Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Dennett | I 143 Actualism/Dennett: Thesis: Only that what is real is possible. - The mind can only be regarded as an activity, not as a substance. I 163 Determinism/actualism/Dennett: some authors: If determinism is correct, actualism must also be correct. Or the other way around. If actualism is wrong, indeterminism would have to be right. DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, therefore determinism is wrong. DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism. >Determinism. I 249 Actualism/DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore he was a follower of actualism. >Repetition/Nietzsche. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Compassion | Nietzsche | Danto III 225 Compassion/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche has (at least) two objections against compassion. 1. that the compassionate person actually suffers vicariously with someone, and is brought to the same level as the subject of compassion - which in turn makes him "sick and melancholic".(1) Danto: This is also how it is to be understood when Zarathustra says that God dies of compassion after suffering, as one should assume, from the suffering of those in whom he has empathized. To demand compassion from the strong means (in this peculiar way) to demand from them to become weak. Christian ethics/Nietzsche: here Nietzsche observes that compassion is elevated to the "basic principle of society". For Nietzsche, it proves to be what it is: a will to negate life.(2) >Christianity/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche. DantoVsNietzsche: this is a central discrepancy in Nietzsche's thinking: by definition, the noble person stands above his companions. In addition, he/she is healthy, powerful and full of vitality. The opposite of noble is common. Unlike the noble personality, the ordinary are sick, exhausted and weak. Consequently, the herd consists of the sick, the weak and the powerless. Danto III 226 It is hardly possible to draw a more misleading conclusion, but it cannot be denied that Nietzsche has drawn it: Nietzsche: There is a surplus of miscarriages, illnesses, degenerates, infirmities, necessary sufferers in humans as in any other animal species; the successful cases are always the exception in humans as well.(3) Danto: correspondingly, the extraordinary human being is not only regarded as statistically deviating, but as a splendid example of his species, which stands out from a mass of miscasts and inferiority. Only if we take the lowest ones as yardsticks, can we believe otherwise. But this belief, as Nietzsche could oppose, would be anything but justified. >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Danto: According to Nietzsche, the average applicant is therefore rejected because one expects to fill the position with the best person. DantoVsNietzsche: that most people are not healthy is simply wrong. In epidemics, on the other hand, strong ones are taken away just like the weak ones. 1. F. Nietzsche Morgenröthe, KGW V. 1, S. 124. 2. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, S. 217. 3. Ibid. p. 79. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Copula | Nietzsche | Taureck I 84 "Is"/VsNietzsche/Taureck: he confused copula and identity signs: "For a terribly long time, a thing on Earth was considered equal and coincident with a single feature, for example a certain color. The multiplicity of features was admitted with the greatest slowness. Even from the history of language we see a resistance to the multiplicity of the predicates ... ". >"Is", >Predication, >Syntax, >Equal sign, >Identity, >Propeties, >Attribution, >Predicate. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Darwinism | Huxley | Danto III 197 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: all too often Nietzsche falls into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. >F. Nietzsche, >Evolution. Nietzsche overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world. >Fitness, >Survival, >Selection, >Initial conditions, >Life. |
HuxleyA I Aldous Huxley Science, Liberty and Peace London 1946 HuxleyTh I Thomas Henry Huxley Lectures On Evolution Whitefish, MT 2010 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Darwinism | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer I 5 Darwinism/Evolution/Nietzsche/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Pfotenhauer: Darwin's theory of evolution, which makes selection into a principle according to the measure (...) of selection performances to external conditions, is not liked by Nietzsche; he even hates it: "[...]this is the moral.... the middle ones are worth more than the exceptions"..."I am appalled by the formulation [of this] moral." Added Fragments, Spring 1888, KGW VIII, p. 95ff). --- Danto III 197 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche falls too often into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. He overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, T. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world. Danto III 268 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche was convinced VsDarwin that the disabled survive and the abled ones perish. Danto: apart from this tenacious belief, which is as easily attacked by Huxley's famous refutation as its flip side (See Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.), it is difficult to see why Nietzsche wanted people to see him as an anti-Darwinist. Danto III 269 Survival/Nietzsche: According to Nietzsche, whether you preserve yourself or not has nothing to do with the blind exercise of the will to power, which characterizes every thing at every moment. Something survives, insofar as it emerges victoriously from the struggle of the will; but it does not fight to survive - if so, it would be exactly the other way round: above all, something alive wants to omit its power - life itself is the will to power: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it.(1) >Will/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, S. 21. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Grammar | Nietzsche | Ries II 35 Grammar/On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: pre-drawn relation of "accidental" predicate and "underlying" subject: fiction. This has made the rule of madness irrevocable. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction. Ries II 75 Grammar/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: Subject formation suggests real entities. Value judgements and statements of reality appear identical in their linguistic form. Terms are linked to attributes. Thus philosophy believes that it has made the real properties of things visible. --- Danto III 209 Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: something similar had set up thrasymachos in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, however Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. But pulsation cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can pulsate. >Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche. Danto III 210 Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Happiness | Nietzsche | Danto III 271 Happiness/bliss/Nietzsche/Danto: From Nietzsche's theory of the will to power follows that bliss is not the goal we are actually fighting for. It is not different from the rest of the world; people are concerned about power. Humans are undeniably suited to more power ((s) than other living beings) and this has nothing to do with happiness. Joy is simply the conscious reflection of our superiority in strength. The 'last human' who thinks in terms of 'peace' and bliss, is involved in contradictions. There's no happiness without a fight.(1) Danto III 272 Nietzsche/Danto: obstacles experienced as displeasure are stimuli for the will to power and foreplay to pleasure. Pleasure/Nietzsche/Danto: there are two corresponding types of pleasure - the pleasure of victory and the pleasure of sleep. The latter is the happiness of nihilistic religions and philosophy. The rich and living want victories, overcome adversaries, overflowing the feeling of power over other areas than hitherto.(2) DantoVsNietzsche: Nietzsche uses the term "pleasure" here (as is often the case) in both a narrower and a broader sense. It is absurd to respond to the intention to avoid unwillingness by saying that life is struggle and unwillingness, so that the questionable intention is opposed to life.(3) Danto: Last but not least, Nietzsche's inability to look through this fallacy contributed to his lack of foresight in social reform. >Life/Nietzsche. 1. Cf. F. Nietzsche, Nachlass, Berlin 1999, p. 750. 2. Ibid p. 713. 3. Cf. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, p. 217.). |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Language | Nietzsche | Ries II 35 Language/On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: Seduction by Language: makes the deception of intellectual judgement performance appear as a natural context. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction. Ries II 86 Language/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche:"coarse fetish being": produces reason prejudices: subject, causality and substance. --- Danto III 51 Language/thinking/order/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche draws his pessimistic conclusions from his epistemological analysis (like B. Russell later): according to them, our perceptions cannot be similar to their causes, so that the language we use (...) does not really describe the world. Order/Nietzsche/Danto: At this point Nietzsche assumes that there could be an order or structure in the world which we are not able to comprehend. Danto III 107 Language/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a philosophical mythology hidden in language, which breaks out every moment, however cautious one may be otherwise.(1) Danto III 209 Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak, but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. >Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche. Danto III 210 Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not nouns and adjectives. 1. F. Nietzsche: Der Wanderer und seine Schatten, KGW IV, 3. p. 215. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Liberalism | Raz | Gaus I 416 Liberalism/Raz/Weinstein: Contemporary political theory's historical myopia has consequently made Joseph Raz's perfectionist liberalism seem more anomalous than, in fact, it is. Though Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift are correct in concluding that Raz 'transcends' the rivalry between liberalism and communitarianism, they overemphasize his originality (1996(1): 250). Perfectionist liberalism: Raz's perfectionist liberalism is refurbished new liberalism but with some differences. For instance, Raz distinguishes autonomy, a seminal value requiring serious political attention, from self- realization, which he holds is merely one variety of autonomy. >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Self-realization/Raz: Whereas a self-realizing person develops all of his capacities to their full potential, an autonomous person merely develops 'a conception of himself, and his actions are sensitive to his past'. In 'embracing goals and commitments, in coming to care about one thing or another', such persons 'give shape' to their lives, though not necessarily according to a unified plan as with Hobhouse (Raz, 1986(2): 375, 387) (...). Value pluralism: Moreover for Raz unlike new liberals, autonomy entails value pluralism because goods and virtues are incommensurable, often forcing us to trade them off, 'relinquishing one good for the sake of another' (1986(2): And, tragically, we have to make trade-offs because (though Raz fails to argue why) the menu of goods and virtues available to us is largely socially determined (1986(2): 366, 398-9) (...). Goals/Raz: Notwithstanding these differences, for Raz autonomous agents nevertheless 'identify' with their choices and remain 'loyal' to them, just like new liberal self-realizing agents. Second, in shaping their lives, autonomous agents, like self-realizing agents, don 't arbitrarily recreate themselves in spite of their social circumstances. RazVsNietzsche: Brute Nietzschean self-creation is impossible, for we are all born into communities presupposing our values. At best, acting autonomously transforms slightly, or reconfirms these values selectively (1986(2): 382, 387—8). >Perfectionism/Raz. 1. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Literal Truth | Nietzsche | Danto III 57 Literal Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: if you define the metaphor like Nietzsche (see Metaphor/Nietzsche) and therefore each sentence is considered metaphorical, then - absurdly - each sentence must also be unconventional. Then it's hard to see what we mean by metaphor. Danto: Nietzsche would probably reply: "Metaphors are sentences that are never perceived, or at least never literally true; no sentence is ever to be taken literally in relation to what he is dealing with; therefore, each sentence is metaphorical to a certain degree. In practice (or even rhetoric) it makes little difference whether we say that no sentence is literally true or, as Nietzsche should formulate it even more radically later, that every sentence is literally wrong. The only question is whether our language can help us in life. --- Danto III 58 DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is also just metaphorical, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.). --- Danto III 62 Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Metaphors | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 41 Metaphor/Concepts/Nietzsche(1): the concepts that built up a rigid and regular world covered a fundamental "drive to metaphor formation" - the anthropomorphic activity, which is also the basis of ... Pfotenhauer IV 42 ...science, but hidden, it then would become productive on the basis of this drive. New "transfers, metaphors, metonymies"(2) would be added. Continually, the desire to redesign the existing world of the awake human being so colorfully and irregularly, incoherently, and eternally new as the world of dreams is. Pfotenhauer: He no longer finds consolation in an art exercise that is above all of them, the aesthetic game has become the moment of a life's fulfilment.... In this conception, the change of emotions and the causality of the mental processes has replaced the exuberant view of aesthetic possibilities. >Aesthetics/Nietzsche, >Literature/Nietzsche, >Language/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW, III, 2, p. 380ff 2. Ibid. p. 381 --- Danto III 53 Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense(1)). We are talking about metaphors. Cf. >Truth/Nietzsche. Note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche), cf. >Analogies. Danto III 58 DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is just metaphorical as well, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.). Danto III 62 Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors. 1.F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW1/III, 2, S. 374f. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Nietzsche | Adorno XII 136 Metaphysics/Nietzsche/Adorno: Nietzsche has shown or believed to show that (...) the surface of the categories assigned to a sensual life of any sense, according to the measure of his own metaphysics, i. e. a metaphysics of the very living, are deeper than what this surface denies and only insists on the hidden, but this is due that if one wanted to insist on it, it would transform into in ideology. For example Carmen/Nietzsche: be deeper than Wagner's "Ring". Adorno: in its essential surface being, in its essential sensual being, certain mythical behaviours are met. Nietzsche understands this as more appropriate than oppposed to the Wagnerian, where the myths become a kind of back world or latent meaning. >Music/Nietzsche. XII 137 Content/Nietzsche/Adorno: the point of Nietzsche's philosophy is to a certain extent that the surface, i. e. the immediate, passionate, sensual and manifesting life itself is precisely the content. Cf. >Aesthetics/Adorno. --- Ries II 46 Transcendental/"ideal things"/Nietzsche: philosophy, religion, art, morality are all "higher lies", because they are traced back to their origin in the lower, all too human. >Transcendentals. NietzscheVsMetaphysics: Insignificance is given illusory meaning. Ries II 77 Metaphysics/Morality/Beyond Good and Evil(1)/Nietzsche: The problem of legitimacy: in the previous "Science of Morality" the problem of morality itself was still missing! The suspicion that there is something problematic here. Ries II 78 The occidental metaphysical contrast between God and devil is lost. Thus also the basis for a metaphysically founded morality of the "good in itself". >God/Nietzsche. Ries II 87 Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: the entire decay history of Western metaphysics is recounted by Nietzsche on a single sheet of paper: how the true world finally became a fable. History of an error. Ries II 88 Metaphysics/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Development: Plato: Spatial model of the truth relations: "here" and "there" are replaced by the temporal determination "now" and "then". Temporalization of metaphysics through Christianity, decaying platonism. Ries II 89 Kant/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: Kant makes God and the "true world" unattainable, because it cannot be proven. >Kant/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2. --- Danto III 210 Metaphysics/Morality Theory/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a complex connection between Nietzsche's moral theory and metaphysics: For example, if a falcon behaves like a lamb, it is - according to this theory - a lamb, because a lamb is what a lamb does. This is how the strong ones behave under all circumstances. >Morality/Nietzsche. Language/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives. >Language/Nietzsche. Danto III 209 Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. >Justice/Thrasymachus. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Nietzsche | Löwith | Pfotenhauer IV 22 Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith 1953)(1): Karl Löwith deals with Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. He doubts the context (sic) that arises from the connection to the western metaphysics Nietzsche with Aristotle, Leibniz or Hegel. (p. 90). >F. Nietzsche. Löwith believes Heidegger overestimates Nietzsche because he demonstrates on him his own motives for thinking. Löwith believes that Nietzsche is more important in the expressions of his subjective concern, which, from a philosophical point of view, would be closer to Pascal or Kierkegaard. (p. 96). >S. Kierkegaard, >B. Pascal. Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith 1956)(2): Nietzsche would consider the experience of natural rhythms to be important as an impulse for philosophical reflection on transsubjective orders. The preservation and return of the forces would thus determine our physical existence and commit our thinking. >Order, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. Pfotenhauer IV 23 Christianity/Nietzsche/Löwith: Nietzsche's critique of Christian spiritualism would basically meet the philosophical-historical view (cf. K. Löwith 1964)(3)(3) of a control and overcoming, given up by us, of given living conditions. This would only nourish self-tormenting resentment towards one's own, unassailable prerequisites for existence. It seduces to nihilism, it tempts projections of a fulfillment of existence in an unattainable future. >Nihilism, >Philosophy of history, >Christianity. Despite all the positivist naturalism (K. Löwith, 1956, p. 208ff), Löwith's concept of an antique conception of nature, which he believes he can recognize and affirm in Nietzsche, is strongly humanistic. >Naturalism. Pfotenhauer: It is based on the model of classic moderation and sublimation of modern subject claims. Consequently, he must protect Nietzsche's return to pre-socratic thinking against his own, often shrill emphasis on will. For it is not the sovereignty claims of the individual that basically determines life. (LöwithVsNietzsche). 1. K. Löwith, Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Frankfurt 1953, S. 76ff. 2. K. Löwith, Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Stuttgart 1956, S. 120ff 3. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1964, S. 356ff |
Löw I Karl Löwith Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit Göttingen 1960 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Psychology | Nietzsche | Ries II 79 Psychology/Resentment/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: Basic concept of the Psychology of Christianity. Explains how the hierarchy of power given by nature could turn into the rule of the powerless. 1. F. Nietzsche Genealogie der Moral, VI. 2. --- Danto III 130 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche considered himself a born psychologist. DantoVsNietzsche: in his thinking was a whole lot of circular arguments. Our psychological theories are part of our perspective, but our perspective must be explained by psychic phenomena that are part of it. Our moral attitudes are jointly responsible for our (...) perspectives. Psychology, however, is invoked to explain why we take our moral perspectives, and especially why exactly them. >Perspective/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche. Danto III 132 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: If there is nothing material, then there is nothing immaterial.(1) Danto: one could say that there is no substance that would be the task of psychology to explore. Moral/Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche fought on two fronts at the same time: On the one hand, he hoped to attack morality by exposing the psychology that was attached to it as illogical, on the other hand, he wanted to attack this psychology by attacking the morality assumed by it. Philosophy/Nietzsche: The attack on the soul or the self - in which he claimed to find the essence of modern philosophy - was at the same time an assassination attempt on the basic premise of Christian doctrine.(2) Danto III 134 I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the "I" as being, in the "I" as substance and projects the belief in the ego-substance on all things - it only creates the term 'thing' through this ... Being is thought into everything as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'...(3) >Subject/Nietzsche, >Person/Nietzsche, >I/Nietzsche. Danto III 200 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: two terms play a prominent role in Nietzsche's psychology: resentment and bad conscience. Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. Danto III 201 He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Finally, the master will be evil in his own eyes. >revaluation of all values, >Master/Slave. Danto III 208 Gentlemen/Slaves/Nietzsche: it would be a mistake to ask the beast to suppress its animal instincts. Similarly, people have no choice but to be different from what they are. Nietzsche: Demanding from strength that it does not express itself as strength (...) is just as absurd as demanding from weakness that it expresses itself as strength.(4) Strengths/Nietzsche: the strong are simply actions of strength, not individuals who act in a strong way at their discretion. Just as lightning is not an entity that does something, but the light itself. The strong being is not free to show his strength or not to show it.(5) >Individual/Nietzsche, >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Danto III 209 Humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in politics: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. >Justice/Thrasymchus. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 537. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 p. 33. 3. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 p. 71. 4. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 293. 5. Ibid. p. 294. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Repetition | Nietzsche | Danto III 46 Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's nihilism culminates in the doctrine of the Eternal Return, according to which the world repeats itself endlessly and precisely. Nietzsche considered it to be a serious scientific insight and the only alternative to the view that the world has or can have a goal, a purpose or an end state.(1) If every state of the world (if one can even say so since Nietzsche describes the world as formless) comes back an unlimited number of times, no state can be definitive, and as far as the nature of things is concerned, there can be neither progress nor regression... Danto III 47 ...rather, the same is always repeated. >World/Nietzsche. Danto III 244 Return/Repetition/Eternity/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's thought of eternal return is that everything that exists will return, and that everything that exists is a return of itself, that everything has already happened and will happen again, every time in exactly the same way, forever and ever. There is no beginning and no end, and no middle in the story of the world: there is only the monotonous emergence of the same episode. Gateway/Danto: in the gateway episode, the dwarf is the personification of gravity. Danto III 245 Nietzsche: From this gateway a long eternal lane runs backwards: behind us lies an eternity... Does this doorway not also have to be there already?... And does it not have to be so tightly knotted with all things that this moment draws all the coming things after itself? So - also itself?(2) Zarathustra: I myself belong to the causes of the eternal return.(3) >Cause/Nietzsche. Danto III 247 Apart from the Zarathustra and one or two mentions in Beyond Good and Evil and in Ecce homo (as well as some early references in Gay Science), the doctrine of eternal return hardly ever appears in the published works. Danto: there can be no proofs or evidence for the doctrine of the return. If the repetitions are exactly the same, they cannot bear traces or imprints of previous episodes. ((s)VsNietzsche: Problem: It is not clear where the seams of the episodes should run or where a new episode should start. For example, it cannot happen while an object is falling because the case is not interrupted; in any case, the doctrine does not involve the interruption of processes. As processes are now constantly under way and observable, there are no points at this level where a repetition could occur. Danto III 252/253 Repetition/Poincaré/Danto: In 1890 Poincaré(4) proved a theory of the phases, according to which a certain mechanical system within the Statistical Mechanics to be specified conditions must, in a sufficiently long period of time and this infinitely often come close to each of its states. Danto: But "infinitely close" does not correspond enough to Nietzsche's doctrine to affect the problem. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 684. 2. F. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, KGW VI. 1. p. 196. 3. Ibid. p. 272. 4. Henri Poincare, memoir on the three-body problem (1890). DOI:10.1016/B978-044450871-3/50129-7 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Dennett Vs Actualism | I 162 Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if the determinism is correct, the actualism must also be right. Or the other way around. If the actualism was wrong, indeterminism would have to be right. DennettVs: that’s wrong. E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, so the determinism is false. >Determinism. DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of the determinism. I 249 DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore, he was a follower of actualism. I 360 Dennett: we reject actualism, but how may we not go so far in the other direction as to assert that the space of the real possibilities is more densely occupied than is the case. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 16 HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual . II 87 VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit. Rorty III 196 HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: understood the difficulty of throwing away the ladder at the end of a story very well. He himself did not want to give a narrative, but a litany. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Heidegger, M. | Rorty Vs Heidegger, M. | III 195 Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point. III 197 Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. >Langauge/Heidegger. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences. History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger). III 198 Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time. III 199 Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate. III 204 RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style. IV 79 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests". IV 80 Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens. IV 142 RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words. VI 140 Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools. I 390 RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Rorty Vs Kant | I 166 Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas. >Cartesianism, >dualism. I 169 Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here). I 171 Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between persons and >propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box. I 173 Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us. RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal. a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction! I 174 Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making. IV 117 Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual). VI 256 Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria. VI 257 This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand. They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer. VI 263 Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers. RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment. VI 264 RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of "purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre: Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Dennett Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | I 249 DennettVsNietzsche: E.g. Eternal Return: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. He was a follower of >actualism. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | Habermas I 180 HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications. Habermas II 87 VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon. Rorty III 68 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: inverted Platonism: romantic attempt to elevate the flesh above the spirit, the heart above the head, mythical "will" above equally mythical "reason". Rorty III 179 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "Reverse Platonist". Urge to join a higher one. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Putnam Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | V 284 PutnamVsNietzsche: "better" moral: you can only pull out randomly determined values out of context. >Morals/Nietzsche, >Good/Nietzsche, >Goals/Nietzsche, >Customs/Morality/Nietzsche, >Values/Nietzsche. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Rorty Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | III 59 Truth/RortyVsNietzsche: with the traditional conception of truth he did not abolish the notion that we could discover the reasons for why we are. (>Metaphysics/Rorty, Metaphysics/Nietzsche). III 60 Language/Vocabulary/Rorty: as poets (and thus, according to Nietzsche, as humans) we fail if we accept the description given of our self by another. III 62 Nietzsche: "Turn all 'it was' into a 'so I wanted it to be'!" |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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