Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Logic | Cresswell | I 40 Logic/natural language/semantics/Cresswell: not every logic can be taken as the basis of semantics: difference Entailment/Consequence: in the natural language, "Monday follows Sunday" must not be taken as a consequence of "Snow is white" - (only formal, not correct content-wise). >Everyday language, >Material conditional, >Consequence. I 42 Logic/Semantics/entailment/meaning postulates/Cresswell: E.g. meaning postulate: (x) (x is bachelor > x is male). - Then the conclusion of "roses are red" and "violets are blue" on roses and violets ..and snow is white" becomes valid. ((Vs). >Meaning postulates. CresswellVsMeaning postulates: false alignment of entailment and consequence. Snow is not white in all possible worlds. >Entailment. Solution: possible world semantics. >Possible world semantics Difference between necessary and contingent truths. >Necessity, >Contingency. Quine/Cresswell : This seems to reject analytically/synthetically the distinction together with the distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity/Quine, >Necessity/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Meaning Postulates | Cresswell | I 30 KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning postulates. --- II 163 Meaning Postulates/Definition/Entailment/inconsistency/Cresswell: Meaning postulates are needed to define terms such as entailment and inconsistency. >Entailment, >Contradictions, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Meaning Postulates | Katz | Cresswell I 30 Group: KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning Postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning Postulates. >Meaning, >Language rules, >Semantics, >Meaning postulates/Nagel. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author![]() |
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Meaning Postulate | Chisholm Vs Meaning Postulate | III 85 Synthetically a priori/Chisholm: examples for this may be: "everything that is red, is colored". One knows it a priori, but cannot demonstrate that it is analytic. Meaning postulates/Solution: some authors: alleged synthetic sentences a priori are in reality important postulates. ChisholmVsMeaning postulates: (in this context): this is a confusion between mentioning and use. A meaning postulate would e.g. mention the word "red". But the sentence above uses the words, it does not mention it. ((s) therefore it cannot be a meaning postulate itself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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