Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Ambiguity Montague Hintikka I 106
Quantification/quantifiers/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics show how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man.
(13) John is looking for a dog.

HintikkaVsMontague: explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which are actually ambiguous. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers.

Scope/Hintikka: the scope determines the logical order.
Quantifier/Quantification/everyone/he/Montague/Hintikka: E.g.
(14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy.
(15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy.
Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize").
---
I 107
HintikkaVsMontague: we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules.


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
de re Hintikka II 98
W-questions/who/what/where/Hintikka: thesis: W-questions are nothing but quantified phrases.
II 99
Logical form: (1) John knows who the Prime Minister of Norway is.
Analyzed as a that-construction:
(2) (Ex) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto)
Problem: you have to specify the area of the individual that the variable "x" passes ((s) quotation marks by Hintikka).
De re: (de re reading of (1)):
(3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway &
(Ey) John knows that (x = y))
De re/de dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2).
((s) Because otherwise omniscience follows again).
Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not have to analyze knowledge here as the relation to the alternatives, which picks out the same individual in each knowledge compatible possible world.
HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: all this does not work within the framework of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of the Montague semantics, which we consider here, the following sentences are all valid:
(4) (x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z)))
II 100
Everyday Translation/Hintikka: John knows about every existing individual who it is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z==
Everyday-Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John, who this individual is (again de re).
Problem: Both are extremely wrong.
Non-existence/Hintikka: however, this is unproblematic as long as we do not have to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds.
Hintikka: Problem: this does not change the problem.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Determinism Montague Lewis V 37
Definiton determinism/Possible worlds/Lewis: if two worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly the same all the time or in no two time sections equal. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the laws of nature are deterministic. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but diverges from it in two points:
LewisVsMontague:
1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatzworlds (substitute worlds ((s) = sets of sentences)). 2. I take temporal equality of worlds as a simple relation. Montague instead takes the relation, to have the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecified.
My definition presupposes that we can identify different time segments from one world to another.


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Domains Hintikka II 98
Individual domain/Possible Worlds/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this assumption leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts.
Individual/Montague: Individuals are the domain of functions that function as the sense of a singular term.
Belief Context/opaque context/belief/propositional attitude/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague does not devote contexts with propositional attitudes a special approach (setting contexts). E.g. "knowing who", e.g. "remembering where", e.g. "seeing what". This is a defect because Montague had been interested in propositional attitudes.
II 176
Domain/variable/individual variable/quantification/Hintikka: my own approach (semantics of possible worlds) has been called "interpretation of the restricted domain". HintikkaVs: this misunderstands the logical situation: it is about the fact that the individuals have to be well-defined for the set of worlds with which we have to deal.
N.B.: the set of worlds changes with the propositional attitudes. So the the actual world, e.g. does not have to be included!
Propositional attitudes/Hintikka/(s): different attitudes (beliefs, doubts, seeing, etc.) demand different sets of worlds.
Variables/values/Hintikka: it may be that the domain of our variables can be a superset of the set of the actual individuals (if the set of possible worlds does not contain the actual world).
E.g. it may be that someone has correct beliefs about all the actual individuals, but also mistakenly believes that there are still more individuals that he only imagines.
Hintikka: therefore my approach can be called with the same right one of the "extended domains".
II 176
Individual domain/domain/Russell/Hintikka: Russell, on the other hand, seems to have actually represented a set of the restricted domain by restricting it to objects of acquaintance.
II 196
Possible world/individual domain/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The speech of worlds is empty if there is possible experience that could make them different. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be excluded.
II 196
Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later. Re-identification/Hintikka: is the key to cases of separation and fusion.
Separation/Hintikka: there is a structural reason why it is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation corresponds to a singularity, and this is a rare phenomenon.
Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual area should remain fixed. (HintikkaVsKripke).

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Each/All/Every Hintikka II 40
Everyone/All/None/Ontology/Existence/Non-existence/Hintikka: If we allow that the domain of our quantifiers is also extended to non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects?
E.g. Everyone's lover - for example, no one's lover.
Both are obviously possible. But unlike Meinong's round square.
E.g. "the envy of all" - e.g. "the one who is envied by everyone".
N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first.
Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is not a solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" is only possible with existent objects. ((s) That is, we must allow here non-existent or possible objects (possibilia).)
Meinong/Hintikka: gains the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also see Non-Existence/Terence Parsons).
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world.
II 106
Quantification/Quantifier/Ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: On the whole, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man
(13) John is looking for a dog.
HintikkaVsMontague: explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which ones they actually are. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers.
Domain/Hintikka: the domain determines the logical order.
Quantifier/Quantification/Every/he/Montague/Hintikka: E.g.
(14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy.
(15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy.
Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) can not precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize").
II 107
HintikkaVsMontague: so we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Events Montague Lewis V 246
Definiton Event/Richard Montague/Lewis: (Montague 1969): certain properties of time - "Lewis: that means it is identified with the property to be a time when it happens - LewisVsMontague: 1.in the RT it is not always clear, what time is. 2.with Montague we first have to find the place with it the region is already given - event/Quine: (as Lewis): can be easily identified with the region - then there cannot be two events in one region - if two in the same, it is a single event - wrong: to say e.g. that a "qua conference" the other "qua battle"(if it is the same).


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Modal Operators Cresswell II 148
Modal operator/Montague/Cresswell: (Montague 1974, 286-302): proof, that modal operators are not predicates of sentences. (Also Anderson 1983). SkyrmsVsMontague: (1978) denies the importance of this result. It would make a certain sense in which a metalinguistic modal semantics could be given.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Modal Operators Montague Cresswell II 148
Modal Operator/MO/Montague/Cresswell: (Montague 1974, 286-302): Proof that modal operators are not predicates of sentences. (Also Anderson 1983). SkyrmsVsMontague: (1978): denies the importance of this result. There would surely be a meaning in which modal operators could be given a metaphorical semantics.
VsSkyrms/Cresswell: for this he pays the price of a very strict type hierarchy.


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Montague Semantics Hintikka II 12
Montague/Hintikka: for him it was mostly about a framework for general meaning analysis. Possible World/Hintikka: Montague would need all linguistic (semantic, analytical) possible worlds. But it would require stronger arguments than the ones that Montague had available to limit them so that they would be less than the logically possible worlds.
This makes his use of non-standard semantics even more puzzling in the later work.
II 97
Quantifier/Quantifiers/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of its treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The proper treatment of quantification in Ordinary English".
Montague: Theses:
(i). Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions.
(ii). Semantic objects ((s) words) are linked to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond one-by-one to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. That is, the semantic rules work from the inside out.
(iii) quantifiers: e.g. "a girl", e.g. "every man"...
II 98
...behave semantically as singular terms. That is, "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is based on the semantics of possible worlds. (It is a generalization of Carnap's approach).
Ad (ii) is a form of the Frege principle (compositionality principle).
Ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica.
Individual Area/Possible Worlds/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant range of individuals.
HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Non-Existence Hintikka II 37
Non-existent objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
II 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: it's about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional!
Model theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
II 39
Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.
II 103
Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But Problem:
Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn).
((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)
Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for".
((s) that is, that both are looking for the same unicorn.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?)

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Non-Existence Montague Hintikka I 103
Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague's semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But there is a problem:

Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it, too. ((s) the same unicorn).
Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "looks for".
((s) That is, that both are looking for unicorns.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?).
---
I 103
Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless the example (11) shows that the way of reading should not oblige us to accept the existence of unicorns. Non-existence/epistemic context/intensional/belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can look for the same thing, even if it does not exist.
Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some worlds. For this, only a slight modification is necessary.
Problem: with more complex sentences, all problems come back:
---
I 104
Example: John does not know whether unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn because Mary is looking for it.
Problem: here John must be able to recognize a special unicorn. (Otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true), although he is considering the possible non-existence.
World line/Hintikka: in order to extent the Montague semantics, we must allow more or less unnatural world lines.


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Lewis, D. Montague Vs Lewis, D. I 10
Erlebnis: nicht identisch mit der Eigenschaft, die man jemandem dadurch zu spricht, dass man sagt, er habe dieses Erlebnis. Erlebnis: derjenige Zustand, der eine gewisse definierende kausale Rolle innehat.
Eigenschaft: eben die Eigenschaft, sich in dem Zustand zu befinden.
Bsp Schmerzen sind nicht identisch mit der Eigenschaft, Schmerzen zu haben! »Schmerz« ist ein kontingenter Name., das heißt, der hat in verschiedenen möglichen Welten verschiedene Denotationen. (Nicht starr).
»Die Eigenschaft, Schmerzen zu haben«, ist demgegenüber ein nicht kontingenter Name. (Starr, in jeder möglichen Welt das gleiche).( I 11 +: MontagueVsLewis, LewisVsMontague).
Montague, R. Dummett Vs Montague, R. Dummett I 176
Schulte: Frege sometimes talks of an "ideal language". Frege: scientific language: without demonstratives and indicators. Do you think that what Geach once called the "Hollywood-semantics" (Montague) could come close to that? Dummett: No, that s probably not the same direction. The program is based on Frege s idea though, but differs but very much. (DummettVsMontague).

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Montague, R. Lewis Vs Montague, R. I 10
Experience: not identical to the property that one assigns to someone by saying that they have this experience. >Experience/Lewis. Experience: the state that has a certain defining causal role. >Causal Role/Lewis, >Events/Lewis.
Property: the property of being in this state.
For example, pain is not the same as the property of having pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, which means it has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Non-rigid). >Rigidity.
"The ability to have pain," on the other hand, is a non-contingent name. (Rigid, the same in every possible world).( I 11 + MontagueVsLewis,LewisVsMontague).
V 37
Def Determinism/Possible Worlds/Lewis: if two possible worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly equal throughout the whole time or in no two periods of time. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of nature are deterministic. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but deviates from him in two points:
LewisVsMontague:
1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatz worlds ((s) elsewhere: = sets of sentences). 2. I temporarily take equality of worlds as a simple relation. Instead, Montague takes the relation of having the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecific.
My definition assumes that we can identify different periods of time from one world to another.
V 246
Def Event/Richard/Montague/Lewis: (1969) certain properties of time. The event occurs at a certain time in a certain possible world if and only if the event belongs to the world and the time. This means that the event is identified by the property of being a time when the event occurs.
LewisVsMontague: I think my approach has two minor advantages:
1. in the theory of relativity it is not always clear what time is,
2. Suppose a Montague event happens at a certain time in a certain possible world, then we have to find the place first. With my approach, the region is given immediately.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Montague, R. Verschiedene Vs Montague, R. Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse
Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994

Heusinger I 33
Quantifier-free/logical form/everyday language/Hilbert/Epsilon operator/Epsilon analysis/Heusinger: Epsilon expressions: make quantifiers superfluous: instead (complex) epsilon terms. Raise/VsMontague/Heusinger: the general increase of all NP as with Montague can then be dispensed with! (Hintikka 1976).
Functor/Argument/Operator/Heusinger: the functor-argument structure can also be found in the grammatical structure.
Range/Heusinger: also the dependence on expressions does not have to be represented by interaction of the range.




Montague, R. Hintikka Vs Montague, R. II 97
Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man".
II 98
Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica. Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes.
W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases.
II 99 logical form:
(1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction:
(2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka).
de re: (de re interpretation of (1)):
(3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y))
De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid:
(4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z)))
II 100
Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem.
Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague.
Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?.
II 101
Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b).
II 102
Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem:
(7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense).
II 103
Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?)
((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell.
II 142
(Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong).
II 103
Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface:
II 104
E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g.
(9) John holds this bush for a bear.
Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics:
(10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y).
I 105
SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another.
Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians.
II 106
Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man
(13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers.
Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence.
Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g.
(14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy
(15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize").
II 107
HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Montague, R. Wiggins Vs Montague, R. II 312
Modal Logic/Lemmon: System S0.5 (1959)(1): excludes: necessarily ((necessarily p) > p).
Thus it does not have the self enclosing properties of stronger systems.
Used by Montague.
WigginsVsMontague: he also ignores the real possibility that modal logic might end up being forced to recognize a hierarchy of languages to avoid paradoxes.
Meta Language/Wiggins: our intuitions about "necessary" are beyond the boundary of what marks Lemmon's system S0.5. And this is also the reason why I still have to be discouraged from reading "necessary" in a meta-linguistic way de dicto, namely as a predicate of sentences that has a broader meaning than provable.


1. J. Lemmon, "Is there only one correct system of modal logic"Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. xxxiii (1959), 31

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Montague, R. Cresswell Vs Montague, R. I 100
Proposition/CresswellVsThomason/CresswellVsMontague: regarding them as primitive entities, brings other problems: Kaplan: (1983) has an argument that shows that there is no such thing as the sum of all propositions: E.g. For any person x and any proposition p and time t, there must be a world in which p is the only proposition that x expresses at t. In addition, there must be at least as many propositions as there are sets of possible worlds. Problem: these two requirements are incompatible. Because the first one requires that there are just as many propositions as possible worlds, and the second one, that there are more propositions than possible worlds. Kaplan/Cresswell: advantage of his approach: that we can still construct propositions as sets of possible worlds (not hyper-intensional).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Montague, R. Stalnaker Vs Montague, R. II 35f
Pragmatics/Stalnaker: I proceed according to the following scheme: The syntactic and semantic rule for a language determine an interpreted proposition or subset. This, together with some features of the context of use of the proposition determines a proposition. This in turn, together with a possible world (poss.w.) determines the truth value.
interpreted proposition: corresponds then with a function of contexts on propositions
Proposition: is then a function of poss.w. on truth values.
Truth value/Tr.v.: is then partially determined by both, the context and the poss.w.. This can also be summarized (merge).
Then
Proposition: is a function of context-possible worlds (poss.w. in a certain context) on truth value.
Pragmatics-semantics/Stalnaker: should then as examination of the way how not depend propositions but truth value from the context.
Poss. w.: would then be part of the context.
Montague/Stalnaker: that is the way how - I think - Montague suggested the analysis of the pragmatics.
StalnakerVsMontague: his analysis is simpler than the one I suggested. So I need a justification for my intermediate step - the propositions. They must be of interest themselves and there must be a functional difference between contexts and poss.w..
Proposition/Stalnaker: are interesting because they are objects of speech acts and propositional attitudes. That cannot be represented directly by assuming that propositions themselves determine the truth values.
II 37
E.g. "Are you going to the party?" – "Yes, I am". The answer addresses the question, because the proposition is expressed in the question.
StalnakerVsMontague: this cannot be expressed in his direct analysis.
Montague/Stalnaker: for him propositions that are expressed from different points of view are different propositions.
Content/Stalnaker: a shared truth value is not enough here to be the content. It would not be appropriate to answer "Yes, snow is white".
II 41
StalnakerVsMontague: his simpler approach (that throws the poss.w. and context together) cannot distinguish between Donnellan's cases referential/attributive. If you go directly from propositions (together with the context) to the truth value (tr.v.) you missed the ambiguity. Because the truth conditions in a fixed context then coincide with both interpretations.
II 42
Solution/Stalnaker: if you go from poss.w. to truth value the difference appears (in the intermediate step).

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Montague, R. Stechow Vs Montague, R. I 44
Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in".
Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol.
Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular.
StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type.
Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon.
I 104
Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example
Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money.
105
Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps.
150
Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)!
151
Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation.
Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side.
Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression.
The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λ-abstract that we form from the second expression.
VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun.
Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958).
152
Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range).
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Proposition Thomason, R. Cresswell I 100
Proposition/Thomason: These haben mindestens so viel Struktur wie die Sätze, die sie ausdrücken. Er nimmt Propositionen als einfache Grundbegriffe, die die Bedeutungen von Sätzen sind um Dinge anderer Kategorien funktional zu analysieren. (Cresswell 1966 dito). Proposition/Montague: (1974, Kapitel 10) dito, Vsquotationale Theorie.
Cresswell: es gibt ArgumenteVsThomason, VsMontague, meine Argumente Vsquotationale Theorie haben mit seinen nichts zu tun.
Proposition/CresswellVsThomason: wenn sie sui generis ist, müssen wir erklären, was sie wahr macht ((s) im Gegensatz zu dem, was den entsprechenden Satz wahr macht).
Lösung: MöWe-Semantik, die Mengen von MöWe zuschreibt bzw. extensionale Interpretation, die WW direkt der Satz-Bedeutung (=Proposition) zuschreibt.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984