Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analysis | Moore | Avramidis I 2o Analysis/Moore: two types of analysis: 1) eliminate confusion over a concept (>Quine (1960) Word and Object(1) §53) 2) Make our thoughts clearer. Broad: per 1) - Moore per 2) WisdomVsMoore: new level of concept: asymmetry: E.g., the analysis of nations discovers something about individuals. MooreVsWisdom: we have to stay on the same level! (Symmetry). Ad 1) Avramides: understanding a concept through other concepts. ad 2) Location of a concept in the network. - These are two interpretations of the same biconditional. >Interpretation, >Levels, >Description levels, >Biconditional. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
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| Determinism | Pauen | Pauen I 274 Determinism/Van Inwagen/Pauen: the principle of the causal closure says that only physical explanation may be used. - It is not about a need for certain causal chains. Only requirement: that for any higher order describable change there is a physically describable change. Thesis: from full description later states can be derived. >Initial conditions, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Description, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal dependence, >P. van Inwagen. Pauen: determinism is more than controversial. I 275 Determinism/freedom/Moore: determinism does not entitle us to the conclusion that nothing else could have happened. >Freedom, >Freedom of will, >Actions, cf. >Anomalous monism. Ambiguity of "can": a) possible actions b) physical impossibility. G.E. Moore: For the purposes of a) it is possible to say "I could have decided otherwise" - ("conditional analysis"). VsMoore: Example he would falsely call psychological coercion "free". >Coercion. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dissimilarity | Putnam | An example for dissimilarity: V 273 Non-Cognitivism/Moore: thesis: "good" is completely outside the natural sciences, e.g. "good" cannot mean "contributes to the utility maximization" because then it would not only be wrong to say "it is good, but does not contribute to maximizing" but it would be self-contradictory, and that should be excluded. Property/term/PutnamVsMoore: there is a confusion of >property and >term: that two concepts are different, does not entail that being good is not the same property as being P. >Predicates. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Ethics | Brentano | Chisholm II 276 Ethics/Brentano/Moore/Koller: Brentano and Moore converge in amazing ways. Ethics/Brentano/Moore: The ultimate goal of right action: "the best thing you can do": II 279 The greatest possible sum of the good which can be attained. VsMoore/VsBrentano: that does not only assume that we already know what the good is, but also that we can recognize the best among the achievable good. So that there is something that is intrinsic and recognizable good. Brentano/Moore: assert for this reason that there is a direct, immediate knowledge of what is good in itself. Immediate evidence. Good/Ethics/Value/Brentano/Moore: the good is what you should desire and should be taken for good. Brentano: what it is worth to love it with a love that is properly characterized for its own sake. II 280 E.g. (Brentano): pleasure, clear insight, knowledge, joy (if it is not joy in the bad), correctness of our judgment and of our emotions, (of our love, hate, and will). Brentano: Principle of summation (of the good: 1. Something good is better than something bad 2. The existence of good is better than its non-existence 3. A greater good is better than a smaller one. II 280 Ethics/Value/Good/Moore: Question: What things in isolation are to be considered for good on their own? This also requires the determination of levels of value. II 281 Method of isolation. This is why pleasure, taken alone, is of no great value for Moore. Only together with the experience of beautiful things it has a valuable force. This leads to the Principle of Organic Units: Many things take on quite different properties, depending on the context. (MooreVsBrentano). ((s) "syncategorematic" values.) MooreVsBrentano: since the inner value is characterized by connecting several simple properties, it can not simply match the sum of its parts. For example, when no one is aware of a beautiful object, it has no value. II 282 Method of Isolation/Moore: that are now applied again to recognize the value of such organic units. Thesis all things that have real value are complex organic entities. E.g. the joys of human intercourse, enjoying beautiful things. E.g. Bad: Enjoying ugly things, cruelty, hating the good, etc. Exception: Pain: is already an evil without any connection to others. Mixed virtues/Moore: as whole things clearly good, but contain something bad: e.g. courage, compassion, (hating the bad) knowledge of bad or ugly things. II 283 Acting/ethics/Brentano/Moore: that is sufficient as a basis to answer the question: what action is right? Of several possibilities for action is only the one right that either produces more or at least not less good things in the world. It is indifferent whether this good is beneficial to the agent himself, or to others. An action is therefore correct, if it has correct consequences. Criterion/Ethics/Moore/Brentano: the purpose of doing as much good as possible in the world is then the criterion for correct action. Judgement: Problem: in regard to this our knowledge is always incomplete. II 284 Moore/Brentano: therefore ethics cannot provide general rules. We have "rules of medium generality". These then apply in the majority of cases. Ethics/values/ontology/intrinsic properties/Moore/Brentano/Koller: ontological question: what are the objects of the intrinsic value concepts, on which things can the concepts of the intrinsic good and bad be applied at all? What is the logical structure of these concepts, can the method of isolation always be applied? II 287 KollerVsBrentano/KollerVsMoore: the questions about the epistemological justification of intrinsic valuations and the question of their suitability for a sustainable foundation of ethics are precisely the questions that make the approach of Brentano and Moore appear doubtful. Chisholm II = Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Facts | Cartwright | Horwich I 48 Fact/Moore: (early): means that the proposition owns the simple property of truth. Later: it consists in possessing the truth through a proposition. R. CartwrightVs: if facts and propositions are distinguished, no simple property (truth) is needed anymore. Then we have facts as correspondents. I 49 Ayer: Propositions cannot be facts. Because with wrong propositions there are no corresponding facts. CartwightVsMoore: nothing must be missing in the universe if a proposition is wrong. For example, if Scott had not written Waverley, he (Scott = author of Waverley) would not have to be missing in the universe. I 50 Moore/R. Cartwright: (early): would have had to assume that "the fact that" was a rigid designator: he would have had the following two sentences express the same proposition: a) the fact that there are subways in Boston would not have had to be the fact that there are subways in Boston... b) The author of Waverley did not have to be the author of Waverley. >Rigidity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Generality | Stroud | I 206 General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: With Descartes the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. >René Descartes. VerificationismVsGeneralization: Verificationism considers eneralization as suspicious: one should not apply statements of the system to the system itself. >Verificationism, >Self-reference, >Cirular reasoning. StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. >Senseless, >Verification. Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. >Everyday language. I 264 Public/knowledge/Stroud: there are indeed general statements about knowledge: e.g. that someone knows something about Sicily of the 4th century. - E.g. that no one knows the causes of cancer. VsMoore: that he does not achieve a general statement about knowledge, but is not due to a lack of generality. >G.E. Moore. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Good | Moore | Stegmüller IV 181 Argument of the open question/good/definition/Moore: Assuming, someone said "good" can be defined as "promoting the joy of life". Then we could still understand the question: "admittedly, it promotes the joy of life, but is it also good?". Conclusion: "good" must mean a simple, non-analytic, non-natural quality. StegmüllerVsMoore: this can only refer to the moral goodness. Cf. >Good/Plato, >Definitions, >Definability. Stegmüller IV 182 We might still suspect that there are common meaning cores in moral and non-moral contexts. >Morals, >Ethics, >Cognitivism, >Norms, >Community, >Society, >Discourse. Stegmüller IV 186 "Good"/Moore/open question/Mackie/Stegmüller: the solution of Moore's problem: those requirements with regard to whether x is good are not identical with those for which we have already admitted that x satisfies them. Vs: some believe that only the assumption of objective values could resist the argument of the open question. Only from the standpoint of "overall reality" all requirements are taken into consideration. >Objectivity. MackieVs: it is a deceptive hope that there might be something that could satisfy all conceivable kinds of requirements. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Good | Putnam | V 273 Non-Cognitivism/Moore: thesis: "good" is completely outside the natural sciences, e.g. "good" cannot mean "contributes to the utility maximization" because then it would not only be wrong to say "it is good, but does not contribute to maximizing" and would be self-contradictory, and that should be excluded. Property/term/PutnamVsMoore: confusion of >property and >term: that two concepts are different, does not entail that being good is not the same property as being P. >Predicates, >Attribution, >Concepts. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Good | Quine | V 77 "Good"/language learning/QuineVsMoore/QuineVsTradition: there are two factors: perceptual similarity and desire. >Desire, >Similarity. Distinction between aesthetically good and morally good: the former feels good, the latter announces the former. Moral/Quine: is like a taste: a question of sociality. Cf. >Taste. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Internal/external | Carnap | II 207 Internal/External/Carnap: internal: within a frame: E.g. a unicorn is a mythical creature - external: E.g. existence of numbers or physical things. Stroud I 183 External/Internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine: distinction between "Categories Questions" and "Subset Questions": external: only one type variable for all things - then the question "is there such and such?" covers the whole range (category). - Internal: a variable for any kind of thing: Subset question, we come to generality by letting a kind of variable go over all things. Stroud: nevertheless same syntax. - Carnap: therefore different languages. >Syntax, >Language. I 184 Thing language/("Dingsprache"): here questions of existence are possible. >Existence statements. I 185 Practical Question/Carnap: here the solution consists in an action. ((s)> Manifestation/Dummett). Important argument: Carnap: existential questions must be treated as practical matters - choice of question is a practical question (of convention). - Problem: CarnapVsMoore: The kind of choice cannot be answered internally - Thing language: is efficient, but does not show a reality in the world. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Knowledge | Hume | Stroud I 105f Knowledge/proof of existence/existence/Hume/Stroud: there are two principles: 1. No one knows of the existence of something when it is not perceived directly by someone > Apprehension: is unordered or the person knows what he/she has perceived directly, is a sign of the existence of this thing. 2. No one can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she has not perceived these two things (thing and sign) directly. MooreVsHume: both principles are wrong: e.g. I know that this pencil exists. According to Hume I could not know that, so they are wrong. This is a reductio ad absurdum. StroudVsMoore: Hume's principles are valid. >Principles/Hume. Moore: for him it is relevant what is safe, the pencil or the principles. Skepticism/Stroud/(s): but skepticism is not a question of certainty. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Knowledge | Kant | Stroud I 130 Knowledge/skepticism/KantVsDescartes: Who reads a proof needs to know at the end. Problem: this is only possible in the sciences, not in philosophy. KantVsTradition: Kant treats knowledge of the outer world always indirectly or inferentially. Solution/Kant: immediate perception / = consciousness of external things. That is a sufficient proof of their reality. - With inferential access skepticism would be inevitable. Per skepticism: forces to show that we have acquired our knowledge. KantVsMoore/Stroud: Moore does not show this. I 134 Skepticism/Kant: is refuted only by a proof of realism. >Reality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Realism/Kant, >Skepticism. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Knowledge | Wittgenstein | McDowell I 82 Knowledge/ostension/measuring/Wittgenstein: E.g. Someone says: I know how high I am! and put his hand on his head. >Measurements, >Method. --- Wittgenstein VI 212 Knowledge/certainty/certitude/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: if doubts are excluded, then "knowledge" is no meaningful concept. - e.g. pain has nothing to do with knowledge. - e.g. at best after an accident I can assure myself that I have two hands. - (> Moores hands/Stroud), >Skepticism. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Language | Dummett | I 11 ff Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto). Husted IV 448 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition". 2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use". McDowell I 152 Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >Gadamer.) Dummett III (b) 81 Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences. III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. Horwich I 461 Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language Acquisition | Quine | V 68 Language Learning/Quine: the success depends on whether the similarity standards match. - What do the episodes have in common? V 71 Approval/learning/Quine: instead of reward: is more general. There are not enough situations for rewards, because not everything is pronounced. - Language learning: is not only done by linguistic statements, but also through non-verbal responses. - Even animals. - Approval: leads to voicing one's own sentences -> Gavagai: if you just wait until the parents say rabbit, you will not find out that everything that is called a rabbit is also referred to as an animal. Radical Interpretation: question and answer game is essential here. - Approval must be obtained. ((s) reward has to be confirmed otherwise). V 75 1) red from the child, yes from the mother - 2) vice versa - generalization: by previously learned expressions - criterion for approval: readiness, to express an observation sentence on one’s own initiative. >Observation Sentences V 77 Good/language learning/QuineVsMoore/QuineVsTradition: two factors: perception similarity and desire. - Distinction between aesthetically good and morally well: the former feels good, the latter announces former. Moral/Quine: as flavor: community thing. V 113 Truth/language learning/Quine: somehow such a connection of meaning and truth is indicative for learning, regardless of the logical particles - we learn the use of declarative sentences by learning the truth conditions - but truth value is learned late. V 121 Compliance/language learning/Quine: in casual conversation - not hidden meanings. - ((s) internal objects). V 147 Set theory/language learning/Quine: set theory/language learning/Quine: by imagining the substitutional quantification as a simulation of the referential quantification, we imagine the general term as a simulation of abstract singular terms, of names of attributes or names of classes. - Class name: is an abstract singular term, not a general term. >Classes/Quine. VI 89f Whole sentence/holophrastic/language learning/Quine: we need whole sentences to define that e.g. a mirrored object is meant - or reflection. - ((s) or mirroring). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Moore´s Hands | Carnap | Stroud I 180 Verificationism VsMoore/Carnap/Moores hands/Stroud: Carnap goes much deeper than Moore because he recognizes the need for justification in a positive philosophy. >Skepticism, >Verificationism, >Verification, >Certainty. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore´s Hands | Stroud | I 83 Moore's hands/existence proof/Stroud: Moore has misunderstood Kant that he doubted the existence of our outside world. - ((s) Only our knowledge of it.) >G.E. Moore, >Thing in itself, >Immanuel Kant, >External world, >Existence. StroudVsMoore: this is only possible in response to a specific question. VsMoore: false evidence: It is an error that the premises are known to be true. Norman MalcolmVsMoore: Moore's answer is no answer to skepticism. - It does not say what is wrong with his doubts. - Instead of hands, he could not take "that tree there" and prove it by a clear view on him. - (But that is what he seems to do). >Norman Malcolm. I 89 AmbrosVsMoore: insufficient as direct empirical position. I 90 Malcolm: Moore argues linguistically. I 92 AmbroseVsMoore: Moore thinks, the special case of the hands can be distinguished from other things of the outside world - but it cannot. I 93 Wittgenstein: if you succeed in the proof of the hands, we will give you the rest. I 94 Moore himself: considered his evidence not linguistical but empirical. I 99 Moores hands/skepticism/Stroud: the skepticism does not state anything that Moore proves to be false. - That is the importance of Moore's proof. - There must be a general sentence that there would be no external things, which Moore refutes. - Then the skepticism would be much more complex and difficult. >Skepticism. I 114 Moores hands/skepticism/Stroud: "I know that here is a hand": one cannot deny that there are questions to which this is a response. StroudVsMalcolm: Moore also knows what he is doing - he just does not answer skepticism. Stroud: A deficiency in Moores proof is only there if there is a general question about knowledge, which makes it impossible for Moore to answer. Outside world/Stroud: unlike skepticism: here Moore has revealed the existence of external things (as we know). I 115 Stroud: in the questions of the existence of the external world no particular philosophical problem is answered. - E.g. direct question: were there apples in Sicily before Christ? - Then we have an idea how we (ask historians) can find out. Scepticism: but that does not work, if you do not know anything about the world. ((s) Knowledge/(s): if knowledge questions are answered, existence is already implied.) I 117/18 Skepticism/Stroud: The skepticism can only be refuted from the "distanced position" (external knowledge, philosophical, not scientific). - Then I cannot rely on certain things like hands. External knowledge/Stroud: is not a more general form of knowledge. (Believing that was Moore's mistake). - The philosophical question cannot be expressed by a common form of words. Pro Moore: especially his refusal to take the external position shows the importance of his remarks. Skepticism/Stroud: Skepticism does not only ask what is known, but how it is known. StroudVsMoore: his evidence is not empirical. I 124 General/Special/Moore's hands/skepticism/Stroud: there is nothing wrong with Moore's approach (that he provides the general questions of philosophy with certain answers). - How else should you answer general questions? I 133 Premises/proof/Moore's hands/Stroud: Moore was aware that he has not proven his premises. - But premises must not be proven anyway. - Many things can be known directly without proof. >Premises, >Proofs, >Knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore’s Law | Morozov | I 218 Moore's Law/Morozov: Intel co-founder Gordon Moore's original 1965 formulation stated that the number of components on chips with the lowest manufacturing costs per component would double about every twelve months. Ten years later, Moore revised his estimates considerably and updated the growth rate to twenty-four months. But he also changed what was measured. Illka TuomiVsMoore: while Moore still counted the components on semiconductor chips, he no longer focused... I 219 ...on cost-optimized chips, but measured the development of the most complex existing chips. In 1979 he changed his law again. The industry, for its part, interpreted his law as it fitted their view. (1) Gordon Moore/Morozov: to this day, most people think it is about 18 months, but Moore says he never said anything like that. "I said one year and then two years." (2) Growth/Tuomi: the actual growth observed differed from the forecasts every decade. Tuomi's thesis: instead of satisfying a market need, the semiconductor industry has actively and aggressively created markets. (3) Morozov: something like "Moore's law" does not fall from the sky. Speaking of "what technology wants" allows corporations to present their business strategies as a natural course of history. But technology does not want anything - and neither does the Internet. >Internet/Morozov, >Technology, >Technocracy. 1. Law”: Ilkka Tuomi, “The Lives and Death of Moore’s Law,” First Monday 7, no. 11 (2002), http:// firstmonday.org/ htbin/ cgiwrap/ bin/ ojs/ index.php/ fm/ article/ view/ 1000/ 921. 2. Quoted in ibid. 3. ibid. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Morals | Schiffer | I 153 Moral/physicalism/positivism pro Moore: moral properties cannot be identified with natural aptitude - But, VsMoore: it does not follow that there was a realm of non-natural (moral) properties. >Mentalism, >Inner objects, >Intensional objects. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Necessity | Putnam | Kripke I 141 Necessity/needed/Putnam: "cats are animals" is less necessary than "bachelors are unmarried". --- Putnam V 72 Metaphysically Necessary/Kripke: Putnam: it is "metaphysically necessary" that water is H20, but that is explained by earthly chemistry and earthly facts about speaker intentions regarding reference. When describing a hypothetical liquid which is not H20 and merely resembles water, one does not describe any possible worlds, in which H2O is not water. V 274 Metaphysically Necessary/heat/Kripke/Putnam: possible Worlds, where heat does not corresponds with molecular motion, are possible. Language: but then we say that there is a different mechanism that triggers heat sensation. Identity/heat/molecular motion/Kripke: the identity is necessary, but not a priori. The statement is empirical, but necessary. >Necessary a posteriori. Molecular motion is an essential property of the temperature. KripkeVsMoore: then equating goodness with utility maximization cannot only be contingently wrong. KripkeVsNon-Cognitivism: from the fact that the words are not synonymous, one cannot conclude that the characteristics are not identical. >Non-cognitivism, >Synonymy. V 279 Pro Moore: Moore was right that our concepts of natural science are more neutral as opposed to ethical ones. VsMoore: but that does not mean that the good did not exist. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Skepticism | Ambrose | Stroud I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both: skepticism cannot be refuted empirically. Ambrose's thesis: The skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing would be proof of a "thing of the outside world". Therefore, the sentence "nobody knows if things exist" cannot be falsified. AmbroseVsSkepticism: skepticism cannot help but be aware of the things it talks about. I 91 For example, when he says "I know I have three bucks in my pocket" he talks about something possible! ((s) If he thought it was impossible, he would not be a skeptic) - He admits that it is not necessarily a falsehood to use the language this way. AmbroseVsMoore: can therefore not show that skepticism uses the language wrongly. VsMoore: argues as if the phrase "no one knows whether hands exist" was a necessary truth. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Malcolm | Stroud I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both authors: skepticism cannot be refuted empirically. Alice Ambrose thesis: The skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing would be proof of a "thing of the outside world". Therefore, the phrase "nobody knows if things exist" cannot be falsified. AmbroseVsSkepticism: skepticism cannot help but be aware of the things it talks about. >A. Ambrose. Stroud I 91 For example, when he says "I know I have three bucks in my pocket" he talks about something possible! ((s) If he thought it was impossible, he would not be a skeptic) - He admits that it is not necessarily false to use the language this way. AmbroseVsMoore: can therefore not show that skepticism misuses the language. VsMoore: argues as if the phrase "no one knows whether hands exist" was a necessary truth. >Moore's Hands. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambrose, A. | Stroud Vs Ambrose, A. | I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both think that skepticism - correctly understood - cannot be refuted empirically - by the senses. Skepticism/Ambrose: Thesis: Skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing could be proof of "There are things in the outside world". There are no describable circumstances in which one could say that someone could be described as knowing that. So the sentence "Nobody knows whether things exist" cannot be falsified (A. p. 402). Skepticism argues for a logical impossibility of knowing from the outside world and not for an empirical fact. Every sentence like "I don't know if there's a dollar in my pocket." I 90 is "necessarily true" for the skeptic. I 91 MalcolmVsMoore/AmbroseVsMoore/Stroud: they are directed against what Moore believes he is doing. He could not do it either! StroudVsAmbrose/StroudVsMalcolm: we will see that these two reviews fail, but for that we have to go a long way with Moore to see how he means his proof and that he even does what he believes, even if he achieves something else. I 92 AmbroseVsMoore: for her, Moore is not in a position to do what he wants to do, which is to give direct empirical evidence. N.B.: Moore wants to point to things that differ from other things in their properties" But he cannot do that because the only things he can point to and intends to point to are "external things" and they all have the same property to be "external". That is, it has no contrast at all to other things, which it would have to have to say at all about external things in general. He can only point to some external things as opposed to other external things to show differences between them, but with that he cannot provide proof of existence for external things in general. (Circular) Proof of Existence/Overview/General/Special/Solution: one can prove the existence of coins by pointing to a penny. MooreVsAmbrose: (Moore p. 672): insists that his proof is empirical and that he proves the sentence "There are no external things" wrong. I 93 For example, like pointing to a penny to prove that there is at least one outer thing. Moore admits that there are differences between the terms "outer thing" and "coin", but not with regard to the possibility of pointing to instances. Pointing/MooreVsMalcolm/MooreVsAmbrose: you can certainly only point to outer things, but you can draw attention to inner objects. So the term "outer thing" probably has a significant contrast to other things that do not fall under this class: they are things you can point to. "Outer Thing"/Moore: is like "coin" simply a more general term. But it is just as empirical as "coin. Moore: the only refutation could be in his eyes that one shows that he has not proved that there is one hand here and another there. Stroud: then the only objection would be that the premises are not really known. Wittgenstein seems to have this in mind in "On Certainty": Moore's Hands/Wittgenstein: "if you know there's a hand here, we will give you the rest". (On Certainty, 1969, §1). MooreVsAmbrose/Stroud: because Moore considers his evidence empirical, he ignores Ambrose's objection that he merely makes a recommendation for the use of language. I 94 He sees himself as proving with one fact - here is one hand - he is proving another: - that there are external things. Language Use/Proof of Existence/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: I cannot have assumed that the fact that I have a hand proves anything about how the term "outer things" should be used. (Moore, 674) Just as nothing is shown about the usage of e.g. "I know there are three misprints here" when I show that there are three misprints on this page. This is about nothing linguistic. Nothing about how words should be used follows from the premises. MooreVsMalcolm/Stroud: then Malcolm's interpretation must also be wrong. That there's a hand here does not prove anything about how any expressions should be used. MalcolmVsMoore: Malcolm believes that Moore did not reject him and actually agrees with him. StroudVsMalcolm: But that cannot be if Moore does what he says. MalcolmVsMoore: another argument: he could not have done what he wanted to do. Skepticism/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: the skeptic may think he has a priori reasons for denying external things or knowledge about them. I 96 But even then, that does not mean he cannot be empirically rejected. Suppose someone claims to have a priori reasons that there are no things in the outside world. Just then he can be refuted by simple empirical showing of such objects. Moore/StroudVsMalcolm/StroudVsAmbrose: the reaction of Ambrose and Malcolm is still that Moore does exactly what he believes he is doing. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Austin, John L. | Putnam Vs Austin, John L. | Hacking I 179 AustinVsMoore: there is an independent opportunity to pick out facts: ostension. Then we put on assertions by combining referring expressions and names for properties and relations. PutnamVsAustin: he must now accept that this approach of Austin is scuppered by >Löwenheim because there is no possibility of independent reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Burnyeat, M. | Stroud Vs Burnyeat, M. | I 123 Skepticism/BurnyeatVsMoore: (in Philosophy 1977 S 396f) he cannot free himself from the traditional epistemic position. He should be able to explain the certainty of his examples. He needed a general basic principle that would explain his belief. StroudVsBurnyeat: I do not see how a general explanation and justification I 124 of the idea that "individual examples are the first thing a philosopher should respond to" should exempt Moore from the traditional epistemic position. Burnyeat: Moore should know what skepticism is about and explain why he cannot do it. General/Special/StroudVsBurnyeat: there is nothing wrong with Moore's approach (that he provides the philosophers' general questions with certain answers). How else should one answer general questions? Moore/Stroud: does not explain how the questions of skepticism come about or why they could not be asked. He simply denies them. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Cavell, St. | Stroud Vs Cavell, St. | I 260 Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construct the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. StroudVsCavell: is it true that e.g. Descartes does not make a "concrete" assertion at all? The very general fact that the various linguistic actions (speech acts?) such as assertions, questions, etc. all have their own conditions of expression is not sufficient to justify Cavell's point. We need to know what the conditions are to claim something to show that they are not fulfilled in the cases the philosopher is considering. And it is also not enough just for assertions, it must be shown that the conditions for not saying or thinking anything in any way that could fulfill the philosopher's purposes, I 262 could be fulfilled here. Problem: but what are "all" possible ways to say something? It seems that there would have to be only one specific (single, particular) instance of knowledge that we would all regard as knowledge. For example, he imagines (or finds himself in the situation) sitting by the fireplace. He wonders if he knows and how he knows that he is sitting there. Even if he makes no assertion here, it looks as if he (StroudVsCavell) could still ask if he knows if he is sitting there at that moment and discovers a basis for any such knowledge, and can then assess the reliability of that basis. StroudVsCavell: he could then come to the conclusion that he does not know, although he even has made no (knowledge) assertion! If that is true, he does not seem to need a concrete assertion (context) to evaluate his position in this situation. Stroud: This is how I describe Descartes' project as an attempt to test his knowledge. Stroud: with this he wants to check the reliability of everything he has claimed since his youth. It then does not seem essential that he makes or has made a certain assertion at a certain point in time. I can still ask how I would know if I knew. I 263 StroudVsCavell: I, for example, read a detective novel and find that - without making an assertion - I assumed that something particular would be impossible. And that I have no reliable basis for this assumption, that it might be possible, although I never explicitly said that. I can then subsequently assess the position I was in and find it inadequate. ((s) According to Cavell this would not be possible, because he demands an explicit assertion beforehand, which clearly defines the context.) Still: Stroud pro Cavell: I think he's right that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case that makes a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you do not have to show that no statement has been made. StroudVsSkepticism: if it looks like he can estimate his position, even without making a certain assertion, the diagnosis should concentrate on showing that any assessment of his position that the philosopher makes cannot have the meaning that he thinks it has. That is the crucial point. I 264 Generality: what general conclusion does the skeptical philosopher seek and why can it not be given? StroudVsCavell: it is not sufficient to say that he is seeking a general conclusion, because it is not true that the investigation of an individual case does not allow a general conclusion about human knowledge: for example, I learn that historians know something about apples in Sicily in the 4th century BC. This shows that someone has knowledge about Sicily and this is a general statement about human knowledge. For example, that no one knows the causes of cancer is also such a general statement about knowledge. VsMoore: if he does not make a general statement about human knowledge, as the traditional epistemologist seeks, it is not due to a lack of generality! It is expressed in exactly the same general terms as the philosopher would use. Solution/Stroud: we must introduce a distinction between two uses of the same words. >Thompson Clarke: "Representativeness" (Skepticism/Clarke) (...+...) |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Correspondence Theory | Moore Vs Correspondence Theory | Hacking I 179 MooreVsCorrespondence Theory: an essential condition of the theory is that a true statement of the reality that in relation to which will include its truth, always deviates in a specific way when the reality again is not itself a sentence. It is the inability to detect such a specific difference between a true statement and the supposedly matching reality which refutes the theory. Horwich I 45 Correspondence Theory/CartwrightVsMoore: Problem: then there is also a property of agreement (correspondence) that does not have the wrong proposition. And this seems to depend undeniably on the world! From a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise wrong. CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this that ignores the theory of truth as a simple, unanalyzable property. But they were both aware of that. ("Meinong's Theory" , p 75). They stuck to it because of it: RussellVsCorrespondence Theory, MooreVsCorrespondence Theory. I 46 Truth/Moore: (Baldwin Dictionary, early): some believe that it consists in a relation of a proposition to reality. ("Correspondence"). MooreVsCorrespondence Theory: assumes that truth differs from reality (in order to be able to establish a relation at all). But such a difference cannot be found at all! Solution/Moore: Proposition/Moore/early: Thesis: is not identical with belief, but the object of belief. ((s) >Relation.Theory). Truth/Moore/Early: Thesis: is identical with reality. It does not differ from it...+.... |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Moore Vs Descartes, R. | Dream/MooreVsDescartes: if I do not know that I am not dreaming, then I do not know that I am getting up. StroudVsMoore: it is precisely this consequence of Descartes that leads to skepticism. I do not understand why Moore accepts them. I 121 MooreVsDescartes: but that is not a problem because it "cuts off both directions". Because when I know that I am getting up, I know that I am not dreaming. So: because I know that I am not dreaming, I know that I am getting up! StroudVsMoore: so he believes that his argument is empirical. But I do not see how that follows from this. Of course, skepticism can say the opposite (converse). ((s) If I do not know that I am not dreaming, I do not know whether to get up or dream to get up). Stroud: one argument is as good as the other. Stroud: is that justified? Example Scepticist: one does not know whether one gets up - this is analog to the argument E.g. DetectiveVsAssistent that the list is not complete. StroudVsMoore: but you cannot deduce a "draw" from it. The argument is not "cut off in both directions". He cannot say. For example "Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete". The assistant did not check the list. StroudVsMoore/(s): Moore always refers to things on the list. StroudVsMoore: but he should show that he knows that the list cannot be incomplete. I 122 He cannot simply turn the sceptic's argument around as he does. ((s) Because he needs a distanced position (external knowledge) that skepticism takes, not by asserting something particular, but something general). N.B.: of course the detective could have been wrong and the assistant would have checked the list completely. I.e. in the detective's assertion there is nothing that implies something that would be impossible. ((s) So the position of skepticism is not to show the incompleteness of the list or a lack of authorization of the list.) Explanation: the "list" does not imply that an external point of view would be impossible.). Skepticism/Moore/Stroud: there are other places in his work where he moves towards skepticism (+) he never seems to have been satisfied with it. He even admits the "logical possibility" that if all his sensory impressions could be dream images, he would not know he was not sleeping. I 123 Solution/Moore: remembrance of something immediately previous. Skepticism/StroudVsMoore: it does not show that this logical possibility does not exist. |
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| Hume, D. | Moore Vs Hume, D. | Stroud I 104 Knowledge/Proof of Existence/Existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles: 1. Nobody knows of the existence of anything if he/she has not perceived it directly (apprehended >apprehension: disorderly) or that he/she knows that something he/she has perceived directly is a sign of the existence of that thing. 2. Nobody can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she did not perceive these two things (thing and sign) Stroud I 106 directly. (> StroudVsMoore: I do not understand why he accepts that (MooreVsDescartes). I also do not understand why he overlooks the consequences of sensory data theory. MooreVsHume: the two principles are wrong: for example, I know that this pen exists, but if Hume's principles were true, I could not do that. So they, one or both, are wrong. Moore/Stroud: accepts that if you start from Hume's position, it follows that he does not know that there is a pen. StroudVsMoore: both arguments are valid. And they have a common premise. For Moore, the question of what conclusion to accept amounts to whether it is safer to know that this is a pen or safer to know that Hume's principles are true. I 107 MooreVsHume: Example pen: is even the strongest argument to prove that its principles are wrong. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Idealism | Kant Vs Idealism | Stroud I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world, which is independent from us, is unknowable. Or that the latter is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Stroud I 142 Knowledge/KantVsMoore: the knowledge of everyday life must be shown "well-earned". But this is a philosophical task, not e.g. the problem if we are to believe a witness in court or the scientist. "Scandal"/Kant/Stroud: does not imply that the scientist or the person in daily life accepts the world only because of faith. Life/daily life/knowledge/Kant: Here knowledge does not have to be proved. It is complete and unproblematic. Knowledge/understanding/KantVsIdealism: but in order to understand our knowledge, the idealism must be rejected. Knowledge/How-is it-possible-question/Kant: if we think, "How’s that possible?", we are quickly turning to idealism. I 143 KantVsScepticism: he, however, gets into a predicament if he is needs to generally explain how our knowledge of the world is possible. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Intuitionism | Stegmüller Vs Intuitionism | Stegmüller IV 187 Metaethical Fallacy/Intuitionism Ethics/Stegmüller: another kind of metaethical fallacy: in intuitionism: the thesis that there can be no real moral knowledge without a corresponding object of knowledge. StegmüllerVsMoore/StegmüllerVsIntuitionism: this is based on the false premise that "good" in the moral sense designates a "non-natural" and non-analyzable quality. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Moore, G.E. | Austin Vs Moore, G.E. | Hacking I 179 AustinVsMoore: there is an independent possibility to pick out facts: ostension. Then we put on allegations by combining referring expressions and names of properties and relations. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Moore, G.E. | Ayer Vs Moore, G.E. | Horwich I 52 RussellVsPropositionsRussellVsRussell: (later, Logic and Knowledge, 1956, p. 223): I used to think there were some. But that would only be shadowy additional things to facts. CartwrightVsRussell: we still do not know what the objection against them is!". Horwich I 53 Fact/AyerVsMoore: expresses himself unclearly when he says, "the fact does not exist". Properly, it should be: "There is no fact". ("There is"/Existing/"Being"). (Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 210). CartwrightVsMoore: it still remains a poor argument: it cannot be concluded that because a false belief has no fact as an object it has no object at all. What Moore meant becomes more clear in "Some Main Problems": the proposition "that lions exist" is definitely in the universe, if someone believes that, regardless of whether it is true or false. Because the expressions "that lions exist" and "the existence of lions" are names for that which is believed. (p. 260). Cartwright: at first this looks like a mistake, but it’s not: because he seems to have accepted (together with Russell) that what is believed can be named with a verb ("verbal noun"). Horwich I 54 Then we seem to have a demonstration that there is no such thing as the proposition that E.g. there is no subway in Boston. Because if there were one, there would also have to be such a thing as the non-existence of a subway in Boston. And this cannot exist, because there is a subway in Boston. Cartwright: what is the basis of this argument, the assumption that what is believed may be referred to by a verb (verbal noun)?. CartwrightVsMoore: the argument is not very convincing: Maybe the sentence E.g. "Brown believes that God exists" is synonymous with "Brown believes in the existence of God." But it does not follow that what Brown believes is the existence of God. ((s) The "object" (object of the belief) is on the one hand a sentence with "that", and on the other hand the actual existence). (FN 19). The reason for this lies in Russell’s access to propositions: (8) Brown is taller than Smith. Horwich I 56 Fact/proposition/CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: Problem: now it is just hard to see how a proposition can be anything but true! (FN 23). If in (8) Brown is linked to Smith the way it is said above, how can Brown be anything but taller than Smith?. Russell: E.g. the proposition "A is different from B". The components seem to be only A, B and difference. Nevertheless, they do not constitute the proposition when they are next to each other. The Proposition combines the parts in more ways than a mere list. (FN 24). Cartwright: nevertheless, if the proposition links the parts like this, it cannot be wrong!. Cartwright: if a proposition like (8) exists, then Brown is taller than Smith. Russell: in "Principles" he was also aware that there is a difficulty, but as a solution he could only propose: Russell: if a proposition is true, it has another quality apart from that which it shares with other propositions. (p. 49). Cartwright: this additional quality should of course be the simple, unanalysable truth. But this appeal comes too late! Either the components are linked properly, then the proposition is invariably true, or they are not, then we have no proposition at all. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93, In: Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Moore, G.E. | Carnap Vs Moore, G.E. | Stroud I 186 Language/Existence Assertion/Carnap: for Carnap the choice of a language is a practical question of the convention. CarnapVsMoore: but the type of choice cannot be answered internally as Moore tried. Practical solution: can be influenced by theoretical considerations. It can be about fertility and simplicity. Thing Language/Carnap: is efficient, but it makes it attractive, but it does not show any evidence of the reality of the world. (ESO, 208). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore, G.E. | Danto Vs Moore, G.E. | I 92 Argument of the open question/Intuitionism/Morality/G.E. Moore: should "causes joy" be all that what "good" really means? No, then it would say: does "causes joy cause joy"? And the answer would be absolutely meaningless. Known as the "open question argument". Moore used it to show that "good" is indefinable. Good/Definability/Moore: "Red" is a quality or property of things themselves, simple as yellow. Based on our "intuition" we can say if something is good, just as we can say that something is yellow. We do not argue, even indirectly, that something is good or bad, we just see that it is! I 108 DantoVsMoore: VsArgument of the open question: becomes blunt when we assume complete expressions - example "good husband". I 95 DantoVsMoore: Can we even imagine that two things can be exactly the same, with the only difference that one is good and the other is not? I 112 Would goodness be some kind of scent? Could the good be absent without the bad being present? This shows that something must be wrong, an idea that the good is simple and therefore indefinable. The two things have to be different somehow. DantoVsMoore: his argument of the open question becomes blunt if we assume complete (syncategorematic?) expressions like "good husband" instead of the fragment "good" alone. I 108 DantoVsMoore: he approaches moral questions too cognitively: the question which things are good in his view depends too much on whether they are recognized as such. I 119 Moore: seems to have had the feeling to have found a point in the basic inventory of the world itself. That the term "good" belongs to the atoms of reality itself and that the understanding, the knowledge and the world have the same architecture. DantoVsMoore: but if this turns out to be an illusion, whole contingents of philosophy sink. This gives the term "definition" an even greater weight, because definitions integrate the basic concepts into larger contexts. They must not be vulnerable. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Moore, G.E. | Nagel Vs Moore, G.E. | I 126 NagelVsMoore: commits a petitio principii by appeals to the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, there is not even his hands, and he cannot help to clarify this question. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Moore, G.E. | Prior Vs Moore, G.E. | I 21 Correspondence Theory/Prior: now we can handle the fact that truth and falsity are not only applied to propositions, but also to beliefs and assertions. Truth/Belief/Logical Form/Prior: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, and there will be one." (X believes that) p and p. (Parenthesis). Falsity: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, but there not will be one." ((s) but = and.) X believes that p and ~p. Correspondence Theory: Aquinas' "adaequatio intellectus et rei" goes back to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli from the 10th century. Locus classicus of modernity: Correspondence Theory/Moore: (G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, New York 1953) I 22 Example: Suppose a friend falsely believed that he (Moore) went on holiday and says: Moore: We should say, of course, that if this belief is true, then I must have gone on holiday, and vice versa (conversely): we should say that if I went, this belief is true, of course. Prior: so far it is Aristotelian. Now Moore continues, however, and says: Although its absence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the belief of his friend to be true, it cannot be what is meant by saying that the belief is true! Because: Moore: if we say "the belief that I'm gone, is true", we mean that the belief has a specific property that it shares with other true beliefs. But if we say: "I'm gone", we do not attribute a property to any proposition! We only express a fact, and this fact could also exist if no one believed that! Point/Moore: if no one believes it, the belief does not exist, and then this belief must be false, even if I'm away! ((s) then it must not be false, because nothing that does not exist must be anything or have any properties per se.) PriorVsMoore: he is forced to say that, because he assumes that belief consists in a relation between this belief and a fact. A relation that is not definable, but "familiar". ((s) > "overarching general": if the belief itself consists in a relation between (itself) the belief and a fact, the belief occurs twice. Problem: if it should be defined by this relation. But neither Moore nor Prior say that here. Instead: separating of levels. Belief/Name of the Belief). Moore: the "name of the belief" is to be: "The belief that I'm gone." Name of the fact: "I'm gone." Correspondence/Moore: relation between "the name of the belief and the name of the fact" is what he calls the correspondence. PriorVsMoore: (he probably discarded it later anyway). this is doubtful in two respects: 1) The reason he indicates for the fact that his absence should be constitutive for the truth of the belief of his friend, is at the same time the reason to say that "the former [was] no sufficient and necessary condition for the latter". 2) But if we corrected this with a truly sufficient condition, this correction would also give us a definition. I.e. the belief is true if X believes that p and it is the case that p. Correspondence would not be more, then. (Simply accordance with the facts). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Moore, G.E. | Russell Vs Moore, G.E. | Horwich I 44 True/Moore: (Baldwin's dictionary article): is ambiguous, depending on whether it is applied to believe I 45 then Smith' and Brown's believes are different or propositions: E.g. Suppose, someone believes that there are no subways in Boston, then this is wrong, but the object of believe (= Proposition) exists in any case. Truth/Moore: (early) is a simple, unanalysable property that simply does not have a false proposition. I 64 Falsehood/Moore: definable in terms of truth. RussellVsMoore: both terms are unanalysable. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Moore, G.E. | Searle Vs Moore, G.E. | III 191 SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition). III 193 Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism. III 195 The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions. V 264 naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Moore, G.E. | Strawson Vs Moore, G.E. | IV 45 Philosophy/Moore: most important task, description of the whole universe, whereby it must be distinguished between what things we know that they have to be in it, and of which we do not know. --- IV 48 StrawsonVsMoore: with the word "important" we will not get far. It boils down to the question of the most common things and most general terms. ((s) things cannot be general, there are always terms of which generality is claimed.) |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Moore, G.E. | Wittgenstein Vs Moore, G.E. | VI 212 "On Certainty"/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the book goes back to the confrontation with the remark Moore's "I know that I have two hands" or: "This is a material object" and others. E.g. Moore: "The earth has long existed before I was born". (> "Moore's hands") WittgensteinVsMoore: one can only say that this sentence has a clearer sense than "it exists in the last 5 minutes". Wittgenstein: E.g. But why should a king have not been brought up to believe that the world started with him? Knowledge/certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: Moore justifies knowledge by specifying contingent empirical propositions. Wittgenstein (PU, BPP): we see in knowledge often the highest level of a hierarchy of attitudes to objects of knowledge. --- VI 213 From this ranking, we too easily conclude that sentences that are fixed indubitable, are sentences at the same time, whose contents one knows. E.g. 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say, you "knew" things like this? Thesis: if doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is not appropriate. E.g. I am simply in pain, has nothing to do with "knowing that". --- VI 216 E.g. At maximum, after an accident I can reassure myself that I still have my hands. --- VI 222 WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: E.g. "I never went far from the surface of the earth": it is difficult to classify the sentence into a context. Therefore, it is also not clear what one might call error here. Moore's sentences can hardly be assigned to a language game, a spokesperson cannot be fixed. --- VI 233 Certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: sentences that exclude doubts and mistakes, stand on a dead track. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Moore, G.E. | Verschiedene Vs Moore, G.E. | Grice I 266ff Hungerland Thesis Vs "inductive conception" of the paradigm of context implication: p claim to imply believing that p. Hungerland: instead: thesis Explanation model, if an assertion is normal, everything is implied that can be inferred from it. This depends on three different things: 1. Context of the assertion 2. Assumptions about what is considered normal 3. Rules for the correct use of expressions Example (Moore) "He went out, but I don't believe it." Hungerland: that is no contradiction! No logical isolation in the community. Brendel I 14 Term Analysis/Moore/Brendel: necessary condition: synonymy of the terms. Epistemological criterion/Synonymy/Moore: "Nobody can know, I 15 that the analytical standard applies to an object without knowing that the analytical standard applies to it. (Moore 1942, 663). Synonymy/Cooper LangfordVsMoore/Brendel: if the terms are then synonymous (i.e. the analysis is considered correct), it is trivial. ("Paradox of Analysis"). Synonymy/KünneVsMoore: is not at all a necessary condition for a correct conceptual analysis. I 16 Def Co-Implication/Künne/Brendel: Solution: "Co-Implication" = necessary extensional equality. (Künne 1990. 37). Logical form: "x is A" and "x is BC" imply each other in all possible worlds. Problem: this is not always obvious even for competent speakers. Intension Equality/Brendel: condition for it is necessary extension equality: if two expressions have the same intension, then they have the same extension in all possible world. Intension/Extension/some authors: but this does not apply vice versa. Example Kirkham: "2+2=4" and "36+7=29" and example "This object has a form" and "This object has a size" are extensionally equivalent by having the same truth value in all possible worlds, but they are not intensionally equivalent (not synonymous). I 17 Concept Analysis/Kirkham/Brendel: sometimes it is only about extension equality in the real world. Extension Equivalence/Equal Scope/stronger/weaker/Brendel: also in all possible worlds it is still somewhat weaker than synonymy. Putnam I 195 BurnyeatVsMoore: "he philosophises as if Kant never existed". (a propos "Moore's hands"). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Moore, G.E. | Stroud Vs Moore, G.E. | Brendel I 267 Moore's Hands/Brendel: Moore is aware that his example does not refute the sceptic. VsMoore/Brendel: but his critic starts from a concept of knowledge that he himself does not share. He admits that he cannot prove the premises of his proof. Knowledge/Moore: N.B.: but it does not follow that he cannot know that he has two hands! Thesis: knowledge is also possible without proof. I 268 StroudVsMoore: Moore did not really get involved with the skeptical hypothesis. His "proof of the outside world" is an internal reaction. This is inadequate. Skepticism/Stroud: Thesis: his question cannot be posed within a certain knowledge context. External/Internal/Skepticism/Moore's Hands/Stroud/Brendel: to show that Moore is right one would have to show that the skeptical hypothesis cannot be formulated externally. Moore's Hands/BrendelVsStroud: could also be understood as an external assertion. The fact that a subject can know something without justification is typically externalistic (see above). BrendelVsExternalism: (see above 8.3.3). I 270 Moore's Hands/BrendelVsMoore/pro Stroud/Brendel. Stroud I 115 Knowledge/Skepticism/Stroud: Example Question: were there apples in Sicily 400 B.C.? I do not know, but I have an idea how to find out: New question: is it known whether there...? Then I could ask historians. Some will say "I know...". Then when someone asks me, I can say: "Yes, it's known that ..." These are all questions about knowledge that are answered directly. StroudVsMoore: the same is not possible if you do not know anything about the world at all. The example implies that one knows something about Sicily at all ((s) that one knows that it exists at all. Existential assumptions are already implied if knowledge questions are answered). Moore/Stroud: assumes that such questions need not be taken seriously, I 116 because it's very easy to answer. Knowledge/Stroud: it is about the fact that there are general truths about human knowledge that simply follow from the fact that something is known at all. Moore/Stroud: such a general question could therefore be answered with reference to a certain piece of knowledge. This is how Moore seems to understand it. For example, geology explains something about rock layers, so there are material things, for example, there are nine planets, so there are at least nine material things. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Moore, G.E. | Cartwright Vs Moore, G.E. | Horwich I 45 Correspondence theory/CartwrightVsmoore: Problem: there is also a property of coincidence (correspondence) which does not have the false proposition. And that seems to depend undeniably on the world! On a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise it is false. CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this which the theory of truth ignores as a simple, unanalysable property. But both were aware of this. ("Meinong Theory", p 75). They stuck to it, because: RussellVsCorrespondence theory, MooreVsCorrespondence theory. I 47 Fact/True proposition/Moore/Cartwright: (Moore: Some Main P, pp 262): seems to have explained his former theory wrongly there: Tact/MooreVsMoore: (late): does not consist in a proposition having a simple property while remaining the same, regardless of whether it is true or false. Even if we concede the existence of propositions. The relation of the proposition to the fact is not simply that the proposition is a constituent of the fact, one of the elements of which it is composed. Moore/Cartwright: otherwise, one would have to say that E.g. the fact that lions exist was a fact about the proposition that lions exist. But how is this relevant for Moore’s earlier theory? Because that was not what it was about, but rather that the fact that lions exist simply is the proposition. (Moore, early: fact = true proposition, not part of it) The simple property (truth) is possessed by the proposition itself. I 48 Anyone who believes that the proposition that lions exist is true, believes the corresponding proposition. The fact here is that the proposition is true. Fact/Moore: (early): consists in that the proposition possesses the simple property of truth. Fact/Moore/late: (Some Main P, misrepresenting his earlier theory): now consists in the possession of the truth (simple property) by the proposition. Important argument: then there is no identity fact = true proposition: because identity does not consist in itself having a property. ((s) A does not consist of the fact that A has the property F,> consist in, consist of, identity). Moore/Cartwright: the time of "Some Main .." he had come to the view that the relation theory of beliefs (acceptance of belief objects) is inconsistent with the identification of facts with true propositions. Now a relation was searched rather than the identity and his solution was the relation of "consisting in": Def Fact/Moore: (Some Main Problems): consists in the possession of truth by the proposition. (still simple property). CartwrightVsMoore: he saw himself that this was not very successful: there are facts that do not consist in a proposition having a certain simple property. CartwrightVsMoore: worse: once facts and propositions are distinguished, no simple property (truth) is needed anymore. Instead, we now have facts as the corresponding ones! It was precisely this inability to distinguish propositions and facts that had led Moore and Russell to the theory of truth as a simple unanalysable property!. Fact/Proposition/Moore/Cartwright: what had led Moore to start believing that propositions and facts cannot be identified?. I 49 E.g. Suppose Brown believes that there are subways in Boston. Moore/Russell/early: then there is a corresponding proposition that Brown believes. Problem: even if the belief had been wrong, Brown would have needed a faith object. Because what someone believes cannot depend on its truth!. So the believed proposition is definitely in the universe. But if the proposition is false, there is no corresponding fact in the universe. So propositions cannot be identical with facts. Ayer: this is a compelling argument. Cartwright: but for me it does not refute the early theory!. Russell/Moore/Early/Cartwright: sure, if something is true of a proposition, and it is not true of the corresponding fact, then proposition and fact are not the identical. But is this case given here? According to the early theory, the proposition would be in the universe anyway, even if it were wrong. Question: Is Moore right to say that the same does not apply to the fact? CartwrightVsMoore: it is not obvious that if the belief, e.g. that there are underground trains in Boston, was wrong, it would be necessary that something that actually exists in the universe, (namely that there are underground trains in Boston) would then be missing in the universe. Surely it would not be fact, but that does not mean that an entity would be missing if the belief had been wrong. I 50 Analogy: e.g. there is someone in the universe who can be correctly described as the author of Word and Object (namely Quine). Now, it could easily have been the case that Quine had not written the book. But that would not require Quine (= author of W + O) to not exist in the universe! E.g. Someone else might also have written the book. Furthermore, all persons who actually are in the universe, would not have had to be in the universe. Moore/Early/Cartwright: According to Moore’s earlier theory one might have thought that by analogy, something could also be in the universe that is "correctly described" with that there are underground trains in Boston, which, in the case that there were no underground trains in Boston, would not be a fact. That is wrong because of the false analogy between people and abstract belief objects). CartwrightVsMoore: (early): a follower of the early theory would have expressed the true same proposition with the following two sentences: (3) The fact that there are underground trains in Boston would not have had to be the fact that there are underground trains in Boston. and (4) The author of Word and Object would not have had to be the author of Word and Object. CartwrightVsMoore: (early): With that he would have assumed that "the fact that" would have been a rigid designator. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Moore, G.E. | Malcolm Vs Moore, G.E. | Stroud I 87 Knowledge/Skepticism/Compatibility/Moore's Hands/Stroud: how can skepticism be misinterpreted when it comes to compatibility with our everyday minds? Two possibilities: Stroud I 88 Proof of Existence/External World/Moore's Hands/Norman MalcolmVsMoore: (Malcolm: Moore on Ordinary Language, (in Schilpp Phil.of Moore, New York 1952, p. 348ff "S"): the answer VsSkepticism remains open. Moore does not say what is wrong with the skeptic's doubts about the existence of his hands. It would be pointless for Moore to say, for example, "I know there's a tree because I have a clear view of it. But that is exactly what Moore seems to be doing. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore, G.E. | Verificationism Vs Moore, G.E. | Stroud I 180 VerificationismVsMoore/Stroud: Verificationism goes much deeper than Moore because it recognizes the need for justification in a positive philosophy. We must be able to eradicate empty illusions from our intellectual map. Positive Approach/Carnap/Stroud: with this he offers what he considers to be a correct description of our everyday position in relation to the outside world, and in relation to the question of how it is possible that we know something. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore, G.E. | Newen Vs Moore, G.E. | New I131 Metaethics/Newen: to clarify, what the status ethical statements is - not what kind of ethics is the right one. Moore: is utilitarian. Moore pro utilitarianism. Good/Moore/Newen: 1) Thesis: you never make a purely empirical assertion by saying that something is good. 2) good is not a natural property, i.e. it is a non-natural one. 3) For that, we need moral intuition. Def Right Action/Moore/Newen: I 132 The one that brings forth more good than any alternative action. "Right": can therefore be further analyzed. Naturalistic Fallacy/Moore/Newen: the wrong intention to define values properties empirically. This confuses two worlds. The natural and the non-natural. Good/Moore: since the substitution in "What we all want, we want all" by "What we all want is good" is not trivial, "good" cannot mean the same as "what we all want." I 133 NewenVsMoore: this does not mean that "good" is a non-analyzable and non-empirical property. Paradox of Analysis/Moore/Newen: (solution see above I 15) a concept relation necessarily applies and it is informative if it is not part of the normal language competence, but can only recognized through systematic study of conceptual relations. This option applies - as for all expressions - also for "good". I 133/134 Good/Moore/StevensonVsMoore/Newen: Suppose Moore had shown that "good" is not a natural property. It does not follow that it is a non-natural property. It would require that "good" is a describable property at all. Although Moore is right that such statements are not empirical ones, it does not follow that they are non-empirical. Value/Values/Stevenson: Thesis: Value statements are no assertions that are true or false, they do not express opinions and beliefs, but they serve to evoke attitudes. This thesis was called emotivism. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Moore, G.E. | Stegmüller Vs Moore, G.E. | Stegmüller IV 181 Argument of open question/good/Definition/Moore: suppose someone claims that "good" can be defined as "conducive to joie de vivre". Then we could still understand the question: "Admittedly, it promotes joie de vivre, but is it also good? Conclusion: "good" must mean a simple, non-analytic, non-natural quality. StegmüllerVsMoore: this can only refer to moral goodness. IV 182 We could still assume that there is a common core of meaning in moral and non-moral contexts. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Putnam, H. | Hacking Vs Putnam, H. | I40 Truth/Reason/Putnam: are very closely connected. HackingVsPutnam. I 148 Meaning/Science/HackingVsPutnam: we should talk about types of objects, not about types of meaning. Meaning is not a very good concept for philosophy of science. I 156 HackingVsPutnam: Reference is ultimately not decisive! (E.g. muon). For physicists, "Meson" was initially synonymous with "whatever corresponds to the presumption of Yukawa". That’s something like Fregean sense. When it became clear that this sense did not correspond to the object, the baptism was annulled and a new name was given. I 163 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Vs idea of "fixed whole of mind-independent objects". HackingVsPutnam: nobody has never represented this!. I 164 HackingVsPutnam: links his different theses, as if they were logically connected. They are not!. HackingVsPutnam: he used to represent a scientific realism. He has not changed party, he has changed war. I 179 HackingVsPutnam: however, actually he has shown nothing but the failure of the reference by naming a number of true statements, which are brought into being in the first-order logic (>Löwenheim, >AustinVsMoore). I 181 Löwenheim-Skolem/Premises/Hacking: 1) the sentence is only about the first-order logic sentences. So far, no one has proved that the language of the physicists could be pressed in this context. Spoken languages contain indicators: "this" and "that". Montague thesis: colloquial language primarily uses second-order quantifiers. Wittgenstein’s arguments against showing, according to which it was not possible to fully specify meaning using rules, do not imply that there was something in our linguistic practice, which is essential undetermined. Löwenheim and Skolem spoke about large numbers and we can only talk about them. About cats or cherries we can do more than merely talk. Putnam asserts that it is possible to reinterpret words such as "designate" and "refer" in turn. HackingVsPutnam: I do not need theory of reference to refer. And it’s a - possibly with reference to Wittgenstein - at least defensible conception that there cannot be a general theory of reference. I 182 scientific articles on muons are full of photographs! - E.g. muons: it has been found that the mass of the muon is 206,786 times the mass of the electron. How have we found out this figure at the time?. I 183 From a whole bunch of complicated calculations with a bunch of variables and a number of relations between nature constants. These consist not only of sentences, but are linked to experimental findings. They also have been found by independent scientists and laboratories. I 184 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is not constructive. I.e. in principle there is no method for producing a non-intended interpretation available to man. - E.g. we also speak of "Persian" and "Heart Cherry". These species names do not act like ordinary adjectives of the type "sweet", because sweet heart cherries are sweet fruits and not "heart fruit". - Solution: This is not possible or would be noticed, because the number of subspecies is not the same: the number of cherry species is different from the number of cat species. So no correspondence relation will preserve the structure of the species names. Moreover, you would not bake a cake with cats! How should cherry facts come to light in the cat world?. I 185 Putnam perhaps commits the gravest error possible in philosophy: he takes a sentence as an example that was perhaps never uttered and would be pointless outside logic. The next step is then to assert that just as it is possible to reinterpret "cherries" it is possible to reinterpret "designating". Reference: its warranty does not depend primarily on the expression of true propositions, but on our interactions with the world. Even at the level of the language there is far more structure given than Putnam involves. I 220 HackingVsPutnam: transcendental Nominalist (anti-realist). It is not possible to step out of the system of thought and retain a base of reference that does not belong to one’s own system of reference. HackingVsPutnam: misguided dichotomy of thought and action (like Dewey). Hacking Thesis: man is a representing being. (A tribe without images is not a human tribe for me). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Cavell Vs Skepticism | I (a) 52/53 Skepticism/Cavell: Asymmetry: you assume that your inability ((s) to show the pain) has the same meaning as that of the skeptic: he should be able to show what he has in mind, if it is understandable. Otherwise you assume that the skeptic cannot show that his position is understandable. For the skeptic, however, there is another asymmetry: he does not have to prove the comprehensibility of his incapacity. The critic of skepticism must therefore show that even the skeptic has no use for his words. For example, as long as one cannot show that it is possible to see through the objects, it is pointless (incomprehensible) to speak of the inability to see through. Why can the skeptic not just say, "You don't understand what I mean"? I (a) 54 The source of intelligibility are the words themselves then one can say: VsSkepticism: he uses the words in a case where they are no longer meaningful. SkepticismVsVs: that is double-edged: the objection shows that the sceptic changes the context, but it also shows that what the sceptic says is understandable! Stroud I 256 Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxf. 1979, "CR", p. 45ff)) We must note the difference between the skepticistic assertion that we never know anything and the everyday assertion that in individual cases we do not know anything. Stroud: Question: how can the philosophical question about the general possibility of knowledge arise at all, while we are dealing with the assessment (evaluation) of an individual case? I 257 Cavell: is the example that the skeptic produces to be understood as an example of an individual case? Descartes/Stroud: we take them more as everyday questions. For example, I do not know if I am really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: in the case of Descartes the basis is not introduced completely naturally. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (s.o. AustinVsMoore). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Oxf. 1979, 208) Use Theory/Cavell: assumes individual situations. Use TheoryVsEpistemology/Stroud: this is a special branch of the critique of skepticism. CavellVsSkepticism: it is not that he cannot mean the things he thinks he means because his conclusion would be contradictory. Rather, he ignores the terms of his sceptical claims, while his words retain their normal meaning. ((s) No change in meaning). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Various Authors | Cresswell Vs Various Authors | II 58 Computation/Cresswell: (representative: e.g. Moore/Hendrix, 1981) make it appear as if they have solved a problem which logicians have tried in vain to solve for years. CresswellVs: these are two completely different issues: ((s) The logicians are more concerned with the semantic one, the computation people with psychological issues). Content/Cresswell: (of a complement sentence) can be considered to be an equivalence class of all objects that are considered representations of this sentence. Belief objects/Moore/Hendrix (Hendrix 1981) some of these objects (the objects of mental states such as beliefs) are sentences in an internal language of the mind, others are in public language. There may be some that are in no language at all. (E.g. logical formulas). --- II 59 Content/Meaning/Cresswell: two sentences have the same meaning when they have the same content, providing they contain no index words. (5) The map indicates that the distance to Lower Moutere is 12 km. ... This requires each sentence to already have a meaning, so that the attitude is simply an attitude with regard to the meaning. CresswellVsMoore/CresswellVsHendrix: i.e. we can only solve the problem of Moore and Hendrix if we already have a semantics. Synonymy/Cresswell: if the synonymy relation ~~ (notation: in the book two swung dashes on top of each other) is defined like that, it can be set up compositionally for the whole language. I have no idea how this is supposed to work, but Hendrix and Moore refrain from it anyway. CresswellVsHendrix: they do not show how the synonymy classes are obtained. --- Hughes I 260 Non-standard systems/Hughes/Cresswell: have other basic operators as L and M. E.g. Halldén (1949b): limitation to a single three-digit operator which defines all other modal and truth-functional operators: [p, q, r] with the meaning that "either p is false or q is false or r is impossible" , i.e. (~p v ~q v ~Mr). Then: negation, conjunction, possibility: ~a = def [a,a,a] (a . b) = def [a,b[a, ~a,a]] Ma = def ~[[a, ~a,a],[a ~a,a],a] Hughes I 261 Hughes/CresswellVsHalldén: that makes an unnatural impression. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Skepticism | Cavell, St. | Stroud I 257 Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: In the case of Descartes, the basis is not completely natural. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (see AustinVsMoore above). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Conceptual Role, 208) I 258 Use Theory/Cavell: The thesis is based on individual situations. I 258f Skepticism/CavellVsSkepticism: the skeptic does not do what he believes he is doing. He says nothing! - Then he cannot mean anything either. - Traditional epistemology: it says surprisingly little - it claims no knowledge! Def Basis/Cavell: a sentence that produces a special claim. CavellVsDescartes: did not make a claim either. - Difference: to imagine sitting by the fireplace, and to imagine claiming to know this. So the solution method cannot even look similar to our everyday methods. - Assertion: requires context that is not generally transferable. The sceptical judgement would not be representative. I 261 The judgement of the epistemologist or skeptic is always particular. I 261 StroudVsCavell: I can see that I have made a condition that is not met. Then this calls my knowledge into question, without me having previously put this forward in a claim to knowledge ("basis"). Nevertheless: like Cavell: StroudVsEpistemology: needs each time a concrete knowledge claim, which makes a general answer impossible. I 263 Stroud pro Cavell: I think he is right, thesis: that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case, which make a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you don't have to show that no assertion has been made. |
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| Skepticism | Descartes, R. | Stroud I 11 Descartes: Thesis: the senses do not show us with certainty whether the situation in which we believe we find ourselves actually exists. This shows that we cannot know anything at all about the outside world. Descartes: Thesis: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream. I 18 Descartes/Dream/Skepticism/Stroud: Thesis: two steps of Descartes' considerations are correct. Nevertheless: StroudVsDescartes: Thesis: We may sometimes know that we are not dreaming. I 19 StroudVsDescartes: Thesis: one can also know something about the world when one dreams (see below). I 24 Weaker Thesis/StroudVsDescartes: the undeniable truth is merely that when one dreams that one then lacks knowledge. ((s) so this is a weaker thesis). Skepticism/Stroud: The thesis is only reached with the stronger thesis! I 111 Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud/VsMoore: Descartes arrives at his thesis by assessing all our knowledge. Source: were the senses in Descartes. I 140 "All Different"/Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: achieves his skeptical conclusion from the thesis that our perception could be exactly as it is, even if there were no external things at all. Gap/Stroud: for Descartes there is a gap between appearance and reality. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Skepticism | Ambrose, A. | Stroud I 89 Skeptizismus/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: beide: Skeptizismus kann nicht empirisch widerlegt werden. Ambrose These: der Skeptizismus kann nicht einmal beschreiben, welche Art Ding ein Beweis für ein "Ding der Außenwelt" wäre. - Daher kann "niemand weiß, ob Dinge existieren" nicht falsifiziert werden. AmbrosVsSkeptizismus: Der Skeptizismus kann nicht anders als sich der Dinge über die er spricht, bewusst zu sein. I 91 Bsp Wenn er sagt "Ich weiß, dass ich drei Doller in der Tasche habe" spricht er über etwas mögliches. - ((s) Wenn er es für unmöglich hielte, wäre er nicht Skeptiker). Er gibt zu, dass es nicht notwendig eine Falschheit ist, die Sprache so zu gebrauchen. AmbroseVsMoore: kann daher nicht zeigen, dass der Skeptiker die Sprache falsch gebraucht. - VsMoore: argumentiert, als ob der Satz "niemand weiß, ob Hände existieren" eine notwendige Wahrheit wäre. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Malcolm, N. | Stroud I 89 Skeptizismus/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: beide: Sk kann nicht empirisch widerlegt werden - Ambrose These: der Sk kann nicht einmal beschreiben, welche Art Ding ein Beweis für ein "Ding der Außenwelt" wäre - daher kann "niemand weiß, ob Dinge existieren" nicht falsifiziert werden - AmbrosVsSkeptizismus: der Sk kann nicht anders als sich der Dinge über die er spricht, bewußt zu sein - I 91 Bsp wenn er sagt "Ich weiß, daß ich drei Doller in der Tasche habe" spricht er über etwas mögliches! - ((s) wenn er es für unmöglich hielte , wäre er nicht Skeptiker) - er gibt zu, daß es nicht notwendig eine Falschheit ist, die Sprache so zu gebrauchen - AmbroseVsMoore: kann daher nicht zeigen, daß der Sk die Sprache falsch gebraucht - VsMoore: argumentiert, als ob der Satz -žniemand weiß ob Hände existieren-œ eine notwendige Wahrheit wäre |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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