Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Method | Feyerabend | Method/Feyerabend Thesis: the theory of Galileo (as well as other deficient theories) does not only correspond to the facts, but is also perfectly reasonable. Any attempt to implement some of the more familiar methodologies of the twentieth century, such as the Trial and Error method, would have had catastrophic consequences! Cf. >Trial and Error. I 270 Methodology/Method/Feyerabend: Observations that do not match are rightly regarded as indications of errors in the theories and not in methodology. This changes when the disturbances become overwhelming and surround every observation. (Feyerabend: "cosmological criticism", is preferable here). (VsLakatos). I 271/272 FeyerabendVsMethodology: (VsLakatos): it does not help to rationally reconstruct the dispute between the old and the new. At any rate, not at the time of the dispute. The methodology misses the tricks with which Galileo worked propagandistically. (...) (I 281) E.g. Research Programs/Feyerabend: Comparison between Einstein and Lorentz. Einstein's program begins to degenerate, while that of Lorentz advances. (+ ...) I 283 Research Programs/Feyerabend: The consistency of the speed of light arises from Lorentz' program as a random fact, and is therefore closer to the general theory of relativity than Einstein's program, where the consistency is a fundamental law. And his heuristics are at least as convincing as those of Einstein, for any law that follows from a research program can, of course, be used in its heuristics. The choice of research programs and competitors is quite arbitrary, and so are the judgments that are based on them. I 283 Speed of Light/Feyerabend: "E = mc²" was already deduced by Poincaré in 1900 without relativistic aspects. I 376 Sciences/Feyerabend: Sciences have no common structure. (Family similarity at most). Successful research does not obey general rules. --- II 54 Tradition/Feyerabend: Thesis 1: Traditions are neither good nor bad Thesis 2: A tradition obtains desirable or undesirable traits only if it is referred to another tradition. (When viewed as a participant of a tradition). II 55 Relativism/Feyerabend: the theses 1 and 2 lead to a relativism of exactly the kind that Protagoras seems to have defended. (Man is what matters). II 73 Scale/Feyerabend: the validity and usefulness of popular standards can only be determined by a research procedure that violates them. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lakatos, I. | Feyerabend Vs Lakatos, I. | I 271 Methodology: observations that do not fit them, are rightly considered to indicate errors in the theories and not in the methodology. That changes when the disturbances abound and surround each observation. (Feyerabend: "cosmological criticism" is preferable here). (VsLakatos). FeyerabendVsMethodology: (VsLakatos): with it the dispute between the old and the new cannot be rationally reconstructed. At least not at the time of the dispute. Also, the tricks Galilei worked with for propaganda purposes escape the methodology. I 284 FeyerabendVsLakatos: his case studies contain (A) a discussion of certain sociological regularities (B) the proposal of arbitrary standards that have no methodological force (C) the assumption that the regularities do not only lie in the facts, but are traits of reason. I 286 FeyerabendVsLakatos: he has not demonstrated that his standards are those of science, and that they lead to important results. He disregards the ’external’ influences or distorts the history of science by the insinuation that progress does not require the observed deviations from its standards. I 295 FeyerabendVsLakatos: In addition, the standards of Lakatos are not always applicable. They presuppose that relationships can always be established between sentences that originate in various research programs. But the content classes of alternative theories are often incomparable in the sense that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be established between them. Such incompatibility surely exists between myths and scientific theories. They are found again in the most advanced, most generic and therefore most mythological parts of the sciences themselves. II 18 Lakatos: On the fact that today’s standards of rationality and logic are too tight and have hampered the progress of science. But requires research to have dynamic traits. FeyerabendVsLakatos: Just about any development matches this. Hacking I 212 Lakatos: you should read all the texts you can ever get hold of. Hacking and FeyerabendVsLakatos: this is an elitist demand. FeyerabendVsLakatos: elitist. Rationality is simply defined by what is approved by a community. (Here, however, only of the last 200 years). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| |||