Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discrimination | Rawls | I 331 Discrimination/Sexual Practices/Rawls: when we say that certain sexual relations are degrading and embarrassing and should be banned on this basis, even if only for the benefit of individuals, regardless of their actual desires, it is often because the principles of justice do not apply here. Instead, we fall back here on terms that are used in connection with excellence. >Perfectionism/Rawls. We are probably influenced by subliminal aesthetic preferences and personal feelings of ownership. Individuals, class and group differences are often sharp and irreconcilable. Solution/Rawls: Instead of relying on uncertain perfectionist criteria, we should rely on the principles of justice, which have a better defined structure(1)(2)(3). RawlsVsPerfectionism: here again it is shown that perfectionism is not a suitable basis for social justice. >Perfectionism. 1. See Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London, 1965). 2. See also L. A. Hart Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford, 1963). 3. See also Brian Barry, Political Argument (London, 1965). |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Perfectionism | Rawls | I 325 Perfectionism/Principle of Perfection/Rawls: two variants: a) the principle of a teleological theory that leads a society to build institutions and shape the duties and obligations of individuals in such a way that outstanding achievements in the arts, sciences and culture are achieved. >Teleology. b) (to be found in Aristotle and others) has more ambitious goals: here the principle of perfection is only one of several principles within an intuitionistic theory. >Intuitionism. The demands of perfection can even diminish for example, demands that are made on the maintenance of freedoms, e.g. when it is argued that slavery serves the goal of cultural refinement. On the other hand, it can only be a question of dividing social wealth into different areas, e. g. culture,... I 326 ... then egalitarian ideas become balanced. This less strict certainty allows for a variety of interpretations(1)(2)(3). Terminology/Rawls: we assume, Def Ideality-driven principles/ideal-regarding principles: are those that are not wish-driven(4). In other words, they are not only concerned with the distribution of a society's total wealth among needs that need to be satisfied. Then the principles of justice and perfection belong to the realm of idealistic principles. >Principles/Rawls. I 327 Contract doctrine/Rawls: holds onto an intermediate position between utilitarianism and perfectionism by not pretending to be a standard ideal of human excellence. >Utilitarianism. Perfectionism: if he wants to have a criterion of perfection, he must try to rank achievements and try to sum up their values. Problem/RawlsVsPerfectionism: in the initial situation of a society to be built, we assume that people initially have no mutual interest in each other; however, they know that they have certain moral and religious interests and also other cultural ideas that should not be put at risk. They can also have conflicting attitudes towards the aspirant. ((s) They just do not know what position they will take later in this society.) Problem: Assuming standards of perfection could lead to having to give up other freedoms, e. g. regarding religion. >Veil of ignorance, >Society/Rawls. I 328 The case here is completely different from the question of the principles according to which primary public goods (freedoms, infrastructure, etc.) are to be distributed! The latter are goods that everyone will strive for, regardless of their position. >Public Good/Rawls. In other words, striving for these goods makes no distinction between people. Criteria/perfection/Rawls: the criteria of excellence have not seen a rational basis from the point of view of daily life. On the other hand, within the arts and sciences there are standards for assessing achievements. Comparability: intrinsic values can obviously be compared. Value judgments have an important place in human life. They do not have to be vague. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Justice/value judgments/art/science/Rawls: the argument against perfectionism is rather that because of the different goals of the aspirations, the participants in the initial position of a society to be established have no reason to adopt the principle of perfection ((s) instead of the principles of justice). >Justice/Rawls. 1. See B. de Jouvenal, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, 1951), S.53-56, 62-65. 2. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (London, 1907), vol. I, pp. 235-243. 3. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ch. VI. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London, 1965) pp. 39f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rawls, J. | Cavell Vs Rawls, J. | I 31 RawlsVsPerfectionism/RawlsVsEmerson: unjust celebration of strong and inventive individuals at the expense of the weak. CavellVsRawls: this is too limited to the social, cultural and political order. He only demands the maximization of the given culture and forgets to ask about the conditions for anything to be considered a successful cultural engagement. I 32 CavellVsRawls: it is not the question how we can get more and more of the same, but how to find culture at all. Emerson: "Conversion of the world" ~Finding true goals. Def Self/Cavell: to articulate the reasons and conditions by which one's own position in the world becomes understandable means to be a subject. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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