Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Attitude-Semantics Cresswell I 64
Attitude Semantics/VsPossible World Semantics/Semantics of Possible Worlds/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, yet the other one is not, but still both are true in the same possible world. >Pierre eyample.
Cresswell: E.g. all logical and mathematical truths.
But they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
>Logical omniscience.
I 65
CresswellVsSituation Semantics: the situations are to play roles that cannot be played simultaneously. Solution: possible world semantics: the roles are played by entities of various kinds.
>Semantics of possible worlds.
Solution: context with space-time indication - incorrect sentences: describe non-actual situations.
>Situations, >Situation Semantics.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context. - The context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. >Context.
Interpretation/Barwise: meaning of sentences in context.
>Intepretation,
>Barwise/Perry.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Possible World Semantics Cresswell I 99
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: Advantage: allows quantification in belief contexts. >Opacity, >Quantification into belief context.
II 72
Definition true/truth/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the set of worlds, which is its intension (of the sentence). >Intensions, >Extensions.
Cresswell: therefore it can be said that the extension of the theorem is its truth value.
>Truth Value/Frege.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/possible world/FieldVsPossible World Semantics/Cresswell: (Field 1978(1), 40) the use of possible worlds binds someone to a general concept of synonymy. >Synonymy.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: allows an immediate access to terms such as entailment and inconsistency. That is, meaning postulates are superfluous. >Meaning postulates.
II 164
Def Entailment/Possible World Semantics: is simply the class inclusion in the set of possible worlds. >Entailment.
Def contradiction: something that is true in no possible world.
>Contradictions, >Impossible worlds.

1. Field, H. 1978. Mental Representation. In: Erkenntnis 13. Reprinted in Block 1981, pp. 9-61.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Situation Semantics Barwise Cresswell II 169
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation.
Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ...").
>Situations.
Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations.

Cresswell I 63
Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations.
>Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics.
Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete).
CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7)
Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds.
Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations.
Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation.
>Possible World Semantics.
What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds.
I 64
Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
I 65
CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds.
Solution: Context with space-time specification.
>Context.
False sentences: describe non-actual situations.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context.
>Interpretation, >Sentence meaning.
Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true.
Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time.
I 67
On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks
e*: = in I, Mollie, yes.
That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?).
Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that

u[[φ]] e iff e* < e.

((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.)

The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context.
Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property.
>Atomic sentences.
Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u.
In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely.


1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry
2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293
3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press
4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x

Barw I
J. Barwise
Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R. New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.

NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.

NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008