Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completeness | Cresswell | I 69 Incompleteness/completeness/incompleteness/CresswellVsSituational semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: the question of completeness is less clear than it seems: 1. How to understand u [[φ]] e ? "In context u, φ describes situation e". e: we have understood as a proposition until now. But one can just as well understand a situation as a world, so that it would then say: "with respect to context u, φ is true in e". Disjunction/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: Barwise and Perry's construction requires that situations be conceived of as possible worlds, but this turns situation semantics into semantics of possible worlds. >Barwise/Perry, >Situation semantics, >Possible world semantics. Incompleteness/incomplete/partial/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: e.g. disjunction: (1) Tomorrow morning between 9 and 12 I will either be at home or at the university. This is not a sentence disjunction, but it is equivalent to (2) Either I will be at home between 9 and 12 tomorrow or I will be at the university between 9 and 12 tomorrow. which is a disjunction of (3) I will be at home between 9 and 12 tomorrow and (4) I will be at the university between 9 and 12 tomorrow. If we also have speaker, date etc., the possible worlds divide into two classes, those in which (1) is true and those in which (1) is false. ((s) It is always about (1) not about the single alternatives.) Cresswell: Among the worlds in which (1) is true, there can also be some in which I am in both places, even if not at the same time! I 70 Incomplete/cisjunction/possible Worlds/Cresswell: but of course there will also be such worlds in the crowd where I am in one place but not in the other. In this sense (1) is incomplete. I.e. the proposition can be made true in different ways. Situation/incomolete/Cresswell: if a situation is to be like a proposition, then for the situation to be incomplete, a single (only) situation must be described by (1), which is the situation of my-being-at-home-or-at-university. ((s) "disjunctive situation", "all in one"; and not one (disjunction of situations) where I am in situation a) at home or situation b) at the university.) Situations/Cresswell. Cresswell: Each element of the class is either a at-home world or an at-university world but it is not true that each element is a at-home world or each is an at-university world. That is, the proposition is incomplete (a partial proposition). Incompleteness/Cresswell: Barwise/Perry can be understood (Perry 1986(1), p 85) as saying that they consider situations to be incomplete. Reason: a situation does not give an answer to every question. 1. Perry. J. 1986. From worlds to situations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 15. pp.83-107 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| de re | Searle | II 247 De dicto: de dicto concerns only the mental contents. De re: de re concerns relationships between people and objects. SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. II 271 De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: de re and de dicto is a distinction between different types of report. Intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves. There is no "de re-setting", only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry). >Indexwords, >Indexicality. --- IV 182f De re/de dicto/Searle: de re and de dicto are not two different beliefs. Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit him- or herself. Ralph cannot express this difference. The >truth conditions are the same. >Belief/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Representation | Castaneda | Frank I ~ 459ff VsRepräsentation/I/CastanedaVsPerry: "I" is no representation. - Then there is no (changing) sense. - Instead: each of the tokens is a design (guise). >Guise theory. No semantic or psychological mediators. >Reference, >Sense, >Unambiguity, >Identification, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-reference. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 |
| Sense | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense. >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning, >Denotation, >Intention, >Propositional attitudes. Reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses. Then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings. >Sense, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 400ff Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning. >Guise-Theory. From this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs). VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary. I 432ff Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a). PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense. Problem: the extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor. - Facts about the language are no solution. I 459ff Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role. - CastanedaVs, PerryVs. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Evans | Frank I 485f Sense/Evans: Evans is in favour of these views: pro Frege, pro Oxford (everyday language) - while he ist against these views: VsPerry, VsCastaneda. Fregean sense/Evans: should be regarded as a way of thinking instead of a way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Fregean sense. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Situation Semantics | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation. Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ..."). >Situations. Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations. Cresswell I 63 Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations. >Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics. Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete). CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7) Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds. Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations. Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation. >Possible World Semantics. What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds. I 64 Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. I 65 CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification. >Context. False sentences: describe non-actual situations. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. >Interpretation, >Sentence meaning. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true. Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time. I 67 On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks e*: = in I, Mollie, yes. That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?). Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that u[[φ]] e iff e* < e. ((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.) The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context. Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property. >Atomic sentences. Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u. In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely. 1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry 2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press 4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sugar Trail Example | Searle | II 273 SearleVsPerry: e.g. sugar track in Supermarket: the content of the belief that it was me, cannot be given in space-time coordinates. II 274 Perry/Kaplan: there is no complete Fregean sense, which is sufficient to determine the satisfaction conditions. >Conditions of satisfaction, >Fregean sense. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Kaplan Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 484 Singular Term/Frege: is not limited to standing for an object, but always has a special way of being given. ("sense", intension). Index words/indexical/Perry/VsFrege/KaplanVsFrege: this model is tailored to descriptions and names and fails with references to the first person. EvansVsPerry/EvansVsKaplan: 1. there is no reason to suggest that Frege said that the object of a singular term is always given by the fact that a certain description applies to it, 2. the peculiarities of the indexical reference are to be uncovered precisely by a theory of the non-descriptive ways of the given connected with it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Situation Sem. | Cresswell, M.J. | I 65 CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Thesis: The so-called "situations" should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution/Cresswell: Possible world semantics/semantics of possible worlds: here the different roles are played by entities of very different kinds. Context: that the meaning of a sentence in meta language is the set of worlds in which the sentence is true, must be related to a context. I.e. they need information about place, time, speaker, etc. I 77 CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry/Possible World Semantics: Conclusion: Situational semantics: knows only entities of a single species (situations). Possible world semantics: assumes three types of entities: 1. possible worlds, which are single and complete and are assessed against the truth. 2. propositions - classes of possible worlds - are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context. 3. individuals (single things) among them events. Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of any of these entities! Problem: only occurs if you assume only one type of entity that should play all these roles. |
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| personal Identity | Perry, J. | Lewis IV 71 PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the R-relation (> Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states) is not the same as the I-relation (between states of an individual) in this case (split). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are I-r, but because of the split not R-r. Perry thesis: every person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable to that time. It should be noted that persons can share stages: Splitting: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity-to-t is somewhat counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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