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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Citizenship | Gender Theory | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Gender theory/Mottier: Much of feminist theory has focused on the absence of women from political theory. This theme was first addressed by authors such as Okin (1979)(1), Elshtain (1981)(2), Pateman (1983)(3) and Arlene Saxonhouse (1985(4); see also Mottier, Sgier and Ballmer-Cao, 2000)(5). Their pioneering work demonstrated that modern political theory neglects to address the subordinated position attributed to women in classical theories of democracy. The emergence of modern liberal democracy introduced a universalistic political discourse which claimed to be indifferent to gender or other identity differences. Citizenship/Tradition: Mainstream political theory consequently considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(6), Ruth Lister (1997)(7) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(8) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(9), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. Feminism: Feminist perspectives on citizenship diverge, however, as to the ways in which they conceptualize citizenship, the theoretical foundations of these conceptualizations, and the conclusions to be drawn from the questioning of the universality of citizenship. Perhaps most importantly, they diverge in their relationship to liberalist thought. There has been an important move over the last two decades within feminist theories of citizenship 'to recuperate the liberal project' (Squires, 1994a(10): 62). Authors such as Pateman (1989)(11), Susan James (1992)(12), Phillips (1993(13) and Mouffe (1992)(14) explore the affinities between liberal and feminist conceptions of citizenship. Feminist theorizations of political citizenship and the democratization of the public sphere have consequently been dominated by debates between liberal feminist theorists and their critics. Amongst the latter, maternalist and Marxist perspectives have been particularly prominent in the 1980s, but more recently the focus of debate has shifted to poststructuralist and postmodem critiques of liberal understandings of citizenship. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1979) Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 4. Saxonhouse, Arlene (1985) Women in the History of Political Thought. New York: Praeger. 5. Mottier, Véronique, Lea Sgier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao (2000) 'Les rapports entre le genre et la politique'. In Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Véronique Mottier and Lea Sgier, eds, Genre et politique: Débats et perspectives. Paris: Gallimard. 6. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 7. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 8. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 9. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 10. Squires, Judith (1994a) 'Citizenship: androgynous or engendered participation'. Annuai,æ Suisse de Science Politique, 34: 51-62. 11. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 12. James, Susan (1992) 'The good-enough citizen: female citizenship and independence'. In G. Bock and S. James, eds, Beyond Equality and Difference. London: Routledge. 48-65. 13. Phillips, Anne (1993) Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity. 14. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Walby | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Walby/Mottier: Tradition: Mainstream political theory (...) considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(1), Ruth Lister (1997)(2) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(3) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(4), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. In this respect Walby joins other feminist critics of the concept of citizenship, such as Lister (1990)(5) and Pateman (1989)(6), for whom the fact that women have not been treated in any democracy as full and equal citizens means that 'democracy has never existed' (1989(6): 372). Gender roles/WalbyVsPateman/WalbyVsLister: However, Walby also points out an important contradiction in their work: on the one hand, authors such as Lister and Pateman question the gendered nature of the frontiers between the public and the private while insisting on the importance of female values and roles (Pateman, 1991)(7) and on the recognition by the public sphere of the work done by women in the private sphere (Lister, 1990)(5). 1. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 2. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 3. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 4. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5. Lister, Ruth (1990) 'VVomen, economic dependency and citizenship'. Journal of Social Policy, 19 (4): 445-67. 6. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 7. Pateman, Carole (1991) The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Costs of Production | Rothbard | Rothbard III 340 Costs of production/Rothbard: (…) the cost, or "marginal" cost, of any decision is the next highest utility that must be forgone because of the decision. When a means M must be distributed among ends E1, E2, and E3, with E2 ranked highest on the individual's value scale, the individual attempts to allocate the means so as to attain his most highly valued ends and to forgo those ranked Iower, although he will attain as many of his ends as he can with the means available. If he allocates his means to E1 and E2, and must forgo E3, E3 is the marginal cost ofhis decision. Ifhe errs in his de- cision, and arrives at E3 instead of E2, then ex post - in retrospect - he is seen to have suffered a loss compared to the course he could have taken. Production: What are the costs involved in the decisions made by the owners of the factors? (…) these costs are subjective and cannot be precisely determined by outside observers or be gauged ex post by observing accountants.(1) Secondly, it is clear that, since such factors as land and the produced capital goods have only one use, namely, the production of this product (by virtue of being purely specific), they involve no cost to their owner in being used in production. By the very terms of our problem, the only alternative for their owner would be to let the land lie unused, earning no return. The use of labor, however, does have a cost, in accordance with the value of the leisure forgone by the laborers. >Marginal costs. Sale: (…) in most cases, the sale of the good at the market price, whatever the price may be, is costless, except for rare cases of direct consumption by the producer or in cases of anticipation of a price increase in the near future. This sale is costless from the proper point of view -the point ofview of acting man at the relevant instant of action. The fact that he would not have engaged in the labor at all if he had known in advance of the present price might indicate a deplorable instance of poor judgment, but it does not affect the present situation. At present, with all the labor already exerted and the product finished, the original - subjective - cost has already been incurred and vanished with the original making of the decision. Rothbard III 341 Price/production costs/Rothbard: (…) once the product has been made, "cost" has no influence on the price of the product. Past costs, being ephemeral, are irrelevant to present determination of prices. The agitation that often takes place over sales "below cost" is now placed in its proper perspective. It is obvious that, in the relevant sense of "cost," no such sales can take Place. The sale of an already produced good is likely to be costless, and if it is not, and price is below its costs, then the seller will hold on to the good rather than make the sale. That costs do have an influence in production is not denied by anyone. However, the influence is not directly on the price, but on the amount that will be produced or, more specifically, on the degree to which factors will be used. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 343 Price: (…) it is clear that the determinants of price are only the subjective utilities of individuals in valuing given conditions and alternatives. There are no "objective" or "real" costs that determine, or are co-ordinate in determining, price. Time/costs: There is another (…) element: present goods are being forgone in exchange for an expectation of return in the future. Time, therefore, is a critical element in production, and its analysis must pervade any theory of production. Rothbard III 347 For the case that all factors of production are only hired, see >Interest rates/Rothbard. Rothbard III 355 Money costs are the opposite of a basic, determining factor; they are dependent on the price of the product and on consumer demands. In the real world of uncertainty it is more difficult to see this, because factors are paid in advance of the sale of the product, since the capitalist-entrepreneurs speculatively advance money to the factors in the expectation of being able to recoup their money with a surplus for interest and profit after sale to the consumers.(2) Whether they do so or not depends on their foresight regarding the state of consumer demand and the future prices of consumers’ goods. In the real world of immediate market prices, of course, the existence of entrepreneurial profit and loss will always prevent costs and receipts, cost and price, from being identical, and it is obvious to all that price is solely determined by valuations of stock - by “utilities” - and not at all by money cost. But although most economists recognize that in the real world (the so-called “short-run”) costs cannot determine price, they are seduced by the habit of the individual entrepreneur of dealing in terms of “cost” as the determining factor, and they apply this procedure to the case of the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy) and therefore to the inherent long-run tendencies of the economy. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Rothbard III 360 This is not to deny, and the Austrians never did deny, that subjective costs, in the sense of opportunity costs and utilities forgone, are important in the analysis of production. >Opportunity costs/Rothbard. Rothbard III 357 Costs of production/Alfred Marshall/Rothbard: The enormous advance provided by the Austrian School, on this point as on others, was blocked and reversed by the influence of Alfred Marshall, who attempted to rehabilitate the classicists and integrate them with the Austrians, while disparaging the contributions of the latter. >Classical economics, >Austrian School. It was unfortunately the Marshallianand not the Austrian approach that exerted the most influence over later writers. This influence is partly responsible for the current myth among economists that the Austrian School is effectively dead and has no more to contribute and that everything of lasting worth that it had to offer was effectively stated and integrated in Alfred Marshall’s Principles. >Alfred Marshall. Producion costs/Marshall/Rothbard: Marshall tried to rehabilitate the cost-of-production theory of the classicists by conceding that, in the “short run,” in the immediate market place, consumers’ demand rules price. But in the long run, among the important reproducible goods, cost of production is determining. According to Marshall, both utility and money costs determine price, like blades of a scissors, but one blade is more important in the short run, and another in the long run. Marshall: (…) concludes that „as a general rule, the shorter the period we are considering, the greater must be the share of our attentionwhich is given to the influence of demand on value; and the longer the period, the more important will bethe influence of cost of production on value. . . . The actual value at any time, the market value as it is often called, is often more influenced by passing events and by causes whose action is fitful and shortlived, than by those which work persistently. Rothbard III 358 But in long periods these fitful and irregular causes in large measure efface one another’s influence; so that in the long run persistent causes dominate value completely.“(3) RothbardVsMarshall, Alfred: Marshall’s analysis suffers from a grave methodological defect - indeed, from an almost hopeless methodological confusion as regards the “short run” and the “long run.” He considers the “long run” as actually existing, as being the permanent, persistent, observable element beneath the fitful, basically unimportant flux of market value. He admits (p. 350) that “even the most persistent causes are, however, liable to change,” but he clearly indicates that they are far less likely to change than the fitful market values; herein, indeed, lies their long-run nature. He regards the long-run data, then, as underlying the transient market values in a way similar to that in which the basic sea level underlies the changing waves and tides. For Marshall, then, the long-run data are something that can be spotted and marked by an observer; indeed, since they change far more slowly than the market values, they can be observed more accurately. Marshall’s conception of the long run is completely fallacious, and this eliminates the whole groundwork of his theoretical structure. Rothbard III 359 The long run, by its very nature, never does and never can exist. This does not mean that “long-run,” or ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy), analysis is not important. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Prices/costs/RothbardVsMarshall: The fact that costs equal prices in the “long run” does not mean that costs will actually equal prices, but that the tendency exists, a tendency that is continually being disrupted in reality by the very fitful changes in market data that Marshall points out.(4) 1. Cf. the excellent discussion of cost by G.F. Thirlby, “The Subjective Theory of Value and Accounting ‘Cost,’” Economica, February, 1946, pp. 33 f.; and especially Thirlby, “Economists’ Cost Rules and Equilibrium Theory,” Economica, May, 1960, pp. 148 - 53. 2. Cf. Menger, Principles of Economics, pp. 149ff. 3. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), pp. 349 ff. 4. On this error in Marshall, see F.A. Hayek, The Pure Theory of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 21, 27 - 28. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Marginal Product of Labour | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 106 Marginal Product of Labour/Economic theories/Harcourt: [A one-commodity model] allows both a complete bypass of the distinction between short run and long run, as raised, for example, by D. H. Robertson [1949](1) in 'Wage Grumbles', and the merging into one of the process of investment and the use of capital in production, see Robinson [1970a](2), pp. 311-13. >Economic models, >One-commodity model. Harcourt: It could be noted here that, for exactly the same reasons as Joan Robinson's, Hicks [1932](3), p. 20, rejected the notion of a short-run marginal product of labour which was equal to the real wage, but went on to argue for a full long-run equilibrium equality for reasons that are vulnerable to criticisms that stem from both Salter's analysis and the points made above. RobertsonVsMarshall: D. H. Robertson's 'grumbles' related to the question: What in fact is held constant when employment is changed in Marshall's description of the marginal product of labour and its relationship to the real wage? Is it a mysterious general concept of capital, so that nine shovels become ten slightly inferior ones, or is it the existing equipment, in which case what does the tenth man work with? Marshall: In the long run, Marshall supposed that suitable adjustments were made so that the wage was equal to the net marginal product of labour. >A. Marshall. Harcourt: This, however, introduces a joint production puzzle and leaves unexplained the level of the normal rate of profits that is earned on the adjusted stock of capital. Moreover, long-period comparisons are only comparisons since each point is an equilibrium position with its own (realized) past, as far as the values of r and w are concerned, and its own confidently expected future. To attempt a transition from one point to another could both rupture one equilibrium and not allow the economy to enter another. Harcourt I 107 Time may only run at right angles, as it were, through each point. >One-commodity Model. 1. Robertson, D. H. [1949] 'Wage Grumbles', Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (American Economic Association), pp. 221-36. 2. Robinson, Joan, [1970b] 'Review of C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, 1969', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 336-9. 3. Hicks, J. R. [1932] The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan). |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Marshall, Alfred | Sraffa | Kurz I 104 Alfred Marshall/SraffaVsMarshall/SraffaVsKeynes/Sraffa/Kurz: [While Sraffa ciritizied Marshall], Keynes and with him most Cambridge economists clung to Marshallian concepts, making use, in particular, of the Marshallian demand-and-supply apparatus. Seen from Sraffa’s point of view, this meant that their analyses were flawed. A careful scrutiny would invariably bring the flaws into the open. As regards Keynes’s contributions, Sraffa’s criticism concerned especially the following: 1. The idea expressed in the Treatise(1) that the price level of consumption goods and that of investment goods can be considered as determined independently of one another, and the related idea that the price level of the latter is determined exclusively by the propensity of the public to “hoard” money. 2. The “marginal efficiency of capital” schedule in the General Theory, which carried over the concept of a given order of fertility of different qualities of land to the ordering of investment projects. 3. The view that the banking system can control the money supply and that therefore the quantity of money in the system can be considered exogenous. 4. The argument put forward by Keynes to substantiate his view that the liquidity preference of the public prevents the money rate of interest from falling to a level compatible with a volume of investment equal to full employment savings. >Alfred Marshall, >Demand, >Supply. Kurz I 105 While Keynes focused on the problem of money and output as a whole, Sraffa focused on the problem of value and distribution. >Value, >Distribution/Sraffa, >Distribution/Leontief. 1. Piero Sraffa: The Man and the Scholar, London: Routledge. Marcuzzo, C. (2002). “The Collaboration between J. M. Keynes and R. F. Kahn from the Treatise to the General Theory,” History of Political Economy, 34:2, 421-447. Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Method | Sraffa | Kurz I 70 Method/Sraffa/Kurz: (…) Sraffa’s implicit methodology: the threefold relationship between ‘economic reality’, ‘the economist’ and ‘economic theory’. By ‘economic reality’ we mean the collection of human agents and material objects which constitute the human process of production and reproduction of commodities. By ‘the economist’ we mean the human agent who observes, classifies and analyses economic reality. By ‘economic theory’ we mean the main intellectual product emerging from the economist’s effort to analyse the economic reality under investigation. Our main results may be summarized as follows. In his published works of the 1920s and early 1930s Sraffa appears to consider economic reality as Kurz I 71 if it existed independently of the activity of observation and classification carried out by economists. >As if. Furthermore, he makes several empirical claims about economic reality as if they were self-evident or, at least, easily verifiable. Whereas Sraffa acknowledges that an element of human arbitrariness is unavoidable within economic theorizing, he also stresses that different quaesita may require different ‘points of view’ in the sense that, given a specific theoretical problem, one specific ‘point of view’ may prove to be best suited to analyse and solve the problem at hand. This implies the necessity of the choice of the ‘point of view’ by an economist. What matters to Sraffa is to detect what different economists/observers can consistently say about a given object or to build the analytic tools required to discover a given property of the object. Ontology/Sraffa/Kurz: While Sraffa’s ontology concerns his vision about ‘reality’ as an object which does or does not exist independently of its ‘observer’, Sraffa’s methodology concerns the rules the economist must abide by in the process of elaboration of economic theory. In particular, many Marshallian economists would have shared basically the same assumption about an independent reality (Signorino 2000a(1), 2000b(2), 2001b(3)). We claim that a characteristic of Sraffa’s methodology, not shared by the majority of his contemporaries, is how Sraffa makes use of these elements in his critical writings and in the elaboration of his own theory. Kurz I 75 Arbitrariness/Kurz: Sraffa’s acknowledgement of the problem of the arbitrariness of the economist raises (at least) two orders of questions: (i) What exactly is the source of the ‘arbitrariness’ of the economist? (ii) How does one cope with the problem of the arbitrariness of the economist, that is, what are, if any, its admissible boundaries? The problem of the arbitrariness of the economist lies at the very heart of Sraffa’s 1925-6 critique of the Marshallian theory of value and its inability to classify real world industries into the three ‘boxes’ of constant, increasing and diminishing returns. >Alfred Marshall. Method/SraffaVsMarshall, Alfred: In the opening section of the Italian paper, Sraffa asks (rhetorically) „whether the failing cannot be found in the very nature of the criterion according to which the classification should be conducted. In particular, it remains to be seen whether the fundamentum divisionis is formed by objective circumstances inherent in the various industries, or, instead, is dependent on the point of view of the person acting as observer;(…)“ (Sraffa 1998[1925]: 324)(4). Kurz I 76 Kurz: The aim of the 1925 paper is to show the tension, existing within the Marshallian theoretical framework, between an object, economic reality and its structural properties, and the point of view chosen by a subject, the economist/observer. Such a tension obliges Marshallian economists to introduce some further assumptions, such as external-internal scale economies, within their theoretical framework. As a consequence, the theoretical domain of Marshallian theory is drastically reduced: „The fact that the ‘external economies’ peculiar to an industry, which make possible the desired conciliation between scientific abstraction and reality, are themselves a purely hypothetical and unreal construction, is something that is often ignored.“ (Sraffa 1998 [1925]: 347)(4) For SraffaVsHayek see >Method/Hayek. Kurz I 77 Ontology/Method/Sraffa/Kurz: The ‘various forces at work’ and the ‘equilibrium resulting from their opposition’ constitute the economic reality investigated by the economist. The arbitrariness of the economist lies in the choice of the scheme of classification, that is to say, the way the economic forces may be grouped. Since different schemes may be selected, the criterion to follow for Sraffa, at least in the 1920s, is that of simplicity, ‘the most homogeneous manner’, which obliges the economist to choose the scheme best suited to highlight the influence of each force on the equilibrium position. Kurz I 78 Method/SraffaVsMarshall, Alfred/Kurz: The theoretical domain of Marshallian theory, once reconstructed in a logically consistent way, turns out to be too narrow: „Reduced within such restricted limits, the supply schedule with variable costs cannot claim to be a general conception applicable to normal industries; it can prove a useful instrument only in regard to such exceptional industries as can reasonably satisfy its conditions.“ (Sraffa 1926: 540)(5) Kurz: According to Sraffa, the Marshallian theory may gain logical consistency only by making recourse to unrealistic assumptions. 1. Signorino, R. (2000a) ‘The Italian debate on Marshallian (and Paretian) economics and the intellectual roots of Piero Sraffa’s “Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantita prodotta”: a note’, History of Economic Ideas 8: 143-57. 2. Signorino, R. (2000b) ‘Method and analysis in Piero Sraffa’s 1925 critique of Marshallian economics’, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7: 569-94, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 3. Signorino, R. (2001a) ‘Piero Sraffa on utility and the subjective method in the 1920s: a tentative appraisal of Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts’, Cambridge Journal of Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Italian edition: Produzione di Merci a Mezzo di Merci. Premesse a una Critica della Teoria Economica, Torino: Einaudi. 4. Sraffa, P. (1998) ‘On the relations between cost and quantity produced’, in L. L. Pasinetti (ed.) Italian Economic Papers, Vol. III, Bologna: il Mulino and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 323-63, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, English translation of Sraffa (1925). 5. Sraffa, P. (1926) ‘The laws of returns under competitive conditions’, Economic Journal 36: 535–50, reprinted in H. D. Kurz and N. Salvadori (eds) The Legacy of Piero Sraffa, 2 Vols, 2003, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo. 2015. „Piero Sraffa: economic reality, the economist and economic theory. An interpretation.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Objectivity | Marshall | Coyne I 8 Objectivity/Alfred Marshall/Coyne/Boettke: In the wake of the marginal revolution, most economists agreed that value (the demand side of the market) is subjective. However, many held that production (the supply side of the market) is determined by objective conditions. In this vein, the economist Alfred Marshall likened the market (supply and demand) to the two blades of a scissor. Just as both scissor blades cut a piece of paper, so too do subjective value and objective costs determine the market price. Austrian SchoolVsMarshall, Alfred: This view of the market, however, overlooks the subjective nature of costs (…). >Costs, >Supply, >Demand, >Subjectivity, >Austrian School, >Decisions/Marshall. |
Marshall A I Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. London 1970 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Opportunity Cost | Marshall | Rothbard III 361 Opportunity costs/Alfred Marshall/Rothbard: Marshall’s treatment of subjective costs was also highly fallacious. Instead of the idea of opportunity costs, he had the notion that they were “real costs” that could be added in terms of measurable units. Money costs of production, then, became the “necessary supply prices” that entrepreneurs had to pay in order “to call forth an adequate supply of the efforts and waitings” to produce a supply of the product. These real costs were then supposed to be the fundamental, persisting element that backstops money costs of production, and allowed Marshall to talk of the more persisting, long-run, normal situation.(1) RothbardVsMarshall, Alfred: Marshall’s great error here, and it has permeated the works of his followers and of present-day writers, is to regard costs and production exclusively from the point of view of an isolated individual entrepreneur or an isolated individual industry, rather than viewing the whole economy in all its interrelations. Marshall is dealing, of necessity, with particular prices of different goods, and he is attempting to show that alleged “costs of production” determine these prices in the long run. But it is completely erroneous to tie up particular goods with labor vs. leisure and with consuming vs. waiting costs, for the latter are only general phenomena, applying and diffusing throughout the entire economic system. The price necessary to call forth a nonspecific factor is the highest price this factor can earn elsewhere - an opportunity cost. What it can attain elsewhere is basically determined by the state of consumer demand elsewhere. 1. Marshall, Principles of Economics, pp. 338 ff. |
Marshall A I Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. London 1970 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Rent | Marshall | Rothbard III 557 Rent/Marshall, Alfred/Rothbard: The Marshallian theory holds that durable capital goods earn “quasirents” temporarily, while permanent lands earn full rents. RothbardVsMarshall, Alfred: The fallacy of this theory is clear. Whatever their durability, capital goods receive gross rents just as lands do (…). >Rent/Rothbard, >Production factors/Rothbard. (…) Rather, these changes are profits or losses accruing to their owners as entrepreneurs. (…) then, incomes in the real world are net rents (accruing to labor and land factors) and entrepreneurial profits (…). >Wages/Rothbard. |
Marshall A I Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. London 1970 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Subjectivism | Marshall | Kurz I 11 Subjectivism/Alfred Marshall/Kurz: Marshall, (…) had tried to patch over what was a major breach with the objectivist tradition of the English classical economists, especially David Ricardo and Robert Torrens. He did this in terms of completely re-defining the received concept of ‘real cost’. >Costs. While originally this was meant to capture the materials (means of production and means of sustenance in the support of workers) used up in the production of a commodity, or the amount of labour actually bestowed upon it, Marshall used it to refer to ‘the exertions of all the different kinds of labour that are directly and indirectly involved in making it; together with the abstinences or rather the waitings required for saving the capital used in making it’ (Marshall, [1890] 1970, p. 282)(1). LeontiefVsMarshall, Alfred: Apparently, Leontief was not impressed by Marshall’s re-definition and he was also not convinced by Marshall’s insistence that prices could be determined only with reference to the forces of ‘demand’ and ‘supply’, conceived of as functional relationships between the Kurz I 12 price of a commodity and the amount demanded or supplied, as is famously exemplified by Marshall’s analogy with the two blades of a pair of scissors. Price/LeontiefVsMarshall, Alfred: Indeed, one of the main messages of Leontief’s 1928 paper(2) was that relative prices can be determined exclusively in terms of the observable amounts of commodities that are respectively produced and used up during a year - without any reference to demand and supply. >Demand, >Supply. 1. Marshall, A. (1970) Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. 2. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the earlyworks of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Marshall A I Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. London 1970 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
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