Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bostock, D. | Simons Vs Bostock, D. | I 86 Part/mereology/Bostock/Simons: (Bostock 1979): his mereology should be a basis for his theory of extensive measurement, the rational and irrational numbers. Part-Relation/Bostock: thesis: there is more than one part-relation! SimonsVsBostock: (see below, Part II): Bostock's assumptions are still too strong to be as minimal as he assumes. System P/mereology/Bostock: there are no sets, "‹" is a basic concept. I 87 Least upper bound/l.u.b./sum/product/mereology/Bostock: mereology takes as duality for the product not the sums + and σ but the least upper bound (l.u.b.) +’ and σ’. Compact Set/Bostock: the second axiom (...) tells us that when F-s exist and they are limited above, they then have a sum (σ, not l.u.b. σ'). The resulting system is a little weaker than the classical mereology: it does not force us to assume the existence of a universe. SimonsVsBostock: with this, his system is still very strong. Bostock: his system only provides 6 nonisomorphic models ((s) interpretations) for the 7-element model (see above). A binary least upper bound exists when two objects have an upper bound at all. Bostock needs this relative strength in order to be able to express the analogy between parts and subsets. Simons: that is just not the case for the classical mereology. Bostock: thesis: it is the analogy between part and subset that explains why the concept of the part is at all important to us. SimonsVsBostock: which cannot be denied but will be undermined in part II for other cases. BostockVsMereology/stronger/weaker: one should avoid its strongest theses because there are classes of objects that are unlimited above, or they could exist. The strong classical mereology boils down to that there should be sums that are, in a certain sense, too large or too heterogeneous. Sum/Bostock: we need an additional condition: sums should be formed exclusively of their summands. This is intended to exclude unintended interpretations of P that are not mereologically. E.g. the Hasse diagrams from §1.4: higher points are obviously not formed from the lower points. "To consist of"/mereology/Simons: this is itself a mereological term. The lower points do not form the higher because they are not parts of them! Part/Bostock/Simons: Bostock's informal condition that we should really understand "part" as part is nothing other than that we do not want unintended models. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Gestalt Theory | Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory | Simons I 290 Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions. Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums). Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not! Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be. Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name. SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also >empty names. Simons I 324 Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme). Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view. Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning. stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. ((s) >Strength of Theories). |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Mereology | Simons Vs Mereology | Simons I 290 Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: mereology criticizes the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. Arbitrary Sums/Simons: arbitrary sums are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions. Individuals/Simons: it is not clear what properties individuals hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums). Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being-individual is not! |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Mereology | Wessel Vs Mereology | Wessel I 360 Mereology/LesniewskiVsSet Theory: Lesniewski rejected set theory and built up his mereology as a competitor, as a theory of concrete object groups or as part of whole theory. In this theory there are no empty object groups. (>empty set). I 361 WesselVsMereology: there is no reason to discard class logic when distinguishing between sets and accumulations. (Frege already pointed out this difference). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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