Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. Avramides I 115
Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently!
Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism.

Schiffer I 125
paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna.
Ambiguity:
E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna.
Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here).
Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!.
false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement.
I 126
A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief.
(3) Galileo believed that the earth moves
First, there are similarities:
1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same.
Galileo believed this. The earth moves.
2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative
3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation.
Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation.
B(x,u)
With an actual statement. E.g.
Galileo said something
If this is true, then
(Eu) S(Galileo,u)
I 127
But this does not work with Galileo believed something
(Eu) B(Galileo, u)
LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation.

Schiffer I 131
3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types.
possible solution:
The earth moves
Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement.
SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties.
Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept!
Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this".
Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here.
B. Second problem
paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle:
I 132
Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“.
singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar:
(P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x.
E.g. assumed I say:
Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things.
Alternative:
Ralph said that she was driving George's car.
Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George!
SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson:
(5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves.
From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence
SchifferVsDavidson:
1. principle (P)
2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves."
I 133
3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct.
C. Third problem
paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of
(a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude)
as
(b) Sam PA that. flounders snore
cannot be correct because
(1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam
(2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude.
Schiffer: (1) seems correct.
Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it.
I 134
Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche
Donald: Tarski said this.
Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…).

Schiffer I 135
SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows!
I 136
(9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore.
Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements.
But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people!
Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge.
I 137
If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987