Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common Sense | Mill | Rawls I 304 Common Sense/Mill/Rawls: the maxims of justice cannot be based solely on the Common Sense: For example, wages should be paid to everyone I 305 according to his/her commitment and his/her contribution. These are contradictory provisions in themselves! Nor can they be weighted against each other.(1) >Justice. RawlsVsMill: but that doesn't mean that utilitarianism is needed as a solution, as Mill apparently believed. >Utilitarianism. For example, a company that needs employees must also invest in the training of the underqualified in order to benefit its own interests. It will later incur even higher costs because they will then have to pay the employees higher wages. >Income, >Education, >Education Policy. I 307 Common Sense/RawlsVsMill: None of the maxims of common sense can be elevated to the rank of a principle of justice. Any one of them would cause distortion. I 308 This has to do with the inefficiencies of the market.(2) >Principles, >Markets. 1. J. St. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. V, par. 30. 2. Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, (Cambridge, 1962) pp. 434f. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Democracy | Mill | Höffe I 356 Democracy/Mill/Höffe: Mill fears that mere democracy, which he does not qualify in more detail, could lead to a terror of opinion, which he emphatically rejects(1). In contrast to a simple understanding of popular rule, which is reduced to factual majorities, this concept suggests the idea of a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law and the constitution. In every mere democracy, there is the threat of forced domination by society over the individual. In this case, what alone is desirable is not ruled by itself, but by all others, so that, which frightens the highly educated Mill, everyone is ruled by an uneducated mass. Individualism/Mill: Mill's rejection of any form of coercive domination over the individual merely allows the state to establish a framework within which everyone is free to make their own well-informed decisions. >Governance. HöffeVsMill: However, the uncompromising nature of this partisanship for freedom and impartiality contradicts Mill's theory of science and epistemology. Because it accepts contre cæur not only in utilitarianism(2), but also in the writing "On Liberty"(1), and that does not exist at all according to the system of logic: an a priori element. Cf. >a priori/Mill, >Freedom. In the writing "The Subjection of Women"(3) Mill himself will admit this contradiction. >State/Mill. 1. J.St. Mill. On Liberty, 1859 2. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 3. J.St. Mill The Subjection of Women, 1869 (dt. Die Hörigkeit der Frau) Brocker I 508 Democracy/learning/skills/personality/Mill: The process of improving human abilities (in cognitive, moral and emotional perspectives) requires individual courage and - as Mill very critically states in On Liberty - is undermined by democracy and majority decisions. Democracy has an inherent tendency towards mediocrity, which restricts freedom. SchaalVsPateman: Carole Pateman(1) shortens Mill inadmissibly by referring significantly to Mill's On Representative Government and largely ignores the connection between freedom and the holistic training of human abilities that Mill carries out in On Liberty (in reference to Wilhelm von Humboldt). >Abilities, cf. >W. v. Humboldt. 1. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge 1970, S. 34f Gary S. Schaal, “Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Ethics | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 169 Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error. >Truth makers. The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties). >Truth condition, >Metaphysics. Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically). >Ontology. Stegmüller IV 173 Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong? IV 179 Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. >Belief, >Correctness, cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. IV 280 Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense. >Generalization. Stegmüller IV 263 Morality/Ethics/Mill: Mill believed in gradual change of human nature toward a "general love of man". StephenVsMill: "impartial charity" could also lead to Stalinism. Mackie ditto - MackieVsMill. IV 269 Freedom/Mill/Stegmüller: Thesis: The only justification for interfering with the freedom of others is to prevent harm to others. MackieVsMIll: This is too weak. Freedom of thought cannot be justified with this. Instead: "Principle of legitimate intervention. >Freedom. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Ethics | Mill | Höffe I 348 Ethics/Utilitarianism/Mill/HöffeVsMill/Höffe: Since Mill rejects any kind of a priori statements, he cannot allow them for ethics. An inexperienced justification of moral obligations remains impossible for him. The alternative, a consistent empiricism, joins - in contrast to any "a priori" or "intuitionist school" - an "inductive school" of ethics. But since the utilitarian guiding principle is supposed to guide all action, it forms its precept, which Mill does not base on experience, so that it is likely to assume the ostracized pre-empirical character. >Mill/Höffe. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Experience | James | Suhr I 93 Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled term": like "life" and "history". --- Diaz-Bone I 55 Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories. >Association. --- I 59 Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere. ((s) = Being is perceiving.) |
Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Forces | Cartwright | I 59 Composition/causes/forces / Physics / Cartwright: E.g. mix of electromagnetics and gravity. - Vector addition: is a calculation! - It is not nature, what "adds" the forces - because the "component forces" are not there! MillVs: the partial forces exist. CartwrightVsMill: Partial forces do not exist - not even - "partial movement towards the north and the east" where the body moves to the northeast. I 61 Solution/Cartwright: we have to give up the "facts-view": In the vector addition causal forces are added - no physical forces. - Then not "behavior" of the body, but "ability" to behave". Problem: so easily the "facts" cannot be abandoned. >Facts, >Complex/complexity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Functionalism | Searle | Dennett I 557 Function/Searle (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle. Searle I 19 SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam): relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. Cf. >Functions. I 59 ff VsFunctionalism: functionalism eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. >Qualia, >Simulation. I 233f A machine is defined by effects and cannot be recreated from cheese. A computer is syntactically defined and can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese). Syntax is always relative to the observer but not intrinsical. However, the heart is an intrinsical pump. Also, water can be described as intelligent (lowest resistance). I 266f Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts. Causality only exists through interest-oriented description here. >Description dependence. Rules are no cause for action. >Rules. I 266 Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer. >Description level, >Levels(Order). I 269 Pattern: a pattern plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) >Causality/Searle. III 24 SearleVsMillikan: a function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: the function arose evolutionary. >Ruth Millikan. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Functions | Searle | I 266 Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer. E.g. the heart has no function, which would be added to its causal relations. Brain: by elimination of the level of the deep unconscious, the "physical causation" dissolves into nothing. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation. I 267 The normative component is in the eye of the beholder. The connection of mental content does not need to have a mental content itself (e.g. delusions). >Content, >Empirical content, >Observation, >Deception. III 24 Function/Searle: a function always precedes the object: we do not perceive a table simply as an object. (Cf. objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). But nature does not know of functions. III 25 It is nature immanent, that the heart pumps blood, but immanent is the flow, merely attributed to the function. The function only exists in a system of previous value allocations - there, no other facts are detected than causal facts. III 26 Larry Wright: if Z is the function of X, then 1. there is X, because there is Z, 2. Z is a consequence of that there is X. SearleVs: that would eliminate the observer relativity of the function. III 27 Function/SearleVsMillikan: functions are always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: functions arose evolutionary. >Evolution/Millikan. SearleVs: so we can introduce everything and call it relevant. This does not explain the normative component of functions. Old dilemma: there are either only raw causal relations or real "functional" functions. III 50 Animals can assign functions to objects. >Animal. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice | Millikan | I 52 Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. their literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function. >Terminology/Millikan. Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below). Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding. >Grice. Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements. Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener. Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions! Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction. >Speaker intention. Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction. Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction. Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general. I 53 Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. I 63 Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things. In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. >Intention/Grice, >Intentionality/Grice. I 65 VsMillikan: one could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions. Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking. E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!" A similar example is given by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Humanities | Dilthey | Gadamer I 12 Humanities/history/historiography/ Dilthey/Gadamer: Even Dilthey, in which the influence of the scientific method and the empiricism of Mills' logic(2) is much more strongly asserted, nevertheless retains the romantic-idealistic heritage in the concept of the spirit. Cf. >Historiography/Droysen. DiltheyVsEmpirism: He always felt superior to English empiricism because he lived in the vivid perception of what distinguished the historical school from all scientific and natural law thinking. "Only from Germany can the real empirical method come in place of the prejudiced dogmatic empiricism." DiltheyVsMill: "Mill is dogmatic for lack of historical education" - this is a note Dilthey wrote in his copy of Mill's Logic. In fact, all the decades of hard work Dilthey dedicated to the foundation of the humanities is a constant examination of the logical demand that Mill's famous final chapter(2) had made on the humanities. Method/Dilthey/Gadamer: Nevertheless, Dilthey let himself be deeply influenced by the model of the natural sciences, even if he wanted to justify the methodological independence of the humanities. For Dilthey, scientific knowledge includes the dissolution of the bond of life, the gaining of a distance to one's own Gadamer I 13 history, which alone makes it possible to make them into objects. >Method/Dilthey. 1. W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. V, S. LXXIV. 2. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel, 1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissen- schaften«. Wright I 19 Humanities/W. Dilthey/Wright, G. H.: Dilthey used the term "humanities" for the entire domain of the method of understanding. The German term "humanities" comes from the translation of the English "moral science". |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Humanities | Gadamer | I 9 Humanities/"Geisteswissenschaften"/Tradition/Gadamer: The word "Geisteswissenschaften" has become established primarily through the translator of John Stuart Mill's logic. In his work, Mill seeks to begin by sketching the possibilities of applying induction logic to the moral sciences. The translator says humanities(1). >Humanities/Mill. I 10 GadamerVsTradition/GadamerVsMill/GadamerVsHume/GadamerVsInduction: But now the real problem that the humanities pose to thinking is that one has not correctly grasped the essence of the humanities when one measures them by the yardstick of progressive knowledge of regularity. The experience of the social-historical world cannot be elevated to a science by the inductive method of the natural sciences. Cf. >Hermeneutics, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Cultural Transmission. 1. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel, 1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissenschaften«. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Humanities | Mill | Gadamer I 9 Humanities/"Geisteswissenschaften"/Mill/Gadamer: The word " Geisteswissenschaften" has become established primarily through the translator of John Stuart Mill's logic(1). In his work, Mill seeks to sketch out the possibilities of applying induction logic to the moral sciences. Gadamer: It is already clear from the context of Mills' logic that it is not at all a matter of acknowledging a logic of its own in the humanities, but on the contrary of showing that it is the inductive method underlying all experiential science that is also valid in this field alone. Mill thus stands in an English tradition whose most effective formulation Hume gave in his introduction to the "Treatise"(2). Also in moral science it is important to recognize uniformities, regularities, regularities that make the individual phenomena and processes predictable. VsMill, VsHume see >Humanities/Gadamer. 1. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel, 1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissenschaften«. 2. David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Introduction. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Imagination | Mill | WI 11 VsMill: ideas (and imagination) cannot explain names, as they are not intersubjectively accessible. Always new ideas, but not always new names. >Proper name, >Proper name/Mill, cf. >Reference, >Meaning, >Idea. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
| Individualism | Mill | Höffe I 353 Individualism/Mill/Höffe: Mill expanded [in his main work in social and legal philosophy, the treatise On Liberty(1)] his social economic liberalism to include political liberalism. Its basic idea consists in the uncompromising objection to a "tyranny of the ruling opinion and disposition," to a "tyranny of the majority," which itself enslaves the soul. Höffe I 356 Mill fears that the mere democracy, which he does not qualify in more detail, could lead to a terror of opinion, which he emphatically rejects. In contrast to a simple understanding of popular rule, which is reduced to factual majorities, he suggests the idea of a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law and the constitution. Because in every mere democracy, there is the threat of forced domination by society over the individual. In this case, what alone is desirable is not ruled by itself, but by all others, so that - which frightens the highly educated Mill - everyone is ruled by an uneducated mass. Höffe I 357 VsMill/Höffe: Problem: There is a tension between the political liberalism of "On Liberty"(1) and its soon-to-be-published utilitarianism(2), which is committed to the collective good. As an alternative - either liberalism or utilitarianism - it plays an important role in later debates. A coherent plea for the social and political freedom of the individual would in any case have to separate the two strands of thought and then decide which side it prefers: >liberalism, which is committed to individuality, or >utilitarianism, which is oriented toward the collective good. 1. J.St. Mill. On Liberty, 1859 2. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Liberalism | Waldron | Gaus I 89 Liberalism/Waldron: The modern distinction between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ versions of liberalism arises in connection with a serious problem about the basis of justification for liberal principles in a pluralistic society. The problem arises as follows. Liberals envisage a tolerant, inclusive society, populated by people adhering to a variety of belief systems. Many modern societies in which liberalism flourishes as a political ideal already have this character: they are religiously pluralist and multicultural societies (...). But a pluralist society also faces an additional agenda. Where different faiths and cultures rub shoulders, there is likely to be friction and offence: one group’s worship or festivities might seem like a reproach or an attack on another group, and as values and philosophies compete in the marketplace of ideas, the competition will often seem disrespectful as each creed tries to discredit its opponents and gain adherents for itself. It is not easy to define the duty of mutual toleration under these circumstances, or to sustain the distinction between harm and offence that a pluralistic regime requires. >Pluralism/Waldron. Gaus I 90 Toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Problem: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life on this sort of basis, we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. We seem to be picking and choosing among the variety of ethical, philosophical and religious traditions in the world, privileging some as foundational and marginalizing others. >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 91 Def Political liberalism/Waldron: Two political liberals may therefore be distinguished from one another by their different positions and their different conceptions. But what they will have in common – as political liberals – is their insistence on a distinction between the principles and ideals that (in their respective views) define a liberal order for society, and the deeper values and commitments associated with particular philosophical outlooks. Def Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: The political liberal insists that the articulation and defence of a given set of liberal commitments for a society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. A comprehensive liberal denies this. He maintains that it is impossible adequately to defend or elaborate liberal commitments except by invoking the deeper values and commitments associated with some overall or ‘comprehensive’ philosophy. Political liberalism: There may also be a second layer of difference among political liberals. Whether or not the substance of their liberal commitment is the same, two political liberals may differ in the justificatory strategies they adopt as political liberals. >Consensus/Waldron. ((s) Cf. >Agreement/Habermas). Comprehensive liberalism: obviously there are important differences, also, among comprehensive liberals. Two comprehensive liberals may have different liberal commitments: one may be a left liberal and the other a libertarian liberal. A second layer of difference has to do with the content of the comprehensive outlooks on which their liberal commitments are based. John Locke’s Christian foundations are not the same as Immanuel Kant’s (1991)(1) theory of autonomy, and none of those is the same as the hedonistic foundation of Jeremy Bentham’s (1982)(2) utilitarianism. >Autonomy/Kant, >Utilitarianism. Gaus I 92 Problems: (VsMill, VsKant, VsHumboldt): It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. They just took it for granted that liberalism required a philosophical foundation of this kind, and that their task as political philosophers was to articulate that foundation, convince (as Mill put it) ‘the intelligent part of the public … to see its value’ (1956(1): 90), and if necessary argue, as Locke argued in his discussion of atheism (1983(2): 51), that those who could not subscribe to these foundational positions might have to be regarded as dangerous by the government of a liberal society. >Liberalism/Mill, >Community/Humboldt, >State/Humboldt, >Categorical Imperative. >Neutrality/Waldron. Gaus I 97 The doctrine of human dignity and equality deployed in a theory of justice must be able to resist – in more or less the manner of a moral absolute – various pragmatic considerations that might tempt us to sacrifice or neglect the interests of a few weak and vulnerable persons for the sake of the convenience or prosperity of the wealthy or powerful. Justice has to be able to stand up to that, and its constitutive doctrines have to have what it takes to do that heavy moral lifting. Many of the comprehensive conceptions that political liberals want to exclude from the public realm address themselves to exactly this issue: they explain in ethical or transcendent terms why exactly it is that the few weak and vulnerable may not be sacrificed in this way. The political liberal proposes to do this work without help from any such conception, but in a way which nevertheless retains their allegiance in overlapping consensus. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron, >Abortion/Rawls. Gaus I 99 Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: Some comprehensive conceptions will affirm the moral importance of people’s actual experience here and now, while others may sideline or denigrate it. Those that do affirm it will sit more naturally with, and in a way will generate and inspire, the moral and political commitments traditionally associated with liberalism. And that is what the comprehensive liberal wants to remind us of. Liberalism is based on certain ethical commitments, certain propositions about what matters and about the importance of certain kinds of respect for the lives, experiences, and liberty of ordinary men and women. It is not a neutral or nonchalant creed, and its commitments arguably cannot be articulated at a purely political level. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1956 [1859]) On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Life | Mill | Singer I 92 Life/Intelligence/Value/Mill: no intelligent human being would want to swap with an animal, not even if it could swap satisfaction for it: no intelligent and sentient person would swap with a non-sensory and empty-headed human being. It is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a happy pig. The reason is that further developed people are able to see both sides. VsMill/Peter Singer: many critics have questioned this: does Socrates really know what it is like to be an idiot? ((s) See bat example; Literature: Th. Nagel (1974), What is it like to be a bat? in: Philosophical Review 83 (October). 435-50). Can a wise human being experience the simple pleasures of an uneducated human? UtilitarianismVsMill/P. Singer: Mill's point of view is difficult to reconcile with hedonistic utilitarianism: the idiot is satisfied, Socrates is not. >Utilitarism, >Hedonism. I 93 Preference Utilitarianism: whether it can be reconciled with Mill's view depends on how different preferences are weighed against each other. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Mill | Höffe | Höffe I 346 Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German idealism, there is no such thing as a pre-empirical insight, but only an empirical, i.e. a posteriori insight. >Empiricism, >Idealism, >a posteriori, >Knowledge, >Epistemology. Explanation: Scientific explanations, which are also possible in the human sciences (moral sciences), consist in the subordination of individual events to suitable laws. Mathematics: Even mathematics and logic should be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. That the mathematicians Höffe I 347 argue with another method, is acknowledged by the philosopher. However, he considers the corresponding view to be an illusion that the necessity of mathematical statements is merely psychological. Because of the extraordinary amount of evidence for mathematical statements, however, the appearance of necessity arises. >Theory/Mill. Höffe I 348 Utilitarianism/Ethics/HöffeVsMill: Problem: Since Mill rejects any kind of a priori statements, he cannot allow them for ethics. An inexperienced justification of moral obligations remains impossible for him. The alternative, a consistent empiricism, joins - in contrast to any "a priori" or "intuitionist school" - an "inductive school" of ethics. But since the utilitarian guiding principle is supposed to guide all action, it forms its presupposition, which Mill does not base on experience, so that it is likely to assume the ostracized pre-empirical character. >Utilitarianism, >Ethics, >Induction. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Numbers | Mill | Thiel I 15 Numbers/John Stuart Mill: mathematical objects, especially the numbers, are abstractions taken from concrete experience, that is, the most general properties or characteristics of reality. By generalizing the observation, we arrive at definitions for mathematical objects. They express facts about the totality of physical objects. (Mill: "aggregates"). Each proposition based on this asserts that a definite totality could have been formed by combining certain other totals, or by withdrawing them. Each numeral sign "2", "3", etc. denotes for Mill a physical phenomenon, a property which belongs to the totality of things that we describe with the numeral signs. I 16 FregeVsMill: drastic counterexamples: Doubtfulness in the case of 0 and 1, but also for very large numbers. Who should have ever observed the fact for the definition of 777 865? Mill could have defended himself. That his position seems to be more suited to the justification of our number and form than for the justification of arithmetic. >Numbers/Frege. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Political Representation | Mill | Rawls I 232 Political Representation/Justice/Mill/Rawls: Mill took the view that more intelligent and educated people should be given more voting rights (extra votes) to give their opinions greater influence.(1) Rawls: Mill believed that this was in accordance with the natural order of human life. This is in everyone's interest and corresponds to the human sense of justice. However, this should not go as far as class legislation in their favour. Ideally, the wiser should be on the side of the law and be the deciding factor in critical questions. Mill was convinced that everyone would benefit, including those who would be less strongly represented. RawlsVsMill: I don't want to criticize him here. But his attitude is an example of why political equality is sometimes seen as inferior to other freedoms. >Equality, >Emancipation, >Education, >Education Policy, >Inequality, >Democracy, >Society, >Electoral systems. 1. J. St. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in Representative Government, ed. R. B: McCallum, Oxford, 1946, pp. 216-222. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Predicates | Millikan | I 109 Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... I 110 ...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects. (BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap"). 2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature? Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive). Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself. >Natural kind. I 111 3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. >Identity/Millikan, >Terminology/Millikan. I 227 Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. >Negation/Millikan. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence. E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back". Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject. Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal. Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities. I 228 External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. >External negation. I 272 Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain. Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others. Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain. No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time). MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations. >Particulars/Strawson. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Preference Utilitarianism | Singer | I 13 Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics. Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community. I 14 Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. >Preferences. Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here. >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 80 Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future. >Animals. I 81 This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future). I 81 Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others. Cf. >Utilitarian Liberalism. For Utilitarianism see Carlyle - Chapman - Dworkin - Gaus - Habermas - Hooker - Kant - David Lewis - Mill - Talcott Parsons - Rawls - Sen - Singer - Smart Counter concept to Utilitarianism: >Deontology. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Principles | Rawls | I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. >Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. >Justice/Rawls. I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2). >H. Sidgwick. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. >Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. >VsUtilitarianism. I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. >Equal opportunities. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls. 1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. 2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Proper Names | Kripke | I 36 Names have no sense, descriptions have a sense. >Sense, >Meaning/Kripke. I 39 Name: a name has a different sense, but the same meaning. Alexander was teacher and student... - facts are not part of the sense of the name. I 59 Names are rigid designation expressions (descriptions are not). I 81 KripkeVsMill: ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. Otherwise we could not understand any sentence in which Socrates appears if we do not know that Socrates means the individual who is called Socrates. >Signs, >Understanding. I 103 Description does not abbreviate the name, e.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel still refers to Goedel. >Description/Kripke. I 118 Russell: logical proper names: identity is without empirical investigation, therefore logical proper names are the only real names. I 136 Name for natural kinds: gold: could turn out to be blue, but would still be gold (would retain existence). >Natural kind/Kripke. I 145 Concepts for natural kinds: are much more closely related to proper names than unusually assumed. I 146 Kripke: general names like "cat" do not express any property. >Properties/Kripke. --- III 362 Names/designate/KripkeVsWallace: not everything has to have a name and not every term is denoted (> Frege: every sentence is denoting: ((s) All sentences with unicorn are false or without truth value). >Unicorn example, >Nonexistence, >Truth value, >Truth value gap. --- Prior I 170 Names/Kripke: names do not have a structure. Simple sentences are wrong if x does not exist. --- Stalnaker I 172f Names/Kripke: reference is the designated object directly, without the mediation of sense. >Reference/Kripke. Frege/Dummett/Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the designated object - otherwise signing out would be inexplicable. Learning a language cannot be explained. >Language acquisition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Proper Names | Logic Texts | Read III 133 f If a description has a Def narrow range: we take it to describe various objects in different worlds. Def wide range: means that they refer to the same object in all the worlds, regardless of how many planets there are in that world. This gives the >planets-example a different hue. Real names always have a long range (rigid designators, for all the worlds). >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms. descriptions: are therefore not always rigid, depending on theory. (Not rigid, just for the actual world). III 138 Names/Mill: have no sense, they are purely denotative (also Kripke: no sense, because non-modal statements can have different truth values). - FregeVsKripke/FregeVsMill: names do have a sense. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Proper Names | Searle | II 288 Names/Searle: names presuppose any other representation. They have no explicit intentional content.< >Intentional content. II 291 ff Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: Kripke exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. He overweights parasitic cases and presupposes an omniscient observer. Meteorology baptizes future events. >Causal theory of proper names. II 291 ff Names/Mill: names have no connotation, only denotation. Frege: the meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions, >Connotation. II 292 Names/SearleVsKripke: a causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention. The causal chain is not pure, self-descriptive. Baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise a successful reference is explained by successful reference (circular). >Speaker intention. II 311 Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is". We speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries. >Description/Kripke. E.g. swapped spots: identification: "the spot that causes the experience". Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." Wolf II 168 Names/Searle: the meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true. We cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle (Strawson ditto). >Bundle theory. Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name. Solution/Zink: localisation. >Zink. Searle V 145 Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Names/Mill. V 145 There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance. Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. V 245 Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description, we must unfortunately assume substances. From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties. Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning. - SearleVsWittgenstein. V 247 Names/Mill: names have no sense. FregeVsMill: e.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar. This is not more informative than Everest = Everest. FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects. Identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. V 256 Names/SearleVsFrege: names are not entirely clear, e.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description. SearleVsKripke: names are not rigid, otherwise they are like logical equivalents. Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function. >Predication, >Ostension. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Reference | Stalnaker | I 177 Proposition/sentence/truth/knowledge/identification/Evans: (1982)(1) e.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is, i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence. I 180f Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object: a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (Kripke) >Kripke b) indirectly through our sensing... (Frege) >Frege ...and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things. Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion? >Essentialism. SearleVsMill: direct reference (without an intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties. >Cf. >Properties/Quine. Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. ((s) It could have been different). >Modal properties. 1. Evans, G. (1982): 'The Varieties of Evidence' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 31. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Seeing | Millikan | I 244 Seeing-as/Seeing/Millikan: seeing-as seems to be a preliminary act of identification. N.B./Millikan/(s): seeing a three-dimensional object means to see an object with a back. Image/Wittgenstein/Millikan: seeing a painted object is only an alleged seeing-as. I 301 Seeing/Knowledge/Eye/Millikan: the lens of the eye automatically adjusts to sharpness. The function is now that the object, which diffuses rays, is once again bundled (composed) into an object in the eye. For this purpose, however, the organism first has to know when the eyes are focused on an object, i.e. it must know which object the world should look alike, (s)VsMillikan: then only adults could see.) Generality/Millikan: there must then be characteristics that characterize typical clear images of objects. Learning/psychology/Learning Psychology/Millikan: has recently shown that the hard wiring of such knowledge belongs to the conditions of learning. >Psychological theories on learning. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Semantics | Brandom | I 297 Brandom's thesis: understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. >Pragmatics. --- II 145 Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions, > Terminology/Brandom). II 146 Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics. - Epistemology is its suitable working area. >Reliability theory. --- Newen I 161 Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics. - Justifying the correctness of e.g. "If A is located east of B, B is located west of A". - By the meaning of "west" and "east". Newen I 162 West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski's truth concept is too weak). >Truth/Tarski. "Correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles. >Inferential roles. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Utilitarian Liberalism | Gaus | Gaus I 105 Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus: Utilitarian moral theories hold that we can possess knowledge of both the good and the right; pace Rawls, these are not matters of ‘reasonable pluralism’. The most straightforward versions of utilitarianism maintain that the good is either pleasure, happiness or preference satisfaction, and the right is the overall maximization of the good. Bentham: Bentham, interestingly, did not think that the principle of utility could be proven; he did, though, contend that it could not reasonably be denied (1987(1): ch. 11, s. 11). Any reasonable person would see that pleasure is the ultimate end: consequently the principle of utility was beyond reasonable dispute. Whether or not the principle of utility could be established by reason was and is, though, a matter of dispute. Mill: Mill, famously, advanced a proof (1963c(2): ch. 4). SidgwickVsMill: Sidgwick, in contrast, insists that basic intuitions must be drawn upon in any argument for utilitarianism; in the end, Sidgwick appeared to accept that one could be an egoist and yet not irrational (1962(3): 418–22). Gaus I 106 Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)(4), and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)(5). >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman. 1. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 2. Mill, John Stuart (1963c) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. X, 203–59. 3. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Mill | Höffe I 348 Utilitarianism/Mill/Höffe: Def Utilitarianism/Mill(1): (...) the view that the basis of morality is the greatest happiness, whereby happiness is to be understood in the concept of pleasure and the freedom from lust or suffering. Because "pleasure" means hédoné in Greek, it is a hedonism. >Hedonism. MillVsBentham: In comparison to Mill's model, Bentham, it is striking that the second part of his utilitarian principle "the greatest number", for which the "greatest happiness" is to be sought, is missing here. >Utilitarianism/Bentham, >J. Bentham. Freedom/MillVsBentham: For Mill as a passionate advocate of individual freedom, this deficit is hardly a coincidence. >Freedom. Later in the text the formula "happiness of all concerned" does appear, but without Bentham's double maximization: "greatest" happiness of the "greatest" number. Because of this deficit, Mill does not deal with Bentham's suggestion and his considerable difficulties in calculating the sought-after collective well-being with a simple procedure, a "hedonic calculus". MillVsBentham: 1) The first and most significant change, qualitative hedonism, counters the accusation made against Bentham that utilitarianism is an ethics for pleasure-seekers. The British writer and historian Thomas Carlyle had sharpened it to the objection that utilitarianism is a philosophy for pigs (pig philosophy). Bentham: According to Bentham's provocative aphorism that, with the same quality of pleasure, an undemanding child's play is as good as poetry, the qualitative differences between the various occasions and types of pleasure expressly do not count. Höffe I 349 Mill: Against this vulgarized hedonism, Mill argues with the pointed counter-thesis that it is better to be a discontented Socrates than a satisfied pig. He emphasizes the different rank of the pleasures one can enjoy and at the same time the priority of scientific, artistic and humanitarian activities. 2) (...) in trying to prove the utilitarian principle, Mill rightly rejects the possibility of direct proof. For true principles are, per se, first sentences that exactly therefore cannot be proved. >Theory/Mill. Solution/Mill: a) The core is the expression "desirable", which has two meanings. In an empirical-psychological sense it describes what people actually consider desirable and desirable, in a normative-ethical sense what they are supposed to assess. Naturalistic Misconclusions/HöffeVsMill: If one interprets Mill's so-called proof as a logical deduction of the ethical meaning of desirable from the empirical meaning, there is obviously a "being-should" misconception. VsVs: But since Mill in his Höffe I 350 system of logic, whose last chapter, clearly distinguishes between being and shall, the so called proof can be interpreted benevolently as well: An ethics open to experience understands what is desirable in the sense of those enlightened people who know the different pleasures and prefer those which are higher-ranking in human terms. ((s)Cf. >Preferential Utilitarianism). 3) Is justice compatible with utilitarianism? Mill here acknowledges the existence of a natural sense of justice, but does not consider this to be an original, but a derived sense. To defend this thesis, he distinguishes between different views of justice, such as the imperative to respect a person's legally guaranteed rights, to give everyone what he or she deserves, and the ideas of impartiality and equality. He then recognizes the traditional distinction between perfect (justice) and imperfect (charity) duties. Finally, he claims that having a right means having something that society should protect for no other reason than general utility. Common Goods/Mill/Höffe: In this argument lies either the thesis that there can be no conflict between the collective good, general utility, and the rights of an individual, or the assertion that in the case of conflict the collective good takes precedence over subjective rights such as basic and human rights. HöffeVsMill: Even if it serves the collective good, the right of an innocent person not to be punished, or the right of a suspect not to be tortured, must under no circumstances be violated. >Common Good. 1. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Utilitarianism | Spencer | Gaus I 413 Utilitarianism/Spencer/Weinstein: Spencer agreed with Sidgwick that established morality was the 'marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth' with modern liberal societies converging on the same array of utility- promoting moral rules. >H. Sidgwick, >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick. And he agreed with Mill, though not Sidgwick, that we have reformulated our most fundamental moral rules as stringent rights. Spencer was therefore as much a liberal utilitarian as Mill in so far as he combined a rights- constrained, maximizing theory of right with a hedonic conception of good. For Spencer, rights were indefeasible logical 'corollaries' of his principle of equal freedom, which stipulated that: 'Every man is free to do that which he will provided he infringes not the equal freedom ofany other man' (1978(1): I, 62). >J. St. Mill, >Utilitarianism/Mill. Gaus I 414 SpencerVsMill: General happiness was best promoted wherever basic liberal rights to life, personal integrity and property were unconditionally enforced, making Spencer's liberal utilitarianism more uncompromis- ing than Mill's. VsBentham: While Spencer and Mill acknowledged the extensive similarities between them, Spencer distanced himself markedly from Bentham, disparaging the latter's utilitarianism as merely 'empirical', or unconstrained, and therefore as morally inferior. Being 'empirical', Benthamism allegedly justified sacrificing individuals in the name of maximizing utility even marginally. >J. Bentham, >Utilitarianism/Bentham. Rational utilitarianism: By contrast, he characterized his own brand of utilitarianism as 'rational' precisely because it purported to derive basic rights from the principle of equal freedom and because these putative logical derivations were indefeasible. But Spencer exaggerates his differences with Bentham, if Rosen and Paul Kelly have interpreted Bentham correctly. >Rationality. 1. Spencer, Herbert (1978 [1879-93]) The Principles of Ethics, 2 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utility | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 211 Principle of utility /Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for every individual, then the general happiness is a good for the whole of all people. MackieVsMill: the alleged evidence smuggles illegal assumptions. Mankind is wrongly treated as a psychic subject. Mankind as a whole is never faced with a choice. IV 212 False conclusion: from "everyone" to "all". Furthermore, in the transition from the individual to society, a "value objectivism" is smuggled in here instead of subjectivism. >Every/all, >Objectivism, >Cognitivism, >Emotivism. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwin, Ch. | Mill Vs Darwin, Ch. | Dennett I 695 Ethics / Dennett: Question: what are the consequences of the fact that we are acting under time pressure? (> Darwin: acting under >time pressure); MillVsDarwin. I 697 Darwin: it is the best for the people to follow their permanent pulses. Physics/Dennett: this is true, such as mathematics, throughout the universe (> Minsky); >BarrowVs. Darwinists VsMill: the representatives of the theory of utility (Mill) should bear in mind that when we are before a decision we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public. I 698 MillVsDarwin: E.g. Nobody said, the art of navigation is not was based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings they take the finished work calculated at sea. So rational people lead their lives with ready opinions about right and wrong, and more difficult questions with ready opinions of smart and stupid. (> Internalisation). DennettVsMill: his system was highly impractical. In practice, we see many reasons, including those which we should not overlook. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Brandom Vs Fodor, J. | I 731 BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle. II 12 Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity. II 144 Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states. Esfeld I 71 FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below. NS I 161 Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, as semantics does, that the correctness of the conclusion "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" is justified by the meaning of "east" and "west", NS I 162 he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: Thesis: "west" and "east" get their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur and also the corresponding actions constitute the conceptual content of the words. Inferentialism/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: does not see truth and reference as fundamental units constituting meaning. Correctness/Chance: which conclusions from which utterances are correct is determined pragmatically by social practice guided by implicit rules. Meaning/Holism/Brandom: the meaning of terms and expressions arises from their inferential roles to other terms and expressions, therefore they are not atomistic but holistic. (BrandomVsFodor). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice, P.H. | Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. | I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed). Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin. Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use). I 4 Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use. Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity". Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects. I 5 Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use. belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language. I 51 quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped". I 52 Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. its literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function. literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below). Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding. I 61 Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions. I 62 Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs. I 63 2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth. Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it! Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things. Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. I 65 VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking. Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!" There is a similar Ex by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop. I 66 Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative. ((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones). generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes "Usually: if A then B" and also: "Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: then would follow that John had to believe. a) "usual: if A then C" and b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C. I 67 Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C. Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C? Millikan: we assume that he has to. Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing: "Usually, if D, then C" etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying? |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | James Vs Hume, D. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas. >Association. James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories. I 57 VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. |
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| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 30 Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality. Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions. Searle II 292 SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception. II 293 By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular. II 294 Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose". According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for? Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all. II 295 Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island? II 296 Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory. II 346 A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content. II 297 But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection. II 298 E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory. II 346 The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition. II 300 E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses. Searle IV 179 KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks. IV 179/180 Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them. E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention. IV 181 Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary. There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent. Stalnaker I 173 SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation I 174 SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense". I 175 And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that. Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object. Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93 2. Ibid. p. 80 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Verschiedene Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 232 Identity/Schmidentity/VsKripke: some have claimed that identity cannot be the relation that exists between each thing and itself and only there, because that could not explain the nontriviality of identity statements. Kripke: "Test": if a hypothetical language contains this relation and the same problems are generated, this is not a refutation of the fact that "identical with" in English stands for the same relation. Stalnaker I 175 VsCausal Theory/Name/VsKripke/Stalnaker: was criticized for its vagueness. One would still have to specify the type of causal connection, Kripke: Thesis: he did not provide a reductionist analysis of the reference, but only an alternative picture. I 176 Kripke/Stalnaker: actually articulates only the naive answer, without the details. VsMill's Semantics/: I will examine an argument for the impossibility of a semantics that picks out the reference without intermediate meaning, that separates the two questions and examines where it has weaknesses. VsMill/VsKripke/Stalnaker: an argument VsMill claims that not every well-defined language can be the language of a community. E.g. like this: Language/VsMill/VsKripke: if the semantics are correct, the speakers need to know what they are saying. It may be that in individual cases they use words they do not understand themselves, but 1. a) if you do not know what you are saying, you cannot mean what you are saying, and b) if you present correctly what people say in a community, you have to say that people generally mean what they say. I 177 2. it could be that we can determine a semantic value without knowing what the value is, even that nobody knows what the value is. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metalanguage | Prior Vs Metalanguage | I 100 Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences b) a translation of every sentence of the given language. Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (!), then its sentences are their own translation. Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form: x is true iff. p "x": represents the name in the metalanguage. "p": represents the translation. Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage. That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski. In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language. Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc. This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc. ((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.) Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory. Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense. We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences. I 144 Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance. Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill. Names/Mill: a) singular ones b) general ones each α. "connotative ones", β. not connotative ones. General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative. PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote". Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red"). But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things. I 145 Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it. Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing. Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily. Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it. Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory. Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs. Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects. The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes. Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs! E.g. "every man runs': I 146 here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person". Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative". Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate. E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate. Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verbs). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Mill, J. St. | Dennett Vs Mill, J. St. | Dennett I 697 Ethics/Dennett: Question: What consequences result from the fact that we are acting under time pressure? > MillVsDarwin. I 695 Darwin: it is best for the human to follow their permanent impulses. Physics/Dennett: true, like mathematics, in the entire universe (> Minsky). BarrowVs. Darwin’s followers VsMill: the representatives of utility theory (Mill) should keep in mind that we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public when facing a decision. Dennett I 698 MillVsDarwin: No one asserts that the art of navigation is not based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings, they take the finished calculated work to sea. This way, rational people lead their lives with ready-made opinions about right and wrong and the more difficult questions of wise and foolish. (Internalization). DennettVsMill: this covered the fact that his system was highly impractical. In practice, we overlook many reasons, even those that we should not overlook. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mill, J. St. | Dummett Vs Mill, J. St. | Stalnaker I 179 Mere Knowledge/Mere knowledge/Reference/DummettVsKripke/DummettVsMill/Stalnaker: Dummett states the impossibility of a "bare knowledge of reference". Def Mere Reference/Mere Knowledge/Dummett (M. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysiscs, Cambridge/MA 1991, 127) mere reference of the name a would be the knowledge of an object, the fact that a refers to it, which would, however, be a complete characterization of the determined knowledge. Stalnaker: this could be identified with knowing a certain proposition. - A proposition which is true iff a particular individual is the reference of the name a. Dummett/Stalnaker: his argument for the impossibility of the bare reference corresponds to Searles principle of identification. Principle of Identification/Searle/Stalnaker: We have no knowledge of a thing, that it has a certain property F, if we do not have the ability to describe the object or identify it. Propositional Knowledge/Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: stronger: for every true knowing-what attribution: there must be a true propositional knowledge, the contents of which are a non-singular proposition which makes the method of identifying explicit and contains the knowing-what attribution: an attribution of propositional knowledge on which the knowing-what attribution rests. ((s), the object must be described by a second indication apart from only the attribution by the name in question. A second property except the name in question. Therefore, you need non-singular propositions). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Mill, J. St. | Frege Vs Mill, J. St. | I 33 Numbers/Mill: initially, like Leibniz, wants to base everything on definitions. Numbers/FregeVsMill: he spoils everything, because he considers every science as empirical. This is not possible in the case of numbers. What in the world is to be thought of the physical fact that corresponds to the number 777 864? Too bad that Mill cannot show the physical facts which would correspond to 0 and 1. I 34 Calculate/Mill: does not follow from the definitions, but from the observed fact. FregeVsMill: where could Leibniz have relied upon a fact in the above definition? Mill overlooks, like Leibniz, the gap caused by the elimination of the brackets. Laws: in them, E.g. the peculiarity of the number 1000 000 = 999 999 + 1 is lost. Equation/Addition/Calculating/Numbers/Mill: asserts: the equation 1 = 1 could be wrong, because one pound piece does not always have exactly the weight of the other. I 37 Calculating/Numbers/Addition/FregeVsMill: the sentence 1 = 1 does not want to say that at all! Mill understands the sign "+" in a way that is should express the relationship of the parts of a physical object or a heap to the whole, but that is not the sense of the plus sign. Mill always confuses applications with the purely arithmetical proposition itself. Addition does not correspond to a physical relationship. I 52 Number/Mill: "the name of a number designates a property which belongs to the aggregate of things that we call by that name." This property is the characteristic manner in which the assembly is composed and divisible. " FregeVsMill: there is more than one "characteristic way". (>Intension). I 55 FregeVsMill: there is no physical difference between "a pair of boots" and "two boots". Kripke I 36 FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: in reality, a proper name, which is used properly, is only an abbreviated or disguised description. Read III 158 Names: if there was no criterion for recognition, names could not stand for an object. (FregeVsMill): this is wrong about Mill’s connotation-less explanation of names. (Russell openly admitted that there was a difficulty in identifying real names). Stepanians I 34 Pure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is no sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Thiel I 16 FregeVsMill: drastic counter-examples: doubtfulness in the case of 0 and 1, but also for very large numbers. Who should ever have observed the fact for the definition of the number 777 865? Mill could have defended himself. That his position seems to be more suitable for the justification of our number and perception of form than for the justification of arithmetic. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Mill, J. St. | Husserl Vs Mill, J. St. | I 21 Logic/Mill: logic as an art science of thought is an empirical regularity of thinking, the development of a thought process. This is identical to the laws of psychology. I 22 HusserlVsMill: the contemplation of thought processes leads at best to observations of how the thinking functions under specific conditions. Also the scheme true/false is not to be found by the mere observation of events. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Mill, J. St. | James Vs Mill, J. St. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in intellectual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions that generate ideas by acting on the organism. >Association. James: This "determinism" explains well the feelings of the details, but not the experience of wills, emotional states, rationality, memories. |
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| Mill, J. St. | Kripke Vs Mill, J. St. | Kripke I 36 FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill:Fallacy: in reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only an abbreviated or disguised description. I 81 KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. We could otherwise understand any sentence in which "Socrates" is used if we do not know that "Socrates" means "the individual who is called ’Socrates’". I 145 Mill: "singular names": connotative: Description. Non-connotative: proper name. I 145 But Mill: All names for general types are connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties which specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a human being: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names. KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties/Kripke). Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Mill, J. St. | Putnam Vs Mill, J. St. | I (h) 215 Knowledge/Metaphysics/realism/Putnam: would I dare to be a metaphysician, I would probably create a system in which there is nothing but obligations. Metaphysical fundamentally would be what we should do, say, think. Then all the "facts" would be "values". (> extreme pragmatism). I would be obliged to think that there is a chair when the epistemic conditions are good enough. VsMill: the chair would not be a "permanent possibility of sensations" but a "permanent possibility of obligations". (This would also be the "sense data"). But I am not so daring. Description/Putnam: the reverse tendency would be to reduce everything to description or eliminate it, which is absurd. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Mill, J. St. | Russell Vs Mill, J. St. | FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: error: in reality, a proper name that is used correctly, is only an abbreviated or disguised designation. --- Kripke I 36 Mill: "singular names": connotative: characteristic. Non-connotative: proper names. --- I 145 But Mill: all names for general types connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties, which specify necessary and sufficient conditions for the being-a-human: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: wrong with general names, correct with singular names. KripkeVsRussell: Mill: correct with singular names, wrong in general names. Maybe some general names express ("foolish", "fat", "yellow") properties. General names like "cow" and "tiger" do not, unless being a cow, counts in a trivial way as a property . (> Properties). --- I 145 Strand: Kripke general names such as "cat" express no property. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Mill, J. St. | Searle Vs Mill, J. St. | V 144 SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names were "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Proper names. V 247 Names/SearleVsMill: (Mill: proper names have no sense). E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma can be used to make geographical, not only lexicographical assertions. Had proper names however no sense, no information could be transmitted by that! Then there were no more information than in the sentence Everest = Everest. (This is Frege's argument against Mill). Stalnaker I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969 (1)) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference" without intermediary sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his view of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and it's properties. >Reference. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt, real or alleged characteristics to transmit a language to the world. ((s)> also Kant like Searle). Searle: you cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: there can be no good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 163ff |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Mill, J. St. | Strawson Vs Mill, J. St. | IV 170 Definition Cause/Mill: "epitome of all conditions, positive and negative, taken together, unity of all contingencies of any kind, in whose realization the consequens follows inevitably". StrawsonVsMill: we have no prospect and also no interest to explore all that. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Mill, J. St. | Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. | I 349 Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative". Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute. Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself." TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself. His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object. I 350 Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves. It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation. I 352 Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially. I 353 Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense. I 354 TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense. 2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart. I 355 However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat). I 356 3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mill, J. St. | Mackie Vs Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 209 VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (even U.) concedes that utilitarian theories often fail due to the vagueness and diversity of conceptions of justice. Mill: still, the utility principle has the same sanctions available as all other moral norms. MackieVsMIll: that is empirically false: violationy of the common good upset us far more than violations of special rules of justice. Rule-Utilitarianism: more indirect than U.: two stages: (Austin): IV 210 1. The benchmark of our rules should be usefulness 2. The benchmark of our actions should be the rules. Puts the rules far more to the fore and draws on utility only to justify the rules. These rules do not need to be explicit. VsRule-Utilitarianism: all problems of utilitarianism return on a higher level of abstraction. IV 211 Utilitarianism/Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for each individual, then general happiness is a good for the totality of all people. Utilitarianism/MackieVsMill: the alleged proof sneaks in ineligible premises. The entirety of human kind is falsely treated as a psychological subject. Humanity never has a choice. (IV 225) IV 212 Fallacy: from "everyone" to "all". In addition, in the transition from the individual to society, instead of subjectivism an objectivism of values (Wertobjektivismus) is introduced. IV 263 Morality/ethics/Mill: Thesis: believed in a gradual change of human nature toward "universal human kindness". J. F. StephenVsMill: that's "transcendental Utilitarianism": a person animated by "impartial charity" might behave in a Stalinist way. Anything can be used to justify violence. Mackie dito. IV 264 Morality/ethics/Mackie: must refer to anthropological conditions: different ideals require general (common) principles. IV 265 The rejection of objective values includes rejection of objective rights. Consequence: special rights cannot be deduced a priori from general reasons. IV 269 MackieVsMill: his utilitarian concept of justification is shaky: the "principle of non-intervention" would be better justified differently: IV 270 via the conception of the good for human kind. Good/MackieVsMill: 1. not everyone is able to always correctly assess their own good. 2. Mill's principle is too weak. Ex. freedom of thought, freedom of speech. Both cannot be justified by Mills principle alone! Mackie: instead, we need a "principle of legitimate intervention." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Mill, J. St. | Cartwright Vs Mill, J. St. | I 38 Objective probability/VsCartwright: It might be objected that the partitioning on irrelevant factors would do no damage, once all factors are fixed. "True prob"/Cartwright: = objective prob? Relative frequency/RelFreq/Cartwright: is not the same as objective prob. Simpson’s Paradox/Solution/VsCartwright: We can certainly always find a third factor, but normally we do are not dealing with finite frequencies, but with objective prob. Objective prob/VsCarwright: if you do not extract it from finite data, no apparent correlations will come about. I 60 Vector addition/Cartwright: according to this view, two forces (gravitational force, or electromagnetic force) are produced, but none of them exists. Composition of forces/Causes/MillVsCartwright: he would deny that both do not exist: According to him, both exist as part of the resulting effect. E.g. two forces in different directions. "Partial forces". CartwrightVsMill: there are no "partial forces". Events may have temporal parts, but there are no parts of the kind that Mill describes, e.g. one northwards and one eastwards, with the object not moving neither north nor east, but to the northeast. I 59 CartwrightVsMill: Problem: then it is vital for the laws to have the same form, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the composition. And that’s not possible! It is not possible if the laws are intended to describe the actual behavior of concrete object. I 70 Def Super-Law/Explanation/Law/Circumstances/Terminology/Mill/Cartwright: in the case of E.g. Coulomb’s law and the law of gravity, we can simply put an increasingly complex antecedent in front of it to grasp the situation and thus explain what is happening. Mill: that is possible in mechanics, but not in chemistry. This explains why chemistry is not a deductive or demonstrative discipline. This presupposes the covering-law approach. CartwrightVsSuper law/CartwrightVsMill: 1) Super laws are not always available; if we do not describe everything exactly, we lose our understanding of what is happening. And we explain without knowing super laws. We need a philosophical explanation for why these explanations are good. 2) Super laws may often not even be a good explanation. This is an old objection Vscovering laws. E.g. why does the quail in my garden shake its head? Because all quails do this. I 71 Equally E.g. "All carbon atoms have five energy levels" explains nothing. 3) Certainly, covering laws are explanatory for complex cases. In particular, if the antecedent of the law does not precisely grasp the components of the individual situation, but provides a more abstract description. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Mill, J. St. | Wolf Vs Mill, J. St. | Wolf II 11 WolfVsMill: 1. unsatisfactory: the name designates the object at any time, but the idea is given at a certain time and in a certain perspective. Other authors have therefore spoken of a "non-ideological idea". This is unclear. VsMill: Ideas cannot explain names because they are not intersubjectively accessible. Always new ideas, but not always new names. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Mill, J. St. | Burks Vs Mill, J. St. | Wolf II 139 Description/Meaning/Burks: most people do not have complete knowledge and yet use the signs correctly. Name/Meaning/Burks: since names generally have several meanings (objects), there is no essential predicate. Some predicates may be causally more important than others. In any case, a possibly essential property does not consist in a conjunction of properties! Any given designated has more properties than those referred to by its proper name (or description). II 140 Description/Meaning/Burks: for example, "this brown table was red yesterday" is not a contradiction: the description is not complete anyway. Name/Meaning/Mill: the property on the basis of which a name is assigned is not part of the meaning. Otherwise we would abolish the name if the thing loses the property. Name/Token/BurksVsMill: different occurrences of the same name type often have different meanings, but always denote the same thing. II 141 Name/Existence/Meaning/Burks: a description could have a meaning and still not designate anything. II 142 Of course one could say that an expression is a name only if it really has something designated, but then the question depends on empirical facts and not on purely linguistic considerations. Burks: "name" should be a purely grammatical category. Abbreviation/Burks: strange: for "this time" there is an abbreviation: "now", but not for "this hat". |
Burks I Arthur W. Burks "A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Burks II A. W. Burks Chance, Cause, Reason 1977 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Millikan, R. | Brandom Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 109 Subject/Predicate/Illustration/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of propositions I 110 depict the world and the way logical predicates do this. 1. because one can replace predicates by other predicates e.g. "...swims" by "...flies" they are not to be regarded as objects for a long time yet. (BrandomVsMillikan/(s): Differentiation of frame and insertion "gap"). 2. Question: do predicates have to correspond to universals if we treat them like substances? In any case, we do not have to look at them as individual things, but as tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. Universal/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature? Predicates/Millikan: any simple predicate must reflect a variability historically rooted in nature ((s) >disjunctive). Complex predicates/Millikan: they should also reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Property/Type/Millikan: have only one settlement area: that is nature itself. I 111 3. Relation/Property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in nature in the same way as their identity or selfhood is! (see part IV below). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Millikan, R. | Searle Vs Millikan, R. | III 27 Function/Ruth Millikan (SearleVs): new concept of "actual function" based on "reproduction" and causation. Recursive definition: So that an object A has a function F as its "proper function", it is necessary (and also adequately) that meets either one of the following conditions: 1. A emerged as a "reproduction" (copy or copy of a copy) of an earlier object that has actually performed partly due to the possession of reproduced characteristics, F in the past, and A exists (causal historical) due to this direction. 2. A has emerged as the product of any previous means that under the circumstances of this direction of F had a real function and that under these circumstances is usually the reason that F is performed by means of the production of objects such as A. (derived "actual functions"). Function/SearleVsMillikan: so one can introduce any new technical expression. However, such definitions do not take any certain essential characteristics of the ordinary concept of function into consideration. 1. For Millikan the definition of the function depends on a specific causal historical theory. II 28 Even if all previous, also Darwinian turn out to be wrong, my heart would continue to pump blood. 2. Furthermore, there are also stark counter-examples: E.g. according to Wright and Millikan we would have to say that it is the function of colds to spread cold germs. SearleVs: but colds do not have any function at all! 3. The normative component of functions remains unexplained. (Although Millikan's theory takes into account that some features in reality may not be exercised.) Normative: Millikan does not explain why we are talking about better and worse functioning hearts, heart failure, etc.. Old dilemma: either we talk about crude, blind, causal relations, or we believe that there really is something functional to functions, although Millikan omits the observer relative properties. III 29 Observer relative/Searle: functions, the fact that there are police officers and professors. (Intensional). Immanent: the fact that there are people at all. Blind, causal relations. Function: a) Use Function: screwdriver, drive shaft. b) Non-use functions: independent of practical intentions of the people: the function of the heart to pump blood. III 33 Use functions: within: special class: representative function, represent something, stand for something else: e.g. baseball icons. >Icons, >symbols, >function. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Millikan, R. | Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 90 Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below). Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). ((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.) VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed. Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness. Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself. I 91 Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have? The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature. MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness) I 92 does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness. N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself. Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Russell, B. | Kripke Vs Russell, B. | I 36 FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: In reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only a shortened or disguised description. I 87 Description: Kneale and partly Russell as well say that it is not an insignificant message that Socrates was the greatest philosopher in Ancient Greece. It is, however, an insignificant message that we called Socrates "Socrates". KripkeVs: it is not an insignificant message: If it is some sort of fact, it can be wrong! sie ist keineswegs eine unbedeutende: wenn das irgendeine Art von Tatsache ist, kann es falsch sein! A wrong message is indeed that Jesajah was called "Jesaja". The prophet would never have recognized this name! And naturally the Greeks have not given their country the name "Greece" nor a similar one. It is, however, insignificant that we call Socrates that way. I do not believe that it is analytic or necessary. Sentences as "Socrates is called ’Socrates’" are very interesting indeed, and their analysis can be discussed for hours. I 145 Mill: "singular names": connotative: description. non-connotative: proper names. I 145 But Mill: all names are connotative for general types, e.g. "human being". It is defined as a conjunction of specific characteristics which are sufficient and necessary to be human: rationality, animality and specific physical characteristics. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names. KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties/Kripke). Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property. Wolf II 209 KripkeVsRussell: Artificial descriptions are not always elliptic. II 216 Domain/KripkeVsRussell: It does not work: No two-tier distinction can take on this task because it requires a tripartite. Ex: (2) The number of planets could necessarily have been a straight number. (The number could have been eight, for example, and that would have been a straight number.) II 217 Kripke: If(2) is interpreted as true, it is neither de re nor de dicto, i.e. the description has neither the smallest nor the biggest domain (according to Russell). (M= möglich= possible, N= notwendig= necessary) (2a) MN(Ex)(There are exactly x planets and x is a straight number). (Smallest domain, de dicto) (2b) (Ex)(There are exactly x planets and MN(x is a straight number)).(Biggest domain, de re) (2c) M(Ex)(there are exactly x planets and N (x is a straight number)). (Middle domain,). Middle domains are possible if operators are repeated. (2c) renders (2) true. (2a) states, probably erroneously, that it might have been necessary that there is a straight number of planets. (2b) erroneously states that the real number could necessarily have been a straight one. e.g. The newspapers wrote: "FBI Chef Hoover leveled an accusation that the Barrigan were planning to kidnap an American senior civil servant". (It was Kissinger) a) there is a senior civil servant, so that Hoover believes...(biggest domain, de re) b) Hoover believes that the Barrigan were planning...(smallest domain, de dicto) c) Hoover believes that there was a senior civil servant. (middle domain) The more intentional constructions (or others)are repeated, the more possible domains exist. II 218 Kartunnen showed that no n-partite differentiation suffices for each specific n. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Stalnaker Vs Searle, J.R. | I 178 Identification/reference/Searle: (1969,87): ultimately by description. (description). Stalnaker: and this must then be explained by the ability of the speaker to a certain behavior. Otherwise you need a magic intentionality. StalnakerVsSearle: even if he was right, it would not provide additional premise that he needs to show the impossibility of Mill's semantics. For he does not say that we cannot have intentions on certain individuals. He only says that we need a necessary condition for it. Solution: he needs a restriction on the content of the attitudes that we can have StalnakerVsSearle: he offers instead only a restriction of the conditions under which we may have attitudes with a specific content. Mill/Stalnaker: as long as it is possible to have such intentions ((s) "direct reference") it is possible to speak and understand a corresponding language. I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference", without interposed sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his understanding of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and its properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt to transmit real or alleged characteristics of a language to the world. ((s) > also Kant like Searle). Searle: one cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that now himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: it cannot be a good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from it. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Logic, empirical | Pro | Quine2 XI 64 Quine: Per empirical logic - but QuineVsMill: arithmetic truth is not due to spatial arrangement. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Selbstidentität | Kripke, S.A. | Newen / Schrenk I 87 Self-identity / identity / Kripke / Newen / Schrenk: Kripke: self-identity is necessary - E.g. Cicero is identical with Tully -((s) not that Cicero s first name was Tullius). Newen / Schrenk I 101 Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object. VsMill: Problem: blank name and informative identity sentences. Eg "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is necessary. |
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| Ethics | Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 263 Morality / ethics / Mill: believed in gradual change of human nature towards a "universal human love." JF StephenVsMill: that s "transcendental utilitarianism": a person souled of "non-partisan charity" might behave stalinist. Everything can be used to justify any use of force. - Mackie ditto. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Names | Mill, J. St. | Newen / Schrenk I 101 Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object. VsMill: Problem: empty names and informative identity sentences. E.g. "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is also necessary. |
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