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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional Economics | Persson | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Tabellini | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Persson | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Tabellini | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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