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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minority Rights | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 253 Minority rights/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's(1) defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Group rights: The first issue to be addressed was the question of whether groups could properly be the bearers of rights. To some it was plain that they could not: only individuals could have rights (Narveson, 1991(2); Hartney, 1991(3)). According to one view, groups were fictitious entities - and fictitious entities could not be rights bearers (Graf, 1994(4): 194). Yet in spite of such reservations, political theory has in recent years (with the rise of multiculturalism) become much more sympathetic to the idea of group rights. History: Even before multiculturalism acquired its current prominence, however, some philosophers had already advanced accounts of group rights. Joseph Raz (1986(5): 207—8), for example, in his influential account of rights leaves space for collective rights. Larry May (1987(6): 180), while remaining cautious about the extent to which groups should be recognized as rights holders, argued that moral theorists needed to examine more closely the actions and interests of social groups as possible bearers of rights and responsibilities. And Frances Svensson (1979)(7) had earlier suggested that group rights were needed to do justice to the claims of native peoples. VsMulticulturalism: Nonetheless, theorists (or critics) of multiculturalism did not always mean the same thing when they invoked group rights or 'cultural' rights. Levy: The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997(8): 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. >Cultural Rights/Levy. Group rights: The consensus of opinion is that it is quite possible for groups to have rights, or for rights to be accorded both to groups and to individuals on the basis of identity. A group may hold a right as an independently recognized entity; and individuals may hold particular rights because they are members of particular collectivities. Problems: Nonetheless, this issue has remained controversial because of the implications of granting rights on the basis of group membership. >Group rights. Freedom/oppression: As Peter Jones put it, 'Group rights are often articulated as demands for group freedom, but they are also feared as vehicles for group oppression' (1999(9): 354). VsRaz: Thus Raz's view of group rights, though widely accepted (Brett, 1991(10); Freeman, 1995(11); Margalit and Halbertal, 1994(12)), has been criticized for being too capacious in as much as it identifies groups as no more than collectivities of individuals who share nothing more enduring than an interest in a matter (Réaume, 1988(13); 1994(14); Jones, 1999(9): 359). Content/education/problems: The demands of some groups for rights in the form of exemptions, for example, have generated a substantial debate about the implications of such special rights. This debate becomes especially vigorous, however, when particular issues become salient: religion, education, and children. Children/religion: While most liberal defenders of multiculturalism have been ready to grant cultural minorities the right to live by their own beliefs, children and education have raised special problems. For many, the limits of multiculturalism are set by the need to protect the interests of children, which override even the rights of parents or communities to inculcate their own religious beliefs. >Religion, >Religious belief, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Narveson, Jan (1991) 'Collective rights?' Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 329—45. 3. Hartney, Michael (1991) 'Some confusions concerning collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 293-314. 4. Graf, James A. (1994) 'Human rights, peoples, and the right to self-determination'. In Judith Baker, ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: Umversity of Toronto Press, 186—214. 5. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. May, Larry (1987) The Morality of Gmups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights. Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press. 7. Svensson, Frances (1979) 'Liberal democracy and group rights: the legacy of individualism and its impact on American Indian tribes'. Political Studies, 23 (3): 421-39. 8. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. 9. Jones, Peter (1999) 'Group rights and group oppression'. Journal ofP01itica1 Philosophy, 7 (4): 353-77. 10. Brett, Nathan (1991) 'Language laws and collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 347_60. 11. Freeman, Michael (1995) 'Are there collective human rights?' Political Studies, Special Issue, 43: 25—40. 12. Margalit, Avishai and Moshe Halbertal (1994) 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61: 491-510. 13. Réaume, Denise G. (1988) 'Individuals, groups, and rights to public goods'. University of Toronto Law Journal, 38: 1-27. 14.Réaume, Denise G. (1994) 'The group right to linguistic security: Whose right? What duties?' In Judith Baker ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 118-41. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Multiculturalism | Indigenous Peoples | Gaus I 258 Multicuturalism/Indigenous peoples/Kukathas: Generally, multiculturalism is assumed to speak not only for the interests of immigrant cultural minorities but also for the aboriginal peoples who are minorities in modern states. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, no less than Fiji, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and most of South and Central America, are home to peoples whose ancestry may be traced back to premodern times, and their interests are sometimes thought to be addressed by the development of the institutions of a multicultural society. Indigenous peoples VsMulticulturalism: Yet for many indigenous peoples multiculturalism is less than welcome, for its implication is the further marginalization of their communities and culture in a modern state more attuned to the needs of migrants than to those of aborigines. Kymlicka’s theory: The recognition of this issue has shaped the development of Kymlicka's theory, which is particularly aware of the distinctive concerns of indigenous peoples. His model of group-differentiated rights deliberately makes space for national minorities, as distinct from polyethnic groups. >Minorities/Kymlicka, >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Kukathas: Whether or not Kymlicka's theory is defensible, however, aboriginal groups around the world have pressed the case for the rights of indigenous minorities. (For a sceptical assessment of the notion of indigenous rights see Mulgan, 1989a(1). Mulgan, 1989b(2) also suggests that, in the case of New Zealand, the land is occupied by two indigenous peoples: the Maori and Pakeha, or descendants of white settlers.) Moreover, many indigenous groups have insisted that, unlike immigrant peoples, what they need is not only recognition of their independent status but also rectification for past injustice. Indigenous rights/society/incorporation: Extended treatments of the problem of incorpo- rating aboriginal peoples into modern liberal democratic society, in a way that respects the integrity of aboriginal traditions, have been offered by Tully (1995)(3) and, more recently, Ivison (2002)(4). Both suggest that a viable liberal order requires the establishment of a constitutional modus vivendi that incorporates recognition of aboriginal custom and culture. However, as Ivison argues, mere incorporation of indigenous law may not be enough given that circumstances vary and both society and indigenous societies are themselves changing (2002(4) 141-62). Rectification: the problem of rectification for past injustice, however, remains a serious difficulty, particularly when the effluxion of time has made the matter of ascribing to present generations responsibility for past injustice a difficult one, morally, legally, and politically. Waldron: Jeremy Waldron (1992)(5), for one, has suggested that public policy should focus on future welfare rather than past injustice if the aim is to do justice to the concerns of aboriginal people (see also Sher, 1981(6); Goodin, 2001(7)). Though others have offered theories of rectification that might do justice to the demands of aboriginal peoples (Kukathas, 2003a(8); Hill, 2002(9)), it seems unlikely that those demands will ever be met philosophically,(...). 1. Mulgan, Richard (1989a) 'Should indigenous peoples have special rights?' Orbis, 33 (3): 375—88. 2. Mulgan, Richard ( 1989b) Maori, Pakeha and Democracy. Auckland: Oxford University Press. 3. Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ivison, Duncan (2002) Postcolonial Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Waldron, Jeremy (1992) 'Superseding historic injustice'. Ethics, 103: 4-28. 6. Sher, George (1981) 'Ancient wrongs and modern rights'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1): 3-17. 7. Goodin, Robert E. (2001) 'Waitangi tales'. Australasian Journal ofPhi10sophy, 78 (3): 309-33. 8. Kukathas, Chandran (2003a) 'Responsibility for past injustice: how to shift the burden'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2 (2): 165-88. 9. Hill, Renée A. (2002) 'Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 10 392-415. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Multiculturalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 256 Multiculturalism/Political philosophy/Kukathas: Not all theories, (...) have been entirely sympathetic to multiculturalism, particularly when the price of cultural diversity has looked like being acceptance of illiberal or tyrannical practice. Fish: According to Stanley Fish (1998(1): 73—5), no one could genuinely advocate multiculturalism because that would require tolerating all cultures, including those determined to stamp out tolerance. Most multiculturalists are thus not 'real' but 'boutique' multi-culturalists, prepared to tolerate difference for as Gaus I 257 long as differences are trivial. But regardless of whether Fish's argument is sound - and it is at least debatable, in light of the long history of debate over the question of the toleration of the intolerant (Heyd, 1996)(2) - some theorists have concluded that when multiculturalism comes into conflict with more important fundamental values, multiculturalism will have to yield. EgalitarianismVsMulticulturalism: The most comprehensive liberal egalitarian critique of multiculturalism has been offered by Brian Barry in his book Culture and Equality (2001)(3). >Egalitarianism, >B. Barry, >Liberalism. Barry: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995(4): 521). BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. >Muliculturalism/Barry. FeminismVsMulticulturalism: One of the most important objections to multiculturalism is that, in seeking exemptions or special rights for cultural groups or religious communities and organizations, it in effect seeks protection for groups whose practices are sexist and highly disadvantageous - if not altogether harmful - to women. Susan Moller Okin: this view has been put most forcefully by Susan Okin (1998(5) 1999a(6); 1999b(7); 2002(8)), who has taken issue with almost all of the most prominent defenders of multiculturalism, and found their commitment to women' s rights and interests wanting. >Multiculturalism/Feminism. Gaus I 261 Nation/nationality/citizenship/social justice/Kukathas: (...)a measure of social solidarity is necessary if citizens are to go along with institutions which perform a redistributive function. Indeed, as others have argued, the workings of legal and political institutions may depend to a significant degree on a substantial willingness on the part of the population of a state to view themselves as members of the same group, who owe something to each other in a way which they do not owe to outsiders (Patten, 2001)(9). For this reason, it may be necessary for the state to take an interest in the fostering of a sense of citizenship and belonging. Cf. >Multiculturalism, >Diversity, >Minority rights, >Kymlicka. Individualism/recognition/Kukathas: the desire of each to be recognized as different and distinctive gives rise to a demand for a politics of multiculturalism - one that recognizes and tolerates, or even encourages and honours, diversity. Yet the politics of diversity in turn may give rise to a demand for political separation, and the emergence of communities in which diversity has no place. How the many can live as one remains a salient question in political theory. >Individualism. 1. Fish, Stanley (1998) 'Boutique multiculturalism'. In Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger and M. Richard Zinman, eds, Multiculturalism and American Democracy. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2. Heyd, David, ed. (1996) Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 4. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34. 5. Okin, Susan Moller (1998) 'Feminism and multiculturalism: some tensions'. Ethics, 108: 661—84. 6. Okin, Susan Moller (1999a) 'Is multiculturalism bad for women?'. In Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 7-24. 7. Okin, Susan Moller (1999b) 'Reply'. In Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 115—31. 8. Okin, Susan Moller (2002) '"Mistresses of their own destiny": group rights, gender, and realistic rights of exit'. Ethics, 112: 205-30. 9. Patten, Alan (2001) 'Liberal citizenship in multinational societies'. In Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, eds, Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 279—98. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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