Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idealism | Davidson | Horwich I 449 DavidsonVsIdealism: idealism is metaphysical and seeks ontological homogeneity - this is hopeless. - DavidsonVsPhysicalism: physicalism hopes to discover such homogeneity in the future. Cf. >physicalism. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Learning | Quine | I 109 Learning: "Bachelor": is linked with words - "coin": is linked with object. -> Russell: acquaintance/description. I 150 When learning words we have to learn to send and receive (amplification process), we have not yet considered intelligent hearing. I 151 After all, the child responds to suggestive clues the very first time it hears new words, at this stage its learning becomes independent of operant behaviour. I 156 In the first learning phase vagueness plays an essential role. Distribution around central standard values of norm "More or less red" can be more fundamental for learning than the red norm. >Vagueness/Quine. I 404 Learning by stimuli > sense data - rather VsPhysicalism than VsNominalism. II 19 et seqq. What kind of items do we require? Body, for sure. Primary learning is done through Ostension. But under divergent circumstances. It must therefore be a versatile sentence that applies irrespective of the point of view. Summary under a single name. II 76 Conditioning/Quine: cannot be learned itself. IV 420 Learning: is the formation of a reliable hypothesis as to which behaviours in a group are regarded as approval or rejection. This provides an efficient method for researching the semantics of a foreign language. V 37 Learning/perception/similarity/perceptual similarity/Quine: different degrees of similarity must play a role in learning. N.B.: otherwise any increased response would be equally conditioned to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar. >Language Acquisition/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Goodman | I 118 Nominalism/Goodman: even though my system only speaks of individuals and excludes classes, it can perceive arbitrary things as an individual. The nominalistic prohibition is directed against the uncontrolled proliferation of entities on any selected individuals basis, but leaves the choice of the basis completely open. It thus allows alternative versions. >Individuals, >Classes. I 119 While the doctrine of physicalists: "no difference without physical difference" and the doctrine of the nominalists: "no difference without distinction of individuals", sound the same, they differ significantly. (VsPhysicalism: physicalism only allows one basis which is not clear at all.) >Physicalism. --- ad III 76 Nominalism/Goodman: nominalism places great importance on the etiquette: a nominalist order. Whatever reverence one may have before classes, classes are not moved from sphere to sphere, and attributes are certainly not abstracted from some objects and injected into another. >Attributes. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Nominalism | Quine | I 404 Learning by stimuli > sense data - VsPhysicalism rather than VsNominalism. I 407f Terms: Terms should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). I 462f Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "as many" quantification) - but there are stages of renunciation. II 102 VsNominalism: Even if it were possible to reinterpret somehow ingeniously all speech about qualities through paraphrase in speech about similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still remain: the relationship of similarity. II 221 QuineVsNominalism: tokens are not sufficient for proof theory - (Goodman ditto). VIII 24ff Nominalism/Quine: admits diseases as something that anyone can have, but not as an abstract entity - "Unicorn", "on": are syncategorematic expressions, they do not designate anything. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Physicalism | Schiffer | I 138 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Schiffer. I 142f Def Ontological physicalism/Schiffer: thesis: ontological physicalism has no irreducible psychological entities. Def Sententialist physicalism: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong). If there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. Def Sententialist Dualism: there are true psychological sentences. Belief properties: if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable. Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism/Schiffer: because both are true, there are no belief propositions. NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs. >Dualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Skepticism | Rorty | Rorty VI 225 PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs). >Pragmatism. Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects. >Skepticism/Berkeley). Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist. PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation. RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear. >Criteria, >Causal explanation. I 448 Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped. >Correspondence, >Skepticism/James. Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting. Rorty I 129 Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen. >Skepticism/Descartes. VI 223ff Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem. >Skepticism/Stroud. Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together. >Skepticism/Michael Williams. Rorty: statements only make sense in a situation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartesianism | Davidson Vs Cartesianism | Avramides I 109 DavidsonVsCartesianism/DavidsonVsPhysicalism/Avramidis: his doubts (and also Nagel’s argument) lead to a rejection both of Cartesianism (which is not so reductive) and of the reductive physicalism. Davidson/Nagel/Avramides: both say the impossibility of direct access to the mental lies in the method! Mind/CartesianismVsNagel//Physicalism/Avramides: Important argument: both (C. and Ph.) turn the mind into something objective. And with that in principle into an observation open to a being that has the appropriate skills. I 110 But the arguments of Nagel and DavidsonVsPhysicalism also apply to VsCartesianism. (1979c, p.211) |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Cartesianism | Avramides Vs Cartesianism | Avra I 110 AvramidisVsCartesianism: should be rejected primarily because of the image that it gives of the mind. But Loar wipes that aside when he makes use of naturalism. AvramidesVsPhysicalism: in Chapter 4, I will show that physicalism inherits its image of the mind from Cartesianism. I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidesVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality, no perspective (God view point or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing its behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 133 Mind/AvramidesVsCartesianism: but that results in the loss of any real asymmetry of perspectives! And at the same time the mind loses every possibility to be determined as subjective. The mind becomes something objective to which godlike beings (at least in principle) ((s) i.e. also conceptually) can have access. (see above (Chapter 3)) Then there is nothing special about the perspective of the subject (to itself)! The subject perspective is then one that can be shared. The subject only remains privileged if it is compared with other human beings. ((s) But that is not a property of the mind itself anymore) AvramidesVsCartesianism: Irony: By trying to explain the special relation of the subject to the mind he loses sight of this special relation I 134 The introduction of a specific substance (immaterial) does not at all help to understand what is supposed to be special about the mind. Avra I 154 Behavior/Cartesianism: tries to explain the significance of behavior through hidden thinking (thoughts). AvramidesVsCartesianism: Question: how does a thought acquire its significance (importance)? |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Field, H. | Schiffer Vs Field, H. | I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Idealism | Davidson Vs Idealism | Horwich I 449 Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.) Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Peirce Vs Idealism | Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty: sees a gap between coherence and correspondence. It is bridged by Def Reality/Peirce: "what is designated as existing in the end". Because it reduces coherence to correspondence without metaphysics or further empirical study. It is a simple reformulation (re-analysis) of "reality". RortyVsPeirce: I no longer think (as I did before) that is right. PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have the error in common that "correspondence" is a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Correspondence/Idealism: everything that corresponds to a representation has to be a representation itself (inspired by Berkeley). Therefore VsSkepticism: the world only consisted of representations anyway. >Representation/Peirce. Horwich I 448 Correspondence/Physicalism: the correspondence relation must be causal. Therefore VsSkepticism. Fodor: that's as good as saying that the correspondence theory corresponds to the reality. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Solution/PericeVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: the correspondence relation can easily connect different relata ontologically, there is no problem of "ontological homogeneity". Antirealism/PlantingaVsPeirce: does raise problems of ontological homogeneity: if objects owe their structure and if they could not exist without showing it, they also owe their existence to our creativity. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation: E.g. Peirce: "if there are stones, they will end up showing their structure" E.g. idealist: "if we had no study, there would be no stones".(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Nagel, Th. | Cartesianism Vs Nagel, Th. | Avramides I 109 Mind/CartesianismVsNagel/Physicalism/Avramides: N.B.: both (C. and Ph.) transform the mind into something objective. And thus, it is in principle accessible for observation by a being who has the appropriate abilities. I 110 But the arguments of Nagel and Davidson VsPhysicalism also apply to VsCartesianism. (1979c,p.211) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Physicalism | Fodor Vs Physicalism | Block I 164 FodorVsphysicalism: if functionalism is true, the physicalist faces a dilemma: either he may not accept mental universals like pain any more, or he denies that anything feels pain (or anger, etc.). He must also deny that mental states are brain states (> chauvinism). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Physicalism | Functionalism Vs Physicalism | Block I 162 FunctionalismVsPhysicalism: Physicalism is wrong if functionalism is true. Reason: Turing machine: you can always find a physical realization that fulfills the function but deserves a different physical description. Example: if pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because there are creatures without a brain that can realize the same Turing machine! FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus/Block: the argument aims rather at the fact that it is incomprehensible how a physical property of first order could be common to all and only all possible physical realizations of a given Turing machine state. I 162 According to that, physicalism is chauvinistic. The physicalist of all people excludes brainless creatures that still have a mind. Block I 210 FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus: it is difficult to understand how there should be a single characterization of internal states of all possible organisms that are functionally equivalent to a human being. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
| Physicalism | Nagel Vs Physicalism | Frank I 147 NagelVsPhysicalism: if mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is a way how it essentially is to be subject to certain physical processes. What this is remains a mystery. Identity/Physical/Mental/Necessary/Contingent/Nagel: the description would therefore not be a contingent one, like the one between a cause and a specific effect. It would be necessary that a certain physical state felt a certain way. (like Kripke). The subjective nature of my experience is the essential property. VsPhysicalism: but it is ignored in such analyzes. It is the individual, by virtue of which the experience is necessarily what it is. Like Kripke: I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have a certain subjective character incomprehensible. From a theory that regards the relation of both as contingent, no such explanation can be gained! But even a theory that assumes necessary identity still confronts us with Kripke's problem of why it seems to be contingent! I 148 NagelVsPhysicalism: the meaning of "is" in "mental states are physical states" is unclear. NagelVsPhysicalism: is as unclear as to laypeople the statement that all matter is energy. If we construct the reference of mentalistic terms to physical events on the basis of the ordinary model, either separate subjective events resurface as the effects through which the mentalist reference to physical events is ensured or we get a false explanation for how mentalist terms denote. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel III 15 NagelVsPhysicalism: has no explanation of perceptions and particular perspectives that we share with the experiences of different types of beings that apparently still exist. Not to mention the mental activity of the formation of an objective view on physical reality. ((s) Objectivistic physics cannot explain common sensations (experiences). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Physicalism | Putnam Vs Physicalism | VII 436 Reference/PutnamVsPhysicalism: it leads to that, that the question, "what picks out a relation R as "the" relation of reference" makes no sense anymore. >Reference/Putnam, cf. >identification. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Physicalism | Verschiedene Vs Physicalism | II 308 Physicalism / Papineau: Note that the physicalist explanation esplains the "feel" : namely, as a direct involvement in a physical copy of the experience . Vsphysicalism: here you could see an explanation gap: why should the physical resemblance guarantee phenomenological similarity? II 312 Even if we assumed additional "inner lights", a physicalist theory could not explain why swhy they exist. It would only postpone the question. |
|
| Physicalism | Avramides Vs Physicalism | Avramides I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidsVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality no perspective (God viewpoint or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing his behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 135 AvramidesVsPhysicalism: by emphasizing the difficulties of an intangible empire, he loses sight of an important insight by Descartes: The subject has a unique relation to its interior. PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of first-person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. I 137 Objective mind/Asymmetry/Concept/AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsPhysicalism: thesis: if one understands the mind as objective, conceptual questions can no longer be separated from superficial epistemic questions or maintain a separation between our access to what the states of mind are in themselves and the normal evidence (behavior) that affect them. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Physicalism | Schiffer Vs Physicalism | I XVIII VsPhysicalism: (8th hypothesis) cannot be correct: E.g. if it is a fact that I believe that worms do not have noses, then that is not represented in non-Mentalese and non-intentionalistic vocabulary. Problem: what can you do? we accept Eliminativism: Thesis: We have no belief with meaning or words with meaning. Or Mentalism: Thesis: belief objects as internal entities (QuineVsMentalismus: Z "Sargasso Sea above which somebody slides obliviously). (> Dualism) . Nominalism/solution/Schiffer: we need to accept none of them: but we deny that the existence of language-independent, objective characteristics of belief. That means Belief/nominalism/Schiffer: denies that the characteristics of belief are to believe "this and that" or to be a belief that this and that is the case, and he also denies the facts. Nominalism/Schiffer: allows then to include both: ontological physicalism: there are no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities and the Def Sentential Dualism: that there are true but irreducible belief-ascribing propositions. Schiffer: pro. Here the token token physicalism (6th hypothesis) is tentatively accepted. >Kripke: Paradox of rule following, >Kripkes Wittgenstein, (1982). I 144 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because thesis: if there is true attributions of belief, they cannot be shown without Mentalese or intentional vocabulary. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Physicalism | Castaneda Vs Physicalism | Frank I 215 CastanedaVsPhysicalism: because there is no strict identity, but only a sameness, there can be no reduction. No conceptual or analytical equivalence. However, causal dependency. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Platonism | Schiffer Vs Platonism | I 107 SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus. I 152 Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction). 2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious: SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own). I 234 Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties. Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he believes". Platonic realism: E.g. (a) Mother Teresa is modest after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here: 1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object 2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa) Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation. 3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective "modest". I 235 Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term. Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest). Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is. ((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.) Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest". Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.: 1. Between names and object. 2. Between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Objektive Mind | Loar, B. | I Avramides 137 Loar makes the mind an objective phenomenon - AvramidesVsLoar / AvramidesVsPhysicalism: if one conceives of the mind as objectively, one can no longer separate conceptual issues from superficial epistemic questions. Or a separation between our access to what the mind is, and the normal wvidence (behavior) for mental states can not be maintained. |
|
| |||