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The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bon sens | Bergson | Gadamer I 31 Bon sens/Bergson/Gadamer: The moral motive in the concept of common sense or bon sens has remained effective to this day and distinguishes these concepts from our concept of "common sense". As an example I refer to the beautiful speech that Henri Bergson gave in 1895 on the occasion of the great prize-giving ceremony at the Sorbonne about bon sens(1). His criticism of the abstractions of natural science as well as those of language and legal thought, his stormy appeal to »énergie intérieure d'une intelligence qui se reconquiert a tout moment sur elleméme, éliminant les idéesfaites pour laisser la place libre aux idées qui se font« (88), could be baptized in France in the name of bon sens. Cf. >common sense. Although the definition of this term contained, as is natural, a reference to the senses, Bergson apparently took it for granted that, unlike the senses of the bon sens, the "milieu social". » Tandis que les autres sens nous mettent en rapport avec des choses, le bon senspréside nos relations avec des personnes«(85). He is a kind of genius for practical life, but less a gift than the constant task of »ajustement toujours renouvelé des situations toujours nouvelles«, ea way of adapting the general principles to reality, through which justice is realized, a »tact de la vérité pratique«, eine »rectitude du jugement, qui Vient de la droiture de l'äme« (88). According to Bergson, as the common source of thought and will, the bon sens is a sens social, which avoids the mistakes of scientific dogmatists, who seek social laws, as well as those of metaphysical utopians. (BergsonVsMetaphysics). See >Sensus communis, >Common sense. Gadamer I 32 Science/Hermeneutics/Bergson: Although Bergson also talks about the importance of classical studies for the formation of this bon sens - he sees in them the effort to break the "ice of words" and to discover underneath the free flow of thought (91), he certainly does not pose the opposite question of how far bon sens is necessary to classical studies themselves, i.e. he does not speak of its hermeneutical function. His question is not directed at the sciences at all, but at the independent meaning of bon sens for life. 1. Henri Bergson, Ecrits et paroles I (RM Mossé-Bastide), S. 84ff. |
Bergs I Henri Bergson Durée et Simultanéité. À propos de la théorie d’Einstein, Paris 1922 German Edition: Dauer und Gleichzeitigkeit: Über Einsteins Relativitätstheorie Hamburg 2014 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Common Sense | Reid | Breidert I 216 Common sense/Breidert: the common sense philosophy was particularly strong in 18th century Scotland. Representative: Thomas Reid. Gadamer I 30 There is no doubt that the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition of the sensus communis has become effective. The study of... Gadamer I 31 the development of the senses and their capacity for cognition is drawn from this tradition and is ultimately intended to correct the exaggerations of philosophical speculation. (Thomas ReidVsMetaphysics). >Metaphysics, >Reason, >Empiricism, >Rationalism. Gadamer: But at the same time the reference of the common sense to society is recorded: Reid: » They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark«. In their eyes, the philosophy of common sense, of good sense, is not only a remedy against that of metaphysics - it also contains the basis of a moral philosophy that really does justice to the life of society. >Ethics, >Morals. Gadamer: The moral motive in the concept of common sense or bon sens has remained effective to this day and distinguishes these concepts from our concept of "Gesunder Menschenverstand". >Bon sens/Bergson, >Sensus communis. 1. Thomas Reid, The philosophical Works, ed. Hamilton, eighth edition, 1895. |
Reid I Th. Reid An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition 2000 Ber I W. Breidert Berkeley In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Essence | Searle | V 246 Nature/SearleVsMetaphysics: an object is not a combination of essence (without property) and properties. >Essentialism, >Metaphysics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Brandom | I 716 MetaphysicsBrandomVsMetaphysics: confuses assigning and the assumption or recognition of commitments. >Score keeping, >Attribution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Metaphysics | Bubner | I 19 Metaphysics/Bubner: its climax in Hegel (after Kant's rejection) proclaimed the resumption of the ancient project. Renewal of metaphysics. Provocation: that it is not opposed to science, but as a necessary perfection. --- I 134 Metaphysics/Heidegger: Where does it come from? (HeideggerVsMetaphysics). BubnerVsHeidegger: the question contradicts a philosophia perennis, which manages the eternal questions. Where does the need to deal with so obviously empty questions like those about being come from? Metaphysics/Bubner: 1. Thesis: it was by no means an eternal companion of mankind, but has developed as a task of philosophy in the face of special experiences. The oldest documents of philosophy, on the one hand, are so profound, on the other, so unspecific that the metaphysics label does not fit. Metaphysics/Ancient: first mentioned by Plato. The pre-Socratics, in his opinion, fail before the task of real understanding. So metaphysics arises. Metaphysics/Bubner: Crisis in Descartes and Kant. --- I 136 Skepticism/antiquity/Bubner: originally meant only accurate examination and judgment abstention (> Epoché)! Metaphysics/Bubner: as the supreme knowledge of the powers of pure reason, it cannot proceed otherwise than dogmatically. Thus skepticism is the natural enemy of metaphysics. --- I 144 Metaphysics/Bubner: 3. Thesis: The Transcendental Revolution of Kant does not arise from a genius idea, but from the experience of the failure of metaphysics in its history so far. It serves the elimination of this lack and the insight into the efficiency of reason itself. --- I 149 Metaphysics/Bubner: 4. Thesis: also the beginning of metaphysics is lead by an experience that brings the new discipline on the way. This is certainly not an experience with metaphysics, but an original experience, which involves knowledge when it is in pursuit of its intention diagnosing its lacks. Thus, metaphysics realizes a primal interest of all knowledge. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Metaphysics | Carnap | II 167 ff PositivistsVsmetaphysics: there can be a reality that generally remains hidden from the experience.(1) 1. J. R: Flor, Ernst Mach: "Der Vater des Wiener Kreises" in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 VI 235 Metaphysics / Carnap: all the problems of "interpretation", "Declaration", "Basis" fall in the area of metaphysics. Example parallelism: such parallel series (e.g. between visual and aural experiences) (e.g. report of the test person) can be easily set up; but their interpretation does not fall within the field of science, but within the field of metaphysics. VI 260 The "mystery of life" is not a question but a situation. For the decision on the final reference frame see Solipsism/Carnap; Brazil-Example: Stegmüller I 385 Solipsism/Carnap: Vs vulgar solipsism: E.g. Two geographers, a realist, a solipsist. Realism: for the realist, things exist "per se". Soligpsism: for the solipist, everything is unreal. Both will come to an identical result in their search for an alleged lake in central Brazil, e.g. find the lake. For the realists, the lake exists "per se", for the solipsist it is unreal. Both speak as a metaphysicians. As all empirical methods were exhausted in the search no further decision is possible. >Empiricism, >Realism, >Rationalism, >Solipsism. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Metaphysics | Duhem | I 3 Metaphysics/Duhem: E.g. Acoustic theories are explanations and therefore metaphysical ((s) since they explain or justify perceptible things with non-perceptible ones). Explanations are always metaphysical, since they have reality as their subject. Science must adhere to the results of the experiment. Duhem: in most cases, a physical theory cannot attain such a degree of perfection that it offers a certain explanation of our sense perception. They are content to show that all our perceptions appear as if reality were such: hypothetical explanation. E.g. wave theory of light, ether. I 6 The physical theories are subordinate to the metaphysical ones. >Theories. I 19 DuhemVsMetaphysics: remains inexplicable for its own followers, since it makes assumptions that are not given by its own system. I 20 Duhem: metaphysics explains, physics describes. >Physics, >Descriptions, >Explanations. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Metaphysics | Heidegger | Tugendhat II 25 Being/Heidegger: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: has localized the being in the being. - Gadamer I 262 HeideggerVsMetaphysics: The questioning that turns towards this fundamental, that it is that, is itself a questioning after Being, but in a direction that necessarily remained unthought in all previous questioning after the Being of Being, indeed, that was precisely concealed and hidden by the question after Being posed by metaphysics. Heidegger/Gadamer: By showing the question about being at the same time as the question about nothingness, Heidegger has linked beginning and end of metaphysics. That the question about being could arise from the question about nothingness presupposed the thinking of nothingness, at which metaphysics fails. >Being/Heidegger, >Nothing/Heidegger. --- Figal I 116ff Metaphysics/Heidegger: 1928 still a positive concept. Figal I 165 Metaphysics/Heidegger: Christianity and nihilism do not differ in their orientation to God. Metaphysics interprets the presence into the absence. Nietzsche's death of God brings the West into the situation of being able to put an end to metaphysics. --- Cardorff II 84 HeideggerVsMetaphysics: "because not asking for being". Cardorff II 86 Metaphysics/Heidegger: all attempts, being as remaining, always-equality, availability, presence, i.e. thinking as an independent presence, belong to metaphysics for Heidegger. Likewise, eternal recurrence of the same, Hegel's absolute mind, etc. >God, >F. Nietzsche, >Nihilism, >Christianity, >Being/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Metaphysics | Nietzsche | Adorno XII 136 Metaphysics/Nietzsche/Adorno: Nietzsche has shown or believed to show that (...) the surface of the categories assigned to a sensual life of any sense, according to the measure of his own metaphysics, i. e. a metaphysics of the very living, are deeper than what this surface denies and only insists on the hidden, but this is due that if one wanted to insist on it, it would transform into in ideology. For example Carmen/Nietzsche: be deeper than Wagner's "Ring". Adorno: in its essential surface being, in its essential sensual being, certain mythical behaviours are met. Nietzsche understands this as more appropriate than oppposed to the Wagnerian, where the myths become a kind of back world or latent meaning. >Music/Nietzsche. XII 137 Content/Nietzsche/Adorno: the point of Nietzsche's philosophy is to a certain extent that the surface, i. e. the immediate, passionate, sensual and manifesting life itself is precisely the content. Cf. >Aesthetics/Adorno. --- Ries II 46 Transcendental/"ideal things"/Nietzsche: philosophy, religion, art, morality are all "higher lies", because they are traced back to their origin in the lower, all too human. >Transcendentals. NietzscheVsMetaphysics: Insignificance is given illusory meaning. Ries II 77 Metaphysics/Morality/Beyond Good and Evil(1)/Nietzsche: The problem of legitimacy: in the previous "Science of Morality" the problem of morality itself was still missing! The suspicion that there is something problematic here. Ries II 78 The occidental metaphysical contrast between God and devil is lost. Thus also the basis for a metaphysically founded morality of the "good in itself". >God/Nietzsche. Ries II 87 Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: the entire decay history of Western metaphysics is recounted by Nietzsche on a single sheet of paper: how the true world finally became a fable. History of an error. Ries II 88 Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Development: Plato: Spatial model of the truth relations: "here" and "there" are replaced by the temporal determination "now" and "then". Temporalization of metaphysics through Christianity, decaying platonism. Ries II 89 Kant/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Kant makes God and the "true world" unattainable, because it cannot be proven. >Kant/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2. --- Danto III 210 Metaphysics/Morality Theory/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a complex connection between Nietzsche's moral theory and metaphysics: For example, if a falcon behaves like a lamb, it is - according to this theory - a lamb, because a lamb is what a lamb does. This is how the strong ones behave under all circumstances. >Morality/Nietzsche. Language/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives. >Language/Nietzsche. Danto III 209 Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. >Justice/Thrasymachus. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Stalnaker | I 1 Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics asks how the world is, not how we think about it. I 2 CarnapVsMetaphysics: in metaphysics there is a confusion of discovery and stipulation. I 15 Def understanding/Stalnaker: thesis: we understand the informational or propositional content in terms of distinguishing between options. Def metaphysics: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that need to be made between options. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Def semantics: semantics affects our ability to represent options and to distinguish between them. >Semantics, >Intentionality, >Meaning (Intending). Representation: we can only judge representation if we know how our logical space is structured. >Representation. Descriptive semantics: descriptive semantics asks what the semantic value of expressions is. Basic semantics: basic semantics asks, due to which facts they have this value. Metaphysical: metaphysical is inconceivable. I 181 Metaphysics/Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: thesis: the only role of theory in Kripke is that it serves to reject false arguments based on the confusion of two different questions (metaphysical and semantic questions). >Essence/Kripke, >Metaphysics/Kripke, >Essentialism/Kripke, >Essentialism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Tarski | Horwich I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsMetaphysics: "...as some philosophers call their unborn children."(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Nothingness | Heidegger | Gadamer I 261 Nothingness/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger's thesis was: that being itself is time. With it, the entire subjectivism of newer philosophy - as was soon to become apparent, the entire question horizon of metaphysics, which is occupied by the being as the present, was blown up. >Time, >Being, >Subjectivism, >Metaphysics. Gadamer I 262 HeideggerVsMetaphysics: The questioning that is based on this basic fact that it turns this, is indeed itself a questioning about being, but in a direction that necessarily remained unthought of in all previous questions about the being (German: "Sein") of the being (German: "Seienden"), yes, was even hidden and obscured by the very question about being that is posed by metaphysics. Heidegger/Gadamer: By presenting the question of being as the question of nothingness at the same time, he has linked the beginning and end of metaphysics. The fact that the question of being could arise from the question of nothingness presupposed the thinking of nothing, where metaphysics fails. Precursor/Gadamer: [neither Dilthey nor Husserl], but most likely still Nietzsche. To raise Nietzsche's radical critique of "Platonism" to the level of the tradition he criticized, to encounter Western metaphysics on its own level, to recognize and overcome the transcendental question as a consequence of modern subjectivism - these were the tasks that, according to the approach, that could already be found in "Being and Time". >Kehre/Heidegger, >F. Nietzsche, >Platonism. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Ontological Commitment | Davidson | Horwich I 463 DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine/DavidsonVsFacts: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics - they belong to the dualism of scheme/content. >Scheme/content, >facts/Dummett, >metaphysics. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Positivism | Hacking | I 77 Def Positivism/Hacking: 1st Verification, 2nd observation, 3rd VsCausality, 4th VsExplanation (just brings phenomena in an order that does not explain why.), 5th VsTheoretical Entities, 6th VsMetaphysics (leaves nothing that is not verifiable). >Verification, >Observation, >Causality, >Explanations, >Theoretical entities, >Metaphysics. I 80 PopperVs the label "positivist", VsSense Data - not VsMetaphysics: non-verifiable sentences are acceptable as a first step. That was later refuted by Popper. >K. Popper, >Sense data. I 80 Empiricism: empiricism is concerned with measuring (theoretical entities exist). >Empiricism, >Measurements. Positivism: positivism is concerned with seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, tasting (theoretical entities do not exist). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Principles | Strawson | V 13 Def "Sense Principle"/Strawson: there is no legitimate use of ideas or concepts that would not refer to the empirical conditions of its application. - (VsMetaphysics) >Language use, >Language behavior, >Sense, >Senseless, >Foundation, >Metaphysics, cf. >Private language, >Beetle example. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Transcendentals | Nietzsche | Ries II 46 Transcendental/"ideal things"/Nietzsche: philosophy, religion, art, morality are all "higher deceit", because they are traced back to their origin in the lower, all too human. Ries II 46 NietzscheVsMetaphysics: Insignificance is given illusory meaning. >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Art/Nietzsche, >Philosophy/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
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| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Heidegger, M. | Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. | Habermas I 182 TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth. Tugendhat I 88 TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..." I 90 Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being. I 91 Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger). I 92 Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically. I 104 TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being. II 65 Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being". Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology. II 109 Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..." TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences. II 110 Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us. II 111 Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another. TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being. Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence. TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not. II 112 Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence". TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of! II 113 But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words. II 115 Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being. II 116 For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so? Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both? So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being. II 121 TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving. II 123 Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to". II 124 Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is". TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear. II 129 Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong! II 130 Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future. II 131 Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead. II 131 Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail. II 132 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense! II 132 Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role. II 133 Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing. II 134 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time! Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist. Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Rorty Vs Hobbes, Th. | II (f) 125 Nominalism/Rorty: NominalismVsMetaphysics. > Quine still connects him with that. Language/World/Order/RortyVsHobbes/RortyVsQuine: that leads to contradiction if they think that by words for the smallest particles of matter nature will be dissected in a manner that is not possible with other words! A consistent nominalism must emphasize that the forecast success of such a vocabulary has no importance for the "ontological rank". |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Carnap Vs Kant | Newen I 112 CarnapVsKant: no synthetic judgements are a priori possible. Stroud I 171 Def Pseudo-Question/CarnapVsMetaphysics/CarnapVsKant/Stroud: are questions that cannot be answered because there is no possible sensory experience that decides the truth or falsity of the sentences in which certain expressions occur. ((s) e.g. metaphysical or transcendental expressions). Carnap: For example, two geographers want to find out whether a certain mountain in Africa is real or just a legend. I 172 a) If they find a mountain there that more or less corresponds to what was assumed, they can say that it is real, that it exists. Reality/Carnap: thus, they use an empirical, non-metaphysical concept of reality. (Carnap, Chicago 1958, 207). b) Assuming they were not only scientists, but also philosophers: one of them calls himself "2Realist", the other "Idealist": "Realist"/Carnap: will say that the mountain not only has the qualities (characteristics) that one has discovered in it, but it is also real, i.e. independent of our perception. "Idealist"/Carnap: denies that the mountain is independent of our perception. I.e. it is not real in the sense of the realist. Sciences/Empiricism/Carnap: here this divergence between the two cannot arise at all. (333f) But that does not mean that both theses are wrong. I 173 Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that it could not be wrong because it is necessary to empirically clarify all other meaningful questions. CarnapVsKant: according to the verification principle, however, this is a "pseudo-theory" that cannot explain or guarantee anything. Sense/Sensible/CarnapVsKant: for something to be sensible, we need to know the truth value (WW) of the sentences that contain the corresponding expressions. Weaker: we must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something than its falsity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 139 Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic. Descartes I 142 KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion". Kant I 34 Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made the subject of metaphysical teachings. I 85 Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. Strawson V 227 Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist. V 228 KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist. V 228 Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning. V 229 Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But: V 230 KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. I 234 Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Metaphysics | Carnap Vs Metaphysics | VI 245 Reality/Metaphysics/Carnap: metaphysics characterizes reality as "independent of consciousness". VI 246 CarnapVsMetaphysics: by this criterion, an object in my hand would have to be referred to as "unreal", because I could change it through a corresponding will experience. If that were ruled out, it would be contrary to realism. If it does not change according to the claim of metaphysics, even though I had a corresponding will experience, e.g. lunar crater, it would be contrary to the opinion of the idealism. I 2 CarnapVsMetyphysik/Stalnaker: rührt aus der Verwechslung von Entdeckung und Stipulation her. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Metaphysics | Dummett Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 463 Metaphysics/Frege: the only solution for disagreement here is semantic ascent. Dummett: pro: Rorty: we can go further and prohibit language philosophy to re-establish the alleged contrast between "objective reality" and "useful fictions". DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics. They belong to the duality scheme/content. (1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Field Vs Metaphysics | II 216 Gavagai/FieldVsMetalanguage: Although it is psychologically easier to understand sentences like (10) as formulated in an unambiguous (determinate) ML, but they are just as understandable and have the same truth conditions if the metalanguage is indeterminate: (10) "rabbit" partially signifies the set of rabbits and partially the set of unseparated parts of rabbits. II 385 Metaphysics/FieldVsMetaphysics: I have nothing against "metaphysical restrictions", only that they should rather be called semantic restrictions. They are only demands relating to the meaning of "epistemic goal" or "belief". And here you can demand what you want. If someone has goals that my demand does not meet, why should he bother about whether I call his goals "epistemic" or his mental states "belief"? I doubt that the goals and beliefs of the people differ so radically, but otherwise they could also be called "shmepistemic" and "shmelief". But if these do not exist, it has nothing to do with "metaphysical limitations". Richard Jeffrey: "the fact that it is allowed to wear knight’s armor in buses does not mean that they are full of it." (1983, 145). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Metaphysics | Pragmatism Vs Metaphysics | Rorty I 103 PragmatismVsMetaphysics/Rorty: E.g. the question of whether reality is mental or material in the last instance, is meaningless. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphysics | Wittgenstein Vs Metaphysics | Chisholm II 218 WittgensteinVsMetaphysics: does not need the words in its everyday use. This has led to philosophical errors. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Metaphysics | Chisholm Vs Metaphysics | III 133 "Theories of reality"/VsMetaphysics/Chisholm: metaphysical: we could set up a "theory about the nature of truth": E.g. that an entity such as the one introduced above is additionally created in a way that Socrates is mortal if it is evident for this entity that he is mortal. III 134 Then we could not only say that if it is evident to such a being, then Socrates is also mortal, but we could say that if it is true that Socrates is mortal, then Socrates is mortal. Thus we arrive at a theory of reality. ((s) the relevant fact would then follow from the truth. This is not objectionable, but presupposes a being that knows). Problem/Chisholm: such theories existed many times in history. They always assume that there is a being that judges with evidence, and this is then the "measure of all things". Note III 193 Brentano: this comes down to the truth belonging to the judgment of right one who judges rightly, i.e. the judgment of the one who judges like the one would judge who makes his judgment with evidence. (Truth and evidence, Hamburg 1962, p. 139) Reality/Peirce: depends on the real fact that the investigation if it is only carried out long enough, is destined to lead to a belief in it. III 134 ChisholmVs: how we make sure that what is evident to us is also evident to that being? I.e. our metaphysician requires us to go yet another step. ((s) whose necessity he has not recognized). 3) In the next step each of us is required to be identical with these adopted ((s) ideal) beings. Problem: then every one of us is also identical with the others! ChisholmVsCoherence theory: this is what underlies the idealistic tradition of coherence theory. That’s too high a price for the desired connection of the truth with the evident. Solution/Aristotle: you are not white, because our opinion that you are white is correct, but it is because you’re white that we are telling the truth when we say this. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 |
| Metaphysics | Cartwright Vs Metaphysics | I 102 Laws/Law of Nature/Include/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p. 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it does not provide the cause for L. Laws are not explained by showing how the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but by showing that their truth is a special case of a broader truth. Cartwright: That is also the view of many of today’s realists. GrünbaumVsMetaphysics/Cartwright: should thus be acceptable to modern empiricists. I 103 "Generic-specific point of view"/Terminology/Grünbaum/Cartwright: I call his point of view the "generic-specific point of view". Grünbaum Thesis: in any particular set of circumstances the fundamental explanatory laws and the phenomenological laws make the same assertions. The fundamental laws are superior, because they make more general statements. Deductive-nomological model: goes with: the phenomenological ones are derived from the fundamental laws. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 128 Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not. VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics! |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Metaphyscs | Pro | Hume II 241 HumeVsMetaphysics. |
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