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The author or concept searched is found in the following 70 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common Sense | Nietzsche | Danto III 95 Common Sense/Nietzsche/Danto: for Nietzsche, the common sense itself is an interpretation and nothing that is opposed to interpretations. The common sense is metaphysics that has become everyday for him, (...) a fantasy of error and misbelief, (...) without the slightest concordance with reality. >Metaphysics/Nietzsche. But: Danto III 96 NietzscheVsParmenides/NietzscheVsPlato/Danto: Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live.(1) In the interests of life, we are forced to approve the common sense as set of beliefs and to reject all that is at odds with it. >Truth/Nietzsche, >Reality/Parmenides, >Truth/Plato. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 844 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Concepts | Aristotle | Gadamer I 436 Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: [in the] Epagoge-Analysis(1) (...) Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. (...) he thus [takes] into account (...) the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. In this respect, also according to Aristotle, the formation of linguistic concepts possesses a completely undogmatic freedom, in that what is seen as common in experience and thus leads to the general, has the character of a mere preliminary work, which stands at the beginning of science, but is not yet science. Proof/Science/AristotleVsSpeusippus/AristotleVsPlato: If science sets up the compelling ideal of proof, it must go beyond such procedures. Thus Aristotle criticized Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof. See >Analogies/Speusippus; >Language/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19. --- Adorno XII 50 Concept/Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: according to Diogenes Laertiues Aristotle uses different names for the same thing: in this way, he calls ideas also form (eidos), genus (genos), pattern (paradigm) and beginning (principle, ark). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Conceptualism | Quine | XI 136 Intuitionism/Quine/Lauener: he compares it with ancient conceptualism: universals are created by the mind. VII (f) 125 ConceptualismVsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries - Problem: Poincaré's "impredicative" definition: Def impredicative/Def Poincaré: "impredicative" means the specification of a class through a realm of objects, within which that class is located. VII (f) 126 Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: conceptualism does not require classes to exist beyond conditions of belonging to elements that can be expressed. Cantor's proof: would entail something else: It appeals to a class h of those elements of class k which are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer. VII (f) 127 But this is how the class h is specified impredicatively! h is itself one of the partial classes of k. >Classes/Quine. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism. The same fate strikes Cantor's proof of the existence of supernumerary infinity. QuineVsConceptualism: this is a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: e.g. the proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit. VII (a) 14 Universals Dispute/Middle Ages/Quine: the old groups reappear in modern mathematics: Realism: Logicism Conceptualism: Intuitionism Nominalism: Formalism. Conceptualism/Middle Ages/Quine: holds on to universals, but as mind-dependent. ConceptualismVsReduceability Axiom: because the reduceability axiom reintroduces the whole platonistic class logic. >Universals/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Dialectic | Hegel | Bubner I 75 Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality. Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention. It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it. I 76 Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind. >Irony. Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection. >Reflection. I 77 HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance. This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony. "General irony of the world". >Causality, >Hermeneutics, >Teleology. --- Wright I 21 Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections. Wright I 154 G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. Gadamer I 471 Dialectic/Hegel/Gadamer: The speculative relationship must (...) change into dialectical representation. According to Hegel, this is the demand of philosophy. >Speculation/Hegel, >Predication/Hegel. What means expression and representation here is of course not actually a proving action, but the thing Gadamer I 472 proves itself by expressing and representing itself in this way. Thus dialectic will also really experience that thinking is turned into its opposite as an incomprehensible inversion. Expression: Dialectic is the expression of the speculative, the representation of what actually lies in the speculative, and insofar the "real" >speculative. Proof: But if (...) the representation is not an additional action, but the emergence of the thing itself, then the philosophical proof itself belongs to the thing. Representation: (...) nevertheless, such representation is not at all external in truth. It only considers itself to be so as long as thinking does not know that in the end it proves itself to be a >reflection of the thing within itself. It is true that Hegel emphasizes the difference between speculative and dialectical only in the preface to phenomenology. Because this difference cancels itself out, Hegel later, from the point of view of absolute >knowledge, no longer records it. >Speculation/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Dialectic | Plato | Bubner I 34 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Def "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial. >Dialectics/Aristotle. Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary. I 39 Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. >Kant, >Dialectic/Hegel. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language. I 111 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference. C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic. >Knowledge/Plato, cf. >Propositional logic. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Essence | Hobbes | Adorno XIII 245 Essence/Appearance/HobbesVsPlato/Hobbes/Adorno: the relationship of essence and appearance is reversed in opposition to the Platonic tradition: what is appearance there, becomes essence, namely, the body world, and vice versa, that which is essence there, becomes appearance, namely the way of the mental conception, or even mental activity. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Ethics | Aristotle | Gadamer I 317 Ethics/Aristotle/Gadamer: [Aristotle is concerned with] the correct measurement of the role that reason has to play in moral action. [This is the problem of the relationship between the general and the particular.] Gadamer: (...) what interests us here [is] that it is a matter of reason and of knowledge that are not detached from an existence that has become, but are determined by it and are decisive for it. AristotleVsSocrates/AristotleVsPlato: Through his restriction of the Socratic-Platonic "Intellectualism" in the question of the good, Aristotle, as is well known, becomes the founder of ethics as a discipline independent of metaphysics. By criticizing the Platonic idea of the good as an empty generality, he poses the question of the human good to it, the good for human action. In the direction of this criticism, the equation of virtue and knowledge, of "arete" and "logos" as it underlies the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of virtue proves to be an exaggeration. Aristotle brings them back to the right measure by showing the orexis as the supporting element of man's moral knowledge, the "striving" and its shaping into a fixed attitude (hexis). The concept of ethics already bears in its name the reference to this Aristotelian foundation of the "arete" in practice and "ethos". >Humans/Aristotle. Gadamer I 318 (...) Aristotle [confronts] "ethos" with "physis" as an area in which there is no irregularity, but which does not know the regularity of nature, but rather the changeability and limited regularity of human statutes and human behaviour. >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Humans/Aristotle. Gadamer I 319 Knowledge/Aristotle: remains Socratic in so far as he records knowledge as an essential moment of moral being (...). 1. Eth. Nic. A4. (But cf. my vol. 7 of Ges. Werke proposed academic paper: „Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles“). Adorno XIII 226 Mesotes/Ethics/Aristotle/Adorno: the ideal of the middle is an all-Greek ideal. One finds it formulated in Aristotle's theory of virtue, for example the bravery as the middle between cowardice and foolishness. Generally formulated this is in the category of mesotes, the middle measure. As an ethical ideal, it reappears in apathia, the state of apathy, in which one is independent of pain, and no longer knows any affects. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Forms | Bigelow | I 51 Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his strategy is to postulate a single entity, along with a variety of relationships between individuals and that entity. ((s) Relation: participation, entity: form). >Methexis. On the other hand, another approach would be: VsPlato: to assume many different properties instead of a variable relation, each for a quantity: e.g. the property to have a weight of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach facilitates many things that are difficult to explain for Plato: he shows what distinguishes objects (whereas Plato rather shows what they have in common). This is because the different masses do not overlap here. PlatoVsVs: Problem: the new approach does not show what the objects have in common. >Determinates/determinables. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Generality | Aristotle | Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: generality emerges from the rhetorical exercise of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of general statements and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? The concrete individual is always familiar to us from the sensory experience. But the general? Generality/Knowledge/AristotelesVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the general comes from sensory experience and epagogé. Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. They derive from induction and are to be intuitively understood. Gadamer I 318 Generalities/Aristotle/Gadamer: If the good for humans meets in each case in the concretion of the practical situation in which he or she is, moral knowledge must do just that, to look at the concrete situation, as it were, what it demands of the person. In other words, the actor must see the concrete situation in the light of what is generally demanded of him or her. But this means negatively that knowledge in general, which does not know how to apply itself to the concrete situation, remains meaningless, and even threatens to obscure the concrete demands that emanate from the situation. This fact, which expresses the essence of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives moral relevance to the problem of method. >Ethics/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >The Good/Aristotle, >Techne/Aristotle, >Self-Knowledge/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Good | Aristotle | Bubner, I, 164 Good/something good/Aristotle/Bubner: one of the most difficult problems: what role does good play in his metaphysics, practical or metaphysical good? Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. >Idea/Plato. Bubner I 165 Good/something good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of the good as the highest: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "holy". No practical benefit is to be achieved with the idealization of good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of activities of all kind. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. >Teleology. Practice/Aristotle: No action is done for its own sake, with the exception of the game. (s) Then victory is one step outside of the game. Aristotle: otherwise, the goals would hinder the flow of practice only by virtue of their plurality through competition, blockades, undecidable alternatives, etc.. An order becomes necessary. No for-the-sake-of-which is isolated, it rather points to a bigger one. The hierarchy, however, would be in vain if there was not a supreme good, which in turn can still be realized in practice. Bubner I 166 The Highest Good/Aristotle: the unity of a successful life. >Unity/Aristotle. All the actors agree, because everyone wants to be happy. Of course this is interpreted differently. Lust, honor, money are external determinations. The sovereign form, on the other hand, lies in the philosophical way of life, i.e. in enlightened self-reflective practice. Thus the problem of the highest knowledge posed by Plato, which legitimates the rule of the philosophers' king, is solved. >Philosopher king/Plato. Gadamer I 318 The Good/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle emphasizes in relation to the doctrine of the good, which is determined by the Platonic theory of ideas, that in "practical philosophy" it cannot be a matter of accuracy of the highest order, as the mathematician does. Such a demand for accuracy would rather be misplaced. It is merely a matter of making things visible in outline and, by this drawing of the outline, of giving some help to the moral consciousness(1). But how such help is to be possible is already a moral problem. For it is apparently one of the essential characteristics of the moral phenomenon that the actor must know and decide for him- or herself, and nothing can make him or her accept this. For the correct approach of a philosophical ethics it is thus crucial that it does not push itself in the place of the moral consciousness and yet does not seek a purely theoretical, "historical" account, but rather helps the moral consciousness to become clear about itself by means of the outline clarification of the phenomena. >Ethics/Aristotle. Knowledge/Knowing/Aristotle: [The human] (...) must have developed an attitude in him- or herself through practice and education, which in the concrete situations of his or her life Gadamer I 319 is to be adhered to and to be proved by the right behaviour as it remains his or her constant concern(2). 1. Aristotle, Eth. Nic, A 7 u. B 2 2. The final chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics gives the broadest expression to this demand, thus justifying the transition to the question of "politics". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Good | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Absolute/Hegel. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of the good under the caption of the idea of "recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand. >Recognition/Hegel. I 184 Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of recognition", which in its turn is split into the "idea of truth" and the "idea of the good". Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship. >Dialectic/Hegel. The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of the good" in practical action. Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". >Experience/Kant, >I. Kant, >Reason, >Experience/Hegel, >Practice. I 185 Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it. I 186 Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good. The executed good would be the abolition of otherness. With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed. Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of truth and the idea of good is abolished. Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality. After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection. I 187 Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression! |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Good | Plato | Bubner I 25 Good/The Good/Plato/Bubner: without Aristotelian glasses, the good in Plato seems less colorless: Why did the top idea have the good as its content? I 32 Good/Ideas/Republic/Plato/Bubner: the idea of good can only be reflected in parables. All ideas reveal a certain content in their truth. This is how by no means a hierarchy is established. It arises only when not the truth, but the idea of the good comes into view. (As a vanishing point of all knowledge). >Idea/Plato, >Truth/Plato, >Good/Aristotle. I 33 But this does not lead to a regress in meta-levels (where the not thematized becomes an issue), nor is it the demand for self-reflection. In the state, however, it is not about a question of a principle of being, but about the sense of theory as a whole. This, however, requires more than a mere increase of theory from the principle on knowledge of principles. I 35 Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine. The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic). I 166 Def Eudaimonia/Plato: the "human good" whose investigation is part of politics. The summit of knowledge is achieved only by the one who is given the highest function in political coexistence. For he knows exactly what all the actors are striving for, but can only recognize vaguely. >Philosopher king. I 167 Practice/Plato: "to do his own" is his formula for everyone's role in the state, but everyone can do it only in the context of the whole without overlooking the whole. >Practise/Plato. Gadamer I 317 Good/The Good/Plato/Gadamer: AristotleVsPlato: By his limitation of the Socratic-Platonic "intellectualism" in the question of the good, Aristotle, as is well known, becomes the founder of ethics as a discipline independent of metaphysics. By criticizing the Platonic idea of the good as an empty generality, he confronts it with the question of the human good, the good for human action. >Generality/Aristotle. In the direction of this critique, the equation of virtue and knowledge, of "arete" and "logos" as they underlie the Socratic-Platonic virtue doctrine, are an exaggeration. Aristotle brings them back to the right measure by showing the orexis as the supporting element of humans's moral knowledge, the "striving" and its shaping into a firm attitude (hexis). The concept of ethics carries already in its name the reference to this Aristotelian foundation of the "arete" in practice and "ethos". Gadamer I 318 Teaching of Ideas/AristotleVsPlato: Aristotle emphasizes, in contrast to the doctrine of goodness determined by Platonic ideology, that "practical philosophy" cannot be about accuracy of the highest order, as the mathematician carries it out. >Ethics/Aristotle, >The Good/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Governance | al-Farabi | Höffe I 126 Governance/rule/al-Farabi/Höffe: Just as there is a guiding and at the same time perfect organ in the hierarchically structured body, so a community needs an excellent regent, who by his innate nature belongs to the rule, to which the gift of prophecy also belongs. >Community/al-Farabi. The ideal ruler is characterized (...) by a double qualification, by the unity of philosophy and prophecy, which makes one think of Mohammed qua Regent of the city-state of Medina, even if al-Fārābī does not name him here.(1) The excellent ruler must also be a good orator who knows how to convince, in which the precedence over authoritarian orders is evident. Al-FarabiVsPlato: two differences: a) While Mohammed willingly took over the rule of Medina, i.e. he had a "natural" interest in power, Plato lacks this interest, for his Höffe I 127 philosophers must be forced to rule because they prefer to philosophize rather than rule. b) Socrates [is] a mere philosopher who, according to the Symposium, allows himself to be taught by a priestess, Diotima, but does not present his teaching as a revelation free from self-reflection and criticism. >State/al-Farabi. Ruler: Dominion [is] not inherited, since it is not the son but the most able who should rule. 1. al-Farabi, On the perfect State. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Idealism | Kant | Strawson V 211 Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. >Knowledge/Kant. StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. V 213 Def Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) V 222 Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". --- Stroud I 129f Def Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. Stroud I 130 Def Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Cf. >Thing in itself/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 58 Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. Adorno: in this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment. >Nominalism, >Enlightenment. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Idealism | Nietzsche | Ries II 27 Idealism/NietzscheVsIdealism/NietzscheVsSokrates, VsPlato: VsEquation Reason = Being. >Idealism, >Socrates/Nietzsche, >Reason/Idealism. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Ideas | Aristotle | Adorno XII 51 Idea Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: from the idea Aristotle says that it is neither moving nor inactive, it is also one and many things. Concepts/Antiquity/Adorno: in a time when the language knowledge was not yet dead and lexical, the lively philosophical terminology places the emphasis on different things. The above words all alternate with the word idea by Plato. Idea/Plato/Adorno: in the Platonic idea, all these moments are actually contained as different ones. Höffe I 52 Ideas/Aristotle/VsPlaton/Höffe: Aristotle differs from his "teacher" mainly in two things: He rejects Plato's theory of ideas and criticizes his political thinking, partly explicitly, partly tacitly. >Politics/Plato, >Politics/Aristotle. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Ideas | Epicurus | Adorno XIII 229 Ideas/EpicurusVsPlato/Epicurus/Adorno: this is one of the great discoveries of Epicurean philosophy, although we can scarcely trace it back clearly to its sources: it has probably given an account of it - and this is, in turn, very antiplatonic: that there is no idea in which there are no traces of the sensual. From this also follows in ethics the specifically materialistic element of Epicurus. >Ethics/Epicurus. Cf. >Idea/Plato, >Idea/Aristotle. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Ideas | Schopenhauer | Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 I 55 Ideas/Schopenhauer: not subject to the sentence of the reason. - To be recognized only by aesthetic perception = losing oneself to the object. >Aesthetic perception, >Aesthetic experience, >Justification/Schopenhauer. I 77 Idea/Schopenhauer: A central link between the views and multiplicity of the individual things of the imaginary world. >Imagination, >Will. As objects for a subject, the ideas themselves are determined by the conceptual; as objectivizations of the will, they themselves determine the imagination. As immediate objectivization they have more reality than the things of the world of appearances. >Objectivity, >Appearance, >Reality, >World. I 79 Idea: free from causality - not the effect of will, but its appearance. Cf. >Causality. I 80 The supreme idea: the human being. >Humans. I 84 Idea/SchopenhauerVsPlato: because Schopenhauer equates will with Kant's thing per se, the ideas in his system cannot take on the highest metaphysical rank they have in Plato - like Plato: the transient things are only by participation in the ideas, therefore they have a lower degree of reality than these. >Methexis. Ideas/Plato: equality, size, unity, similarity (= epistemological categories). |
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| Individuals | Nietzsche | Danto III 173 Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy(1), where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... Danto III 174 ... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules. >Language and thought/Ancient philosohy, >Language/Hobbbes, >Social contract/Hobbes, >Language/Locke, >Social contract/Locke. Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial". NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,... Danto III 175 ...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity. >Consciousness/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Interpretation | Benacerraf | Field I 22 Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965)(1) Thesis: Identification of mathematical objects with others is arbitrary - E.g. numbers with quantities. - E.g. real numbers with Dedekind cuts, Cauchy sequences, etc. - There is no fact that decides which is the right one. >Equations, >Equality, >Identification, >Real numbers, >Numbers, >Mathematics, >Mathematical entities. Field ditto. I 22 Indeterminacy of reference/Field: is not a problem, but commonplace. >Reference, >Indeterminacy. I 25 For Benacerraf it is about identity, not about reference - otherwise he might falsely be refuted with primitive reference: "Numbers" refers to numbers but not to quantities - But that is irrelevant. Cf. >Reference/Field. I 25 BenacerraffVsPlatonism: locus classicus - VsBenacerraf: based on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. >Platonism, >Causal theory of knowledge. Field I 25 BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973)(2): if without localization and interaction we cannot know whether they exist. VsBenacerraf: indispensability argument. 1. Benacerraf, P. What Numbers Could Not Be, The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, S. 47–73. 2. Benacerraf, P. Mathematical Truth, The Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, S. 661–679. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Justice | Plato | Höffe I 28 Justice/Platon/Höffe: Because of the claimed harmony, a political eudaimonism, Plato counts justice (dikaiosynê) among the highest class of goods (megista agatha)(1), which is striven for both for its own sake and for its consequences useful to the actor.(2) Höffe I 29 Justification: Only the righteous live in mutual trust with one another(3) and, because they would rather suffer injustice than commit it, find both self-respect and respect for those they care about. The unjust, on the other hand, live in discord with their fellow human beings and, because contradictory desires are at war within them, in discord with themselves. Plato's argument here is not moralizing, but exposes "selfish" expectations of happiness as self-deception, as illusion. Tyranny: The extreme figure of the unjust, the tyrant, is alone in one respect, lust, three to the power of two to the power of three, thus 729 times worse than the just and still "infinitely more in terms of moral conduct, beauty and virtue".(4) >Laws/Plato, >Constitution/Plato. Problem: Justice alone is not enough for well-being. Because of excessive covetousness it needs additional prudence (sôphrosynê), in the face of danger bravery (andreia), and for the purpose of good advice wisdom (sophia). Höffe I 30 (...) Plato [recognises] the ordinary understanding "to each his own", later known as "suum cuique", namely to reward the good, to punish the bad, to distribute burdens and advantages fairly. Idiopragy/Plato: [Plato] understands the formula in a special sense: Everyone should do (prattein) what is peculiar to him, his own (idion), namely what corresponds to his natural disposition. Thanks to this so-called idiopragy formula, justice helps the individual to achieve harmony of the driving forces, i.e. personal justice, and the community to achieve harmony of the professional groups or estates: political justice. Isomorphism: There is a uniformity between the two, isomorphism, which is why ethics and political philosophy are intertwined. Höffe I 43 In the dialogue Phaidon (...) Plato tries with four arguments ("proofs") to make the immortality of the soul credible. The belief in the afterlife is thus familiar to Plato. HöffeVsPlaton: Nevertheless, it is not easy to decide whether the final myth of the judgment of the dead is indispensable for the eudaimonistic value of justice or whether it only confirms for the hereafter what is already true for this world: a) Is it an argument decisive for the eudaimonistic assessment of this world or b) only that important addition to the view of this world, which shows how much worse off the superlativistically unjust, the tyrant, is the just? >Tyranny/Plato. 1.Politeia, II 366e 2. II 357b-358c 3. I 351d; more detailed IX 575c-576a 4. IX 587e-588a Gaus I 310 Justice/Plato/Keyt/Miller: The challenge of Gyges' ring is to show that justice pays, that it is not a necessary evil but an intrinsic good. >Gyges/Ancient Philosophy. Social justice: The response requires a definition of justice in the soul, or psyché. But instead of defining it directly Socrates first defines social justice, and then, assuming the analogy of polis and psyche, constructs a corresponding definition of psychic justice. The definition of social justice, as Socrates notes himself (Rep. IV.433a), is simply the principle of the natural division of labour, which was introduced to explain the origin of the polis. (According to Socrates, it is mutual need that gives rise to the polis rather than, as Glaucon hypothesized, fear of harm.) Keyt/Miller: this is not the economic principle championed by Adam Smith and modern economists but an implicitly anti-democratic affirmation of human inequality and implasticity. Polis: III.415a-c). The just polis is the one in which each person does the one job for which he is suited by nature and no other: rulers rule, warriors defend, and workers provision the polis (Rep. IV .432b-434c). Psyche: by an independent argument Socrates infers that the psyche has three parts analogous to the three parts of the just polis, and then, following a principle of isomorphism, defines a just psyche as one with the same structure as a just polis. Thus, in a just psyche each of the psychic elements sticks to its own work: reason rules the psyche; spirit, or thymos, defends it from insult; and the appetites provide for its bodily support (Rep. IV.441d-442b). Psychic justice turns out to be something like mental health, an intrinsic good no one wants to be without, so the challenge of Thrasymachus and Glaucon is answered (Rep. IV .444c-445b). Problems: there is an ongoing controversy, however, over the cogency of Socrates' response. For it is unclear that the Platonically 'just' man is just in the sense of the problem of Gyges' ring. >Gyges/Ancient philosophy. What prevents the Platonically just man from harming others? (The controversy, stoked by Sachs, 1963(1), has generated an enormous literature. Dahl 1991(2), is a good representative of the current state of the debate.) 1. Sachs, David (1963) 'A fallacy in Plato's Republic'. Philosophical Review, 72: 141-58. 2. Dahl, Norman O. (1991) 'Plato's defense of justice'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 809-34. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Kehre | Gadamer | Gadamer I 262 Kehre/Heidegger/Gadamer: What Heidegger finally called "the Kehre" was not a new turn in the movement of transcendental reflection, but the release and execution (...) of this task: to raise Nietzsche's radical critique of "Platonism" to the level of the tradition he criticized, to meet Western metaphysics on its own level, to recognize and overcome the transcendental question as a consequence of modern subjectivism (...). >Subjectivism, >VsPlatonism, >Platonism, >F. Nietzsche, >Metaphysics, >Transcendentalism. Gadamer: Although "Being and Time" critically revealed the ontological underdeterminedness of Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity, it had itself formulated its own exposition of the question of being with transcendental philosophical means. In truth, however, the renewal of the question of being, which Heidegger had set himself as a task, meant that in the midst of phenomenology he recognized the unresolved fundamental problem of metaphysics, which in its final culmination was concealed in the concept of the spirit as speculative idealism had conceived it. Heidegger's tendency therefore aimed, through the critique of Husserl, at the ontological critique of speculative idealism. In his foundation of the "hermeneutics of factuality" (>Hermeneutics/Heidegger) he transgressed the concept of the spirit that classical idealism had developed as much as the thematic field of transcendental consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction. >Phenomenology, >E. Husserl. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Knowledge | Aristotle | Bubner I 118 Knowledge/Aristotle: the knowledge available outside of scientific evidence establishes the connection of science theory with general ontology. >Ontology/Aristotle, >Science/Aristotle. Bubner I 119 Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and Epagogé (nowadays controversial whether to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. >Practical Syllogism/Aristotle. Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantifications and individual cases. In Aristotle, no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal? >Prior knowledge/Today's discussion. Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé. Bubner I 149 Knowledge/Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: to know truly and definitively requires the certainty that the knowledge has come to its full extent, by even recognizing that which explains already existing knowledge. Such certainty cannot be determined from outside, it must be found in knowledge itself. >Metaphysics/Aristotle. Gadamer I 317 Knowledge/Aristotle/Gadamer: Human morality is essentially different from nature in that it is not simply the result of abilities or powers, but that the human only becomes such a being through what he or she does and how he or she behaves, Gadamer I 318 i.e. but: being so, behaves in a certain way. How can there be a theoretical knowledge of the moral being of humans (...) and what role does knowledge (i.e. "logos") play for the moral being of humans (...)? General/special: If the good for humans meets in each case in the concreteness of the practical situation in which he or she finds him- or herself, then moral knowledge must do just that, as it were to look at the concrete situation and see what it demands of that person. In other words, the actor must see the concrete situation in the light of what is generally demanded of him or her. But this means negatively that knowledge in general, which does not know how to apply itself to the concrete situation, remains meaningless, and even threatens to obscure the concrete demands that emanate from the situation. This fact, which expresses the essence of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives moral relevance to the problem of method. >Ethics/Aristotle. Gadamer I 319 Aristotle remains a Socratic in so far as he records knowledge as an essential moment of moral being (...). Gadamer: Moral knowledge, as described by Aristotle, is obviously not objective knowledge. The knower is not confronted with a fact which he or she only ascertains, but the person is directly affected by what he or she recognizes. Science/Knowledge/Gadamer: That this is not the knowledge of science is clear. In this respect, the distinction that Aristotle makes between the moral knowledge of the "Phronesis" and the theoretical knowledge of the "Episteme" is simple, especially when one considers that for the Greeks, science, represented by the example of mathematics, is a knowledge of the unchangeable, a knowledge based on proof, and that therefore everyone can learn it. On the other hand: See >Techne/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Knowledge | Newell, A./Simon, H. | Münch III 74 Knowledge/Search/Recognition/Menon/Socrates: How do you want to search that of what you do not know what it is? And if you find it, how do you recognize that it is what you did not know? Solution/Plato: The Famous Theory of Recollection. Knowledge/Finding/Recognizing/Newell/SimonVsPlato: today much easier explanation: to represent a problem means, 1. a test for a class of symbol structures (solutions) and 2. a method for generating symbol structures. >Symbol/Newell/Simon. Why do we not immediately produce an expression that describes the solution? We do that when we wish and dream. But: knowing how we would test something if we had it does not mean we know how it is developed. There are move procedures, but there is no procedure for winning moves. There must be a problem area prior to the move process. Definition moves/move/Newell/Simon: moves are transformations of problem area situations. Symbolic systems: they guarantee that they can represent problem areas and have move procedures. Cf. >Problem Solving. Allen Newell/Herbert Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search“ Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 19 (1976), 113-126 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Knowledge | Plato | Bubner I 35 Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object. The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good). Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason). Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine. The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic). >Good/Plato, >Dialectic/Plato. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge. >Knowledge/Aristotle, cf. >Knowledge paradox. Gaus I 311 Knowledge/governance/Plato/Keyt/Miller: in the Statesman [Politikos] the Eleatic Stranger pursues the idea of the rule of reason to its logical terminus and draws a conclusion that in the Republic remains tacit - that knowledge by itself provides sufficient warrant for the application of force, even deadly force, when persuasion fails (for the antithesis see Plt. 296bl, 304d4). It is within the bounds of justice, according to the Eleatic Stranger, for the true statesman, the man who possesses the political art and is 'truly and not merely apparently a knower' , to purge his polis, with or without law, with or without the consent of his subjects, by killing or banishing some of its members (Plt. 293a2-e2). The only true constitution is the one ruled by such a person. Since such persons are exceedingly rare (Plt. 292el-293a4, 297b7-c2), a central question is how a polis bereft of a true statesman can share in reason. The answer of the Eleatic Stranger is that it can share through law, law being an imitation of the truth apprehended by the true statesman (Plt. 300c5-7, 300el 1-301a4). Imitation: Since the true statesman rules without law, there is a better and a worse way of imitating him. The rulers of a polis can imitate reason's rule by ruling according to reason's reflection in law, or they can imitate reason's lawlessness by ruling contrary to law (Plt. 300e7-301 c5). Given that the rulers are one, few, or many, there are three good and three bad imitations of the one true constitution. Since the fewer the rulers the stronger the rule, the six imitations form a hierarchy, fewer rulers being better when rule is according to law but worse when it is contrary (Plt. 302b5- 303b5). >Governance/Plato. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Putnam | V 99ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: Kripke's Wittgenstein is VsPlatonism (universals) and pro nominalism (VsProperties in themselves). See also >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Language | Plato | Gadamer I 409 Laguage/Plato/Gadamer: (Ancient philosophy had no word for what we call language.) Gadamer I 411 GadamerVsPlato: Plato [in Cratylos](1-3) obviously retreats from the real relationship between word and thing. Here, he explains the question of how one can recognize existence as something too great, and there, where he speaks of it, where he thus describes dialectic in its true essence, as in the excursus of the 7th letter(4), linguisticity is only envisaged as an external moment of dubious ambiguity. It is one of the pre-walls (pro-teinomena) that precede and that the true dialectician must leave behind, like the sensual appearance of things. Thinking: The pure thinking of ideas, the Dianoia, is mute as a dialogue of the soul with itself (aneu phones). Logos: The Logos(5) is the stream that emanates from such thinking through the mouth (rheuma dia tou stomatos meta phthongou). >Language and Thought/Plato. Gadamer I 412 In any case, even where Plato, prefacing his dialectic, transcends the level of discussion of "Cratylus", we read no other relationship to language than (...) : tool, image and production and evaluation of the same from the original image, the things themselves. Recognition: Thus, even if he does not recognize the area of words (onomata) as having an independent function of recognition, and precisely by calling for the transgression of this area, he adheres to the question horizon in which the question of the "correctness" of the name arises. Correctness: Even if he does not want to know anything about the natural correctness of names (e.g. in the context of the 7th letter), he still holds onto a relationship of equality (homoion) as a yardstick there, too: for him, image and archetype is precisely the metaphysical model in which he thinks all reference to the notion of the noetic. >Word/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. 1. Krat. 384 d. 2. Krat. 388 c. 3. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 4. VII. letter 342ff. 5. soph. 263 e, 264 a. --- Saussure I 60 Language/Cratylus/Plato: Question: is the meaning of a word owed to natural practicing or to social-social genesis? |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Putnam | Rorty I 323 Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language is seen as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language. Cf. >Language evolution, >Language acquisition, >Understanding, >Intentionality. --- Horwich I 457 Language/Putnam: if language is only noise, then it is nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. Instead: correctness makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities. (Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.) --- Putnam III 124 Language/intensional/Davidson: e.g. the new minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. This is similar to the use of color predicates. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Mathematics | Aristotle | Thiel I 23 ff Mathematics/Tradition/Thiel: Aristotle, Kant and Plato accept an object, an area of mathematics. More important to them is the question of how the human behaves in relation to this object. Differentiation invention/discovery/Plato: Euthydemos: geometers, arithmetic artists and astronomers are like hunters, they are exploring what is already there. >Discoveries/Inventions. I 24 AristotleVsPlato: he had joined the Kratylos and Heraclitus inasmuch as there could be no science of the sensible after him, since everything was in flux. Thus, objects cannot even be defined. >Science/Aristotle, >Science/Plato. Plato: There are always many of the same kind of the mathematical objects, while the idea is always only one. >Idea/Plato, cf. >Mathematical entities. Thiel: one may think of the four-time appearance of the isosceles triangle in the square. I 25 Aristotle's Plato: denies an existence of the mathematical objects independent of the bodies. They exist on or in objects and can be isolated by abstraction. Mathematical objects are not themselves concrete, real objects. But they also have no "separated being". Each number is always only number of something. >Platonism, >Abstraction. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Mathematics | Thiel | Thiel I 10 Mathematics/Object/Thiel: The object does not coincide with the question "What is mathematics? The latter is about the way of thinking. I 13 Old definitions of "mathematics" 19th century: she was "ultimately" science of numbers. Mathematics/Bolzano: it is the science of the quantities. 20th century Paul Lorenzen (1962) "essentially nothing other than the theory of the infinite itself." Also Weyl, 1926 Third view: Empiricists: they have difficulties with infinity. In the strict sense in the 20th century it is no longer represented this way. Validity is conceded, but the content is denied. >Empiricism. I 23 et seq. Mathematics/Tradition/Thiel: Aristotle, Kant and Plato adopt an object, an area of mathematics. More important to them seems to be the question of how the human relates to it. Distinguishing between inventing and discovering. >Discoveries. Plato: Euthydemos: Geometers, mathematicians and astronomers are like hunters, they explore what is already there. I 24 AristotleVsPlato: he had joined Kratylos and Heraclitus to the extent that even after him there could be no science of the sensual, since everything was in flux. Thus, a definition of objects is not even possible. >Definitions, >Definability, Plato: there are always many of the same kind of mathematical objects, while the idea is always only one. >Ideas, >Mathematical entities, >Platonism. Thiel: one will be allowed to think of the four-time occurrence of the isosceles triangle in a square. I 25 AristotleVsPlato: denies the existence of mathematical objects independent of body things. They exist on or in objects and can be isolated by abstraction. Mathematical objects are not themselves concrete, real objects. But they also have no "separated being". Each number is always only the number of something. >Ontology, >Numbers, >Number of. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Memory | Pinker | I 153 Memory/Pinker: thoughts are not stored as a whole, but composed of terms. I 157 Not every statement can be assigned to a memory space: too much energy loss. Cf. >Memory/Luhmann. I 158 Memory/Pinker: 1. "episodic" or autobiographical, 2. "semantic" or general knowledge memory. The two forms are wired according to different patterns. >Event, >Semantics. I 177 Memory/Pinker: not sound chains but delimited words are stored. >Language, >Words, >Sentence, >Picture. I 180 PinkerVsPlato: no impression in wax, no "resistance" - there are indelible memories. >Plato. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Nature | Aristotle | Gaus I 312 Nature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras: >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. Gaus I 313 Nature makes its first appearance in three basic theorems that stand as the portal to the Politics: (1) the polis exists by nature, (2) man is by nature a political animal, and (3) the polis is prior by nature to the individual (Pol. 1.2). These statements are referred to as theorems because they are not simply asserted but argued for. Problems: nothing concerning them or the arguments supporting them is uncontroversial. The very content of the theorems is contested, for it is unclear what 'nature' means in each of them. Aristotle distinguishes several senses of 'nature' (Phys. II.1; Metaph. V .4), the most important of which correspond to his four causes (final, formal, efficient, and material); but he usually relies on the context to indicate the intended sense of a particular occurrence of the term. It has even been suggested that 'nature' has an entirely different sense in the Politics than it has in the physical and metaphysical treatises. Questions: what is Aristotle tacitly assuming? Are the arguments valid or invalid? How plausible are his premises? The tenability of Aristotle's naturalism depends upon the answer to these questions. (For the controversy see Ambler, 1985(1); Keyt, 1991b(2); Depew, 1995(3); Miller, 1995(4): 27-66; and Saunders, 1995(5): 59-71.) Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and nomos. >Nomos/Aristotle. Phys.: Aristotle Physics Pol: Aristotle Politics Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics 1. Ambler, Wayne (1985) 'Aristotle's understanding of the naturalness of the city'. Review of Politics, 47: 163—85. 2. Keyt, David (1991b) 'Three basic theorems in Aristotle's Politics'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Depew, David J. (1995) 'Humans and other political animals in Aristotle's History of Animals'. Phronesis, 40: 159-81. 4. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon. 5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and 11. Oxford: Clarendon. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nature | Dewey | Suhr I 156 Nature/17th century/Dewey/Suhr: The 17th century banishes goals from nature. Now qualities become something subjective. >Qualities, >Goals, >Teleology, >Subjectivity. Nature/modern times: In modern times nature is no longer opposed to the mind as something separate. Natural goals are something real: in the aesthetic work. Aesthetic enjoyment becomes an equally justified element of reality. (VsPlato). >Aesthetics, >Mind. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Nature | Plato | Gaus I 312 Nature/Plato/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (For PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras see >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. >Nature/Aristotle. Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nominalism | Adorno | XII 107 Nominalism/Adorno: Prehistory: Aristotle's critique of Plato. Concept/Plato/Adorno: for Plato, the concepts were independent and being-in-itself and indestructible and eternal, namely, the ideas. >Ideas/Plato, >Logos/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Words/Plato. AristotelesVsPlato/Adorno: these concepts should instead be mediated and fulfilled with concrete and factual. >Concepts/Aristotle, >Logos/Aristotle, >Plato/Aristotle. Kant/Adorno: he has also transferred this critical motive to the concept of God in opposition to the reification. --- XIII 56 Nominalism/Adorno: Nominalism is the view, which in principle views the concepts as abbreviations of the matters covered by them, and denies the concepts - in any case tendentially - the independence against what they contain among themselves. This western view belongs to Kant himself. In the consequence of nominalism, the subjective moment of the concept of idea prevails. >Concepts/Kant, >God/Kant, >Immanuel Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Nominalism | Kotarbinski | Geach I 166ff Kotarbinski: recognizes only concrete objects! That is no numbers, functions, classes, Platonic ideas, not even facts, events, situations, etc. - Nouns are only "noise". >Platonism, >VsPlatonism, >Definitions, >Definability, >Numbers, >Functions, >Classes, >Sets, >Events, >Facts, >Sounds, >Objects, >Nomina, >Words, >Word Meaning, >Ontology, >Formalism. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Nominalism | Rorty | II (f) 124 Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description. >de dicto, >de re, >Necessity, >Knowledge. NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints. Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words. >Materialism, >Wittgenstein. II (f) 125 Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. >Metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! >Naturalized epistemology. A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football" II (f) 126 Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists. >Discourse. Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Numbers | Black | II 125 Numerals/numbers/names/Black: numerals are unlike names for physical objects: E.g. "two people came in" here "two", is an adverb. - It can be transformed into "another and another". - That s not possible for "red". >Adverbs, >Proper names. BlackVsFrege: that shows that numbers are no special objects. BlackVsPlatonism. >Platonism. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Philosophy | Dewey | Suhr I 38 Definition Philosophy/Dewey: the reflection on what the knowledge requires of us. Knowledge requires thinking, not contemplation. >Pragmatism. Suhr I 153 Philosophy/Dewey: The philosophical fallacy: the fallacy is the denial of uncertainty and danger to what the philosophers declare as true reality, and the shifting from all that means danger into a world of pretense. (DeweyVsPlato). Thus, from what is actually the object of an action, becomes a prior reality: the good becomes an in-itself! (Coincidence with Nietzsche: Twilight of the Idols). This is remarcable because Dewey cannot have known Nietzsche's text. Suhr I 154 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols(1): 1. The true world is attainable for the wise. 2. The true world is unattainable for now, but promised f+ the wise, the virtuous, the pious (reward). 3. The true world is unattainable, unprovable, not promisable, already thought as comfort. 4. Is the real world unattainable? In any case, it is unattained. (Gray morning, first yawning). 5. The "true world" is an idea that is not useful for anything. Bright day 6. The true world is abolished (noon, moment of the shortest shadow, end of the longest error, climax of humanity, INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA. 1. F. Nietzsche, Werke in sechs Bänden, hg. von K. Schlechta, Bd. IV, München 1966, S. 963. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Philosophy | Wittgenstein | Danto I 49 Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Danto: cannot capture any states of affairs - as opposed to science - there are no philosophical states of affairs - hence their sentences cannot be true or false. >States of affairs, >Facts, >Truth values. --- Hintikka I 51 WittgensteinVsPlato: his thesis of the scientific collection of forms is precisely the confusion between science and philosophy. --- ad Wittgenstein II 95 Philosophy/Wittgenstein: is no field of competing theories. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Phronesis | Aristotle | Gadamer I 27 Phronesis/AristotleVsPlato/Aristotle/Gadamer: It is (...) a positive, ethical motive [in the judgement] effective, which enters into the Roman Stoic doctrine of the sensus communis. The comprehension and moral coping with the concrete situation requires a (...) subsumption of the given under the general, i.e. the purpose that one pursues, that the right thing arises from it. Thus, it presupposes a direction of the will, i.e. a moral being (hexis) already. Therefore the phronesis is a "spiritual virtue" according to Aristotle(1). He sees in it not simply an ability (dynamis), but a determination of moral being, which cannot be without the whole of the "ethical virtues", just as conversely these cannot be without them. Although this virtue in its exercise has the effect of distinguishing the feasible from the infeasible, it is not simply practical wisdom and general resourcefulness. Its distinction between the doable and the undoable has always included the distinction between the decent and the unseemly, and thus presupposes a moral attitude which in turn trains it. It is this motif, developed by Aristotle against Plato's "idea of the good", to which, according to Vico's reference to the sensus communis, the matter refers. >Sensus communis/Vico, >Sensus communis/Thomas. 1. Aristoteles, Eth. Nic. Z. 9, 1141b 33. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Plato | Aristotle | Höffe I 53 Plato/Aristotle/Höffe: [Aristotle] rejects Plato's theory of ideas and criticizes his political thinking, partly explicitly, partly tacitly. >Idea/Plato, >Politics/Plato, >Philosopher King/Plato. Polis/AristoteleVsPlato: [Aristotle turns against] every only functional determination of the polis. Philosopher rule/AristotleVsPlato: In contrast to Plato's Politeia, the poets remain autonomous, as well as the economy, and politics anyway. Society: Aristotle thus already advocated an idea that sociological systems theory believes to be established only after the dissolution of the so-called old European society: a relative independence of different areas of society. AristotleVsEqual rights: On the other hand, Aristotle does not adopt Plato's emancipatory element, the equality of women. >Equal rights/Aristotle. Similarities with Plato: State: Also Aristotle [obligates] the state to happiness and determines the good constitution from the common good; thus he too represents a political Eudaimonism. Aristocracy: [Aristotle, like Plato] also thinks aristocratically, of course, because the citizens in the narrower sense, those who possess civic virtue, are relieved of work for a living. Idiopragy: He also takes up Plato's idiopragy formula: that everyone should do what is proper to him, his own (idion). Cf. >Justice/Plato. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Plato | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 309 Plato/Political philosophy/Keyt/Miller: after 2,400 years there is still no settled interpretive strategy for reading Plato. Since he writes dialogues rather than treatises, the extent to which his characters speak for their author is bound to remain problematic. The major divide is between interpreters who respect Platonic anonymity and those who do not (see D.L. III.50-1). A. Plato as anonymous author: [These interpreters of Plato] are impressed by the literary 'distancing' that Plato creates between himself and his readers. (The ideas attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, for example, are thrice removed from Plato: they are expressed by Socrates, whose speeches are read in turn by Euclides, the narrator of the dialogue.) Characterology: Interpreters who take such distancing seriously might be called characterologists' since they hold that the characters in the dialogues are literary characters who speak for themselves, not for Plato. Characterologists take the dialogues to be 'sceptical', or aporetic, rather than 'dogmatic', or doctrinal, and emphasize their dramatic and literary elements. Leo Strauss: Thus, Leo Strauss, a particularly fervent characterologist, claims that the dialogues must be read as dramas: 'We cannot,' he says, 'ascribe to Plato any utterance of any of his characters without having taken great precautions' (1964(1): 59) (...) . B. Platonic persons as speaking for themselves: The opposing group of interpreters suppose that in each dialogue Plato has an identifiable spokesman: Socrates in the Gorgias and the Republic, the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman, and the Athenian Stranger in the Laws (D.L. III.52). Such interpreters fall into three camps (1) Unitarians suppose that Plato's spokesmen present a consistent doctrine in all four dialogues. (2) Developmentalists believe that the doctrine expressed by Plato's spokesmen evolves from one dialogue to the next. They believe, of course, that the order of composition of our four dialogues can be established, the order usually favoured being, from earliest to latest, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman, Laws. (3) Particularists interpret each dialogue on its own. Though they allow that there may be thematic links among the four dialogues, Gaus I 310 they do not worry overly much about the relation of one dialogue in the group to the others. Griswold (1988)(2) and Smith (1998(3): vol. I) are two useful collections of essays on interpretive strategies, and Tarrant (2000)(4) is a major new work on Platonic interpretation. Dialogues: Nomoi: in the Laws the Athenian Stranger enumerates seven claims to rule - the claim of the wellborn to rule the base-born, the strong to rule the weak, and so forth - and concludes that the greatest claim of all is that of the wise to rule the ignorant (Laws III.690a-d). This conclusion is the animating idea of the four political dialogues. Gorgias: in the Gorgias Socrates maintains that true statesmanship (politiké) differs from public speaking (rhetoriké) in being an art (techné) rather than an empirical knack (empeiria) - where an art, unlike an empirical knack, has a rational principle (logos) and can give the cause (aitia) of each thing (Gorg. 465a). He argues that none of the men reputed to be great Athenian statesmen practised true statesmanship (Gorg. 503b-c, 517a), and claims to be himself the only true statesman in Athens (Gorg. 521d6-9). Republic: in the Republic the role of reason and knowledge in politics is neatly encapsulated in the simile of the ship of state: just as a steersman must pay attention to sky, stars and wind if he is to be really qualified to rule a ship, so a statesman must have knowledge of the realm of Forms, a realm of incorporeal paradigms that exist beyond space and time, if he is to be really qualified to rule a polis (Rep. VI.488a7-489a6). Politikos: in the Statesman the Eleatic Stranger asserts that the only correct constitution is the one in which the rulers possess true statesmanship, all other constitutions being better or worse imitations of this one (Plt. 293c-294a, 296e4-297a5); and in the Laws the Athenian Stranger affirms the same principle (IX.875c3-d5). (The relations among these dialogues are discussed by Owen, 1953(5); Klosko, 1986(6); Laks, 1990(7); Gill, 1995(8); Kahn, 1995(9); and Kahn, 1996(10).) >Justice/Plato. Gaus I 311 Republic:/today’s discussion: the Republic is the most controversial work in Greek philosophy. There is no settled interpretation of the dialogue as a whole, of any of its parts, or even of its characters. Of the current controversies surrounding its political ideas the most notable concern its communism, its view of women, its hostility toward Athenian democracy, and its utopianism. >Plato. Aristotle/VsPlato: Plato's rejection of private, or separate, families and of private property (at least for the rulers and warriors of his ideal polis) is usually examined through the lens of Aristotle's critique of Platonic communism in Politics II.1-5. >Aristotle. Literature: T. H. Irwin (1991)(11) and Robert Mayhew (1997)(12) reach opposite conclusions about the cogency of Aristotle's critique. Feminism: Whether Plato was a feminist and whether he masculinized women are hotly debated issues, especially among feminist philosophers. Tuana (1994)(13) is a collection of diverse essays on this topic. (New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964(14); Annas, 1981(15); White, 1979(16); and Reeve, 1988(17). Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999(18): vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b(19); and Höffe, 1997(20).) Statesman/Politikos: (After long neglect the Statesman has recently come into the spotlight. Lane, 1998(21), is a study of its political philosophy; and Rowe, 1995(22), is an extensive collection of papers on all aspects of the dialogue.) 1. Strauss, Leo (1964) The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally. 2. Griswold, Charles L. (1988) Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. New York: Routledge. 3. Smith, Nicholas D., ed. (1998) Plato: Critical Assessments. Vol. l, General Issues of Interpetation. London: Routledge. 4. Tarrant, Harold (2000) Plato 's First Interpreters. London: Duckworth. 5. Owen, G. E. L. (1953) 'The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues'. Classical Quarterly, 3: 79-95. 6. Klosko, George (1986) The Development of Plato 's Political Theory. New York: Methuen. 7. Laks, André (1990) 'Legislation and demiurgy: on the relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws'. Classical Antiquity, 9: 209-29. 8. Gill, Christopher (1995) 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Statesman 291—303'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. 9. Kahn, Charles H. (1995) 'The place of the Statesman in Plato's later work'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. 10. Kahn, Charles H. (1996) Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Irwin, T. H. (1991) 'Aristotle's defense of private property'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 12. Mayhew, Robert (1997) Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 14. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's. 15. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon. 16. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett. 17. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 18. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 20. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie. 21. Lane, M. S. (1998) Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 22. Rowe, C. J. (1995) Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Plato | Popper | Höffe I 45 Plato/Popper/Höffe: After [Popper's] work The Open Society and its Enemies (1957)(1) Plato appears in the Politeia as an opponent of an open society and advocate of collectivist utilitarianism. >Utilitarianism. Höffe: It is true that Plato's main work contains many highly objectionable elements. For example, he subjects the guardian state to strict rules of reproduction; he allows censorship, even a political lie, i.e. a deception, provided it serves the common good. Euthanasia/Platon: Furthermore he advocates a rigorous euthanasia - not uncommon in antiquity, of course - he allows infanticide and refuses medical help for people who are malignant and incurable according to their soul. Equality/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: But it is also true that Plato opposes the inequality of men and women that prevailed at that time and considers institutional precautions against corruption. HöffeVsPopper: One can hardly blame the philosopher for not being aware of the openness and dynamics of modern societies, even to a limited extent, for not correctly assessing the measure that was already possible back then. More importantly, Plato is concerned with an element that also deprives modernity of openness and dynamism, the basic and framework conditions of the community. Idiopragy/Plato: With Plato, the idiopragy formula is considered unchangeable; in modernity it is democracy in conjunction with fundamental rights and separation of powers. On the other hand, the idiopragy formula allows for openness and dynamism, and accordingly gifted people are open to advancement(2). 2. popperVsPlaton: Popper's second accusation, that Plato subjects the individual to the collective good, can refer to the beginning of Book IV, according to which it does not matter that any group (ethnos: tribe) is particularly happy, but the whole polis (3). Polis/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: A Platonic polis does not sacrifice the welfare of individuals or groups for the common good. Rather, it is set up in such a way that everyone, groups as well as individuals, can become happy. The above-mentioned passage only formulates, in provocative exaggeration of Plato's basic intention, that no one may pursue his interests in an exclusiveness that robs others of the same right to pursue their interests. >K. Popper, >VsPopper. 1. K.Popper 1945. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. London: Routledge 2. Politeia III 415 b–c 3. 420b |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Platonism | Field | I 8 Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics. >Mathematics/Field, >Mathematical entities. I 14 FieldVsPlatonism: Platonism has to answer the fictionalist in his language - it cannot rely on it's "initial plausibility". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. >Numbers/Frege, >Gottlob Frege. Def Gödelian Platonism/Crispin Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation. FregeVsGödel. WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. >Nominalism. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. FieldVs: instead only between objects. --- II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. >Field theory. II 334 Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. III 31 Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? III 90 Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Platonism | Quine | XII 44 Platonic Idea/Quine: is not the same as a mental idea. >Ideas/Quine. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about choosing a language. >Language/Quine. VII(f) 125 Conceptualism VsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries. Problem: Poincaré's impredicative definition: Def Impredicative Definition/Poincaré/Quine: the specification of a class by a realm of objects within which this class is located. >Classes/Quine. VII (f) 126 Classes/Platonism/Quine: when classes are considered pre-existing, there is no objection to picking one of them by a move that presupposes their existence. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, however, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Of course, this should not be interpreted in terms of time. VII (f) 127 Platonism/Conceptualism/Quine: both allow universals and classes as irreducible. Conceptualism: allows fewer classes. But rests on a rather metaphorical reason: "Origin". >Conceptualism/Quine. V 126 Platonism/Quine: is opened by form words, not by color words! Reason: a union of color spots has the same color, but a union of spots of a certain shape does not necessarily have the same shape. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Politics | Aristotle | Bubner I 176 Politics/Aristotle: as long as man lives together with others, he cannot concentrate on the idle show, but must choose the "second best way" of the political actor. >Community/Aristotle. I 179 Practice/Aristotle: must perform an ordering performance within the contingency. The objective is never given, but must be actively introduced into the practical situation. The possibilities for action must be structured. >Practise/Aristotle. Def Prohairesis/Aristotle: the selection of the most appropriate means. Politics/Aristotle: Politics only means realizing on a large scale what every concrete process of action already performs in the small scale. I 188 Politics/Zoon Politikon/Aristotle: this property is attributed to man because of his speech! >Language/Aristotle. Political institutions are to be understood from an ethics point of view. Politics is not simply a ruling order, (VsPlato) with a good ruler like in Hobbes or Max Weber. >Philosopher King/Plato, >Politics/Weber, >Government/Weber, >Politics/Hobbes, >Order/Hobbes, >Social contract/Hobbes. The ruler is not a large-scale housekeeper. A common goal is to be investigated. Politics/Aristotle: Starting point: village, which does not only exist due to everyday life needs. In the polis, the character of "self-sufficiency" replaces the elementary natural conditionality. Objective: Eudaimonia, the "good life", in this highest of all objectives, the practice structure returns, as it were, reflexively to itself. Problem: Contradictory towards the natural: on the one hand, the essence of practice as a goal has been politically entered into its own telos, and this legitimates talk of man as a political entity by nature. On the other hand, the natural conditions have been overcome thanks to a self-sufficient practice. Nothing but practice itself, no nature defines the good. This self-determination means freedom. Gaus I 314 Politics/literature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: (After 100 years Newman, 1887-1902(1), is still the most important work on Aristotle's Politics. Two recent commentaries are the unfinished series Schütrumpf, 1991a(2); 1991 b(3); Schütrumpf and Gehrke, 1996(4); and the four volumes of the Clarendon Aristotle Series: Saunders, 1995(5); Robinson, 1995(6); Kraut, 1997a(7); and Keyt, 1999(8). Miller, 1995(9), and Kraut, 2002(10), are major studies of Aristotle's political philosophy. Lord, 1982(11), and Curren, 2000(12), are studies of Aristotle's views on education. Six collections of essays should be noted: Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji, 1977(13); Patzig, 1990(14); Keyt and Miller, 1991(15); Lord, O'Connor and Bodéüs, 1991(16). Neo-Aristotelianism: Aubenque, 1993(17); Höffe, 2001(18). Galston, 1980,(19) is an example of neo-Aristotelianism.) 1. Newman, W. L. (1887-1902) The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon. 2. Schütrumpf, Eckart (1991a) Aristoteles Politik, Buch I. Berlin: Akademie. 3. Schütrumpf, Eckart (1991b) Aristoteles Politik, Bücher Il und Ill. Berlin: Akademie. 4: Schütrumpf, Eckart and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (1996) Aristoteles Politik, Bücher IV—VI. Berlin: Akademie. 5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Robinson, Richard (1995) Aristotle Politics Books III and IV with a Supplementary Essay by David Keyt (1st edn 1962). Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Kraut, Richard (1997a) Aristotle Politics Books VII and VIII. Oxford: Clarendon. 8. Keyt, David (1999) Aristotle Politics Books V and VI. Oxford: Clarendon. 9. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon. 10. Kraut, Richard (2002) Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Lord, Carnes (1982) Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 12. Curren, Randall R. (2000) Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 13. Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji, eds (1977) Articles on Aristotle. Vol. Il, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth. 14. Patzig, Günther, ed. (1990) Aristoteles ' 'Politik ': Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 15. Keyt, David and Fred D. Miller, eds (1991) A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Lord, Carnes, David K. O'Connor and Richard Bodéüs, eds (1991) Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley, CA: University of Califorma Press. 17. Aubenque, Pierre, ed. (1993) Aristote Politique: Études sur la Politique d 'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 18. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (2001) Aristoteles Politik. Berlin: Akademie. 19. Galston, William A. (1980) Justice and the Human Good. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Properties | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 60 Name/property/relation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the names of properties and relations are themselves properties and relations - the number of the names must be the same as that of the objects - ((s) Cf. the problem, that there are not enough names ...). I 207 Properties/object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the properties, without which an object could not exist, may not be attributed in a description of the object - ((s) elsewhere/other author: one must be able to abstract from properties. - Source?) >Predication, >Attribution, >Attributes, >Predicates. --- II 189 Properties/WittgensteinVsPlaton: looks for constituents of a mixture, such as if the properties would be constituents of things. II 285 Properties/Notation/Wittgenstein: one could e.g. characterize all objects in the room on how far they differ from a chair - this is not a statement about the objects, but about the grammar - ((s)> Chisholm: "to live opposite from...": no property. >Properties/Chisholm. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quantities | Bigelow | I 49 Quantities/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: with quantities we are going to refer to the core area of metaphysics. >Metaphysics. Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: universals emerge from the confrontation that certain things can be something and something else at the same time. That is only a superficial contradiction. >Universals. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example: a) two things are equal by both having a mass. b) they differ at the same time because they have different masses. Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities. >Properties, >Problem of quantities. Solution/Plato: Participation in forms. This allows a gradual treatment. >Methexis. Bigelow: We are a moving a little away from Plato. Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and vary the relation between this entity and the individuals who own it. I 50 The entity explains what individuals have in common. The relation explains the different degrees. >Relations. Nominalism/Berkeley/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is Berkeley's nominalism: a platonic, abstract form is replaced by a special individual, a "paradigm". (Terminology). >Nominalism. Commonality: individuals have commonality when they resemble the same paradigm. Similarity: is, of course, also gradual, like gradual participation in forms in Plato. >Similarity. Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual. >Plato, >G. Berkeley. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual). Problem: Degrees of a relation. >Degrees/graduals. Solution: Similarity and participation are an attempt. Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is wrong. BigelowVsPlato: it does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of quantity). >Forms. I 264 Quantities/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Question: What should we allow as basic equipment? Forces, for sure. Thesis: there are essential connections between fundamental forces and the fundamental causal relation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must therefore also be part of the basic equipment of our world. >Forces, >Causality, >Ontology. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Reality | Berkeley | I 217f Matter/material world/outer world/reality/Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality! >Substance. I 232 Involuntary perception is a moment of reality. >Reality. Danto I 202 LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared. >Objects. Berkeley - Schopenhauer: there are only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents. >Content. Danto I 206 World/reality/Berkeley/Danto: there is nothing but ideas. - But we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. >Exterior/interior. BerkeleyVsPlato: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science/Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself. >Experience. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Reality | Deutsch | I 105 Criterion for reality: something that can hit back exists. But also Dr. Johnson did not directly hit the stone. He just hit some nerves, and so on. Cf. >Reality/Hacking. I 107 Def Reality/Deutsch: if a quantity is complex and autonomous according to the simplest explanation, then it is real. >Simplicity, >Complexity, >Explanation. I 111 Theory: the more fundamental a theory is, the more comprehensive are the observations that play a role in it. Physical reality is therefore self-similar in several ways. >Theory, >Theory/Deutsch, >Self-similarity. After all, not everything that is real must be easy to identify. I 119 Simulation: A reality simulator indirectly conveys both internal and external experiences to the recipient, but it cannot be programmed to simulate a particular internal experience. Roulette example and tennis example: the framework conditions are defined here, the course of the game must be open, which means that the abstract laws themselves and not only their predictive power can be simulated in virtual reality. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Simulation, >Prediction. I 190 Life = simulation: both are embodiments of theories about the environment; Something that only exists in the laws of classical physics does not exist in reality. Real hurricanes and butterflies obey the laws of quantum theory, not those of classical mechanics! I 225/26 Plato's apparent refutation that the methods of natural science could lead to mathematical truth: we cannot know anything about perfect circles because we only have access to imperfect circles. DeutschVsPlato: then we can also only build inaccurate tool machines, because the first ones are built with inaccurate tools. So there would be no possibility of self-correction. Cf. >Ideas/Plato. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Recognition | Augustine | Höffe I 102 Recognition/AugustineVsPlato/Höffe: Augustine contrasts the Socratic motto "knowledge is virtue", which is part of Plato's understanding of philosophy as a unity of insight and action, with the separation: "Theory" (knowledge) is not already practice, (philosophical) instruction about what is right is not already conversion. Or, formulated in non-religious language, it is not already lived recognition. Höffe: Now this practiced recognition could be done with Aristotle from example and imitation, praise and blame and constant practice. According to Augustine, however, it requires the help of God, to which one has no claim. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Reflection | Hegel | Gadamer I 348 Reflection/Hegel/Gadamer: [We illustrate Hegel's philosophy of reflection with his] well-known polemic(1) against Kant's "thing in itself". Kant: Kant's critical definition of the limits of reason had limited the application of categories to the objects of possible experience and had declared the thing in itself that underlies the phenomena to be unrecognizable in principle. HegelVsKant: Hegel's dialectical argumentation objects that reason, by drawing this line and distinguishing the appearance from the thing in itself, proves this difference to be its own in truth. In this way, it does not reach a limit of itself, but is rather completely with itself by setting this limit. For that means that it has already crossed it. >Thing in itself, >I. Kant. Border/Hegel: What makes a border a border always includes at the same time that which is limited by the border. It is the dialectic of the border to be only by abolishing itself. >Dialektic/Hegel. Thing in itself/Hegel: So is the viewpoint that characterizes the thing in itself in contrast to its appearance, only for us in itself. What can be shown in the dialectic of the boundary in logical generality Gadamer I 349 is specified for the consciousness in the experience that the view distinguished from it is the other of itself and that it is only known in its truth when it is known as self, i.e. when it knows itself in the completed absolute self-consciousness. >Hegel/Gadamer, >Recognition/Hegel. Gadamer: The polemic against the absolute thinker is itself without position. The Archimedean point of unhinging Hegelian philosophy can never be found in reflection. This is what makes the formal quality of the philosophy of reflection that there can be no position that is not included in the reflective movement of the consciousness coming to itself. The insistence on immediacy - be it that of bodily nature, be it that of the "you" making demands, be it that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of the conditions of production - has always disproved itself, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action. >Absoluteness/Hegel. Gadamer I 351 Plato's mythical refutation of the dialectical sophism, plausible as it may seem, [is] not satisfactory for modern thinking. >Sophists/Plato. HegelVsPlato: Hegel knows no mythical foundation of philosophy. Rather, myth belongs to his pedagogy. In the end, it is reason that establishes itself. By working through the dialectic of reflection as the total self-mediation of reason, Hegel is fundamentally superior to the argumentative formalism that we called sophistic with Plato. His dialectic is, therefore, no less polemical than Plato's Socrates against the empty argumentation of understanding, which he calls "external reflection". >Dialectic/Hegel, >Understanding. 1. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Relation-Theory | Bigelow | I 55 Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. >Quantity, >Sizes/Physics, >Relations, >Objects, >Intrinsic, >Properties. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big. Cf. >Haecceitism. Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here. Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves. >Events. I 56 Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects. Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves. >Methexis, >Plato. BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways. I 57 Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all? Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained. Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur. Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level. 2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things? Ad 1. Example Mass Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). I 58 Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Identity. Entailment/N.b.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete. Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others. Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2. Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things. >Levels/order, >Description levels. It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume. For example, compare the pairs "a, b" "c, d" "e, f" between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length. Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs. I 59 Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities). >Real numbers, >Quantity/Bigelow. Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components (1) Individuals (2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes. >Proportions/Bigelow. Mass/Volume/Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.b. all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other. Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another. >Determinates/Determinables, >Equivalence classes. Level 1: Objects Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level. Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg. N.b.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc. Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet... I 60 ...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField). >Hartry Field, >Numbers, >Mathematical Entities, >Ontology. Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941(1), 1966(2)) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic") Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit. >Measurement, >Equality. Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato. I 61 Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example. >Scales. Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings. Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,... I 62 ...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. >Nominalism. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels). >Realism/Bigelow, >Problem of quantities. Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. >Simplicity. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive. 1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1966). Selected logic papers. New York: Random House. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Relativism | Putnam | VII 436 Realtivism/Putnam: my main concern in the book "Truth, Reason and History": Putnam: thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat. "Companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens (PutnamVsHarman). --- Williams II 503 PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: e.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. >Cultural relativism. --- Putnam III 139f Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: Williams acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. --- V 141 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness, is a fact about our notion of consciousness. Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. V 165 Relativism/tradition: relativism is easy to refute, because relativsm itself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): it is a regress to say: "I think that I think that snow is white". PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. Modern Relativism/discourse relativity/Foucault: everything is relative, also the relativism. Vs: problem: if we say "absolutely true relative to person P", then there is no total relativism. No relativist wants the relativism apply to everything. --- I (i) 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture. >Assertibility. Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. PutnamVsRorty: justified assertibility exists regardless of the majority, but it is not a transcendental reality but a characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. I (i) 249 Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Religious Belief | Epicurus | Adorno XIII 222 Religious Belief/Epicurus/Adorno: Epicurus gives the reason that the universality of their assumption speaks for the existence of God. The reduction of the objective concept of truth to subjective opinion in this already neutralized, compliant, late-Greek consciousness forces Epicurus to join the general ruling more or less in a conformist way. >Religious belief/Ancient/Philosophy, cf. >God/Aristotle, >God/Plato. EpicurusVsPlato/Adorno: if there is no longer an objective concept of reason - as the Platonic has prototypically shaped it - the average value of belief is very easily hypostatized instead. This is found in the Hobbesian form of materialism, in which religion is recommended as a state-preserving means, that is, as a for-another, and not as an in-itself. >Plato, >Hobbes. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Science | Aristotle | Gadamer I 357 Science/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of [the] process [of induction]. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if, in this general flight, one observation is confirmed through re- Gadamer I 358 peated experience, then it stops. >Experience/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle. Thus at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight sets in. If others now join the flight, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and again obeys the unit of the command. The uniform mastery of the whole symbolizes here what science is. The picture is intended to show how science, i.e. general truth, can come about in the first place, which must not depend on the randomness of the observations, but should be valid in real generality. Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: Epagogé emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. >Induction, >Deduction. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal? >Prior knolwdge/Today's discussion. Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé. Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively. I 123 BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms. Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries. Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively. I 147 Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization. The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge. >Ontology/Aristotle. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Science | Heidegger | Gadamer I 263 Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered. >W. Dilthey. Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background. >E. Husserl. Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case. >Objectivism/Husserl. Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger. Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic Gadamer I 264 incomprehensibility."(1) Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Gadamer I 459 Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity. In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called I 460 experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2). Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity. >Language, >Language/Heidegger. 1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153. 2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke). Rorty II 65 Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality. Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. --- Figal I 107f Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Second Nature | McDowell | I 19 Definition second nature/McDowell: Nature includes the second nature acquired by conceptual skills whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons. Second nature(s): internalised background of norms borrowed from nature. >Nature/McDowell. I 109/110 Second nature/McDowell: it cannot float freely above the possibilities that belong to the normal human organism. >Education. I 114 Second Nature/McDowell: Our education updates some of the potentials with which we were born. But: Animal/Human/McDowell: this is not an adding to our animal nature. No admixture. I 118 Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: There are rules of nature, whether one is receptive to it or not. This is the result of proper upbringing. "Naturalism of second nature","Naturalized Platonism". Naturalized Platonism/McDowell: the structure of the space of reasons has autonomy. But it cannot be derived from truths about humans. It is not unbridled: not isolated from the "merely human". (Instead: sensitivity through education). I 121 McDowellVsPlatonism: any platonism means that the norms are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein's Quietism recognizes this as a pseudo-problem. >Platonism, >Quietism. Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhuman. This does not raise any real questions about norms. >Norm/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Sophism | Plato | Bubner I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: uses the same reasons to plead the incompleteness of dialectic, precisely because it has to do with the intersubjective speech practise. I 42 PlatoVsSophists: unmethodic. Bubner I 98 Sophism/Plato/Bubner: also the sophist cannot easily be disproved by empirical comparison. Its speeches must be examined to see if its terms match. ((s)> Coherence theory/Plato). |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sophists | Plato | Gadamer I 351 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists/Plato/Gadamer: The archetype of all empty argumentation is the sophistic question of how one can ask for something that one does not know. This sophistic objection, which Plato formulates in "Menon"(1), is significantly not overcome there by a superior argumentative resolution, but by invoking the myth of the pre-existence of the soul. Admittedly, this is a very ironic vocation, provided that the myth of pre-existence and recollection, which is supposed to solve the riddle of questioning and searching, in reality does not play out a religious certainty, but is based on the certainty of the soul seeking knowledge, which asserts itself against the emptiness of formal argumentation. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the weakness that Plato recognizes in the Logos that he does not base his criticism of the sophistic argumentation logically, but mythically. Just as true opinion is a divine favour and gift, so the search for and knowledge of the true logos is not a free self-ownership of the spirit. Justification by the myth: (...) the mythical legitimation that Plato gives to the Socratic dialectic here [is] of fundamental importance (...). If the sophism remained unrefuted - and it cannot be refuted by argument - this argument would lead to resignation. It is the argument of "lazy reason" and possesses truly symbolic significance insofar as all empty reflection leads to the discrediting of reflection in general, despite its victorious appearance. Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer; HegelVsPlato see >Reflection/Hegel. Gadamer I 415 Sophists/Language/Correctness/Truth/Plato/Gadamer: Cratylos: As always with Plato, there is (...) a factual reason why Socrates is so blind to what he refutes. >Word/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. Cratylos is not clear to himself that the meaning of words is not simply identical with the things mentioned, and he is even less clear about that this justifies the superiority concealed from the Platonic Socrates that the logos, the talking and speaking and the revelation of things carried out in it, is something different from the meaning of the meanings lying in the words - and that only here the actual possibility of language to communicate what is right, true, has its place. PlatoVsSophists: In the misunderstanding of this actual truth possibility of speech (to which by its nature falsehood, pseudo, belongs as a counter-possibility) its sophistic abuse arises. If the logos is understood as the representation of a thing (deloma), as its disclosure, without fundamentally distinguishing this truth function of speech from the meaningful character of the words, a possibility of confusion inherent in language is opened up. One can then think to have the thing in the word. >Truth/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Subjects | Hegel | Bubner I 184 Subject/object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of cognition, Hegel determines the subject/object relationship on two sides: theory and practice. (Following AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "Radical separation of reason from experience". >Experience/Hegel, >Practice, >Reflection/Hegel. I 185 Subject/object/antiquity/Bubner: the whole ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing of this at all. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Unconscious | Freud | Rorty V 47 Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational). 2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged. V 47/48 Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I. V 60 FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. V 61 Def Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning. Searle I 197 Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. >Unconscious/Searle. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Unity and Multiplicity | Nicholas of Cusa | Gadamer I 439 Unity and Multiplicity/CusanusVsPlatonism/Nicholaus of Cusa/Gadamer: the multiplicity in which the human spirit unfolds is not a mere fall from true unity and not a loss of its homeland. Complicatio/Cusanus: Rather, the finiteness of the human spirit, as much as it always remained related to the infinite unity of absolute being, had to find its positive legitimation. This is laid out in the concept of complicatio, and from this point the phenomenon of language also gains a new aspect. It is the human mind that at once summarizes and unfolds. The unfolding into discursive multiplicity is not only one such of the concepts, but extends into the linguistic realm. It is the multiplicity of possible terms - depending on the diversity of languages - that further potentiates the conceptual differentiation. Cf. >Nominalism. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Unity and Multiplicity | Plato | Gadamer I 461 Unity/Multiplicity/Plato/GadamerVsPlato/Gadamer: It was only a first step that Plato took when he realized that the word of language is one and many at the same time. It is always a word that we say to each other and that we are told Gadamer I 462 (theologically: the "Word of God") - but the unity of this word is (...) ever and ever separated in articulated speech. This structure of the Logos and the verbum, as recognized by the Platonic and Augustinian dialectic, is the mere reflection of its logical contents. >Word/Augustine, >Language/Gadamer: "Centre of the language". Cf. >Word of God. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Universals | Armstrong | III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Universals | Place | Armstrong III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. Armstrong III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. Armstrong III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. Armstrong III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. Armstrong III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Universe | Field | I 104 Universe/Classes/Sets/Model/"all"/Field: as the universe of all classes is too large to form a countable model, it is too big to form a class and therefore too large, to form any (over-countable) model. >Models, >Infinity, >Paradoxes. --- II 335 Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "There's only one universe"). >Platonism. Problem: PutnamVsPlatonism: How can we make it at all possible to pick out the "full" (universal) universe and to make it face a partial universe, and accordingly the standard-element-relation in contrast to a non-standard-element-relation? (Putnam 1980)(1). Putnam: Thesis: we cannot do that - i.e. that the "incomplete content" of the concepts "quantity" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all set theoretical theorems. >Element relation, >Truth, >Truth values, >Theorems, >Theories. 1. Putnam, Hilary. 1980. Models and Reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45. (3):464-482 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Virtues | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 147 Virtues/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: Thomas Aquinas pro Aristotle: In the virtue doctrine Thomas Aquinas again follows his philosophical model, in particular in the distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues and the determination of the moral attitude (habitus) as the middle. >Aristotle. Thomas pro Plato: However, he takes over the quartet of cardinal virtues(1) which originated with Plato: measure (temperantia), bravery (fortitudo), prudence (prudentia) and justice (iustitia). ThomasVsPlato: In contrast to Plato these four virtues are surpassed by three "theological" virtues(2): faith (fides), hope (spes) and love (caritas). >Morals/Plato. 1. Thomas Summa la Ilae, qu. 61 2. Ebenda qu. 62 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Word of God | Nicholas of Cusa | Gadamer I 438 Word of God/Nicholas of Cusa/Gadamer: The divine word creates the world, but not in a chronological sequence of creation thoughts and creation days. The human spirit, on the other hand, possesses the whole of its thoughts only in a temporal succession. Gadamer: Certainly this is not a purely temporal relationship, as we already saw in Thomas Aquinas. Cusa emphasizes this accordingly. It is the same as with the series of numbers, the generation of which is not actually a temporal event, but a movement of reason. Cusa sees the same movement of reason at work there, where the genera and species, as they fall under the word, are formed from the sensual and are unfolded into the individual terms and words Gadamer I 439 They too are entia rationis. Emanation/Nicholas of CusaVsNeoplatonism/Nicholas of CusaVsNeoplatonism/Gadamer: As platonic-newly platonic this talk of unfolding may sound, in truth the Cusanian has overcome the emanatist scheme of the New Platonic theory of explications in the decisive point. For he plays the Christian doctrine of the verbum against it.(1) >Emanation. Word/Cusanus: For him the word is no other being than the spirit, no diminished or attenuated appearance of the same. ChristianityVsPlatonism: Knowing this makes the Christian philosopher superior to the Platonists. Correspondingly, the multiplicity in which the human spirit unfolds is not a mere apostasy from true unity and is not a loss of its homeland. Complicatio/Cusanus: Rather, the finiteness of the human spirit, as much as it always remained related to the infinite unity of absolute being, had to find its positive legitimation. This is laid out in the concept of complicatio, and from this point the phenomenon of language also gains a new aspect. It is the human mind that simultaneously summarizes and unfolds. The unfolding into discursive multiplicity is not only one of the concepts, but extends into the linguistic realm. It is the multiplicity of possible names - depending on the diversity of languages - that still potentiates the conceptual differentiation. >Naming, >Denotation, >Words, >Translation, >Meaning, >Bible, >Bible Criticism. 1. Philosophi quidem de Verbo divino et maxlmo absoluto sufficienter instructi non erant . . . Non sunt igitur formae actu nisi in Verbo ipsum Verbum . . . De Doct. Ign. II, cap. IX. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Berkeley Vs Aristotle | I 230 General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Benacerraf, P. | Field Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 24 VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself. I 25 Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities. I 26 Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I I understand Benacerraf). I 27 VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7). I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Benacerraf, P. | Lewis Vs Benacerraf, P. | Field I 231 Example (2) if most mathematicians accept "p" as an axiom, then p. I 232 VsPlatonism: he has a problem if he cannot explain (2). This is a reformulation of the famous problem of Benacerraf in "Mathematical truth". (see above). (>Benacerraf here departs from a causal theory of truth). Field: our current approach does not depend on that, though. I 233 Knowledge/Mathematics/Field: our approach does not depend on the givenness of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Instead: Reliability Theory/Knowledge/Field: the view that we should be skeptical if the reliability of our knowledge is not explainable in principle. Mathematics/LewisVsBenacerraf: (Lewis, 1986, p.111 12): Benacerraf's case is not a problem for mathematics because most mathematical facts necessarily apply. Reliability Theory/Lewis: then we also need an explanation of the reliable relationship, e.g., between facts about electrons and our "electron" belief states and we even have them! In this case, it is the causal approach, according to which the "electron" beliefs counterfactually (>counterfactual conditionals) depend on the existence and nature of electrons. Explanation/Lewis: now it's precisely the contingent existence and nature of electrons, which makes the question of their existence and nature meaningful. Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on non-contingent things. E.g. nothing can counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. Nothing meaningful can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. Stalnaker I 41 Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of general semantics. We should interpret existence statements about numbers, functions and sets with the same truth-conditional semantics as propositions about tables, quarks, etc. I 42 Knowledge/Mathematics/Reality/Stalnaker: On the other hand, we should also expect that the access to our mathematical knowledge is continuous to the to everyday knowledge. The procedures by which we evaluate and justify mathematical statements should be explained by a general approach to knowledge, together with a representation of mathematical knowledge. Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Thesis: he gives natural semantics, but does not allow plausible epistemology. ((s) that does not explain how we come to knowledge). Combinatorial Approach/Combinatorial/Terminology/Benacerraf: Example conventionalism, example formalism: they show mathematical procedures, but do not tell us what the corresponding confirmed mathematical statements tell us. Benacerraf/Stalnaker: he himself does not offer any solution. Reference/Benacerraf: Thesis: true reference needs a causal link. Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Solution/LewisVsBenacerraf: pro Platonism but Vs causal link for reference. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Newen Vs Carnap, R. | New I 115 Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network): Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places. Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations. I 116 If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account. Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism. Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations. VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations. I 117 VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example 1) statements about our own consciousness 2) statements about the world of physical objects 3) about the consciousness of others 4) about intellectual and cultural objects. Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment. I 118 The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory. Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories. Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects. Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color. I 119 Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red. Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction. VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution: I 120 (From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc. Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C. Problem: Carnap neglected GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle. NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial. I 121 Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world. NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen. NS I 30 CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems: 1) problem of empty names. a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence b) how can various empty names be distinguished? 2) Problem: Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. NS I 101 Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory. NS I 102 Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege. VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic. Solution: Searle: bundle theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Conceptualism | Quine Vs Conceptualism | VII (f) 126 Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond expressible conditions of membership of elements. ((s) VsPlatonism: Quasi requires that there should also be classes without such conditions, as classes should be independent of speakers.) Cantor's proof: would lead to something else: He namely appeals to a class h of those members of the class k that are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer. VII (f) 127 But thus the class h is specified impredicatively! h is in fact itself part of the subclass of k. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism. The same fate also applies to Cantor's proof of the existence of hyper-countable infinities. QuineVsConceptualism: which is indeed a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: Ex proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit. ConceptualismVsReducibility Axiom: because it reintroduces the entire Platonist class logic. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Descartes, R. | Freud Vs Descartes, R. | Rorty V 60 FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equal. Mechanization, procedures to change ourselves. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Stegmüller Vs Descartes, R. | Stegmüller IV 370 Knowledge/Recognition Theory/Descartes/Stegmüller: Descartes was dissatisfied with the status of knowledge in his time. He wanted to strengthen it with his methodical doubt. IV 371 (i) I can without contradiction doubt the existence of my body, but not that of my consciousness as the bearer of my doubts. (ii) Cogito Principle: indisputable because of the fact that I recognize his truth clearly and unambiguously. (iii) God as a perfect being cannot deceive. Sensory illusions do not stem from God, they arise in the complicated physiological perceptual apparatus. Knowledge/Recognition Theory/VsDescartes/Stegmüller: 1. The status of the general rule remains unclear. It is at least threatened by the possibility of a deceiving God. Problem: either the rule is absolutely safe, then it is not threatened by a deus malignus, or it is not completely safe, then any thinking threatens it. 2. Cogito argument: based on the insight into the self-contradiction "I don't think now". IV 372 But that is a different clarity than that of mathematics and also that of the proof of God. From the Cogito argument the authority of clear and distinct thinking cannot be deduced! 3. From the fact that at first I can only conclude with certainty that I am a thinking being, it does not follow that my consciousness is a thinking substance and a thing different from my body. IV 373 MackieVsDescartes/Stegmüller: two points: 1. Descartes claims that perfection is a positive term, imperfection a negative one, which presupposes the former. IV 374 On the other hand, he himself admits that I cannot understand the infinity of God and that there is no independent idea of perfection in my mind. But then I can gain a positive understanding of my own imperfection, from which I in turn form the negative concept of perfection. I am in constant change and am aware of it. I could also say that the purely negative concept of freedom from all shortcomings is the only one available to me for the idea of omniscience. 2. MackieVsPlato/MackieVs ideal forms: Example: absolute straight line: such ideas could not come from the sensory perception, because no real distance is completely straight. They would then have to originate from the direct not sensual familiarity with ideal beings. However, we can very well have the idea of a curved line, which is gained from perception! Then we can also imagine that this stretch is less curved. I can then imagine a borderline case that could not be further freed from curvature. The idea of perfection can thus be explained in terms of its content entirely from the material of sensory perception and the understanding of negation. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Dialectic | Martin Vs Dialectic | Arm II 186 MartinVsDialektik/VsPlaton: weder ist Nicht Sein eine Form von Sein noch Sein eine Form von Nicht Sein. Dennoch die Kette von An und Abwesenheiten von etwas sind wesentlich und vervollständigend füreinander. Der Begriff eines Endes ist der Begriff einer Grenze wo etwas ist und etwas nicht ist. . Ebene/Stufen/Ordnung/Martin: das muss man nicht mit zwielichtigen höheren Stufen des Seins erklären, das ist bloß gut für theoretische Übungen an der Tafel. Alles in Begriffen der 1 Stufe abzuwickeln ist schwierig, aber es kann durchgeführt werden. Abwesenheit 1 Stufe macht "allgemeine Tatsachen" oder "allgemeine Zustände" überflüssig. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Wright Vs Field, H. | Field I 43 Anti-Platonism/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): claims that modal considerations undermine my version of the anti-platonism. Because I take mathematics and the existence of mathematical entities (mE) as consistent, and consistency as the modal basic concept (possibility), I would be bound to think that it is wrong that there are mathematical entities - that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent wrong". ((s) "There could just as well have been mathematical entities, i.e. empirical question"). Contingent/Wright/HaleVsField: is not logical, and thus something other than "neither logically true nor logically contradictory". And that makes Field's position absurd. WrightVsField: where should Fields "contingency" be contingent on? For example, according to Field, the actual world contains no numbers, but it could have contained some. But there is neither an explanation for why not, nor would there be an explanation if there were numbers. FieldVsVs: if the argument were good, it would be equally valid against (nonlogical) platonism, for which mathematics goes back behind logic. Then the denial of all mathematics would be logically consistent and therefore "contingent". But this is a confusion of the different meanings of "possible". Analog: For example, if the existence of God is logically consistent, and there is none, then it is contingent wrong that there would be one. Problem: the atheist has no access to what the contingent is supposed to be on. There would be neither an explanation for the existence nor for the non-existence. There are no favorable conditions for God's existence and no unfavorable ones. (>Anselm, 2. Ontological argument). But WrightVsField: has even more interesting arguments: 1. without the assumption that mathematics consists of necessary truths, the view that mathematics is conservative (preserving) is unjustified. I 44 Analog: without the assumption that mathematics is true, the assumption that it is consistent is unjustified. Justification/FieldVsWright: You can justify any belief by a stronger belief from which it follows. (>Strength of Theories). Wright and Hale would have to show that Platonism has better reasons for the necessary truth of mathematics than Anti-Platonism has for assuming that mathematics is conservative (or consistent). And it is not certain that this is true. WrightVsField: 2. Anyone who represents both: a) that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent false" and b) that mathematics is conservative, can give no reason not to believe in mathematical entities! Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that any internally consistent combination of nominalistic statements is also consistent with mathematics. Then no combination of nominalistic statements can provide an argument against belief in mathematics (ontology). WrightVsField: how then can there be any reason at all not to believe in mathematics? He has no proof of his own nominalism. It follows that Field cannot be a nominalist, but that he must be an agnostic. FieldVsWright: this one misjudges the relevance that I attribute to the question of renunciability and indispensability. Conservativity: does not automatically show that there can be no reason to believe in mathematics. To succeed with VsPlatonism, we must also show that mathematics is dispensable in science and meta logic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Black Vs Frege, G. | II 124 Numbers/BlackVsPlato/BlackVsFrege: false Platonism: imagining them as "extraordinary" or "special", "eternal" objects. II 125 Grammatically, however, the names of numbers (numerals) differ in important aspects from the name of physical objects. E.g. "Two people came in": Here "two" is public. Adverb. This can be transformed into "one and one: "a man came in and then another." This is not possible in the case of "red". (> Paraphrase). BlackVsFrege: These grammatical facts show that numbers are no "special kinds of objects". Frege: the great Frege, however, made no elementary mistake by accepting it anyeay, but he was never really satisfied with it. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Prior Vs Frege, G. | I 50 Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument. The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0). But a number! The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values. Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals. Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else. Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.) Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2-1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing". That is to correspond to the fact that 2-1 is not only "> 0", but the number 1! I 51 And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3-1) 1 is the number 1, because 3-1 is the number 2. There are no different truths. PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false. Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid. But we have said above that sentences denote nothing. Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (Wittgenstein II 94): There is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning) Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless. We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each φ and each ψ if exactly one thing φs and no thing ψs, then more things are φ-ing than are ψ-ing. Def "more than". I 51/52 Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink". Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference! That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either). Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?). Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity." Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous. But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone! PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "the false thing". Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension". I 53 PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects). Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names. Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns. And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions) I 166 but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name). PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation. This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Kant | Bubner Vs Kant | I 80 Kant: defended himself against contemporary transcendental philosophy with the essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenen vornehmenen Ton in der Philosophie" ((1796) KantVsJacobi). Kant invents a position for his polemics that deals "enthusiastically instead of critically" with philosophy. He attributes this enthusiasm to Plato. Opposite position: attributed to Aristotle. BubnerVsKant: both positions cannot be historically proven. Kant had very little knowledge of antiquity. I 88 KantVsPlato: the mathematician Plato is not a good metaphysicist. An unfathomable confusion of view and concept. "Intellectual view" erroneously brings together immediacy and discursivity. There was no explanation of how the two came together. "Undemocratic esotericism" is only understandable for members of a "club" > connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau's equality demands. I 89/90 BubnerVsKant: the accusation of confusion can only be upheld if one accepts the Kantian premises. In reality Plato's text is different: the Phaidon praises the "flight into the Logos" as a way out of the immediateism of the pre-Socratics, the "second best journey" renounces the unbroken gaze and seeks the mirror of things in the speeches. The synthetic construction of logic is the access to the world to which we must confine ourselves. Plato is by no means inferior to Kant in his contempt of the "noble tone". I 108 Synthesis/Kant: while the other syntheses find something else, which leads them by their doing to a unity ((s)so nevertheless??) which is again distinguished from it, the highest Synthesis has to do only with itself. Synthesis/VsKant: his followers have uncovered the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this chain of thought. I/Fichte: action of the settling I I/Hegel: vitality of the mind in constant self-mediation. (As an absolute principle). I 109 "Intellectual View"/Bubner: the idea introduced by Kant's successors VsKant to bring together immediacy and reflexivity. BubnerVs: hermaphroditic. The anonymous author of the "Eldest System Program" follows this model. They demand from the philosopher the aesthetic talent that breaks down the barrier to art production. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Nominalism | Carnap Vs Nominalism | Quine XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about the choice of a language. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Field Vs Nominalism | I 67 FieldVsNominalism: I do think that ME like numbers, functions, sets etc. are dispensable, but I do not claim the dispensability of any entity that some self-proclaimed nominalist rejects E.g. spacetime regions. I 68 Because we have causal knowledge of of Sp.t.r., in the case of ME, we must postulate mysterious connections to a Platonic realm beyond time and space. E.g. A knowledge about an absolute infinity of objects in that realm. Sp.t. does not bring epistemic problems with it, even if we do not stand in a causal relation with each tiger. I 69 FieldVsPlatonism: its entities are in principle inaccessible. Reference/Relation/Knowledge/Field: Problem: a) How do words stand for things? b) more fundamental: how do beliefs stand for things? Problem: in the broad sense: ME do not only stand in no causal, but also in no physical relation with us. Sp.t.: no problem: we can point to many of them! And refer to them with index words ("here", "now", etc.). |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Objectivism | Putnam Vs Objectivism | Field II 325 Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "there is only one universe"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we manage at all to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and to oppose this to a partial universe, and in accordance with this the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-member standard relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here from the perspective of "one universe"). Putnam: thesis we cannot do that. That is, that the "incomplete content" of the terms "set" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all theoretical conclusions. PutnamVsObjectivism: concluded the same anti-objectivist methodological consequences such as the Platonism of perfection: although the standard Platonism has incorporated this idea that we have a set-theoretical universe, this is not really part of Platonism per se. PutnamVsPlatonism/Field: if he's right, this standard Platonism cannot be maintained. Field: Putnam is right: the "anti-objectivist" methodology is the right conclusion, whatever the ontological consequences are. The "Platonism of perfection" shows us this. Field II 338 PutnamVsObjectivism/Set Theory/Field: (Putnam 1980 first half): thesis: even if we assume that part of the standard Platonism, who says that there is only one universe, Problem: then there is nothing in our conclusion practices, which could determine the specific truth value of typical undecidable sentences. Field II 339 This can be easily extended to the relation of semantic consequence in logic 2nd order. In short: (ia) Nothing in our practices determines that the term "set" picks out the entire set-theoretical universe V and not any suitably closed part of V. (ib), even if the entire set-theoretical universe V could be picked out, there would be nothing in our practice that could determine that our term "e" picks out, the element relation E on V unlike any other relation on V that obeys our axioms. (ii) The indeterminacy in (ia) and (ib) is sufficient to allow the truth value of typical undecidable sentences of the set theory to be undetermined. ((ib) alone would also be sufficient, often also (ia) alone), Undecidable sentences/Field: which are covered by this scheme? What are the semantic facts that are determined by our conclusion practices? How is the semantics of "quantity" and "e" defined by our practice far enough to allow the quantifier "only a finite number of" to be sufficiently defined. And with that, how the truth will be determined by F-decidable, but otherwise by undecidable sentences, also for the number theory. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Plato | Armstrong Vs Plato | Arm III 90 ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlato: Universals are abstractions. But not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers: III 91 Abstract/Quine: calls Platonic universals "abstract". (In a different sense than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions). Abstraction/Armstrong: a relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Arm III 126 Universals/ArmstrongVsPlato: contingent, just like particulars! That means they do not exist precisely uninstantiated. Therefore, it does not seem plausible at all that if a non-existent U came to existence (Tooley), it would have a certain relation to others or, according to the law of excluded third, would not have. Conclusion: Tooleys ingenious examples do not prevent us from understanding uninstantiated laws as disguised counterfactual conditionals, whose truth or falsity depends entirely on the actual, i.e. on instantiated laws (higher level!). The "law" which is assumed to apply thereafter may never apply. Nevertheless, it may be specified. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Plato | Kant Vs Plato | Bubner I 86 KantVsSchlosser: (KantVsPlato): The decline of apriorism has been expanded to unbridled theory claims. I 88 KantVsPlato: The mathematician Plato is not suitable to be a metaphysician. Unrealized Mistake between intuition and concept. "Intellectual intuition" brings immediacy and discursivity erroneously together. There is no clarification on how to get the two together. "Undemocratic esotericism" only natural for members of a "club"> connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau’s demands for equality. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Plato | Maturana Vs Plato | I 139 Cave Parable/MaturanaVsPlato: we are not like the people in the cave parable, rather like biological probes in the laboratory: we determine and use those realms of reality in which we live. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Plato | Pinker Vs Plato | I 180 Memory/PinkerVsPlato: ever since he coined the metaphor of impression in soft wax, we always assumed the neural medium must have some internal resistance against the retention of information. But actually there are indelible memories. Of course, there is one important restriction of memory (to save costs, e.g. in the form of computation time) but that is not a by-product! I 181 If such laws exist in consciousness, they should be found in other information processing systems as well, and in reality! E.g. frequency of books requested in libraries: those that have been requested more frequently in the past are also in greater demand in the present. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Plato | Rorty Vs Plato | VI 254 Knowledge/Platon/Rorty: Knowledge will set us free. But you have to answer the question: why should I be moral. RortyVsPlaton: with that he has saddled us with a distinction between true and false self. VI 255 Plato suggests to us that we know something of which evil people have no idea. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Plato | Wittgenstein Vs Plato | Danto I 51 WittgensteinVsPlato/Danto: would have considered Plato's thesis of the forms accurately as the type of confusion that the philosophy repeatedly lapses into. Philosophy is simply not science according to Wittgenstein. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Plato | Verschiedene Vs Plato | Vaihinger I 194ff Arnobius/Vaihinger: (300 A.D.) E.g. fiction of a human being who grew up in complete solitude from birth to refute Plato's theory of knowledge. ArnobiusVsPlato. |
Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Plato | Martin Vs Plato | Arm II 186 MartinVsDialectics/VsPlato: neither is not being a form of being nor being a form of not being. Yet the chain of presence and absence of something is essential and completing for each other. The concept of an end is the concept of a border where something is and is not something. Levels/Stages/Order/Martin: one does not have to explain this with dubious higher stages of being, it is only good for theoretical exercises on the blackboard. To deal with everything in terms of the 1st level is difficult, but it can be done. Absence of 1st level makes "general facts" or "general states" superfluous. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Plato | Bigelow Vs Plato | I 49 Quantities/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if properties are something that a thing can either have or not have, there is a problem of quantities. Solution/Plato: participation in forms: Allows gradual treatment. We differ slightly from Plato: Quantity/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: solutions of this kind have in common that they postulate an entity and the relation between that entity and the individuals who own it varies. I 50 Properties/Gradual/Degree/Berkeley/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories are quite similar: they explain how properties can be gradual. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not solve the general problem of quantities (that they are gradual). Problem: degrees of relation. Solution: similarity and participation are an attempt. Forms/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim that his theory of forms is incorrect. BigelowVsPlato: but does not solve the problem of quantities. (The nature of the quantity). I 51 VsPlato: Assuming many differnet properties instead of a variable relation, each for one quantity: E.g. to have the property having a mass of 2.0 kg, etc. This approach makes much of what is hard for Plato to explain easier: he shows what distinguishes objects (while Plato rather shows what they have in common). Def Determinable/Bigelow/Pargetter: what the objects have in common, but what is differently pronounced them. E.g. mass. Def Determinate/Bigelow/Pargetter: is the special property that distinguishes the objects (at the same time). E.g. a mass of 2.0 kg. I 51 Participation/BigelowVsPlato: with Plato, all things have a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the contrary, want relations of things to each other. BigelowVsPlato: that allows us to explain different types of differences between objects, namely, that they have different relational properties which other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things may be different in different ways. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Plato | Hegel Vs Plato | Bubner I 42 PlatoVsSophists: unmethodical. HegelVsPlato: directed the same accusation against him. Do not come beyond the sophistic reasoning. "The dialectic to dissolve the particular and to produce the General is not the true dialectic. (s) stands with the only negatives). The "external reflection" had to yield to the "thing itself".But this makes the voluntary self-task of the reflection necessary! The total mediation must also include mediating itself. (Hegel. logic) --- I 77 HegelVsPlato: stopped halfway. He was moving undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectic, that means the smooth reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability stating a relationship of incompatibility. This is a translation task (of the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be done through the Socratic irony. "General irony of the world". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Plato | Chisholm Vs Plato | III 59 Necessity/Plato/Chisholm: can only be seen when one turns away from growth and decay and towards the absolute and eternal, the unchangeable. AristoteleVsPlato/Chisholm: one must look at the particulars in order to learn something about the necessity. From this we learn what it means, for example, to be blue. The same goes for red, and then we learn that red and blue cannot be in the same place at the same time. Induction/Aristotle: 1. Perception of individuals 2. Abstraction: what does it mean for a thing to be blue, or to be a human being. 3. intuitive grasp of relations between properties. III 60 4. with the intuitive knowledge we have the truths of reason and attribute necessities. Intuitive induction/Terminology/Chisholm: we better call induction like that in Aristotle, because it differs from the later concept. A priori/Chisholm: the proposition on the properties (that a thing is not blue when it is red) and the universal generalization are known a priori. So they differ from the induction by enumeration. On the other hand: Enumerative induction/Chisholm: this is about justifying the conclusion. III 61 Intuitive induction: here the connection between individual examples and conclusion is much less strong. It may be enough to imagine a single thing. Essence/Husserl: can be exemplified even with fantasy situations. III 62 Necessity/Tradition/Chisholm: once we acquire some concepts, (i.e. once we know what it means that something has these attributes) we will be able to know according to this traditional conception what it means for a proposition or fact to be necessary. A priori/Tradition/Chisholm: this is what the tradition called the a priori. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Plato | Nominalism Vs Plato | Rorty II 124 Def Nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all beings are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater extent to the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismVsPlato/Rorty: nature cannot be dissected at its joints. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Plato | Meixner Vs Plato | I 104 Exemplification/E./Meixner: the actual (strong, not Meinongean) exemplification has still two forms: the predicative exemplification, in which the exemplified entity y is a predicative universal (U), i.e. a single-digit or multi-digit U, and the type exemplification, in which the exemplified entity is a non-predicative U, i.e. a type-object. Predicative Exemplification: can be traced back to the actuality of instantiation facts. Type Exemplification/Meixner: reminiscent of Plato's "Participation": "x is sufficiently similar to the idea (the type object)". Today: when we think of "beauty" we think of a certain universalism, namely the property of being beautiful (= o1[o1 is beautiful]). Plato: thought on the other hand of a certain type object; the idea of beauty. Participation/Plato: For example, Diotima participates in beauty because it is different from beauty. Meixner: undoubtedly, beauty is now sufficiently similar to beauty (timeless), because it is even identical to it. Thus follows Plato's original interpretation of type exemplification, I 105 that the beauty EXEM T the beauty. It follows that the sentence "Beauty is beautiful" is true! This is the most famous Platonic self-predication. The fact that beauty is beautiful, justice just, ugliness ugly and injustice unjust could perhaps still be accepted. MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: if bravery is supposed to be brave and dirtiness dirty (quite apart from the fact that the idea of dirtiness no longer suits the upscale society of beauty, justice, etc.). It becomes completely implausible with the type object human being: according to Plato's original theory, the type object human being would be a human being itself. (Because of self-identity, not only similarity). Solution/Meixner: each type object (TO) should have a unique property. x EXEM T y = y is a TO and y EXEM P is the y corresponding property. The corresponding property is known to us, namely "the y corresponding property is a one-digit universal and is a fact and actual". Question: is there a better alternative to this exemplification theory? (So not type exemplification as "predicative exemplification turned into non-predicative" as it were?). I 106 Exemplification/Plato/Meixner: originally: mirroring from more or less great distance, where in the borderline case image and original coincide. Participation: here another alternative already suggests itself. Concatenation: also exemplification as concatenation is at least indicated in Plato. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Platonism | Field Vs Platonism | III 105 1st Order Theory/Conclusion/Field: for each 1st order theory there is a better one that seems to be intuitively true if the original is, and this one is more expressive (stronger). III 106 This applies to nominalistic as well as for Platonic theories. Therefore, it cannot be used as an argument for the inadequacy of N0 if Platonic 1st order theories cannot be regarded as inadequate as well. Conclusion: if you’re set on 1st order theories, there is no obvious way to decide whether one is good enough to deliver the consequences needed in practice and to exclude the "recherché" consequences (with Gödel sentence). FieldVsPlatonism: So the above argument is not an objection to Platonism. 2nd order theory: is, of course, definitely a remedy for this problem. But we have seen that N (which is 2nd order) has all the consequences that the Platonistic ML 2nd order has, and therefore it is difficult to see what the benefits of Platonism should be in the context of the 2nd order logic. I 112 Model Theory/MT/Explanation/Field: Do we also need a nominalistic analogy to the Platonic MT? This is a verbal question. It depends on whether we understand modal logic itself as an analogue to platonistic model theory. If so, then model theory is like physics and we can use the previous considerations. And we have to use them, because the applicability of metalogic cannot be explained not solely from conservativeness. If the logic is not modal. If, on the other hand, we do not consider modal logic like that, then the model theory is like the proof theory: we do not need a nominalistic analogue of the model theory, because it does not serve as an explanation. Then it only serves to find out about possibility and impossibility. Then we do not need to assume the truth of the statements (VsPlatonism). |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Platonism | McDowell Vs Platonism | I 121 McDowellVsPlatonism: every Platonism has the consequence that the standards are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein’s quietism recognizes this as false problem. >Quietism. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Platonism | Prior Vs Platonism | I 52 Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension". I 53 PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as an extension. For truth value and classes are both logical constructions, and very similar ones at that! And no "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Platonism | Putnam Vs Platonism | I (d) 112 Platonism/Mathematics/Putnam: the Platonists claims a mysterious "ability to capture mathematical objects". PutnamVsPlatonism: which neural process could eventually be described as the perception of a mathematical object? Why of a mathematical object and not of another? Why should we be able to capture the correct object neurally and not capture the wrong item neuronal (neural)? I do not doubt that some axioms are built into our concept of rationality: for example, "Each number has a successor". Now, if, for example, the axiom of choice is in abeyance, Skolem gives us reason to assign the corresponding truth value only in the context of a theory previously adopted. Convention/Mathematics/Poincaré: Convention yes, arbitrariness no. >Conventions, >ontology. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Platonism | Ryle Vs Platonism | I 68 Action and Understanding/Ryle: are roughly speaking just different practices of the same craft. The spectator finds what the originator invented. The originator leads and the viewer follows, but the path is the same. --- I 69 Two reservations: 1. The ability to perform and evaluate an operation does not necessarily include the ability to work out a criticism or lesson. E.g. a ship's boy is likely to be able to execute a node and to recognize a wrong one, but he is probably not able to describe it alone with words. 2. The ability to evaluate an action does not require the same degree of skill as the ability to perform it. E.g. you do not need to be a genius to recognize a genius. E.g. a good theater critic may be a moderate actor. --- I 70 Imitation/Understanding/RyleVsPlatonism/Ryle: Unfortunately the program of imitation of Plato has never been quite successful. E.g. I am, after all, a Plato reader of the twentieth century, something that Plato has never been. Understanding must be imperfect. (Because it is a skill). --- I 73 Partial understanding and misunderstanding: E.g. One cannot say that someone only partly knows that Sussex is an English county. Either one knows it or not. But one can partially know the counties of England, and partially not. On the other hand, it is customary to say that someone can do something only in part, i.e. He had a certain ability to a limited extent. As it was to be expected, this also applies to understanding. --- I 74 An ability to learn is something else than to get to know a situation, or to acquire knowledge. "half-trained" is a meaningful expression, but "half-notified" is not. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Platonism | Searle Vs Platonism | V 170 SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered): (Ep)(p = q . p is true) According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition. 2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects. SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute. 2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here. 3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical. V 170/171 SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality. V 245/246 SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato: 1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting). 2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject. SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties. IV 80 Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction. IV 81 There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Platonism | Conceptualism Vs Platonism | Arm II 111 ConceptualismVsPlatonism: which criterion of the existence we apply is a question of what aspect of the classification process, we want to single out: the objects or the ability to classify. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Platonism | Schiffer Vs Platonism | I 107 SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus. I 152 Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction). 2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious: SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own). I 234 Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties. Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he believes". Platonic realism: E.g. (a) Mother Teresa is modest after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here: 1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object 2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa) Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation. 3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective "modest". I 235 Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term. Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest). Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is. ((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.) Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest". Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.: 1. Between names and object. 2. Between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Platonism | Benacerraf Vs Platonism | Field II 324 BenacerrafVsPlatonism/Field: standard argument: if there are objects as Platonism accepts them, how should we have an epistemic access to them? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: used an argument against the causal theory of knowledge at the time. PlatonismVsBenacerraf: therefore attacked causal theory. Field: but Benacerraf's objection goes much deeper and is independent of causal theory. Benacerraf: Thesis: a theory can be rejected if it is dependent on the assumption of a massive chance. For example the two statements:´ II 325 (1) John and Judy met every Sunday afternoon last year at different places by chance, (2) they have no interest in each other and would never plan to meet, nor is there any other hypothesis for explanation. ad (2): should make an explanation by some "correlation" impossible. Even if (1) and (2) do not contradict each other directly, they are in strong tension with each other. A belief system that represents both would be highly suspicious. N.B.: but then Platonism is also highly suspicious! Because it postulates an explanation for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and mathematical facts. (>Access, > Accessibility) For example, why do we only tend to believe that p, if p (for a mathematical p). And for this we must in turn postulate a mysterious causal relationship between belief and mathematical objects. PlatonismVsVs/Field: can claim that there are strong logical connections between our mathematical beliefs. And in fact, in modern times, we can say that we a) tend to conclude reliably and that the existence of mathematical objects serves that purpose; or b) that we accept p as an axiom only if p. FieldVsPlatonism: but this explains reliability again only by some non-natural mental forces. VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. he "proves too much": if his argument were valid, it would undermine all a priori knowledge (VsKant). And in particular undermine logical knowledge. ("Proves too much"). BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Solution: there is a fundamental separation between logical and mathematical cases. Moreover, "metaphysical necessity" of mathematics cannot be used to block Benacerraf's argument. FieldVsBenacerraf: although his argument is convincing VsPlatonism, it does not seem to be convincing VsBalaguer. II 326 BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): other approach, (influential argument): 1. For example, there are several ways to reduce the natural numbers to sets: Def natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and each natural number >0 is the set that contains the set that is n-1 as the only element. Def natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: every natural number n is the set that has as elements the sets that are the predecessors of n. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or Neumann's approach "presents things correctly". There is no fact that determines whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Def Structuralist Insight/Terminology/Field: Thesis: it makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. …+… |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Proof Theory | Deflationism Vs Proof Theory | Field I 100 VsDeflationismus: Problem: wie rechtfertigt man die Nützlichkeit des Schließens auf metalogischer Ebene statt auf der Objekt Ebene? Beweistheorie: hier insbesondere gibt es gar keine Objektebene! Objektebene: hier machen die Aussagen keine Referenz auf Sätze oder Formeln. Oder abstrakte Analoga davon wie Propositionen). Und damit auch nicht auf Axiome, Schlußregeln oder Ableitungen. Problem: wie können wir dann die Anwendbarkeit (Nützlichkeit) von beweistheoretischem Schließen zeigen? I 101 DeflationismusVsBeweistheorie: da diese mit mathematischen Entitäten arbeitet, kann der Deflationist nicht annehmen, daß wir überhaupt Wissen von ihr erhalten. Wie kann der Deflationist dennoch ihre Nützlichkeit zeigen? 1. wir müssen die normalen Definitionen beweistheoretischer Begriffe zurückweisen und welche ohne Referenz auf mathematische Entitäten (mE) finden. a) wir brauchen eine hinreichend kraftvolle Theorie aktualer Inskriptionen, ohne Modalität: mit einer solchen Theorie könnten wir Begriffe wie "e ist eine wohlgeformte Inskription", "e und f sind typ identische Inskriptionen" , "d ist (eine Inskription, die) eine Ableitung (enthält in bezug auf System F)", sowie verschiedene Prädikate von Inskriptionen, die diese strukturell beschreiben (z.B. von einem bestimmten Inskriptions Typ A zu sein). Das könnte in Logik 1. Stufe ausgeführt werden. b) wir müssen eine modale Extension schaffen: in der wir z.B. "A ist ableitbar" verstehen als "es ist möglich, daß es eine Ableitung gibt, deren letzte Zeile eine A-Inskription ist". VsPlatonismus: also nicht: "es existiert aktual ein bestimmter Typ abstrakter Sequenzen abstrakter Analoga der Symbole. Field: damit soll kein neuer Typ von Möglichkeit neben logischer Möglichkeit eingeführt werden außer wenn wir sie aus strikter logischer Möglichkeit plus anderen akzeptablen Begriffen definieren können. Problem: 1. logische Möglichkeit ist gänzlich anti essentialistisch. (?). ((s) Nimmt nichts als wesentliches Substrat an? Als Wesen, als Entität?) Field: das bringt ein Problem für die Übersetzung von Sätzen, wo "ableitbar" im der Reichweite des Quantors liegt. (s) "Es gibt etwas, (eine Entität) das ableitbar ist". Field: Bsp "er äußerte eine ableitbare Inskription" wäre immer falsch in einer naiven Übersetzung. I 102 Lösung: substitutionale Quantifikation. (ungleich Kripke/Wallace). 2. Problem: die Konsistenz mit axiomatischer Beweistheorie ist nicht hinreichend für Beweisbarkeit im normalen Sinn: Unvollständigkeits Theoreme liefern Fälle von unbeweisbaren Formeln, wo die Behauptung, daß es einen Beweis gibt konsistent ist mit der Beweistheorie. Lösung: für die Beweisbarkeit von A ...Existenz eines Beweises kompatibel sein mit einer (nominalistischen oder platonistischen) Beweistheorie die in einer kraftvollen Logik aufgestellt ist, die Ableitungen ausschließen kann, die nicht echt endlich sind. z.B. eine Logik mit einem Quantor "es gibt nur endlich viele" oder mit substitutionalem Quantor. stärker/schwächer/(s): stärker: eine Logik, die unendliche Ableitungen ausschließt. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relativism | Plato Vs Relativism | Putnam V 163 PlatonVsProtagoras (relativist): Protagoras: when I say X, I should actually say "I think X". No view has the same meaning for me as for anyone else. PlatonVsRelativism: Recourse: if every statement X means: "I think X", then you have to insert infinitely: (1) I think that I think that snow is white V 164 PutnamVsPlaton: in this form the argument is not much good. Protagoras might agree, but it does not follow that his analysis must be indefinitely applied to itself, but only that it could! Plato, however, had noticed something very deep. Relativism, modern form: every culture, and every discourse has its own views, standards, requirements, and truth (and justification) is relative in relation to them. Of course, it is naturally assumed that the question of whether X is relatively true to them, is something "absolute", in turn! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Sophists | Plato Vs Sophists | Gadamer I 351 Sophisten/PlatonVsSophisten/Platon/Gadamer: Das Urbild aller leeren Argumentation ist die sophistische Frage, wie man überhaupt nach etwas fragen könne, was man nicht wisse. Dieser sophistische Einwand, den Plato im „Menon“(1) formuliert, wird dort bezeichnenderweise nicht durch eine überlegene argumentative Auflösung überwunden, sondern durch die Berufung auf den Mythos der Präexistenz der Seele. Das ist freilich eine sehr ironische Berufung, sofern der Mythos der Präexistenz und der Wiedererinnerung, der das Rätsel des Fragens und Suchens auflösen soll, in Wahrheit nicht eine religiöse Gewissheit ausspielt, sondern auf der Gewissheit der Erkenntnis suchenden Seele beruht, die sich gegen die Leerheit formaler Argumentationen durchsetzt. Gleichwohl ist es kennzeichnend für die Schwäche, die Plato im Logos erkennt, dass er die Kritik an der sophistischen Argumentation nicht logisch, sondern mythisch begründet. Wie die wahre Meinung eine göttliche Gunst und Gabe ist, so ist auch das Suchen und die Erkenntnis des wahren Logos kein freier Selbstbesitz des Geistes. Rechtfertigung durch den Mythos: (...) die mythische Legitimierung, die Plato der sokratischen Dialektik hier gibt, [ist] von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung(...). Bliebe das Sophisma unwiderlegt - und argumentativ lässt es sich nicht widerlegen -, würde dieses Argument zur Resignation führen. Es ist das Argument der „faulen Vernunft“ und besitzt insofern wahrhaft symbolische Tragweite, als alle leere Reflexion ihrem siegreichen Scheine zum Trotz zur Diskreditierung der Reflexion überhaupt führt. Vgl. >Reflexion/Gadamer; HegelVsPlaton: >Reflexion/Hegel. 1. Menon 80 d ff. Bubner I 37 DialekticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the effect-oriented speaker is mired in the illusion of words. (VsSophists). Bubner I 50 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists: the sophist oscillates intangibly between different beings. The diaireses (distinctions), however, do not function by themselves, but only with the use of prior knowledge. Since the diaireses (distinction of genus and species) fail with the sophists, the insight into the inappropriateness of the method grows after a number of runs. The specifying of general terms cannot handle the sophists. This leads to a reflection on the appearance which always appears different from what it is, and thus remains elusive. I 51 Logic/PlatoVsSophists: now, formal logic does not preclude pointless links. This results in the abandonment of the distinction between the philosopher and the mere sophist. I 52 PlatoVsSophists: the ratio of the linked concepts to each other possibly obscures the relation between speech and thing. Closely related to the problem of otherness. The complex relation of otherness is no longer determinable with the sophists. Thanks to his dialectical ability, the philosopher keeps track. Thus, dialectic is not a neutral method, either. I 98 PlatoVsSophists: coherence theory instead of correspondence theory: not empiricism, but incompatible concepts criticize judgment |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tichy, P. | Armstrong Vs Tichy, P. | Arm III 90 ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers: III 91 Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation. III 97 ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!. III 98 Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Various Authors | Derrida Vs Various Authors | Derrida I 50 DerridaVsLogocentrism: conflict between the "will to say" and the unintentional by the nature of the description given. Derrida tries to find a point outside: the "exorbitant". "Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical. DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this critique around. By wearing out the metaphor, it withdraws. Return in a changed form. Derrida I 88 (?) Vs Derrida: he overlooks that "wearing out" is again a metaphor. The thinking in its relation to the metaphor cannot be determined or identified! I 139 DerridaVsMarx: is too dependent on enlightenment. Derrida deconstructs Marx and introduces the term "messianic" in contrast to messianism. I 150 DerridaVsMauss: does not notice the contradiction between gift and exchange, because there is a delay between gift and exchange. Therefore Mauss does not speak of the gift but in reality of the circular exchange. Habermas I 194 Derrida: criticizes the rule of the Logos, which is always inherent in the spoken word. DerridaVsPhonocentrism: is a disguised figure of the logo centrism of the Occident. The metaphor of the Book of Nature is a manuscript hard to decipher. Habermas I 203 Jaspers: "The world is the handwriting of another, never completely readable world; existence alone deciphers it. DerridaVsPlatonization of meaning. Habermas I 234 DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalism), Vs Structuralist Aesthetics. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Platonism | Field, Hartry | I 44 To succeed in VsPlatonism, we must also show, thesis: that mathematics is dispensable in science and metalogic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. (>Indispensability argument). I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. I 186 Def moderate platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. Then one probably also believes that there are relations of physical size between objects and numbers. (But only derived): Example "mass in kilogram" is then relation between a given physical object and the real number 15,2. Example "distance in meters" is a relation between two objects ((s) on one side) and the real number 7,4. The difference to high-performance platonism (HPP) lies in the attitude to these relations: Moderate Platonism: Thesis: These are conventional relations derived from more fundamental relations existing between physical objects alone. Def High Performance Platonism/Field: denies that and takes the relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact that cannot be explained in other terms. Inflated one could explain this as "platonistic participation". II 332 Standard Platonism: Thesis: Mathematical theories such as set theory or the theory of real numbers are about different mathematical domains, or at least about certain structures, because there is no need to assume that isomorphic domains (i.e. domains with the same structure) would be mathematically indistinguishable. Thus, "regions" should not be assumed as sets. II 333 Def "Platonism of perfection": (plenitude): postulates a set of mathematical objects. Thesis: Whenever we have a consistent purely mathematical theory, there are mathematical objects that fulfill the theory under a standard-fulfillment relation. Platonism of perfection: but also suggests that we can consider all quantifiers about mathematical entities in this way, I 334 that they are implicitly limited by a predicate to which all other predicates of mathematical entities are subordinated: The "overarching" predicate: is then different between the different mathematical theories. These theories then no longer conflict. II 335 Universe/Standard Platonism/Field: (Thesis: "Only one universe exists"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we even manage to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and confront it with a sub-universe, and accordingly the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-standard element relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here placed from the perspective of "Universe"). Putnam: Thesis: We simply cannot do that. |
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| Nominalism | Rorty, R. | II 124 Def nominalism / Rorty: the thesis that all beings are nominal and all necessities de dicto. No description applies to a greater extent the real nature of an object than any other description. NominalismusVsPlato / Rorty: nature can not be dissected at its joints. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Science | Platon | Danto I 51 WittgensteinVsPlaton: seine These: von der wissenschaftlichen Erfassung der Formen ist genau die Verwechslung von Wissenschaft und Philosophie. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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