Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Aspects | Fechner | Chisholm II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Fech I G. Th. Fechner Ueber die Physikalische Philosophische Atomenlehre Charleston 2008 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Colour | Pauen | Pauen I 179 Colors researcher Mary/F. Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism. - Thesis: 1. Neurobiological Knowledge is basically incomplete in terms of phenomenal experiences. 2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties. Phenomenal properties are causally ineffectual side effects of mental states. >Epiphenomenalism, >Phenomena, >Qualia, >Experience, >Sensory impressions, >Perception, >Monism, >Dualism, >Brain states, >Mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Consciousness | Chisholm | I 112 Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self, >Attribution. I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access. I 130 Consciousness/unity/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same. I 133 Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 131f Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe. II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Dualism | Searle | I 32 ff Dualism: there is: a) >property dualism, b) >substance dualism and c) "concept dualism". I 40 SearleVsMonism: it is wrong to start counting. >Monism. I 54 f SearleVsKripke: Kripke thinks dualistically in reference to mind and body. II 326 VsDualism: behaviorism: e.g. to have hands is to have a disposition to certain behavior. >Functionalism: hands can be completely described by causes and effects. Turing theory: means to be in a computer state with specific inputs and outputs (for hands). >Action theory: to say, a system had hands, i.e. to take a certain attitude towards the system. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Materialism | Searle | I 47 SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization). >Levels(Order), >Description level. I 18 ff "Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965). I 27 Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites. Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical. I 40 SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances. I 53 Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. I 62 Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. >Churchland, Patricia, >Churchland, Paul. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism. I 72 The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity. >Subjectivity. I 112 The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural! >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory. . Paul Feyerabend (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. In: Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):49-67 2. Richard Rorty !1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. In: Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Pluralism | Berlin | Gaus I 241 Pluralism/Berlin/D’Agostino: We might believe, (...) as Isaiah Berlin influentially claimed, that diversity in valuations is a reflection, empirically, of a deep and objective fact about values per se, and not about the limitations, however profound, of human reasoning about them. Cf. >Pluralism/D’Agostino, >Diversity/D’Agostino. We might hold, as John Gray put it, that such values are many, (that) they often come into conflict with one another and are uncombinable in a single human being or a single society, and that in many of such conflicts there is no overarching standard whereby the competing claims of such ultimate values are rationally arbitratable. (1993(1): 65) D’Agostino: Here, monism is rejected not on 'practical' grounds, as in Rawls's weak version of pluralism, but rather on the basis, precisely, of 'disputed philosophical theses' (...). BerlinVsMonism: In particular, monism is rejected on ontological grounds - values are plural - and on ethical grounds - the elimination of apparent diversity can slight values that ought to be honoured (and not merely, as in Rawls's 'weak pluralism', because the elimination of diversity would itself require impermissible forms of behaviour). Diversity/Berlin: As Berlin said, it is better to face (the) intellectually uncomfortable fact tof 'objective' diversity) than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our part which could be eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing values altogether by pretending it is identical with its rival - and so end by distorting both. (1969(2): l) D’Agostino: Such a strong pluralism is no longer merely 'practical' , though Rawls's own analysis alludes to some the argumentation supportmg such a stance. >Pluralism/Rawls, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy, >Pluralism’D’Agostino. 1. Gray, John (1993) Post-Liberalism. New York: Routledge. 2. Berlin, Isaiah (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Berl I Isaiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty Oxford 1990 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Pluralism | D’Agostino | Pluralism/Diversity/D’Agostino: Diversity, (...) is a familiar phenomenon, of some potential relevance to political theory and practice. Pluralism, on the other hand, is embodied in theses and arguments about this phenomenon. >Diversity/D’Agostino. A. Weak Pluralism. At the most general level, pluralism is simply the proposition that the fact of diversity must be acknowledged as of fundamental ethico-political significance, or more pointedly, as George Crowder put it, that 'such diversity is desirable' (1994(1): 293). In particular, it cannot be assumed, according to pluralism, that diversity is legitimately eliminable in all cases — that it always, for instance, reflects corrigible epistemic or motivational deficiencies. If diversity of assessments creates difficulties for individual or collective choice, then, in at least some cases, according to pluralism, these difficulties have to be addressed on terms which recognize the significance of the diversity which engenders them. VsMonism: Pluralism, in this sense, stands in opposition to evaluative monism, which holds, on the contrary, that difficulties for choosing posed by prima facie diversity of evaluations are to be addressed, precisely, by the elimination of diversity. >Pluralism/Political Philosophy, >Incommensurability/Political Philosophy, >Pluralism/Rawls. Gaus I 241 B. Strong Pluralism. Berlin: We might believe, instead, and as Isaiah Berlin influentially claimed, that diversity in valuations is a reflection, empirically, of a deep and objective fact about values per se, and not about the limitations, however profound, of human reasoning about them. We might hold, as John Gray put it, that such values are many, (that) they often come into conflict with one another and are uncombinable in a single human being or a single society, and that in many of such conflicts there is no overarching standard whereby the competing claims of such ultimate values are rationally arbitratable. (1993(2): 65) D’Agostino: Here, monism is rejected not on 'practical' grounds, as in Rawls's weak version of pluralism, but rather on the basis, precisely, of 'disputed philosophical theses' (...). >Pluralism/Berlin, >Pluralism/Rawls. 1. Crowder, George (1994) 'Pluralism and liberalism'. Political Studies, 42: 293-305. 2. Gray, John (1993) Post-Liberalism. New York: Routledge. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Qualia | Jackson | Pauen I 179 Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum. E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space. Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences. 2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism). >Epiphenomenalism, >Mary-example, >Monism, >Knowing how. I 180 Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand. JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people. What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not. Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities. I 181 LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected. A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson. I 182 Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all. N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states. LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities. Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions! I 183 This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible". Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios. In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity. VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena. 1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties. I 184 2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable. >Qualia/Chalmers. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Dualism | Wittgenstein Vs Dualism | IV 49 Monism/Dualism/WittgensteinVsMonism/WittgensteinVsDualism: there are no designated numbers in the logic and therefore there is no philosophical monism or dualism. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
Fechner, G. Th. | Chisholm Vs Fechner, G. Th. | II 193 Two aspects-teaching/Fechner/Stubenberg: Thesis: people have an "internal" and an "external" aspect; the inner one is "mental". The theory is not merely another name for the identity theory. FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is also perceived as uniform; as a self-appearance everything is ultimately spirit. II 195 Fechner: Thesis: mind and body or the material and ideal are not ultimately reason and essence, but only different according to position and view or perception. What appears to itself as mental from an inner position, can appear physical to an external person. Diversity of appearance depends on the position. Stubenberg: this is a protagorean position (Man is the measure of all things). II 196 Stubenberg: most interpretations of Fechner’s theory are wrong because they are based on the analogy of two sides of a coin, etc. Fechner: the two aspects of perception are firmly anchored in common sense. II 197 Fechner: there is no need to undermine the mental or material properties, respectively, with essence. 1. "mental" is, what appears to itself. "physically" what appears to someone else. 2. we "have" ourselves in two ways. 3. the identity of the underlying essence. StubenbergVsFechner: "mind" as an internal point of view is only of interest if a sense can be associated with the concept "inner view". II 198 FeiglVsFechner: Problem: All examples only have a clear meaning in the discourse about physical or geometrical objects. E.g. Also the interior of the body is physical. ((s) Thus, the difference at the decisive point does not exist.) II 200 Inner/VsFechner: that has no specific spatial sense. II 202 VsFechner: one could say that at the level of appearance a duality of mind and body arises again. II 204 VsFechner: he does not know himself what the "underlying essence" is. Poor metaphysics. II 206 ChisholmVsFechner: in his thinking there is no place for people. II 209 VsFechner: every part of the body that can be represented cannot be the seat of the soul. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Materialism | Searle Vs Materialism | I 40 SearleVsMonism/SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally misguided. The real mistake was ever to start counting! Dualism: two flavors: substance dualism and property dualism. Searle: you can add a third: "conceptual dualism": that is, taking the dualistic terms so serious that "physically" implies "not mentally" and vice versa. I 41 SearleVsMaterialism: Materialism is in fact a form of Dualism: it takes at least at the beginning the Cartesian categories seriously. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Monism | Hume Vs Monism | Stegmüller IV 408 HumeVsTeleological Proof of God's Existence/Mackie/Stegmüller: (i) Step 1: pointing out the order of structures in the universe. Step 2: an actual (not merely an apparent) plan was behind that. The planner could only be God. IV 409 The transition from the first to the second step is based on inductive analogy: between order structures of the world and products of human planning. HumeVs: 1) the analogy is weak and vague. It can for example hardly be applied to astronomical scales. 2) Even if you accept the analogy, you cannot infer to a personal God from it! (ii) If we accept the analogy, there are still numerous alternative explanations to theism. Hume: that would lead to an anthropomorphism, which we would have to take very seriously! This would question the mere notion of the unity of God! E.g. if a large number of people is necessary to steer a ship, why should one God be enough for the universe? IV 410 Hume: e.g. could the world not have been designed by a divine team? Be the work of an apprentice that has found the displeasure and mocking laughter of the masters? One specimen in a series of experiments? A failed attempt? HumeVsTheism: e.g. could our world not outlast the life of its builder like clockwork? Why should it be the work of a builder equipped with intelligence at all? > Theory of evolution, parallels to the evolution of the plants. IV 411 HumeVsMonism: (like Nicolai Hartmann): the assumption of a single God is an arbitrary feature of our thinking. (iii) For the divine spirit we must again accept an order which is in need of explanation (see above). (iv) In the face of the evil in the world, the assumption of moral qualities of a God is even more problematic than the assumption of his mental qualities. IV 412 (v) Theism is completely useless! Unlike scientific hypotheses no predictions can be derived from it. Conscience/Newman: Conscience has a) a sense of morality and b) a sense of duty. In this sense, it goes beyond itself in a vague way. "It does not rest in itself. It indistinctly (!) recognizes the sanction ... by something that is greater than itself." The joy of a good conscience includes a person about whose praise we are happy. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Various Authors | James Vs Various Authors | I 17 JamesVsHegel. I 29 JamesVsPhysiological Psychology (Lotze/JamesVsLotze). I 52 Monism / James: (terminology): label for neo-Hegelian: existence of an omniscient mind is a prerequisite for knowledge and experience (JamesVsMonism/JamesVsNeo-Hegelianism). Stegmüller IV 494 W. K. Clifford: Thesis: it's wrong to believe anything at all! JamesVsClifford: our mind-like nature is not only allowed to, it must make a choice between alternatives. Our extra-reasonable nature influences our beliefs. What hypotheses do for us are almost always acts of will. (Mackie pro). Most of what one believes, is believed because of authority! (Mackie pro). IV 495 It makes a difference whether you want to recognize truth or avoid error. Moral/James: is objective (MackieVs), but we cannot wait for empirical evidence. IV 495/496 Moral/James: asserts two things. 1) the best things are the more permanent ones that reach into the afterlife. 2) we are already feeling better now if we believe the first statement. Religion/James: the more perfect and more permanent part of the universe is understood personally. The only practical way to assume the religious hypothesis is to meet it halfway. >Morals; social interaction, trust. Facts/Belief/James: even with fact questions the mind may well be the deciding factor. MackieVs: that is too close to Pascal. IV 497 James: where speculative reason does not provide results, self-interest should make the difference. MackieVs: we should not welcome this, it should make us even more critical! MackieVsClifford: we must not only be willing to come up with hypotheses and test them, we also have to be able to carefully agree with them. IV 498 James: the only way to test a hypothesis is to enter into a relation with the (corresponding) person. Theism/James: "meet halfway", get involved in it! We will be better off in the end when we have at least tried to commit ourselves to it. IV 499 James/Mackie/Stegmüller: of all criticized authors, James has the best stand with him. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Color Research | Jackson, F. | Metzinger II 259 Frank Jackson: "Knowledge argument" - "Argument of incomplete knowledge": For example, color researcher Mary grows up in a closed room, the only contact to the outside world is a black-and-white monitor. She learns everything about colors, but not "how it is" to see colors. Thesis: by being released and seeing colors for the first time, she acquires new knowledge. VsJackson: the majority of authors argue that the argument does not lead to the intended result of the existence of non-physical facts. Problem: how to describe the increase in knowledge at all. Nida-RümelinVsNagel: Thesis: the phrase "as it is" misses the point. II 265 Nida-Rümelin thesis: it cannot be inferred from all these cases or examples that a Qualia exchange would be possible with functional agreement. II 275 Knowledge/Belief/Nida-Rümelin: Thesis: Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge in the strict sense: namely, knowledge about something that is the case. II 280 Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: The thesis should show in the original version that there are non-physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary. Pauen I / V 179 Color Researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism - Thesis 1: Neurobiological knowledge is in principle incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences - 2. Monism is wrong, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neuronal characteristics! Phenomenal characteristics are causally ineffective side effects of mental states - epiphenomenalism. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |