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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Citizenship | Gender Theory | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Gender theory/Mottier: Much of feminist theory has focused on the absence of women from political theory. This theme was first addressed by authors such as Okin (1979)(1), Elshtain (1981)(2), Pateman (1983)(3) and Arlene Saxonhouse (1985(4); see also Mottier, Sgier and Ballmer-Cao, 2000)(5). Their pioneering work demonstrated that modern political theory neglects to address the subordinated position attributed to women in classical theories of democracy. The emergence of modern liberal democracy introduced a universalistic political discourse which claimed to be indifferent to gender or other identity differences. Citizenship/Tradition: Mainstream political theory consequently considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(6), Ruth Lister (1997)(7) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(8) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(9), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. Feminism: Feminist perspectives on citizenship diverge, however, as to the ways in which they conceptualize citizenship, the theoretical foundations of these conceptualizations, and the conclusions to be drawn from the questioning of the universality of citizenship. Perhaps most importantly, they diverge in their relationship to liberalist thought. There has been an important move over the last two decades within feminist theories of citizenship 'to recuperate the liberal project' (Squires, 1994a(10): 62). Authors such as Pateman (1989)(11), Susan James (1992)(12), Phillips (1993(13) and Mouffe (1992)(14) explore the affinities between liberal and feminist conceptions of citizenship. Feminist theorizations of political citizenship and the democratization of the public sphere have consequently been dominated by debates between liberal feminist theorists and their critics. Amongst the latter, maternalist and Marxist perspectives have been particularly prominent in the 1980s, but more recently the focus of debate has shifted to poststructuralist and postmodem critiques of liberal understandings of citizenship. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1979) Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 4. Saxonhouse, Arlene (1985) Women in the History of Political Thought. New York: Praeger. 5. Mottier, Véronique, Lea Sgier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao (2000) 'Les rapports entre le genre et la politique'. In Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Véronique Mottier and Lea Sgier, eds, Genre et politique: Débats et perspectives. Paris: Gallimard. 6. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 7. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 8. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 9. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 10. Squires, Judith (1994a) 'Citizenship: androgynous or engendered participation'. Annuai,æ Suisse de Science Politique, 34: 51-62. 11. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 12. James, Susan (1992) 'The good-enough citizen: female citizenship and independence'. In G. Bock and S. James, eds, Beyond Equality and Difference. London: Routledge. 48-65. 13. Phillips, Anne (1993) Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity. 14. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Walby | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Walby/Mottier: Tradition: Mainstream political theory (...) considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(1), Ruth Lister (1997)(2) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(3) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(4), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. In this respect Walby joins other feminist critics of the concept of citizenship, such as Lister (1990)(5) and Pateman (1989)(6), for whom the fact that women have not been treated in any democracy as full and equal citizens means that 'democracy has never existed' (1989(6): 372). Gender roles/WalbyVsPateman/WalbyVsLister: However, Walby also points out an important contradiction in their work: on the one hand, authors such as Lister and Pateman question the gendered nature of the frontiers between the public and the private while insisting on the importance of female values and roles (Pateman, 1991)(7) and on the recognition by the public sphere of the work done by women in the private sphere (Lister, 1990)(5). 1. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 2. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 3. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 4. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5. Lister, Ruth (1990) 'VVomen, economic dependency and citizenship'. Journal of Social Policy, 19 (4): 445-67. 6. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 7. Pateman, Carole (1991) The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Marshall, Alfred | Sraffa | Kurz I 104 Alfred Marshall/SraffaVsMarshall/SraffaVsKeynes/Sraffa/Kurz: [While Sraffa ciritizied Marshall], Keynes and with him most Cambridge economists clung to Marshallian concepts, making use, in particular, of the Marshallian demand-and-supply apparatus. Seen from Sraffa’s point of view, this meant that their analyses were flawed. A careful scrutiny would invariably bring the flaws into the open. As regards Keynes’s contributions, Sraffa’s criticism concerned especially the following: 1. The idea expressed in the Treatise(1) that the price level of consumption goods and that of investment goods can be considered as determined independently of one another, and the related idea that the price level of the latter is determined exclusively by the propensity of the public to “hoard” money. 2. The “marginal efficiency of capital” schedule in the General Theory, which carried over the concept of a given order of fertility of different qualities of land to the ordering of investment projects. 3. The view that the banking system can control the money supply and that therefore the quantity of money in the system can be considered exogenous. 4. The argument put forward by Keynes to substantiate his view that the liquidity preference of the public prevents the money rate of interest from falling to a level compatible with a volume of investment equal to full employment savings. >Alfred Marshall, >Demand, >Supply. Kurz I 105 While Keynes focused on the problem of money and output as a whole, Sraffa focused on the problem of value and distribution. >Value, >Distribution. 1. Piero Sraffa: The Man and the Scholar, London: Routledge. Marcuzzo, C. (2002). “The Collaboration between J. M. Keynes and R. F. Kahn from the Treatise to the General Theory,” History of Political Economy, 34:2, 421-447. Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Method | Sraffa | Kurz I 70 Method/Sraffa/Kurz: (…) Sraffa’s implicit methodology: the threefold relationship between ‘economic reality’, ‘the economist’ and ‘economic theory’. By ‘economic reality’ we mean the collection of human agents and material objects which constitute the human process of production and reproduction of commodities. By ‘the economist’ we mean the human agent who observes, classifies and analyses economic reality. By ‘economic theory’ we mean the main intellectual product emerging from the economist’s effort to analyse the economic reality under investigation. Our main results may be summarized as follows. In his published works of the 1920s and early 1930s Sraffa appears to consider economic reality as Kurz I 71 if it existed independently of the activity of observation and classification carried out by economists. >As if. Furthermore, he makes several empirical claims about economic reality as if they were self-evident or, at least, easily verifiable. Whereas Sraffa acknowledges that an element of human arbitrariness is unavoidable within economic theorizing, he also stresses that different quaesita may require different ‘points of view’ in the sense that, given a specific theoretical problem, one specific ‘point of view’ may prove to be best suited to analyse and solve the problem at hand. This implies the necessity of the choice of the ‘point of view’ by an economist. What matters to Sraffa is to detect what different economists/observers can consistently say about a given object or to build the analytic tools required to discover a given property of the object. Ontology/Sraffa/Kurz: While Sraffa’s ontology concerns his vision about ‘reality’ as an object which does or does not exist independently of its ‘observer’, Sraffa’s methodology concerns the rules the economist must abide by in the process of elaboration of economic theory. In particular, many Marshallian economists would have shared basically the same assumption about an independent reality (Signorino 2000a(1), 2000b(2), 2001b(3)). We claim that a characteristic of Sraffa’s methodology, not shared by the majority of his contemporaries, is how Sraffa makes use of these elements in his critical writings and in the elaboration of his own theory. Kurz I 75 Arbitrariness/Kurz: Sraffa’s acknowledgement of the problem of the arbitrariness of the economist raises (at least) two orders of questions: (i) What exactly is the source of the ‘arbitrariness’ of the economist? (ii) How does one cope with the problem of the arbitrariness of the economist, that is, what are, if any, its admissible boundaries? The problem of the arbitrariness of the economist lies at the very heart of Sraffa’s 1925-6 critique of the Marshallian theory of value and its inability to classify real world industries into the three ‘boxes’ of constant, increasing and diminishing returns. >Alfred Marshall. Method/SraffaVsMarshall, Alfred: In the opening section of the Italian paper, Sraffa asks (rhetorically) „whether the failing cannot be found in the very nature of the criterion according to which the classification should be conducted. In particular, it remains to be seen whether the fundamentum divisionis is formed by objective circumstances inherent in the various industries, or, instead, is dependent on the point of view of the person acting as observer;(…)“ (Sraffa 1998[1925]: 324)(4). Kurz I 76 Kurz: The aim of the 1925 paper is to show the tension, existing within the Marshallian theoretical framework, between an object, economic reality and its structural properties, and the point of view chosen by a subject, the economist/observer. Such a tension obliges Marshallian economists to introduce some further assumptions, such as external-internal scale economies, within their theoretical framework. As a consequence, the theoretical domain of Marshallian theory is drastically reduced: „The fact that the ‘external economies’ peculiar to an industry, which make possible the desired conciliation between scientific abstraction and reality, are themselves a purely hypothetical and unreal construction, is something that is often ignored.“ (Sraffa 1998 [1925]: 347)(4) For SraffaVsHayek see >Method/Hayek. Kurz I 77 Ontology/Method/Sraffa/Kurz: The ‘various forces at work’ and the ‘equilibrium resulting from their opposition’ constitute the economic reality investigated by the economist. The arbitrariness of the economist lies in the choice of the scheme of classification, that is to say, the way the economic forces may be grouped. Since different schemes may be selected, the criterion to follow for Sraffa, at least in the 1920s, is that of simplicity, ‘the most homogeneous manner’, which obliges the economist to choose the scheme best suited to highlight the influence of each force on the equilibrium position. Kurz I 78 Method/SraffaVsMarshall, Alfred/Kurz: The theoretical domain of Marshallian theory, once reconstructed in a logically consistent way, turns out to be too narrow: „Reduced within such restricted limits, the supply schedule with variable costs cannot claim to be a general conception applicable to normal industries; it can prove a useful instrument only in regard to such exceptional industries as can reasonably satisfy its conditions.“ (Sraffa 1926: 540)(5) Kurz: According to Sraffa, the Marshallian theory may gain logical consistency only by making recourse to unrealistic assumptions. 1. Signorino, R. (2000a) ‘The Italian debate on Marshallian (and Paretian) economics and the intellectual roots of Piero Sraffa’s “Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantita prodotta”: a note’, History of Economic Ideas 8: 143-57. 2. Signorino, R. (2000b) ‘Method and analysis in Piero Sraffa’s 1925 critique of Marshallian economics’, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7: 569-94, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 3. Signorino, R. (2001a) ‘Piero Sraffa on utility and the subjective method in the 1920s: a tentative appraisal of Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts’, Cambridge Journal of Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Italian edition: Produzione di Merci a Mezzo di Merci. Premesse a una Critica della Teoria Economica, Torino: Einaudi. 4. Sraffa, P. (1998) ‘On the relations between cost and quantity produced’, in L. L. Pasinetti (ed.) Italian Economic Papers, Vol. III, Bologna: il Mulino and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 323-63, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, English translation of Sraffa (1925). 5. Sraffa, P. (1926) ‘The laws of returns under competitive conditions’, Economic Journal 36: 535–50, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo. 2015. „Piero Sraffa: economic reality, the economist and economic theory. An interpretation.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
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