Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Functionalism Searle Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
---
Searle I 19
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. Cf. >Functions.
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation.
I 233f
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance).
I 266f
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action.
I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer.
I 269
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) ---
III 24
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Functions Searle I 266
Function/Searle: has no separate layer. - E.g. heart has no function, which would be added to its causal relations - brain: by elimination of the level of the deep unconscious, 1. the "physical causation" dissolves into nothing. ---
I 267
The normative component is in the eye of the beholder - the connection of mental content does not need to have a mental content itself - (e.g. delusions). ---
III 24
Function/Searle: always precedes the object: we do not perceive a table simply as an object. - Cf. objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). - But nature does not know of functions. ---
III 25
It is nature immanent, that the heart pumps blood, but immanent is the flow, merely attributed to the function - function only in a system of previous value allocations - there, no other facts are detected than causal facts. ---
III 26
Larry Wright: if Z is the function of X, then 1. there is X, because there is Z, 2. Z is a consequence of that there is X - SearleVs: that would eliminate the observer relativity of the function. ---
III 27
Function/SearleVsMillikan: functions are always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: functions arose evolutionary - SearleVs: so we can introduce everything and call it relevant - does not explain the normative component of functions - old dilemma: either only raw causal relations - or real "functional" function. ---
III 50
Animals can assign functions to objects.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Grice Millikan I 52
Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. their literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function.
Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below).
Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding.
Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements.
Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener.
Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions!
Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction.
Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction.
Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction.
Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general.
---
I 53
Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. ---
I 63
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". ---
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things.
In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
---
I 65
VsMillikan: you could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking.
E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!"
A similar example is given by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Predicates Millikan I 109
Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... ---
I 110
...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap").
2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive).
Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself.
---
I 111
3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. ---
I 227
Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.
E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back".
Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject.
Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal.
Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities.
---
I 228
External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. ---
I 272
Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: Particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain.
Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others.
Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain.
No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time).
MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Seeing Millikan I 244
Seeing-as/Seeing/Millikan: seeing-as seems to be a preliminary act of identification. N.B./Millikan/(s): seeing a three-dimensional object means to see an object with a back.
Image/Wittgenstein/Millikan: seeing a painted object is only an alleged seeing-as.
---
I 301
Seeing/Knowledge/Eye/Millikan: the lens of the eye automatically adjusts to sharpness. The function is now that the object, which diffuses rays, is once again bundled (composed) into an object in the eye. For this purpose, however, the organism first has to know when the eyes are focused on an object, i.e. it must know which object the world should look alike, (s)VsMillikan: then only adults could see.
General/Millikan: there must then be characteristics that characterize typical clear images of objects.
Learning/Psychology/Learning Psychology/Millikan: has recently shown that the hard wiring of such knowledge belongs to the conditions of learning.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Semantics Brandom I 297
Brandom's thesis: understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. ---
II 145
Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions, > Terminology/Brandom). ---
II 146
Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics. - Epistemology is its suitable working area. ---
Newen I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics. - Justifying the correctness of e.g. "If A is located east of B, B is located west of A". - By the meaning of "west" and "east". ---
Newen I 162
West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski s truth concept too weak) - "correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Fodor, J. Brandom Vs Fodor, J. I 731
BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle.
II 12
Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor.   BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states.
Esfeld I 71
FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below.
NS I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, as semantics does, that the correctness of the conclusion "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" is justified by the meaning of "east" and "west",
NS I 162
he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: Thesis: "west" and "east" get their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur and also the corresponding actions constitute the conceptual content of the words.
Inferentialism/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: does not see truth and reference as fundamental units constituting meaning.
Correctness/Chance: which conclusions from which utterances are correct is determined pragmatically by social practice guided by implicit rules.
Meaning/Holism/Brandom: the meaning of terms and expressions arises from their inferential roles to other terms and expressions, therefore they are not atomistic but holistic. (BrandomVsFodor).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Grice, P.H. Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. I 3
Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc.
Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed).
Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized.
Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given.
Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin.
Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use).
I 4
Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use.
Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity".
Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects.
I 5
Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use.
belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language.

I 51
quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped".
I 52
Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between
1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. its literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function.
literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below).
Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding.

I 61
Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions.
I 62
Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs.
I 63
2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth.
Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it!
Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things.
Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
I 65
VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking.
Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!"
There is a similar Ex by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop.
I 66
Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative.
((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones).
generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes
"Usually: if A then B" and also:
"Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)"
rational: then would follow that John had to believe.
a) "usual: if A then C" and
b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases.
1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B.
2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C.
I 67
Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C.
Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C?
Millikan: we assume that he has to.
Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing:
"Usually, if D, then C" etc.
Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying?

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Millikan, R. Brandom Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 109
Subject/Predicate/Illustration/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of propositions
I 110
depict the world and the way logical predicates do this. 1. because one can replace predicates by other predicates e.g. "...swims" by "...flies" they are not to be regarded as objects for a long time yet.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): Differentiation of frame and insertion "gap").
2. Question: do predicates have to correspond to universals if we treat them like substances? In any case, we do not have to look at them as individual things, but as tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universal/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: any simple predicate must reflect a variability historically rooted in nature ((s) >disjunctive).
Complex predicates/Millikan: they should also reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/Type/Millikan: have only one settlement area: that is nature itself.
I 111
3. Relation/Property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in nature in the same way as their identity or selfhood is! (see part IV below).

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Millikan, R. Searle Vs Millikan, R. III 27
Function/Ruth Millikan (SearleVs): new concept of "actual function" based on "reproduction" and causation. Recursive definition: So that an object A has a function F as its "proper function", it is necessary (and also adequately) that meets either one of the following conditions:
1. A emerged as a "reproduction" (copy or copy of a copy) of an earlier object that has actually performed partly due to the possession of reproduced characteristics, F in the past, and A exists (causal historical) due to this direction.
2. A has emerged as the product of any previous means that under the circumstances of this direction of F had a real function and that under these circumstances is usually the reason that F is performed by means of the production of objects such as A. (derived "actual functions").
Function/SearleVsMillikan: so one can introduce any new technical expression. However, such definitions do not take any certain essential characteristics of the ordinary concept of function into consideration.
1. For Millikan the definition of the function depends on a specific causal historical theory.
II 28
Even if all previous, also Darwinian turn out to be wrong, my heart would continue to pump blood. 2. Furthermore, there are also stark counter-examples: E.g. according to Wright and Millikan we would have to say that it is the function of colds to spread cold germs.
SearleVs: but colds do not have any function at all!
3. The normative component of functions remains unexplained. (Although Millikan's theory takes into account that some features in reality may not be exercised.) Normative: Millikan does not explain why we are talking about better and worse functioning hearts, heart failure, etc..
Old dilemma: either we talk about crude, blind, causal relations, or we believe that there really is something functional to functions, although Millikan omits the observer relative properties.
III 29
Observer relative/Searle: functions, the fact that there are police officers and professors. (Intensional). Immanent: the fact that there are people at all. Blind, causal relations.
Function: a) Use Function: screwdriver, drive shaft.
b) Non-use functions: independent of practical intentions of the people: the function of the heart to pump blood.
III 33
Use functions: within: special class: representative function, represent something, stand for something else: e.g. baseball icons. >Icons, >symbols, >function.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Millikan, R. Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 90
Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below).
Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process.
N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle).
((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.)
VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed.
Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness.
Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself.
I 91
Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have?
The force should be epistemic and rational.
Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it.
Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature.
MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness)
I 92
does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness.
N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself.
Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other.





Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Wittgenstein Millikan Vs Wittgenstein I 221
not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining".
Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs.
b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence.
Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist.
Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities.
negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value.
Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation.
negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way.
Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations.
projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts).
Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs).
I 222
And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can.
When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations.
Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference
.Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"?
Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator!
Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p".
1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd.
2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements!
3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference.
Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact.
negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles.
non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation.
negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist".
negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how such a thing is done:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does.
I 223
This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known:
1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist."
Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions.
Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem:
Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square.
Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense!
Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real.
Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function.
2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value.
real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm?
I 224
Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences).
Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function.
Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves.
I 229
"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense.
Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense.
sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense.
Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation.
Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense.

I 303
Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987