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Dispositions | Armstrong | II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong. II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: II 92 but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary. II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Dispositions | Place | Armstrong II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. Armstrong II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. Armstrong II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. Armstrong II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. Armstrong II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? Armstrong II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Armstrong II 92 Armstrong II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Induction | Armstrong | III 50 Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational. III 52 Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation. III 58 Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same. II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Induction | Place | Armstrong III 50 Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational. Armstrong III 52 Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation. Armstrong III 58 Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same. Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Junctions | Armstrong | II (b) 47 Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >Regularities, >Universals. Martin II 126 Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations. Armstrong: not formal, more like a >meaning postulate. - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things. II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection. II 128 Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals? Martin II 128 Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept Martin II 129 MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things. II (d) 149 Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176 * Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically... |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Junctions | Martin | Armstrong II (b) 47 Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >Regularities, >Universals. Martin II 126 Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations. Armstrong: not formal, more like a >meaning postulate. - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things. II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection. II 128 Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals? Martin II 128 Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept Martin II 129 MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things. Armstrong II (d) 149 Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176 * Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically... |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Levels (Order) | Armstrong | Martin III 186 Levels/order/Martin: to handle everything on the first level makes general facts and general states superfluous. >Universals. ArmstrongVsMartin: Laws as higher-order states guarantee that there are no exceptions. >Laws/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Linguisticism | Armstrong | II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism. Place III 107 Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist. Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief. An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka). II 106 Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true". |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
Linguisticism | Martin | Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism. Place III 107 Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist. Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief. An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka). Armstrong II 106 Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true". |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Linguisticism | Place | Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism. Place III 107 Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist. Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief. An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka). Armstrong II 106 Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true". |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Nominalism | Armstrong | II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical" II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Nominalism | Place | Armstrong II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. Armstrong II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical" Armstrong II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
Structures | Armstrong | Place III 109 Structure/PlaceVsMartin: dispositional and non-dispositional properties always have to do with structure - but VsArmstrong: this can also be macrostructure: E.g. the blade of the knife. Cf. >Microstructure, >Dispositions. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
Structures | Martin | Place III 109 Structure / PlaceVsMartin: dispositional and non-dispositional properties always have to do with structure - but VsArmstrong: this can also be macrostructure: E.g. the blade of the knife. Cf. >Microstructure, >Dispositions. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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Martin | Place Vs Martin | Arm II 110 Similarity/Martin: must be "exact" if it is to exist between particulars of the same kind. PlaceVsMartin: this is too big a concession to Armstrong according to whom a universal is a kind of particular that is somehow present itself in all instantiations. Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro, like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar so that they can be "of the same kind". And in this sense, they cannot be "inexactly" similar. But to say that it must be "exact" there is merely pleonastic. II 111 Categorical/Dispositional/Property/PlaceVsMartin: misunderstanding: attributed to Place: in his opinion there were two different properties so that the categorical (qualitative) property is the only cause of the dispositional property as effect. PlaceVsMartin: this cannot be my view, because there can never be any causal relation, if no dispositional property connects the two (separately) interacting objects. Place acknowledges the following principles: 1) Hume Mackie Principle causal necessity is a question of the truth of counterfactual conditionals. 2) The truth of counterfactual conditionals depends on the truth of a causal law statement. 3) Ryle Principle: dispositional statements are causal law statements, which are limited to the individual and to the time during which the disposition lasts. 4) Goodman Principle: the truth of a dispositional statement is all that is needed to support the truth of a causal counterfactual conditional. 5) Truthmaker Principle: the possession of a dispositional property consists in a state that cannot be characterized as other than that it is said that it is the state through which the dispositional statement becomes true. Conclusion: the structure must have both dispositional and categorical properties. VsArmstrong: So it cannot be right that all properties are ultimately categorical. pro Martin: the dispositional is just as real and irreducible as the categorical. II 113 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsMartin: I accept their actual existence here and now. But everything that exists is a property of the carrier of the properties, a substantial law of nature that can only be specified by reference to potential future manifestations. That's all there is. This is not about observability, but about the linguistic fact that extends it as far as the entailments of the dispositional predicates extend. (>Truthmaker). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Paradox | Grover, D. | II 204 Paradoxes/Martin/Grover: Thesis: We need the concept of category error to distinguish between semantically correct and incorrect sentences. Grover: Martin claims to have shown that the liar sentence can never be semantically correct. GroverVsMartin: he concludes that the set of lies is semantically incorrect, but he could just as well have concluded that the idea of the category error is not coherent or useful. (reversal!). Categories/Paradoxs/Grover: Literature for this - see Prior, 1954. II 207 Solution/Process Theory/Grover: instead I want to show thesis that there is no contradiction because Berry's paradox does not refer and the liar sentence does not express a proposition. Thus we also avoid a tricky problem of model theory. |
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