Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Gestures Habermas IV 31
Gestures/Symbols/Rules/HabermasVsMead/Habermas: since it is not sufficient to attribute identical interpretations, but rather to require identical meanings in order to recognize and explain misinterpretations, we arrive at a constitution of rule-based behavior that can be explained in terms of orientation towards conventions of meaning.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Identity Henrich Habermas IV 153
Identity/Philosophy/Psychology/HenrichVsMead/Henrich/Habermas: Henrich thesis: "the connection between genuine philosophical problems and what the term "identity", infiltrated into the psychological enlightenment of the general world, (is) only completely indirect (1) Habermas: Henrich rightly insists on the distinction between the question of numerical identification and the question of "identity",
Habermas IV 154
when it is meant that a person can simultaneously appear as autonomous and unmistakable in his/her actions: Henrich: In philosophical theory identity is a predicate that has a special function; by means of it a single thing or object as such is distinguished from others of the same kind; conversely, this predicate allows to say that under different conditions and in different ways of access only one single object can be thematic. Such identity does not require the identical individuals to be distinguished from one another by special qualities. It certainly does not require that a basic pattern of qualities can be shown in them, in relation to which they orient their behaviour or by which this behaviour can be explained in a uniform context. Even a thing that is completely erratic, or a person who changes lifestyle and beliefs with the weather (...), can be characterized in this formal sense as "identical to himself/herself". If something is a single thing, identity must be assigned to it. It makes no sense to say that it is acquiring or losing identity. (2)
Social psychology/identity/Henrich: The concept of social psychological identity has a completely different logical constitution. Here "identity" is a complex characteristic that people can acquire from a certain age. They do not have to have these characteristics and cannot possess them at all times. Once they have acquired them, they are 'independent' by virtue of their characteristic. They can free themselves from the influence of others; they can give their lives a form and continuity which they previously possessed, if at all, only under external influence. In this sense, they are autonomous individuals by virtue of their "identity". And one sees which associations play between the philosophical concept of identity and the social-psychological one. But this does not change the fact that the meanings of the two are completely different.
Any number of individuals can be independent in exactly the same way. If so, they cannot be distinguished as individuals by their 'identity'. (3)
Habermas: Henrich refers explicitly to Meads social psychology. See also Criteria/Henrich.


1.D Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 371ff.
2.Ebenda S. 372f
3.Ebenda.

Henr I
Dieter Henrich
Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Interaction Habermas IV 21
Interaction/Habermas: the model of interaction is superior to that of internalisation: the model of internalisation, described by H. G. Mead, S. Freud and J. Piaget, states that the subject finds itself in an exterior by taking in and appropriating what opposes it as an object. The structure of appropriation differs from that of reflection by the opposite sense of direction: the self does not refer to itself by making itself an object, but that it recognizes the relinquished subjective in the external object, the action schema or the relationship schema. HabermasVsMead, G.H.: these explanations remain attached to the model of the philosophy of consciousness. This model, which is based on an inner dialogue, can already be found in Augustine's work. (1)
IV 22
Against this: Interaction/Habermas: a higher-level subjectivity, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that it can only behave indirectly towards itself, namely via the complex relationships with others. In this way, it maps the structure of the entire interaction. The more complex the attitudes of a counterpart are, which the interaction participants "take into their own experience", the more what the interaction participants, initially thus the organisms, (...) create, shifts from the level of species-specific innate instinct regulations to the level of an communicatively created inter-subjectivity condensed in the medium of linguistic symbols, which is ultimately secured by cultural tradition.
HabermasVsMead: the operations of this mechanism start at all components of the interaction system: the participants of the interaction, their utterances and the regulators of the coordination of action.
IV 25
Description levels/Habermas: that interaction participants interpret the same stimulus in a consistent way is a fact that exists per se, but not for them ((s) the interaction participants). ((s) See Exterior/interior/Maturana, Descriptions/Maturana).
IV 27
Interaction/Mead: the second organism encounters the first as an interpreter of its own behaviour, i.e. under a modified concept. It brings forth its gesture with communicative intent. HabermasVsMead: Mead does not sufficiently distinguish between the two categories of settings that one takes over from the other: a) the reaction of the other to the own gesture, b) the addressing of a gesture to an interpreter.
IV 28
a) Here the interaction participants learn to internalize an excerpt from the objective sense structure to such an extent that both can combine identical interpretations with the same gesture. b) Here they learn what it means to use a gesture with communicative intent and to enter into a reciprocal relationship speaker/listener.
c) Thirdly, the attribution of an identical and no longer only congruent meaning of gestures is added. See Synonymy/Habermas.


1.Vgl. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969): L. S. Vygotski, Denken und Sprechen, Frankfurt, 1961.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Internalisation Habermas IV 20/21
Internalisation/Mead/Habermas: Mead explains the following transition as internalisation, i.e. through the mechanism of an individual taking the attitude of the other: 1. Gestures are replaced by symbols whose meanings for the participants are identical.
2. The interpersonal relationship between speaker and addressee replaces a causal relationship between stimulus-reaction-stimulus.
3. The participants learn to distinguish between acts of communication and success-oriented actions.
Unlike in the case of a reflexive relationship, in which a subject bends back to itself to make itself an object of itself, the model of internalisation states that the subject finds itself in an exterior by taking in and appropriating what opposes it as an object. The structure of appropriation differs from that of reflection by the opposite sense of direction: the self does not refer to itself by making itself an object, but that it recognizes the relinquished subjective in the external object, the action schema or the relationship schema.
HabermasVsMead: these explanations remain attached to the model of the philosophy of consciousness. This model, which is based on an inner dialogue, can already be found in Augustine's work. (1)
IV 22
Habermas: with this model the adoption of attitudes is only illuminated from one side: the intersubjective relationship of the interaction participants is only represented in the structure of the self-relation. (2) Subjectivity: a higher-level subjectivity, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that it can only behave indirectly towards itself, namely via the complex relationships with others. In this way, it maps the structure of the entire interaction.


1.Vgl. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969); L. S. Vygotski, Denken und Sprechen, Frankfurt, 1961.
2. Das ist der Anknüpfungspunkt für Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1979, S.245ff

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Internalisation Mead (In Mead)
Habermas IV 20/21
Internalisation/Mead/Habermas: Mead explains the following transition as internalisation, i.e. through the mechanism of an individual taking the attitude of the other: 1. Gestures are replaced by symbols whose meanings for the participants are identical.
2. The interpersonal relationship between speaker and addressee replaces a causal relationship between stimulus-reaction-irritation.
3. The participants learn to distinguish between acts of communication and success-oriented actions.
Unlike in the case of a reflexive relationship, in which a subject bends back to itself to make itself an object of itself, the model of internalisation states that the subject finds itself in an exterior by taking in and appropriating what opposes it as an object. The structure of appropriation differs from that of reflection by the opposite sense of direction: the self does not refer to itself by making itself an object, but that it recognizes the relinquished subjective in the external object, the action schema or the relationship schema.
HabermasVsMead: these explanations remain attached to the model of the philosophy of consciousness. This model, which is based on an inner dialogue, can already be found in Augustine's work. (1)


1.Vgl. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969; L. S. Vygotski, Denken und Sprechen, Frankfurt, 1961.

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Language Pinker I 94
Language/thinking/Pinker: we do not think in our mother tongue. ---
I 451
PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for gloating, but they know exactly what is meant - all the strange feeling words can be acquired - Margeret Mead: thesis: the people of Samoa are dispassionate - PinkerVsMead: unbelievable - Derek FreemanVsMead: debunked this as misrepresentation.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Meaning Mead Habermas IV 23
Meaning/Mead/Habermas: in the interaction through gestures, the gesture of the first organism gains a meaning for a second organism that reacts to it: this reaction expresses that one is interpreting the gesture of the other. If the first organism "takes the attitude of the other" and, by doing its gesture, already anticipates the reaction of the other and thus its interpretation, its own gesture gains for it the same, if not yet the same meaning that it has for the other. (1) According to Mead, the same meaning is achieved through internalisation. (See Internalisation/Mead).
Habermas IV 24
HabermasVsMead: more convincing is a Darwinian approach: that the pressure to adapt exposes a premium to increased reaction speed.
Habermas IV 25
Description levels/Habermas: that interaction participants interpret the same stimulus in a consistent way is a fact that exists per se, but not for them ((s) the interaction participants). ((s) See Exterior/interior/Maturana, Descriptions/Maturana).
1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86.

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Models Meadows Brocker I 550
Models/Simulation/World3/Growth/Meadows: Meadows used the preparatory work of Jay W. Forrester, who developed the World-2-model at MIT (Forrester 1971 (1)) to develop his model "World3". Meadows: focused on five macroeconomic variables: population, food production, industrial production, raw material stocks and environmental pollution (2). All five variables are characterized by exponential growth.
Problem: Even food production can only be increased linearly.
Brocker I 553
World3 model: is constructed from 4 steps: 1. The interaction of the 5 basic variables is described in feedback control loops. This can be positive (increasing) or negative.
2. These interactions are defined, resulting in 99 variables that are linked in more than one hundred basically similar causal chains. (3)
3. This data was calculated on the computer for the 200 years between 1900 and 2100. The inputs were varied several times to observe the behavior of the system.
4. Measures proposed at that time were introduced into the system on a trial basis. (4)
Results: A. The curves of the first seventy years to the present were identical in all runs, then they diverged and documented how the model reacted to different of the fed-in quantified assumptions. The system behaviour clearly tends to exceed the limits of growth and then collapses," wrote the authors, with the collapse taking place "as a result of depletion of raw material stocks" (5).
Brocker I 555
B: The various scenarios (assumptions about population growth, food resources, technologies, etc.) showed climate change to be the most pressing global environmental problem. All runs with variants ended in system crashes This would ultimately lead to a decline in population and industrial capacity (6)
VsMeadows: the results were to be expected since the facility ((s) of simulation) was chosen such that exponentially growing factors (population and industrial production) were interacting with limited factors (food, raw material stocks,
Brocker I 556
absorption capacity of pollutants). Under these assumptions, the model world inevitably had to collapse sooner or later. The result was ultimately included in the question.
Brocker I 559
VsMeadows: his model ignored the price mechanism. This would ensure that scarce goods would be replaced by abundant goods. VsMeadows: his database is too narrow for far-reaching statements.
VsMeadows: there is a lack of regional differentiation, which leads to a hasty globalisation of problems. Ultimately, this will depoliticize the problem.
VsMeadows: recent criticism: the predicted shortage of resources and food has failed to materialize.



1. J.W. Forrester, Word Dynamics, 1971
2. Vgl. Donella H. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows/Jørgen Randers/William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New York 1972. Dt.: Dennis Meadows/Donella Meadows/Erich Zahn/Peter Milling, Die Grenzen des Wachstums. Bericht des Club of Rome zur Lage der Menschheit, Stuttgart 1972, p. 15
3. Ibid. p. 108, Diagramm des Weltmodells: p. 88-91.
4. Ibid. p. 76-77.
5. Ibid. p. 111.
6. Ibid. p. 17.

Patrick Kupper, „Dennis Meadows u. a., Die Grenzen des Wachstums“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolMeado I
Dennis L. Meadows
Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World Cambridge 1973


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Norms Mead Habermas IV 72
Norms/Mead/Habermas: Norms do not claim validity because they are linked to sanctions - otherwise they could not oblige the actors to be obedient, but only force docility. Open repression is, however
Habermas IV 73
incompatible with the meaning of the validity of norms. Solution/Mead/Habermas: Mead directly traces back norm validity to the sanction-free, i.e. moral authority of the "generalized other". Although this instance itself is to be created by internalising group sanctions, groups must first have constituted themselves as units capable of acting before sanctions can be imposed in their name. A collective consciousness or group identity must have developed.
Mead: always analyses such processes with terms of personality development.
DurkheimVsMead/Habermas: Durkheim, on the other hand, does not analyze religious belief and patriotism as out-of-the-ordinary attitudes of modern contemporaries, but as an expression of a collective consciousness deeply rooted in phylogenetic history that is constitutive for the identity of groups.

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Recognition Honneth Brocker I 789
Recognition/Honneth: Honneth thesis: a certain form of relationship
Brocker I 790
between individuals has a constitutive meaning for social reality. The intersubjective practice, in which people mutually recognize each other as needy, equal and unique subjects (or refuse to recognize each other), forms the basic building block of social life. It is the basis of the identity of individuals, an essential object of social interactions and disputes and the most important motor of social development. The practical logic of social processes therefore follows a "moral grammar" resulting from individuals' claims to social recognition of their identity and from social struggles for these claims. See Identity/Honneth, Recognition/Hegel, Intersubjectivity/Hegel.
Brocker I 796
HonnethVsMead/HonnethVsHegel: as negative equivalents of the positive aspects love, law and solidarity, the phenomena of rape, deprivation of rights and degradation must also be considered in an empirical theory of recognition. It is such experiences of disregard that make "the fact of withheld recognition for social actors socially tangible" in the first place. (1) Three basic forms of recognition/Honneth: Stage 1: elementary intersubjective basic pattern of love and friendship: this is exemplary in Hegel's relationship between parents and children. (2) Here individuals recognize each other in their concrete nature of needs and affects and their interdependence in this respect.
Brocker I 797
The elementary form of recognition is formed in the relationship of love (see Love/Honneth). However, this form "cannot be applied arbitrarily to a larger number of interaction partners". (3)
Brocker I 798
Stage 2 Socialization, See Law/Honneth, Law/Hegel, Socialization/Honneth. Stage 3: Solidarity: see Self-Respect/Honneth.
Brocker I 800
On the problems: here it concerns the demanded integration of the acknowledgment problem into an overall social moral orientation horizon. HonnethVsMead, HonnethVsMarx, HonnethVsSartre, HonnethVsSorel: see (4). See Politics/Honneth.

1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 150.
2. Ibid. p. 34.
3. Ibid. p. 174
4. Ibid. p. 237, 241, 247f, 253f.
Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Relativism Pinker Vs Relativism I 528/529
PinkerVsMead, Margret: Mead called the Arapesh meek. They were headhunters. She claimed the Tschambuli had changed gender roles, because the men had curls. In reality, they beat their wives, murdered neighboring tribes, and considered murder a milestone in the life of a young man, which authorized him to wear the face paint that had seemed so effeminate to Margaret Mead. >Cultural relativism. Anthropology/Cultural Relativism/Pinker: contrary to popular opinion, there are many constants in all human cultures: E.g. prestige, status, power and wealth disparities, property, inheritances, regulation of sexuality, jealousy, favoritism of young women as sex partners, division of labor by gender, hostility towards foreign groups, violence, rape, murder. I 530 Since every human owes their existence to ancestors who were winners somewhere in some way, everyone is now meant to fight in certain situations.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
VsMead Pinker, St. I 451
Margaret Mead: Thesis: the people of Samoa are dispassionate - PinkerVsMead: incredible - Derek FreemanVsMead: unmasked as the misrepresentation.