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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Habermas | IV 562 Abstraction/Habermas: in order to free Historical Materialism from its historical-philosophical ballast, two abstractions are necessary a) the abstraction of the unfolding of cognitive structures from the historical dynamics of events and b) the abstraction of social evolution from the historical concretion of life forms. >Critical Theory/Habermas. HabermasVsPhilosophy of History: these two abstractions eliminate the basic conceptual confusions to which historical-philosophical thinking owes itself. >Philosophy of History/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Philosophy | Heidegger | Figal I 101 Philosophy/Heidegger/Figal: also according to the conception of being and time, it is a liberation from the bonds of transmitted concepts, but if this liberation no longer leads to the free attention to the beginning of history, but to the actual structure of existence, the history in its essence is no longer historical. The structure of existence exists as long as existence exists. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >History. Figal I 102 Solution: Heidegger succeeds the breakthrough in the winter term 1931/32: interpretation of the cave-parable (Politeia). Liberation from fetters, but metaphor of light (for the time), openness, permeability,"liberate." Figal I 104 Freedom/Heidegger: Being and time: existence makes free - later: light makes free. existence designs: 1. Art 2. Natural science 3. History I 107 Art/Heidegger: neither "expression of experiences" nor pleasure. Instead, "the artist has the essential focus for the possible" to bring the hidden possibilities of beings to work. Figal I 171 HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientificization. --- Cardorff II 13 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's philosophy has no subject. It does not want to organize knowledge, make no statements, but create an event with its speech. "Passion for the useless". His philosophy propagates the domination of an admittedly dialogically unlegitimate speaking. Cardorff II 36 Subject/object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. Instead: "Walten sui generis". (Walten: prevailing). VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Knowledge - Divine/Human - Vs Totality-constituting categories: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself. (HeideggerVsSchopenhauer). Cardorff II 46 Development in Heidegger's work: the process of condensation, the difference between existence and being becomes lesser; the human makes up less as something withstanding and holding to something and more and more as an executing and fitting in. The difference between being and exist (ontological difference) tends to be stronger than the inner action of being itself. Cardorff II 60 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: 1. The thing about which it is can never be guilty of an incomprehension. It reigns as it reigns. 2. Heidegger is never to blame for an incomprehension; he is much too much into the thing. 3. The reader can want to be guilty, but ultimately is never guilty, because it is not he who blocks himself, but the one who is turning away. 4. It can always be assumed that Heidegger has been looking for uncertainty. Cardorff II 69 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's texts draw the reader's attention, inter alia, as both meanings and meaning levels pass into one another. Heidegger is concerned with making it impossible to grasp the subject. Cardorff II 102 Heidegger: all the evaluations of his philosophy are meaningless because they come from wrong questions. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Philosophy of History | Habermas | III 218 Philosophy of History/Habermas: Spencer was able to establish a theory of social evolution that removed the unclear idealism of philosophy of history and regarded the progress of civilization as a continuation of natural evolution and thus subsumed it under the laws of nature without all ambiguities. >H. Spencer, >Civilization, >Laws, >Laws of Nature, >Progress. HabermasVsPhilosophy of History: trends such as scientific development; capitalist growth, the establishment of constitutional states, the emergence of modern administrations, etc. could not be treated as empirical phenomena by philosophy of history. Philosophy of history could only interpret this as a sign of rationalization in the sense of philosophy of history. >Abstraction/Habermas, >Historiography, >History. IV 562 Solution/Habermas: a ((s) purified) theory can no longer be based on concrete ideals inherent in traditional forms of life; it must be oriented towards the possibility of learning processes that have been opened up with a learning level already achieved historically. It must renounce the critical assessment and normative classification of totalities, ways of life and cultures, of life contexts and epochs as a whole. >Totality, >Whole, >Criticism, >Critical Theory, >Society, >Sociology. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Spirit | Husserl | Gadamer I 247 Spirit/Husserl/Gadamer: [It becomes clear] that with the topic of intentionality an increasingly radicalizing critique of the "objectivism" of previous philosophy - also of Dilthey(1) - began, which was to culminate in the claim of philosophy: "that intentional phenomenology for the first time made the spirit as a spirit a field of systematic experience and science and Gadamer I 248 thereby achieved the total conversion of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit encompasses all being in an absolute historicity, which nature classifies itself as a mental entity"(2). >Intentionality. Gadamer: It is no coincidence that here the spirit is contrasted as the only absolute, i.e. irrelative of the relativity of everything that appears to him; indeed, Husserl himself acknowledges the continuity of his phenomenology with Kant's and Fichte's transcendental question: "It must be added, however, in fairness that the German idealism emanating from Kant was already passionately endeavored to overcome the already sensitive naivety" (sc. of objectivism)(3). HusserlVsPhilosophy of Consciousness/Psychology/Gadamer: This is (...) the consequence of his own criticism of objectivist psychology and the pseudo-Platonism of the philosophy of consciousness. This is completely clear after the publication of "Ideas II" (4). >Consciousness/Husserl, >Objectivism/Husserl, >Way of Givenness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI, 344. 2. Husserliana VI, 346. 3. Husserliana VI, 339 and VI, 271. 4. Husserliana Vol. IV, 1952. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth | Nietzsche | Ries II 23 Truth/Nietzsche: nothing is true anymore and therefore everything is allowed. Mirror Cabinet of Perspectivism. >Perspective/Nietzsche. Ries II 33 Truth/About truth and lie in the extra-moral sense/Nietzsche: "The truths are illusions, of which one has forgotten that they are some". Ries II 34 Truth/Lie/Nietzsche: the contrast is a construction forced by a social need. Truth interest: "Equating the non-equal". Ries II 74/75 Truth/Beyond Good and Evil/NietzscheVsPhilosophy: illegitimate claim to be in possession of truth. Moral evaluations are given as necessary attributes of reality. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Value/Nietzsche. Ries II 86 Truth/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche: it ends with the old truth. >World/Nietzsche. Ries II 110 Truth/Nietzsche: there is no truth. Danto III 52 Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: So what is truth? A moving army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations that have been poetically and rhetorically exalted, transmitted, adorned, and that seem to be fixed, canonical and binding to people after a long period of use: the truths are illusions, of which one has forgotten that they are some, metaphors that are worn out and have become sensually powerless, coins that have lost their picture and now as metal do not count as coins anymore.(1) Danto III 53 Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: Please note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche). Danto III 232 Truth/Nietzsche/Danto:... in so far as he [the scientist] affirms this 'other world' [which the scientist wants to discover] he does not have to deny its counterpart, this world, our world...? ... Then it is still a metaphysical belief on which our belief in science is based (...). Plato's belief that God is the truth, that the truth is divine.... (2) >God/Plato, >Truth/Plato. Danto III 233 God/Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: Zarathustra says that God is dead. If he is right and God is equated with truth, the truth must be dead. Nihilism/Nietzsche: but how, if this becomes more and more unbelievable, if nothing turns out to be more than divine, unless the error, blindness, the lie, - if God Himself proves to be our longest lie.(3) >Nihilism/Nietzsche. Danto III 234 Danto: a new problem arises: the question of the value of truth. And since the scientist is committed to the truth, the question cannot be answered scientifically. Nietzsche: All science, (...) the natural as well as the unnatural (...) is now looking to talk the human being out of his former respect for himself.(4) 1. F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW1/III, 2, p. 374f. 2. F. Nietzsche Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V. 2, p. 259. 3. Ibid. p. 259. 4. F. Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 422. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Words | Gärdenfors | I 21 Words/Gärdenfors: express our terms. --- I 115 Words/Gärdenfors: why are there any at all? If we answer from a linguistic point of view, we are immediately involved in syntactic considerations. For example, we then try to find "arguments" of verbs. Problem: already the distinction transitive/intransitive is unclear. Also the assumption that verbs are used "predicatively" comes from the philosophy and the predicate logic and is an artificial construction. (GärdenforsVsPhilosophy, GärdenforsVsLogic). Syntax/Gärdenfors: the semantic theory in this book should be free of syntax, i.e. the semantic concepts should not depend on grammatical categories. I do not mean that syntax does not contribute to meaning, only lexical semantics should be operated independently of syntax. --- I 231 Words/Gärdenfors: are not simply meaning units - they occur in classes. > Word classes/Gärdenfors. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness-Phil. | Heidegger Vs Consciousness-Phil. | Habermas I 164 HeideggerVsPhilosophy of Consciousness: Vs monological approach: Vs inventory securing the object as calculating dealing with perceptible and manipulable objects. Understanding of the subjects among themselves: "To count on the other." - In contrast, Heidegger: non-strategic sense of agreement intersubjectively achieved. Heidegger ignored completely what other philosophers had had as insights on this path (pragmatism, Wittgenstein, Austin, Gadamer). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Phenomenalism | Evans Vs Phenomenalism | I 314 EvansVsPhilosophy of Mind: (this option): like Wittgenstein: E.g. why is it that someone is in love with one of two identical twins? Maybe he met one but not the other. I 315 However, the theorists cannot explain why no other descriptions can be the deciding factor, based on errors, or accidentally refer to the other twin. If God had seen in the mind of the person concerned, wouldn’t he have seen there with whom he was in love, or about whom he has thought. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Philosophy | Feynman Vs Philosophy | I 232 Relativity Theory/RT/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: Philosophers have often misunderstood the theory of relativity. But it is true that the phenomena depend on the reference system. Scientific camps: there is a school of philosophers who are uneasy with the fact that we cannot determine the absolute velocity without looking outside. They would say that it is useless to speak of velocity without looking outside. I 233 FeynmanVs: these philosophers will always be there, they struggle at the periphery, they never really understand the subtleties and depths of the problem. Our inability to demonstrate absolute movement is a result of the experiment and not just of pure thought. If Newton was the first to formulate the principle of relativity, why did people in his time not make so much noise about "everything is relative"? Answer: because only with Maxwell’s equations and theory of electrodynamics laws of physics existed that suggest that one could measure one’s speed without observing the outside world. Soon it was however found experimentally that it it is impossible!. Movement/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: there is a camp of philosophers who assert that movement cannot be proven at all except by observing the outside world. FeymanVs: that’s just not true! Only uniform rectilinear movement cannot be proven (if one is affected by it oneself). E.g. if we rotate in space, we experience a "centrifugal force" ((s) pseudo-force, but noticeable). E.g. the Earth’s rotation can be detected with the Foucault pendulum, without looking "outside". (Internal evidence). I 234 Philosophy/Feynman: if the philosopher is a good one, he comes back and says, "we really do rotate relative to the stars, therefore they must cause the centrifugal force" Feynman: According to all we know that is true. But currently we cannot say whether the centrifugal force would exist, if there were no stars, we just do not know. Then the philosopher might assume he proved that there is only relative movement to the stars. FeynmanVs:... it is just equally obvious that linear movement relative to the stars is not precisely detectable. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Various Authors | Heidegger Vs Various Authors | I 186 HeideggerVsCatholicism: (against the re-admission of a Catholic student fraternity): "one still does not know the Catholic tactic. And one day this will severely take revenge". Habermas Seyn: spelling in late work, Vs traditional ontology. I 123 HeideggerVsHerder: there is no general language. >Language/Foucault, Language/Davidson. HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientification. I 171 Subject/Object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. Instead: "Walten sui generis". VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth, - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Wisdom - Divine/Human - Vs Categories constituting totality: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself (VsSchopenhauer). II 36 HeideggerVsLogic: "dissolves in the vortex of an original questioning..." II 56 Signs/Heidegger: Vs The becoming predominant of the sign character of the word. This must be destroyed. (>Rorty: Sounds become more important, search for original words: Language/Rorty) . II 66 "Indian thinking": does not need the human. (Heidegger Vs). II 131 HeideggerVs "culture enterprise". But he respectfully speaks of "culture", no contemporary thinker is "big enough" to bring thinking directly and in a shaped form before his cause and thus on his way. (Spiegel Interview with M. Heidegger: R. Augstein,Der Spiegel Nr. 23, 31. 05. 1976). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
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