilitarian members of the tradition oppose this: utilitarians insist that only the greatest overall happiness is of value, and so it would seem that individuals are normatively important only as a means to aggregate satisfaction. LiberalismVsVs: While this might be the crux of utilitarianism in moral theory, it has not been in the liberty tradition. Ontological individualism: In addition, the liberty tradition is ontologically individualist in that it takes individuals, not classes, or races, or nations, to be in the final analysis the only sites of value, the only real agents, the only true bearers of rights and of responsibilities (see Bentham, 1987(2): ch. 1, s. 4; Buchanan and Tullock, 1965(3): 11–12). Only individuals make choices; there is, literally, no such thing as ‘social choice’ (de Jasay, 1991(4): 57–9). Normative individualism - the separate importance of each individual’s life, well-being or preference satisfaction - is thought to endorse enforceable moral claims held by all individuals against interferences that diminish their lives, wellbeing or preference satisfaction. A moral claim against interference by others is basic to the liberty tradition (Nozick, 1974(1): 30ff; Machan, 1989(5): 7ff). Legal individualism: The liberty tradition takes individual liberty to be the core political or legal norm (Robbins, 1961(6): 104). Individual liberty is what each individual may legitimately demand of each other individual. >Property/Liberalism. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 2. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 3. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 4. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 5. Machan, Tibor (1989) Individuals and Their Rights. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 6. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 683 Individuals/Liberalism/Barber: Barber's thesis: The core of liberalism is an instrumental understanding of democracy. Politics is then there to protect individuals against external interference and to achieve this protection in such a way that it is compatible with the supposedly unchanging characteristics of individuals. Liberalism tends to summarize the characteristics of individuals in pessimistic descriptions. Democracy is then accepted as a means for liberal purposes, i.e. for the purposes of homines oeconomici, and according to expediency.(1) See Liberalism/Barber. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 56. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| International Relations | Carr | Gaus I 290 International relations/Carr/Brown: (...) for E. H. Carr (2001 [1939](1)), the most influential British realist, the dilemmas of international relations are created by the human condition not by human nature. CarrVsNiebuhr: Scarcity, not sin, is at the root of realism; there are not enough of the good things to go around, and thus the liberal internationalist assumption of a natural harmony of interests is wrong. >International relations/Niebur, >Political realism/Brown. Rather, the privileged, whether states or individuals, will seek to defend the status quo, dressing up this defence in legalistic and Gaus I 291 moralistic terms (...). International politics/Carr: International politics is about this conflict, and the mistake of 1919 was to attempt to assign a moral status to the outcome of the First World War that it did not deserve. In the first edition of his book, Carr makes it clear that the correct way to deal with the challenge posed by figures such as Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s was to buy them off in the general interest, if necessary with other people's property; this position somehow failed to appear in the second edition, published in 1945 (Fox, 1985(2); Cox, introduction to Carr, 2001(1)). CarrVsLiberalism//Brown: Carr's politics were quasi-Marxist and his opponents were liberal internationalists, yet there is much about his account of the world that is consistent with at least one variety of liberalism. Rationalism/realism: Carr presents an essentially Hobbesian account of the human condition. For Carr, states and individuals have interests which they pursue rationally, using whatever means are at their disposal, and this inevitably leads to conflict, which the international system is unable to resolve because there is no international Leviathan. Instead, and here Carr's realism and American realism can agree, the only check on the exercise of power by one state (or coalition) is the power of another. >Political realism/Brown, >Balance of Power/Waltz, >State/Waltz. 1. Carr, E. H. (2001 [1939]) The Twenty Years Crisis, ed. and introduction Michael Cox. London: Palgrave. 2. Fox, W. R. T. (1985) 'E. H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision'. Review of International Studies, 11: 1-16. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| International Relations | Niebuhr | Gaus I 290 International relationsNiebuhr/Brown: In 1919 an attempt had been made to bring international relations under the rule of law and the League of Nations was established, largely at the instigation of US President Woodrow Wilson, although the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles which contained the Covenant of the League. By the early 1930s it was clear that the hopes resting on the League were to be disappointed and realist thought developed on the back of this disappoint- ment, explaining what had gone wrong and proposing an alternative account of international relations. Niebuhr was one of the first to undertake this task; his message is conveyed in shorthand by the title of his most influential work, Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932)(1); his point was that the liberals who created the League wildly exaggerated the capacity of collectivities of humans to behave in ways that were truly moral. Ethics/Niebuhr thesis: Niebuhr held that 'men' had the capacity to be good, but that this capacity was always in conflict with the sinful acquisitive and aggressive drives that are also present in human nature. These drives are given full scope in society and it is unrealistic to think that they can be har- nessed to the goal of international peace and under- standing in bodies such as the League of Nations. State/Augustine: Niebuhr's approach is essentially Augustinian, resting on Augustine's account of the coexistence of the two cities: the community of believers which encompasses past, present and future and all that is good in humanity, and the world as it is, fallen and imperfect. >State/Augustine. NiebuhrVsLiberalism: The liberal internationalists of 1919 made the mistake of assuming that a world of reason and justice could be erected while these cities coexist; instead this coexistence requires a politics based on a clear-headed understanding of power. >International relations/Morgenthau. 1. Niebuhr, R. (1932) Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Scribner. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Strauss | Gaus I 24 Interpretation/Leo Strauss/Ball: Straussians – followers of the late Leo Strauss (1899–1973) – claim that a canon of works by Plato and a handful of other authors contains the Whole Truth about politics, a truth which is eternal, unchanging, and accessible only to the fortunate few (...). Gaining access to this truth requires a special way of reading and of interpreting what one reads. >Truth, >Plato. StraussVsLiberalism: (...) Strauss saw the history of modern Western liberal political thought as a story of degeneration and enfeeblement. He and his followers contrasted the vigour of classical Greek and Roman political thought with the resigned ennui of slackminded modern liberal thinkers. >Liberalism, >VsLiberalism. Modern liberalism is a philosophy without foundations. Having eschewed any grounding in nature or natural law, modern liberalism, from Hobbes to the present, is reduced to a spineless relativism and is therefore without the normative foundations and philosophical resources to resist the winds of twentiethcentury fanaticism blowing from both right and left. >Liberalism/Hobbes, >Th. Hobbes. StraussVsHistoricism: The present being bankrupt, students of political philosophy must look to the past for guidance; they must be historians but not ‘historicists’. >Historicism. Knowledge and guidance of the sort we require are not easy to come by, however. They require that we read these ‘old books’ aright - that we decipher Gaus I 25 the real meaning of the messages encoded by authors fearful of persecution and wishing to communicate with cognoscenti through the ages (Strauss, 1952)(1). >Theory change, >Meaning change. StraussVsLocke/StraussVsHobbes: To communicate with the great thinkers of antiquity is to appreciate how far we have fallen. The rot began in the seventeenth century, with the advent of modern liberalism, and that of Hobbes and Locke especially (Strauss, 1953)(2). >Liberalism/Locke, >J. Locke. They disavowed the ancient wisdom and the older idea of natural law, favouring instead a view of politics founded on security and self-interest. The ancient ‘philosophical’ quest for the good life was transmuted into the modern ‘scientific’ search for safety, security, and the accommodation of competing interests. 1) VsStrauss: Straussian interpretations have been criticized on a number of reasons. One is that they rely on the sort of supposed ‘insider’s knowledge’ that is available only to those who have been initiated into the mysteries of Straussian interpretation (and who in turn conveniently dismiss criticisms by non-Straussian outsiders as being hopelessly ignorant and uninformed). >Knowledge, >Understanding. 2) VsStrauss: Another is that they assume, without argument or evidence, that the ‘real’ text does not correspond, point for point, to the written and publicly available ‘exoteric’ text; the real or ‘esoteric’ text remains hidden from public view, its meaning inaccessible to the uninitiated and unworthy. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Texts, >Literature. 1. Strauss, Leo, 1952. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, IL: Free. 2. Strauss, Leo, 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
StraussDFr I David Friedrich Strauss Der alte und der neue Glaube Hamburg 2012 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Kant | Sandel | Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Barber | Brocker I 681 Liberalism/BarberVsLiberalism/Barber: Thesis: in American democracy reigns a "lobbyist policy" "politics of images", a "politics of mass society" instead of genuine citizen participation. (written in 1984). (1) Liberalism or the concept of representation associated with liberalism, which destroys participation, was responsible for this. (2) Brocker I 682 Liberal Democracy/Barber: focuses on individual rights and an electoral government. >Electoral systems, >Electoral fraud, >Electoral rules. Problem: liberalism misunderstood "politics as keeping predators". Brocker I 683 The core of liberalism is an instrumental understanding of democracy. Politics is then there to protect individuals against external interference and to achieve this protection in such a way that it is compatible with the supposedly unchanging characteristics of individuals. Liberalism tends to summarize the characteristics of individuals in pessimistic descriptions. Brocker I 684 Liberalism/Barber: the pre-conceptual framework is characterized by ideas such as "property", "territory", "borders", "sanctions", "freedom" and "power". Aspects such as human interdependence, mutual assistance, cooperation, membership, brotherhood, community and citizenship are neglected. (3) >Property, >Freedom, >Power. Method/Liberalism/Barber: the methodology of liberalism is a "Cartesian" one, i.e. knowledge is gained through the application of a reliable method. >Method, >Cartesianism. BarberVsLiberalism: Politics is not the application of truth to the problem of human relationships, but the application of human relationships to the problem of truth. (4) Brocker I 685 BarberVsLiberal Democracy: thesis: liberalism creates a type of person whose psyche is susceptible to the totalitarian temptation by throwing the human back on itself. (Haus: here parallels to Hannah Arendt's thinking are revealed.) Nevertheless: BarberVsArendt/BarberVsStrauss, Leo: these are nostalgic theories. (5) >H. Arendt, >Leo Strauss. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 12. 2. Ebenda S. 13. 3. Benjamin Barber Strong Democray. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Twentieth-anniversary edition, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2003 S. 34f. 4. Ibid. p. 64f. 5. Ibid. p. 100. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Dietz | Gaus I 283 Liberalism/Dietz/Mottier: Like Pateman, Young and Benhabib, Dietz (1992)(1) also founds her critique of the gendered nature of citizenship on a critical reading of liberal theories, based especially on the American political context. >Deliberative democracy/Benhabib, >Public Sphere/Pateman, >Democracy/Young. Dietz: She is, however, more hostile towards liberal perspectives. Whereas Pateman reproaches liberal theories for their relative indifference towards social inequalities, including those between men and women, Dietz's critique is more radical: DietzVsLiberalism: [Dietz] argues that liberalism and gendered concepts of citizenship are fundamentally incompatible. She thus joins other feminist critics for whom the central themes of liberalism - the citizen who has rights and pursues his own interests in a capitalist and competitive society - do not allow for the adequate conceptualization of interrelations or relations of dependency between individuals, either in the political or in the family spheres. Public Sphere/privacy/Dietz: Dietz shares the views of Pateman and Walby concerning the necessity of reconceptualizing the links between the public and the private, and of rethinking the distinction between the spheres. Citizenship: She also emphasizes the importance of citizenship as 'a continuous activity and a good in itself, not as a momentary engagement (or a socialist revolution) with an eye to a final goal or a societal arrangement', calling for a 'feminist revitalization' of citizenship (1992(1): 392). 1. Dietz, Mary (1992) 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship'. In Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 63—85. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberalism | Feminism | Gaus I 234 Liberalism/Feminism/Lamont: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. >Income/Moller Okin. Gaus I 235 FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997(1): 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987(2): 36). 1. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 2. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Gaus I 281 Liberalism/Feminism/FeminismVsLiberalism/Mottier: (...) on the one hand, authors such as Lister and Pateman question the gendered nature of the frontiers between the public and the private while insisting on the importance of female values and roles (Pateman, 1991)(1) and on the recognition by the public sphere of the work done by women in the private sphere (Lister, 1990)(2). On the other hand, these authors propose as a solution to the domestic exploitation of women their entry into the public sphere, particularly in the labour market. Feminist theorists have been instrumental in demonstrating the particularistic rather than universal nature of citizenship. They reveal that liberal democratic theory has been based on the implicit assumption that 'political action and masculinity were congruent, whereas political action and femininity were antithetical' , as K. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir (1988(3):2) put it. They also take issue with the liberalist claim to universality for asking subordinated social groups such as women to subordinate their own 'partial' needs to the 'general' interest (Young, 1990)(4). >Citizenship/Gender Theories, >Citizenship/Walby. 1. Pateman, Carole (1991) The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2. Lister, Ruth (1990) 'VVomen, economic dependency and citizenship'. Journal of Social Policy, 19 (4): 445-67. 3. Jones, K. and A. G. Jonasdottir (1988) 'Gender as an analytic category in political theory'. In K. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir, eds, The Political Interests of Gender. London: Sage. 4. Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberalism | Holmes | Krastev I 17 Liberalism/post-communist era/Krastev/Holmes: What the breathtaking rise of China suggests is that the defeat of the communist idea in 1989 was not, after all, a one-sided victory for the liberal idea. Instead, the unipolar order became a world much less hospitable to liberalism than anyone had predicted at the time. Some commentators have claimed that 1989, by eliminating the Cold War competition between rival universal ideologies, fatally damaged the Enlightenment project itself, in its liberal as well as communist incarnation. The Hungarian philosopher G. M. Tamás has gone even further, Krastev I 18 arguing that ‘both the liberal and socialist utopias’ were ‘defeated’ in 1989, signalling ‘the end’ of the ‘Enlightenment project’ itself.(1) KrastevVsTamás: We are not so fatalistic. (...) the anti-liberal regimes and movements (...) perhaps because they lack any broadly appealing ideological vision, may prove ephemeral and historically inconsequential. Krastev I 37 Libralism: Massive emigration, especially of the young, has arguably done more to discredit liberalism in the region than virtually nonexistent immigration. As it was understood in the region, (...) liberalism elevated the freedom to cross borders into something of a sacred value. This gave Westernizing and reform-minded leaders no ready language with which to express and take into account demographic fears fueled by outmigration from low birthrate societies. As a consequence, populist demagogues were able to exploit unspoken fears of national extinction to vilify open-border liberalism, to public applause, Krastev I 38 and claim that the liberal idea has outlived its usefulness in today’s world. Krastev I 67 Liberalism/Krastev: Liberal democracy offers provisional victories only. It denies the electoral winners the chance for a full and final victory. Liberal democracy’s renunciation of definitive and decisive victories, as opposed to temporary and indecisive ones, is what makes the allegedly full and final victory of liberal democracy itself in 1989 seem so anomalous and problematic. PopulismVsLiberalism: How could a political ideology that glorifies ongoing competition, ideological alternatives and merely provisional victories, the populists ask, claim to have done away with all three? 1. Gáspár Miklós Tamás, ‘A Clarity Interfered With’, in Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? (Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 82–3. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Liberalism | Krastev | Krastev I 17 Liberalism/post-communist era/Krastev: What the breathtaking rise of China suggests is that the defeat of the communist idea in 1989 was not, after all, a one-sided victory for the liberal idea. Instead, the unipolar order became a world much less hospitable to liberalism than anyone had predicted at the time. Some commentators have claimed that 1989, by eliminating the Cold War competition between rival universal ideologies, fatally damaged the Enlightenment project itself, in its liberal as well as communist incarnation. The Hungarian philosopher G. M. Tamás has gone even further, Krastev I 18 arguing that ‘both the liberal and socialist utopias’ were ‘defeated’ in 1989, signalling ‘the end’ of the ‘Enlightenment project’ itself.(1) KrastevVsTamás: We are not so fatalistic. (...) the anti-liberal regimes and movements (...) perhaps because they lack any broadly appealing ideological vision, may prove ephemeral and historically inconsequential. Krastev I 37 Libralism: Massive emigration, especially of the young, has arguably done more to discredit liberalism in the region than virtually nonexistent immigration. As it was understood in the region, (...) liberalism elevated the freedom to cross borders into something of a sacred value. This gave Westernizing and reform-minded leaders no ready language with which to express and take into account demographic fears fueled by outmigration from low birthrate societies. As a consequence, populist demagogues were able to exploit unspoken fears of national extinction to vilify open-border liberalism, to public applause, Krastev I 38 and claim that the liberal idea has outlived its usefulness in today’s world. Krastev I 67 Liberalism/Krastev: Liberal democracy offers provisional victories only. It denies the electoral winners the chance for a full and final victory. Poland. Liberal democracy’s renunciation of definitive and decisive victories, as opposed to temporary and indecisive ones, is what makes the allegedly full and final victory of liberal democracy itself in 1989 seem so anomalous and problematic. PopulismVsLiberalism: How could a political ideology that glorifies ongoing competition, ideological alternatives and merely provisional victories, the populists ask, claim to have done away with all three? 1. Gáspár Miklós Tamás, ‘A Clarity Interfered With’, in Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? (Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 82–3. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Liberalism | MacIntyre | Brocker I 661 Liberalism/MacIntyreVsLiberalism/Modernism/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, the liberalism of modern societies is little more than "a collection of strangers, each chasing its own interests under minimal restrictions. (1) Modern nation: be only a traditionally forgotten collection of "citizens of nowhere".(2) >Nation. Rationality/MacIntyre: In a "world of profane rationality", "any public, common logical basis or justification"(3) for our moral orientations is missing. Rationality. We are victims of a pluralism that threatens to overrun us.(4). See Modernism/MacIntyre. Brocker I 664 University/MacIntyreVsLiberalism: MacIntyre advocates an idea of the university that sees it as its stage on which divergent points of view are presented in order to be able to view the central conflicts. Instead, he diagnoses a real university conflict avoidance strategy disguised as liberality.(5) 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 334 2. Ibid. p. 210 3. Ibid. p. 74 4. Ibid. p.. 301. 5. Alasdair MacIntyre , Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Encyclopedia, Genealogy and Tradition (Gifford Lectures 1988) Notre Dame, Ind. 1990 p. 231. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Morgenthau | Brocker I 280 Liberalism/MorgenthauVsLiberalism/Morgenthau: Thesis (1948): European liberalism, historically derived from the internal political struggle against absolute violence, was transferred to the completely different field of interstate relations by academic and foreign elites in Washington. A denatured liberalism of this kind was not able to eliminate the - according to Morgenthau, anchored in humans themselves - elementary power of the political, but rather the objectivity in dealing with the political. America was biased in a tangle of desirables, deceptive hopes and abstract ideals, in simplifying schemes and recipes that supposedly dispensed with the confrontation with power-political reality. Brocker I 286 MorgenthauVsLiberalism: he tries to negate in a decadent way the everywhere existing striving for power, which determines the political. This striving for power is inherent in human nature and dominates both private and social life. See Politics/Morgenthau, Power/Morgenthau. VsMorgenthau: this realistic view was hostile to his American contemporaries ((s) at the end of the 1940s), something Morgenthau had not reckoned with. For Morgenthau, however, this description was morally indifferent. Morgenthau did not realize that his diagnosis could and was understood as a moral affirmation of power and power politics. Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pol Morg I Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948 German Edition: Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Sandel | Brocker I 668 Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)(1)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls. Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all. A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia), Brocker I 669 are usually called teleological. >Eudemonia. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them. B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself. >Order/Hobbes. Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life. Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom. >Norms. State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good. Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself. SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: Sandel criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (2) >The Good, >Life, cf. >Utilitarianism. Brocker I 676 SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (3) >Democracy. 1. John Rawls, (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x. 3. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberty | Pettit | Brocker I 851 Liberty/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: Pettit criticizes the liberal fixation on a "negative freedom": this is all too one-sidedly aimed at maintaining the distance between the individual and the state. Here there are two shortcomings: a) The necessary protective functions of the state for the free self-development of the individual and b) to recognize and appreciate the benefits of the participation of individuals in political decisions. >Liberalism/Pettit. With liberalism, Pettit shares concerns about a dominant state that restricts individual choices and ultimately denies political participation. His model-theoretical and programmatic key goal derived from this is therefore: freedom without dominance, but certainly state support for the attainment of individual freedom. Forms of freedom/Pettit: in addition to the traditional understanding of freedom "to" or "of" something, Pettit introduces a third form: a form of "non-domination": bringing: freedom from domination, compulsion and arbitrariness, from "domination" and "mastery", which however does not stand in the way of freedom for political participation. (1) Problem: An arbitrary ruling position of persons or institutions restricts an individual's freedom of choice through open or covert power of disposal, through the impairment of freedom of will or through manipulation of individual behavior. Non-domination/Pettit: Solution: to distance oneself from arbitrary rule- (2) The state is primarily understood as a political agency with the task of promoting the freedom of the individual and protecting it from foreign domination. >State/Pettit, Republicanism/Pettit. Brocker I 853 Pettit polemicizes against those republican variants that consider "bourgeois-humanist" freedom of political participation as the most important characteristic of the political sphere. In his opinion, they underestimate the notorious tendency of the state to dominate, to which the individuals, as participants in public life, suddenly surrendered themselves. Pettit calls this republicanism, rather unusual and in the expression of contempt, "populist" or "communitarian".(3) PettitVsCommunitarianism. >Governance/Pettit, State/Pettit, >Communitarianism, >Republicanism. 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 22 2. Ibid. p. 66 3. Ibid. p. 8 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Markets | Minimal State | Gaus I 122 Markets/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 1975(1): ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961(2); Gaus, 1983(3)). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965(4)). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975(1); Narveson, 1988(5): 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983b) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Multiculturalism | Taylor | Gaus I 255 Multiculturalism/Charles Taylor/Kukathas: TaylorVsLiberalism: (...) in his influential essay 'The politics of recognition' (1994)(1). Taylor rejects as inadequate what might be called the liberal theory of multiculturalism, for liberalism, in his view, is incapable of giving culture the recognition it requires. Liberalism offers to recognize individuals as the bearers of rights and the possessors of dignity as equal citizens, regarding each person as essentially the same. >Culture, >Cultural relativism, >Liberalism. Individualism/distinctness/diversity//Taylor: But what many cultural groups want is recognition not of their sameness, but of their distinctness. Out of such desires, according to Taylor, grew a philosophical alternative to liberalism: the politics of difference. VsNeurality: This view is sceptical about the pretensions of liberalism to offer neutral or difference-blind principles that are more than simply reflections of the standards of the dominant culture. TaylorVsKymlicka: Taylor thus rejects the efforts of Kymlicka to develop a liberalism that might accommodate difference by granting individuals differential rights to enable them to pursue their particular cultural ends. For him, the problem with this solution is that it works only 'for existing people who find themselves trapped within a culture under pressure, and can flourish within it or not at all. But it does not justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generations' (1994(1):62). It cannot, for example, justify the collective goals of the Québecois, whose aim is the long-term survival of the French- speaking community in Canada. >Multiculturalism/Kymlicka, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Multiculturalism/Liberalism, >Minorities/Multiculturalism. 1. Taylor, Charles (1994) 'The politics of recognition'. In Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Political Science | Honneth | Brocker I 789 Political Theory/Honneth/Sigwart: in political theory, Honneth's social theory is close to republican positions and to the concerns of "perfectionist liberalism". >Perfectionism. HonnethVsLiberalism: the pronounced liberalism ("the official current of modern liberalism"(Honneth (1)) understands the basic principles of freedom and self-realization firmly as principles mediated intersubjectively and to be realized in concrete political institutions. On the other hand Honneth:... See Liberalism. See Recognition/Honneth. 1. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 40 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Barber | Brocker I 684 Politics/BarberVsLiberalism/Barber: Politics is not the application of truth to the problem of human relations, but the application of human relations to the problem of truth. (1) Brocker I 685 Following Aristotle and Dewey, Barber defines politics as a "way of life". See Democracy/Barber, Liberalism/Barber, Participation/Barber. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democray. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Twentieth-anniversary edition, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2003 p. 64f. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Sandel | Brocker I 676 Politics/Principles/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/Sandel: Taking into account the dimension of inter-subjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice that would then, as it were, only be administered by politics and jurisdiction for all time. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community. Brocker I 677 Thus Sandel is in the tradition of Aristotelianism and republicanism. (1) (RepublicanismVsKant, RepublicanismVsLiberalism, AristotleVsKant). HegelVsKant/Rothhaar: this is also an echo of Hegel's criticism of Kant: Kant neglects the subjects' inter-subjectivity; for Kant, the subject is ultimately oriented towards the transcendental subject. (2) (See Intersubjectivity/Sandel, Principles/Rawls.) Politics/Morality/Sandel: Sandel's design of a political philosophy strongly recalls the concept of "morality" that Hegel develops in the basic lines of the philosophy of law. (3) The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. 1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 4-8. 2. Steven B. Smith, Hegel Critique of Liberalism. Rights in Context, London/Chicago 1991, p. 4. 3. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge/New York 1991, p. 202. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Schmitt | Höffe I 386 Politics/Carl Schmitt/Höffe: (...) Schmitt(1) [relativizes] the rank of the state by declaring "the political" a prerequisite and denying the state a monopoly in this area. >State. Friend/Foe-Dichotomy: This formula, which caused a sensation at the time and is still provocative today, is intended to represent the decisive alternative for the political world in analogy to basic distinctions in other areas of life, such as good and evil in morality, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, and profitable and unprofitable in the economy. Schmitt's use of the term "enemy" emphasizes the distinction between the political concept, the public enemy (hostis), and the private enemy (inimicus). Therefore there is no objection in the Christian commandment to love one's enemies. According to Schmitt's "anthropological creed", the human is "evil," because he/she is sinful and dangerous. Höffe: Schmitt's political thinking (...) rejects the idea of a world state that guarantees eternal peace. And it criticizes liberalism, in which, depending on the variety, the political degenerates into spirit, education, business, or property, the state into society or humanity, and domination into control and propaganda. (SchmittVsCosmopolitanism, SchmittVsLiberalism). >Cosmopolitanism, >Society, >Liberalism, >War, >Peace. 1. C. Schmitt, der Begriff des Politischen. 1927/1932. Gaus I 397 Politics/state/Schmitt/Bellamy/Jennings/Lassman: (...) in his The Concept of the Political(1) first published in 1927 Schmitt's starting point is a rejection of the unsatisfactory circularity of the conventional depiction of the conceptual relationship between the state and politics (Schmitt, 1985(2); 1996(3)). For Schmitt, before we can talk about politics we require an understanding of the defining characteristic of 'the political'. This is to be found in the antithesis between friend and enemy. Any genuine politics presupposes an understanding of 'the political' in this sense. 'The political' refers to the most extreme and intense antagonism in human relations. Who counts as 'the enemy' at any particular moment is based upon a decision made by a political state. Clearly, Gaus I 398 for Schmitt and other like-minded thinkers of the Conservative Revolution, this vision of 'the political' must be intensely hostile to liberalism in all of its forms. Liberalism is taken to be a clear example of the 'neutralizing' and 'depoliticizing' tendencies of the modern age. Furthermore, Schmitt (1996)(3) argues that the political state, as 'friend', must express the political unity of a people. 1. Schmitt, C. (1963) Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. 2. Schmitt, C. (1985) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bellamy, Richard, Jennings, Jeremy and Lassman, Peter 2004. „Political Thought in Continental Europe during the Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Schmitt I Carl Schmitt Der Hüter der Verfassung Tübingen 1931 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Republicanism | Pettit | Brocker I 850 Republicanism/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: as an outstanding representative of Republicanism, Pettit resolutely stands against liberalism: his complex model, however, bears some resemblance to a "liberal" understanding of politics. LarmoreVsPettit: Pettit is actually a disguised liberal with his guiding goal of individual independence within the logic of collective coexistence.(1) >State/Pettit, Liberalism/Pettit, Interventions/Pettit, Individual/Pettit. Brocker I 852 Def "Neo-Roman" variant of republicanism: historically refers to the republicanism of Roman antiquity and stylizes it as the propagation of a rule of law that is regarded as a means against personalized arbitrary rule and which assigns a central role to the freedom-guaranteeing action of political institutions. Pettit considers himself part of this movement. In this variant, the concern to encourage political participation takes a back seat to the maintenance of the institutional guarantee for the Republic as a state unit. This is also the position of Quentin Skinner in 1998(2). 1. Larmore, Charles, »A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism«, in: Philosophical Issues 11, 2001, 229-243. 2. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Self | Sandel | Brocker I 676 Self/Sandel: Sandel thesis: for the identity and individuality of subjects, their respective self-understanding as members of a community and bearers of a story, as well as their beliefs of what constitutes good for people, is constitutive. (1) >The good, >Subjects, >Individuals, >Recognition. SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: N.B.: if these moments of community are not "possessed" and thus ultimately remain external, but rather constitute the identity of subjects, then people cannot "leave them behind them" when they enter the "space of the political". >Liberalism, >Liberalism/Sandel. SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2) >Democracy. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 179 2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Society | Neo-Republicanism | Gaus I 175 Society/Neo-republicanism/Dagger: (...) civic virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus- tained. NeorepublicanismVSLiberalism: But the neorepublicans also tend to believe that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. As Sandel says, 'the civic or formative aspect of our LAmericanJ politics has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen' (1996(1): 6). >Liberalism. SandelVsRawls: This 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and the decisions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society in which individuals fail to understand how much they owe to the community. >J. Rawls, >Voluntarism. 1. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Taxation | Minimal State | Gaus I 121 Taxation/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: The market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Market anarchism, >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state, >Social googds/Minimal state, >Markets/Minimal state. Gaus I 122 Govvernment/Liberalism: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 1975(1): ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961(2); Gaus, 1983(3)). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965(4)). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975(1); Narveson, 1988(5): 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. Minimal state theoryVsLiberalism: If crucial public goods would be significantly underproduced in the absence of individuals being required to contribute to their funding (and requiring such contributions would yield a satisfactory level of the production of those public goods), members of the liberty tradition are faced with a hard choice. On the one hand, they may stick with unreconstructed versions of that tradition’s basic norms at the cost of precluding the mutual benefits associated with those public goods (while no doubt insisting that the public good characteristics of law enforcement are typically overestimated, and that most of what the state should do is to provide essentially privately consumed protection services). Or, on the other hand, they may legitimate the coercive takings that are, by hypothesis, needed to fund those valuable goods at the cost of weakening at least some of those central norms. Social goods: How great will be the doctrinal cost of [a] weakening of liberty tradition norms? (>Social goods/Minmall state). We can identify three approaches to justification: (1) that coercive public goods provision is fully consistent with the basic commitments of the liberty tradition; (2) that the goods at stake justify overriding liberty; and (3) that such provision is benign paternalism. Gaus I 123 Small state: If the arguments that support the Taxing Minimal State are extended to legitimize coercive takings for the production of other sorts of public goods (for example, the public good of mosquito abatement) or to correct other types of market failure (say, the regulation of natural monopolies), then we have gone beyond the Minimal State to the Small State. The more types of goods and services that are accepted as significantly public and, hence, as justifiably financed through taxation, the larger the Small State becomes. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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