Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Given | Millikan | I 6 Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory. >Foundation, >Correpsondence theory. I 7 Not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person himself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world. >Knowledge/Millikan, >Naturalism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Picture Theory | Quine | XII 44 Definition Myth of the Museum/Quine: explanations: are the meanings - descriptions: are the words - QuineVsPicture Theory: close to the myth - QuineVsMyth: 1. according to it meanings are to be mental entities - 2. even without this assumption: the semantics would be somehow fixed in the mind: whether it should go beyond behavior and dispositions is unclear. >Meaning/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sense | Millikan | I 6 Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not a reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism. Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory... I 7 ...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world. >Correspondence theory, >Correspondence/Millikan. I 11 Sense/Meaning/Millikan: sense is not "intension": and also not Quinean "meaning". Also not Fregean sense. >Meaning/Millkan. Intension/Millikan: intension has to do with a network of concluding rules. Sense: has taken over the task of "intension", but sense is not completely in contrast with "reference". >Intension/Millikan. Reference: having a referent will be the same as having "sense". Referents: are another thing. >Reference/Millikan. I 111 Def sense/sense/intentional icons/Fregean sense/Millikan: an intentional icon has sense and each of the variable and invariant mapping elements or aspects also have sense. Also every element of a family of such an element has sense. Having sense: corresponds to having normal conditions for the exercise of the direct eigenfunction. Definition sense/sense/Fregean sense/short/Millikan: is the normal mapping rule. The sense of an icon are the rules according to which the icon maps something. --- I 141 Sense/Intension/Summary/Millikan: 1. Neither stimulus meaning nor explicit intension (if any is present) determine the sense. 2. The sense determines neither the stimulus meaning nor the explicit intension (if there is one). 3. Expressions in the idiolect can therefore have different stimulus meanings and/or intensions, and still have the same meaning. Even the same stimulus meaning and/or intension and different senses. 4. Neither stimulus meaning nor intension are infallible. They do not need that because they are not "criteria". For the referent nothing depends on them. 5. Senses - also of thoughts - can be ambiguous and also empty. 6. A term in the idiolect can have multiple intensions and yet have a clear meaning. 7. Sense: an expression is not the same as the sense of one of the explicit intensions. 8. The sense of an expression can be ambiguous or empty, and yet its explicit intension can have a clear meaning. 9. If one can say that an empty term has a meaning (somehow related to intentionality), then only because it has an intension that makes sense on its part. Sense, not intension is the root of all intentionality, intension is only secondary "meaning". 10. It may be that one has two expressions in the idiolect but does not know that they have the same meaning, for example, Hesperus/Phosphorus. That is, knowledge of the synonymy in an idiolect is not knowledge a priori. Knowledge of the ambiguity of the Fregean sense is also no knowledge a priori. I 235 Sense/Complex/Complexity/composed/Expression/Millikan/(s): to have sense, an expression must be composed ((s) in a predication). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Signs | Millikan | I 6 Signs/Millikan: I will set up a general drawing theory based on the Fregean sense but in the sense of Peirce, so that conventional signs, but also thoughts are covered. >Fregean sense, >Sign/Peirce. This has an important consequence: Meaning/Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic characteristic, but it is not reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism. Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of knowledge theory. VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory... I 7 ...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". >Correspondence theory/Millikan, >Intentionality. In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world. I 70 Signs/Conventional/Millikan: conventional signs are normally used without consideration. Convention: what makes conventional signs conventional is that they have an eigenfunction, which is independent of the particular use. >Convention. I 126 Sign/Millikan: each sign is either intentional or not intentional. Only if it is intentional, it is true/false. Intentionality/Millikan: intentionality allows gradations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correspondence Theory | Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory | I 6 Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts. This has an important consequence: Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism. The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected I 7 not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world. I 8 Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple: VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory). Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around: Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!). Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind. I 10 It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"? Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then? Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept. The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning. I 86 Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things. Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty. Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation. This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations. On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied. I 87 Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Myth/Given | Sellars Vs Myth/Given | Esfeld I 145 Def actuality/myth of the actuality/Sellars: everything that shall be something epistemic and thus a kind of knowledge on the one hand without requiring concepts on the other hand. I 146 The myth includes the idea that there is a foundation of our knowledge which requires no justification. McDowell: (1996,S. 31): that means to assume that the space of reasons, the space of the justifications extends further than the domain of the conceptual. SellarsVsMythos: Sense-data is thus attributed to two incompatible functions: 1. simply given without concepts, 2. epistemic status: perceptual beliefs exist in concepts being applied to sense-data. To be in the mental state, to have a sense-data can be the same as to be in the epistemic state, to know that you have a sense-data. naturalistic fallacy/Sellars: a naturalistic fallacy would correspond to suppose that you can derive from the description of a causally caused mental event an epistemic relation. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Myth/Museum | Field Vs Myth/Museum | II 201 Def Museum Myth/Myth of the Museum/Mere Tags/Gavagai/Quine/Field: the thesis that it is determined (somewhere) whether means Gavagai rabbit or rabbit part. ((s)> Naive Realism). Indeterminacy/FieldVsMyth of the Museum: pro Quine: if the indeterminacy is to be rejected, then only because of physical facts. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Myth/Museum | Quine Vs Myth/Museum | XII 44 Definition Myth of the Museum/original point/Quine: Thesis: Exhibits: the meanings Labels: the words. QuineVsMyth of the Museum: 1. Then meanings should be mental entities. 2. (more important, it also exists when meanings should not be mental but platonic ideas or even concrete objects): the semantics is still considered somehow as set in the mind of humans. Thus, it becomes unclear. It should then be something that goes beyond behavior and dispositions. --- XII 46 Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/Quine: E.g. Suppose, in a foreign language there is a word for which there are two mutually incompatible German translations. But no ambiguity in the foreign language. Assuming the foreign expression can be translated in the same use into German in both ways. And both can be equally well reconciled by compensation with the foreign and the own speaker's behavior (assumed with all behavioral dispositions). Problem: then you could never know which translation is right or wrong. QuineVsMyth of the museum: would not be a solution, because we would have no access to the museum. ((s) to the mental entities). 1. decomposition of translation: E.g. "ne ... rien" in French: the "rien" could be translated into German as "something" or equally well, with "nothing". Compensation: you can make both in accordance with each other: by translating the "ne" with either "no" or translate it as empty. Solution: Here we have simply broken down the French into too small parts. The example is disappointing. --- XII 47 Problem: The decomposition is still a problem because it has to be admitted with this length of expressions, which correspond to predicates. Because then they must bear meanings. 2. E.g. (W + O, § 12): Gavagai: based on the fact that exactly a whole rabbit is present if a non- seperated part or a temporal stage is present. Ostension/Show: also repeated showing on several occasions does not help. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Realism | McDowell Vs Realism | I 34 McDowellVsMyth (of the Given): provides us with excuses at best where we need justifications. I 50 McDowellVs "The Given": experiences are active receptivity, moreover, they are conceptual. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Tradition | Davidson Vs Tradition | Frank I 677 Subjectivity/Tradition/Davidson: the concept of the subjective seems to fall apart because of the externalism: on the one hand the true inner states about which the mind reserves authority, on the other hand the ordinary states of belief, wishing, meaning, of the intention which is contaminated by its external links to social environment. By analogy, there is an experts for sunburn who cannot detect whether the sun or any other cause is responsible. Def "Senburn"/Terminology/Davidson: is constituted just like a sunburn, only the sun must not necessarily be involved in the cause: "Sun or other cause", disjunction. Important argument: the expert can recognize a senburn by simply looking at it, but not a sunburn. DavidsonVsTradition: this solution works for sunburn because, unlike with objects of the mind, it is not necessary to havve a very special person who can recognize just by he looks (first person authority) whether the condition exists or not. Mental states/DavidsonVsTraditionVsMyth of the subjective: here the solution is even simpler: Of course people have beliefs, but these are not entities that the mind has in mind. Fra I 678 Ontology/Davidson: Not of interest here. We will always need an unlimited supply of objects that help us to describe attitudes (externalism), belief sentences are thus relational. But these objects are not "psychological objects". Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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