Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Civil Society | Pettit | Brocker I 859 Civil Society/Pettit: Unlike and more concrete than Rawls, Pettit has forces in mind that demand and promote a competitive democracy. Pettit recognizes them in "civil society". For him, these are "extrafamilial, infrapolitical association[s]".(1) Cf. >J. Rawls, >Democracy, >Society/Rawls. The Republican cause therefore remains dependent on the support of politically sensitive individuals and groups committed to the common good and endowed with an idea of "good governance". Civil Society/PettitVsTradition: compared to traditional theories, which in many cases had placed the political-educational function in the foreground, which, through political participation from individuals, shapes state-carrying citizens by showing their interest and sensitivity for the Brocker I 860 common political concerns and encourages them to participate, Pettit sees no need for information about how this sensitization for the common good can be acquired and trained. >Participation, >Common good. Pettit simply assumes the potential of civil society. Pettit then comes up with a new term as a solution: "Untouchable Hand"/"intangible Hand"/Terminology/Pettit: a non-materializable force that emerges from the citizenry itself and contributes to the creation of critical public attention that encourages sceptical observation of political events and to use democratic opposition at the right moment to a state action that deprives freedom.(2) SellersVsPettit: the question remains, where do the forces come from, which only lead to a constitutional order oriented towards an imagined common good. (3) 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 242 2. Ibid. p. 254. 3. Mortimer Sellers, »The Republican Manifesto«, in: Santa Clara Law Review 39/1,1998, p. 365. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Democracy | Pettit | Brocker I 856 Democracy/Pettit: Pettit thesis: Democracy is more to be understood as "contestatory" ((s) competitive) than as "consensual" ((s) being in accordance with).(1) This means that all political decisions, in particular decisions on state directives and state regulation, must be justified by a critical public and must in principle be considered contestable. Procedure: According to Pettit, the basis for this should be laid in a "deliberative republic" ((s) advisory republic). (2) The aim is always to make the arguments of others heard. Democracy thus has an "inclusive" effect with regard to minorities. >Deliberative Democracy. PettitVsPettit: his later work "Just Freedom", however, contains statements that take back this deliberative dynamic of democracy and emphasize that above all the prevention of state coercive power marks the core of the republican understanding of democracy.(3) >Republic, >Republicanism. So it is less about civil disputes and more about consensus on the assessment of state intervention rights. See State/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, p. 185 2. Ibid. p. 187 3. Philip Pettit 2015, Gerechte Freiheit. Ein moralischer Kompass für eine komplexe Welt, Berlin 2015. p. 157, vgl. Pettit On the People’s Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 2012, p. 22. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Governance | Pettit | Brocker I 855 Rule/Government/Pettit: Pettit wants to create the image of public life that offers freedom without domination. His ideal-typical conceptualization of the political sphere should be pluralistic, adaptable and focused on sustainability. >Pluralism. It should not only balance out different interests and needs in an egalitarian direction, but also foster public sensitivity to ecological issues, women's emancipation, minority problems and multicultural coexistence. >Egalitarianism, >Minorities, >Emancipation, >Ecology, >Multiculturalism. Pettit is particularly concerned with related constitutional law problems. Brocker I 856 Constitution/Pettit: some authors consider his discussion of constitutional issues too coarse. VsPettit: (2)(3) >Constitution. Pettit's Replica: PettitVsVs: (4)(5) Brocker I 860 VsPettit: Pettit ends up with an amazingly conventional idea of governing. McMahonVsPettit: He ignores the adverse conditions for implementing republican guarantees of freedom in the thicket of real political contexts of action. (6) VsPettit: Pettit ultimately ends up in the liberalism he criticized, or a liberal model of the common good that puts respect for the freedom of the individual in the first place. >Liberalism, >Individuals/Pettit. Problem: Pettit has no clear reinterpretation of the collective interaction of individuals and their political function.(9) Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 129 2. John A. Bruegger »Republican Freedom: Three Problems«, in: The Journal Jurisprudence 11, 2011, p. 582 3. McMahon, Christopher, »The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/1, 2005, 67-93. 4. Philip Pettit, »The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 34/3, 2005, 275-283. 5. Philipp Schink,»Freedom, Control and the State«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 224 6. McMahon Ibid. 7.Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 1 - 28 8. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013 9. Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 9. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Legislation | Pettit | Brocker I 853 Legislation/Pettit: VsPettit: Pettit's view that there is legislation that does not cause any restriction of individual self-development seems quite naive. Even the harmless "interference" of the state must always be understood as interference in individual self-development (Bruegger 2011 (1); cf. also Schink 2013(2)). >Law, >Laws, >State, >Constitution. 1. John A. Bruegger »Republican Freedom: Three Problems«, in: The Journal Jurisprudence 11, 2011, S. 579 2. Philipp Schink,»Freedom, Control and the State«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, S. 227 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Politics | Pettit | Brocker I 858 Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"(1) as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts.(2) ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets": see also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good. John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought.(3) RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building. PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 p. 53 2. Ibid. p. 63 3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 108 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Republicanism | Pettit | Brocker I 850 Republicanism/PettitVsLiberalism/Pettit: as an outstanding representative of Republicanism, Pettit resolutely stands against liberalism: his complex model, however, bears some resemblance to a "liberal" understanding of politics. LarmoreVsPettit: Pettit is actually a disguised liberal with his guiding goal of individual independence within the logic of collective coexistence.(1) >State/Pettit, Liberalism/Pettit, Interventions/Pettit, Individual/Pettit. Brocker I 852 Def "Neo-Roman" variant of republicanism: historically refers to the republicanism of Roman antiquity and stylizes it as the propagation of a rule of law that is regarded as a means against personalized arbitrary rule and which assigns a central role to the freedom-guaranteeing action of political institutions. Pettit considers himself part of this movement. In this variant, the concern to encourage political participation takes a back seat to the maintenance of the institutional guarantee for the Republic as a state unit. This is also the position of Quentin Skinner in 1998(2). 1. Larmore, Charles, »A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism«, in: Philosophical Issues 11, 2001, 229-243. 2. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
![]() |