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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectives | Logic Texts | Read III 268 ff Tonk/Prior/Read: Do not introduce the link first and then assign meaning. - That cannot have the consequence that another pair of statements is equivalent. >Definition, >Definability, >"Tonk", >Belnap-Prior debate. Important argument: analytic validity cannot show that. Re III 269 The meaning, even that of logic links, must be independent of and be prior to the determination of the validity of the inference structures. - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): Must not define into existence, first show how it works. Re III 271 Classical negation is illegitimate here. >Negation- Negation-free fragment. - Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P". Re III 273 ReadVsBelnap: the true disagreement lies beyond constructivism and realism. - Belnap's condition (conservative extension) cannot show that the classical negation is illegitimate. >Negation. Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Connectives/Hoyningen-Huene: You sometimes read that the truth tables would define the conncetives, i.e. clearly specify them. This is correct if one interprets the connectives in a very specific mathematical sense (namely as illustrations of two statements in the set true, false). If, on the other hand, one understands the connectives as extensional statement links, i.e. as operators that form a new statement from two statements, then the truth tables do not define the connectives. II 66 Binding strength of the connectives: increases in the following order: ,>, v, ∧. II 113 It makes sense to attribute equality and difference to the propositional logical form, because the compelling force of propositional logical inference depends on them. For the same reason, it makes sense to assign the connectives to the propositional logical form. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Definitions | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Def/truth value table/junctor/Hoyningen-Huene: the tables define the junctors only if they are understood mathematically - not if they are understood extensionally. >Extensionality, >Truth table, >Connective, >Logical constant. Hoyningen-Huene II 93 Definition/Hoyningen-Huene: Synthetic: here a concept is created (abbreviation) - it cannot be true/false. Analytical: descriptive or lexical definition: here, an existing concept is analyzed - e.g. bachelor/ unmarried man. Explication: is between analytical and synthetic definition - This can be more fruitful. >Explanation, >Analytic/synthetic. --- Read III 40 The definition of truth is different from the adequacy conditions. III 265 Prior: "tonk": does not define connections first and then meaning. >tonk- Then it cannot cause another pair of statements to be equivalent. - N.B.: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): should not get mixed with the definition of existence, it first has to show how it works -> classical negation is illegitimate here. - Negation-free fragment - > Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P": --- Salmon I 252 Some words must be defined in non-linguistic ways. I 254 Context definition: many logical words are explained by context definition. E.g. "All F are G" is equal to "Only F are G" This is a definition of the word "only". |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Introduction | Belnap | Brandom II 94 Def "tonk"/logical particle/Belnap: 1. Rule: licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. 2. Rule: licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. Thus we have a "network map for inferences": any possible conclusion is allowed! >Definitions, >Definability, >Conclusions, >Inferences, >Logical constants, >Connectives. II 93 Conservativity/Conservative Expansion/Dummett: If a logical constant is introduced by introduction and elimination rules, we may call it a conservative extension of language. >Conservativity. II 94 For example, this might be true of Belnaps "tonk": the introduction rule of the disjunction and the elimination rule of the conjunction. >Disjunction, >Conjunction. PriorVsBelnap/PriorVsGentzen: this is the bankruptcy of definitions in the style of Gentzen. BelnapVsPrior: if one introduces logical vocabulary, one can restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences with only old vocabulary that was not already allowed before the introduction of the logical vocabulary. (Conservative expansion). Such a restriction is necessary and sufficient. >Expansion, >Sufficiency. Brandom: the expressive analysis of the logical vocabulary provides us with a deep reason for this condition: only in this way the logical vocabulary can perform its expressive function. The introduction of new vocabulary would allow new material inferences without the constraining condition (conservativity) and would thus change the contents correlated with the old vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Content, cf. other entries for >"tonk". |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Vocabulary | Brandom | I 199 Conservativeness/Expansion/Language/Tonk/Brandom: pro conservative expansion: if the rules are not inferentially conservative, they allow new material inferences and thus change the contents that were associated with the old vocabulary expressive logic/Brandom: requires that no new inferences that only contain old vocabulary be rendered appropriate by this (if they were not before). >Conservatity. I 200 E.g. "boche"/Dummett: non-conservative extension, statements that do not (!) contain the expression might now be inferred from others that do not contain it either E.g. inference from German nationality to cruelty BrandomVsDummett: this is not about non-conservatism: it only shows that the expression "boche" has a content which is not contained in the other expressions E.g. the cocnept "temperature" has also changed with the methods of measurement. It's not about novelty of a concept, but undesirable inferences. >Concepts, >Words. I 204 In particular the material content of concepts is lost when the conceptual content is identified with the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. I 427/8 Definition Supervenience/Brandom: one vocabulary supervenes another if and only if there could be no two situations in which true assertions (i.e. facts) would differ expressably in the supervening vocabulary, while the true assertions do not differ expressably in the vocabulary that is being supervened more neutral: if it is clear what is defined in one language, then it is clear what is defined in the other. >Supervenience. I 958 Order/Twin Earth/TE/Brandom: it does not help to speak in concepts of what can be distinguished by the individuals, because what they can react depends on which reactions are considered to be different, and then the same problem occurs with regard to the vocabulary used Problem: specifying a vocabulary that satisfies two conditions: 1) The twins are indistinguishable in different environments because of their description in that vocabulary (physical language is not sufficient for that). 2) The sub-determination of the semantic properties of their states in this limited vocabulary must point at something interesting. --- II 76 Material inference/Sellars/Brandom: from "a east of b" to "b west of a" also from flash to thunder, needs no logic. II 79 Formally valid ones can be derived from good material inferences, but not vice versa Proof: if a subset of somehow privileged vocabulary is given, such an inference is correct if it is materially good and it cannot become a bad one if non-privileged vocabulary is replaced by privileged vocabulary. If one is only interested in logical form, one must be able to distinguish a part of the vocabulary as a especially logical beforehand. E.g. if one wants to explore theological inferences, one must investigate which replacement of non-theological vocabulary with non-theological preserves the material quality of the inference. II 94 Definition "tonk"/Belnap: Rule 1): licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. Rule 2): licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. With that we have a "network map" for inferences: any conclusion is thus permitted. PriorVsBelnap: Bankruptcy of all definitions in the style of Gentzen. BelnapVsPrior: Solution: Restriction: no inferences with only old vocabulary that were not allowed previously,otherwise the old contents would be changed retrospectively. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belnap, Nuel | Prior Vs Belnap, Nuel | Brandom I 198 "Tonk": (Belnap) PriorVsBelnap: bankruptcy of definitions of the inferential roles in the style of Gentz. "Network card for arbitrary conclusions". (>"Boche"/Dummett; > conservative extension). Prior: "tonk": Do not start by introducing the link first and then the meaning - cannot have the consequence that another pair of statements is equivalent - Important Argument: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (per analytical validity): must not define into existence, first show how it works. Normal >negation is illegitimate - >negation-free fragment; - Peirce's law: If P,then Q or, if Q only if P, then R. Prior: thesis: it is absurd to assume an "analytical validity", a "carte blanche", to introduce a possibility link and then to give them a meaning by simply determining it. His well-known example was "tonk". Absurd: how can the simple introduction of a new link have the consequence that any pair of statements (without "tonk") is equivalent? III 269 If we learned what "tonk" meant, we would see that one or another inference is not truth-preserving. But, and that's Prior's point: the representative of the view of the analytical validity cannot say this, because he has no independent explanation of the meaning of "tonk" with respect to which he could show that the conclusions are invalid. Meaning: the meaning, even that of logic links, must be independent of and prior to the determination of the validity of the inference structures! (>BelnapVsPrior). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Presentism | Lewis Vs Presentism | Schwarz I 19 Past/Future/LewisVsPresentism: it is common sense that the last moon landing was in 1972 and that certain species are long extinct. Presentism: but also refers to common sense and claims that these things are no longer real. To be past means to no longer exist. There will also be future species only when they are there. There is only what exists now (give/exist/"there is"). LewisVsPresentism: "there is": Lewis does not claim that "dinosaurs exist now". But they do exist (although not today). They only exist in the past. But the presentist also accepts this. Then what is the point of contention? Schwarz I 20 Solution: has to do with the area of quantification. Quantification/Area/Schwarz: unlimited quantifiers are rare and are part of metaphysics. Example "there is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example: "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: so there are different "ways of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/Existence: statements about what exist ignore from his point of view past and future. When we say that there are no dinosaurs ((s) then we (wrongly) extend the present into the past.) Schwarz: through the present tense we indicate that we are not talking about absolutely everything, but only about the present. Quantification/Schwarz: can also be neutral in the present. But it doesn't depend on grammar. Schwarz I 21 Solution: make true: what makes the sentences true, e.g. that Socrates drank the cup of hemlock? Four-dimensionalism truthmakers: the events in the past part of reality. Presentism: does not believe in past parts of reality. But then the truthmaker must be a characteristic of the present! VsPresentism: Problem: the present is logically not dependent on the past. It is possible that the world was only created five minutes ago. Reality/Presentism: (some representatives) one does not grasp reality by just determining what things are present. That Socrates existed is not true because there are certain things now, but because they existed then. Statements about what has existed and will exist express basic facts that cannot be reduced to statements about what is. Then the sentence operators "it was a case that," and "it will be the case" are primitive and unanalytic. (Prior, 1969(1)). Properties/LewisVsPrior/LewisVsPresentism: Vs these primitive operators: All truths must be based on what kind of things with what qualities there are. The two operators above would not be sufficient. Example "Socrates is still admired today" ((s) This does not distinguish the present from the past as desired here. Example "There were several English kings named Charles": Problem: there was no time when there were several. Then, among other things, plural past quantifiers must also be accepted. Four dimensionalism/Lewis: Solution: Temporal operators simply move the range of quantifieres. Example "...1642" is like "...in Australia". Then: with "there were several English kings named Charles" we quantify about a larger part of the past, perhaps about all past things together. Presentism: (some representatives) try to acquire it without sharing the metaphysics: Reference to "Socrates" or "1642" is then somehow abstract and of a completely different kind than that to concrete things (Bigelow 1996). Perhaps past times are linguistic fictions, sentences and their inhabitants contained in them (descriptions). Then, for example, "cup of hemlock" would not require that there is someone of flesh and blood who does anything. (!) It is enough if a fiction tells about it ((s) >Fiction/Field). Schwarz I 22 Other solution/presentism: such sentences about past things as set-theoretical constructions of present things: the Socrates of the year 399 is then a set of now existing qualities, among them also the characteristic to drink the hemlock cup. VsPresentism: not all things that ever existed can be described in our language or constructed from current events. Besides, there are many fictions that have nothing to do with them. What distinguishes the "real" from the "false"? Four dimensionalism: "Surrogate V" ("Replacement V"): interprets other times and their inhabitants as metaphysically fundamental entities. Example "Socrates" refers to an irreducible entity ("being") that is somehow linked to the qualities we assume from Socrates. (LewisVs) Problem: the link must not be that the entity has these properties! Because that would be the true four dimensionalism. LewisVs "ersatz world": no theory of substitute Socrats can be developed where these are really "abstract". PresentismVsFour-dimensionalism: sweeps essential aspects of reality under the carpet: what will become of the flow of time, the change of things and the peculiarity of the present? The four-dimensional block universe never changes. His time dimension "does not flow". E.g. then I can't be happy that the visit to the dentist is over, because it is still just as real. Four-dimensionalismVsPresentism: e.g. visit to the dentist: I am glad that it is no longer there, not that it has been erased from reality. Just as I'm glad the attack didn't happen here, but elsewhere. 1. Arthur N. Prior [1969]: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Prior, A. | Belnap Vs Prior, A. | Brandom I 198 BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you must restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences containing only old vocabulary. This means that the new rules must extend the repertoire conservatively. > Example "boche". Brandom: if these rules are not inferentially conservative, they allow new material inferences and thus change the contents associated with the old vocabulary. The expressive concept of logic requires that no new inferences containing only old vocabulary be made appropriate. Conservativity/Conservative Extension/Dummett: if a logical constant is introduced by introduction and elimination rules, we can call this a conservative extension of language. Brandom II 93 For example, this could apply to Belnap's "tonk": introduction rule of the disjunction and elimination rule of the conjunction: Def "tonk"/Belnap: 1. Rule: licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. 2. Rule: licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. With this we have a "network card for inferences": any inference is allowed! Brandom II 94 PriorVsBelnap/PriorVsGentzen: this is the bankruptcy of definitions in Gentzen's style. BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you can restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences with only old vocabulary that were not allowed before the introduction of the logical vocabulary. Such a restriction is necessary and sufficient. Brandom: the expressive analysis of the logical vocabulary now gives us a deep reason for this condition: only in this way can the logical vocabulary perform its expressive function. The introduction of new vocabulary would allow new material inferences without the restrictive condition (conservatism) and would thus change the contents correlated with the old vocabulary. ((s) retroactive change, also of the truth values of established sentences). Read: meaning: the meaning, even the logical connections, must be independent of and prior to the determination of the validity of the consequent structures. Logic III 269 Belnap: came to the aid of the view of "analytical validity". What it lacks, he said, is any proof that there is such a connection as "tonk" at all. This is a problem for definitions in general. One cannot define into existence. First of all you have to show that there is such a thing (and only 1). Example "Pro-Sum" of two fractions. (a/b)!(c/d) is defined as (a+c)/ (b+d). If you use numbers, you will quickly come to results that produce completely wrong results. Although it is easy to find originally matching numbers, they cannot be shortened.(> Dubislav). Logic III 270 Belnap: we have not shown, and cannot show, that there is such a connection. The same applies to "tonk". Read: one problem remains: why is there any analogy at all between definitions and links? One problem remains: why is there an analogy between definitions and links at all. It cannot always be wrong to extend a language with new links. One could imagine calculation rules for "conservative" extensions of languages. The old rules must continue to exist. |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Prior, A. | Kripke Vs Prior, A. | Prior I 169 Names/Prior: Thesis: Something that does not exist cannot be named, the same way as it cannot be pushed aside by a foot. And this neither by somebody who believes in the existence nor by somebody who does not believe in its existence. In circumstances in which object x is not present, x cannot be used as proper name in sentences and there are no facts with x. Names/KripkeVsPrior: Developed systems in which simple sentences with x are false if x does not exist and the designated truth values I 170 Follow specific rules, e.g. negations of these simple sentences become true. Order/Prior: This leads to an absolute differentiation between simple and complex sentences. Names/Kripke: Are logically without structure as well. But, because it is different in Lesniewski than in Kenny, an unbeliever is able to use names for the objects whose existence he is doubting. There are naturally names for the imagined or the simply possible world. E.g. it is possible that children develop fantasies based on what they imagine and an adult annoys them by bringing up other fantasies. The question is whether the same object is named. This is the problem for purely future or merely possible individuals as well. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Prior, A. | Lewis Vs Prior, A. | IV 19 Perspective/Index/Indexicality/Time/Lewis: when we take a timeless viewpoint and neglect our own localization in time, the great difference between the present and other times disappears. Cf. >Perspective. However, this is not because we then regard all times as equal, but because we IV 20 lose the possibility to use indexical time words we "currently"! Possible world/perspective: just the same, if we take an a priori standpoint and neglect our localization in the worlds, then we lose the distinction between the worlds. This is not because we consider all worlds to be the same, but because we could no longer use index words like "actual". Prior: the word "aktual" can then no longer be used to classify a world that is more real than others!° LewisVsPrior: he fell for it himself: "real" can no longer be used as an index word. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Prior, A. | Chisholm Vs Prior, A. | I 182 Recurring/Time/Prior: if a world state returns, it returns countless times: when we have had it at least n times, we have already had it at least n+1 times. Recurring/Time/ChisholmVsPrior: this is not mandatory: from the fact that a given state of the world occurs again does not follow that other world states reoccur. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| propos Quantific. | Grover, D. | II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "Facts and propositions".) Ramsey: Example "He's always right." Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). ((s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: It is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. II 146 Propositional Quantification/pQ/Grover: Thesis: They exist in everyday language (English). Prior: (1967) ditto. StrawsonVsPrior/StrawsonVsGrover: They do not exist in everyday language. |
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