Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entailment | Geach | I 174 Entailment/Quine/Geach: Quine used "implies" instead of "entails". >Implication. Geach: Entailment requires nouns. Quotes are nevertheless noun-similar. >Quote. Entailment requires quotes to include sentences. >Quotation marks. GeachVsPropositions: "entails": is an artificial word; instead you can also use "an if". Example: "A. if Russell is a brother, Russell is male" That avoids looking at partial sentences as a blackening of the paper (letters). - (Otherwise "The proposition that Russell is a Brother ..."). >Blackening of the paper, >Proposition. I 180 Entailment/Geach: truth conditions: thesis: "p entails q" if and only if there is an a priori possibility to know that Cpq, which is not to find out whether either p or q is true. >Truth conditions. Problem: that implies a possibility that we have: "p" is false and "it is possible to find out that p" is true. One can know necessary things without facts and without conceptual analysis. >Necessity. Lewy's First Paradox: Entailment cannot be fully transitive. >Transitivity. I 183 Entailment/Lewy's 1. Paradox: Summary: 1. One can know a priori that Cpq without knowing p v q. 2. one can know a priori that Cqr without knowing p v r. We can conclude from these premises: Conclusion: one can know a priori that Cpr. N.B.: but we cannot add safely: without knowing ("which is not a way to find out") whether p v r. We have the a priori way of finding out that Cpr, derived from our a priori knowledge that Cpq and that Cqr. But that does not allow to answer if p, and figure out that Cqr allows not to figure out whether r. If the truth table provides the same truth values anyway, you cannot speak of a link. There is no reason to believe that we have any knowledge a priori that both Cp(Kpq) and C(Kpq)r, and such that Cpr, with the exception of a priori knowledge, that r. Therefore, there is no reason to believe p entails r. I 184 Transitivity/Geach: Entailment is not transitive, but validity of evidence is transitive. >Validity, >Evidence. FitchVs: Evidence is not transitively valid in order to solve paradoxes of set theory. >Paradoxes, >Set theory. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Excluded Middle | Quine | XIII 55 Sentence of the Excluded Middle/excluded middle/Quine: Thesis: each sentence is either true or false. You can say a lot about that, pro and contra. Set Theory/Quine: 1. Much in it does not satisfy most standards of intuitionism, i.e. it is assumed that it is neither true nor false (without truth value). This leads from classical logic to intuitionism. >Set Theory/Quine. QuineVsDummett/QuineVsAnti-Realism: the requirement that there must be direct evidence for or against an assertion, but it also obscures the clarity and simplicity of the sciences. QuineVsIntuitionism: is obscure, especially when extended to mathematics. Bivalence/Logic/Quine: the bivalence with the Sentence of the Excluded Middle is the minimal, most streamlined thing that logic has to offer. It comes from the number two, the smallest and simplest number rising from the ground. Assertiveness/Truth/QuineVsIntuitionism: assertiveness is one thing, truth another. XIII 56 Realism/Quine: pro: some truths can be found out, others not. N.B.: then we are also free to call the rest of the (undetectable) sentences false. Future/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Bivalence/Quine: 3. The Sentence of the Excluded Middle has also come under fire from another side: Thesis: Contingents of predictions are neither true nor false. (See future/Quine). VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: a further objection is: non-designating terms such as e.g. Pegasus: sentences containing such terms are neither true nor false. Empty singular terms/Quine: we can accept this for everyday language, but not in science or logic. (See singular terms). Vagueness/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Sorites/Quine: 4. Objection: vague expressions: here again I would plead for a double standard: in logic we simply want to proceed in such a way that we assume that all expressions are precise. Determination/Quine: we can even introduce an additional convention. XIII 57 Sorites/Quine: we save the mathematical (complete) induction by setting exact limits for what a heap is. Even if we do not specify where it goes! Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: pro: the first two objections are ignored, the other two are overcome by a double standard. Proposition/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: some authors resort to propositions to explain. Thesis: The lack would concern sentences, but not the corresponding propositions. QuineVsPropositions: this is an empty game with words (see >truth). Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: is not a fact of life, but a norm that governs efficient logical regimentation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Loar | Avramides I 35 Propositional attitude/Loar/Avramides: when placed on the right side of biconditionals, one no longer has to do with meaning, but with the content of propositional attitudes. Avramides: caution: two types of semantics: Def wide semantics: covers meaning, truth, reference, etc. Def narrow semantics: quasi-equivalent to "meaning". Propositional attitudes/Avramides: further distinction: a) public language b) language of mind (Mentalese). >Language of thought. Reductionism: can analyze propositional attitude only non-semantically. LoarVspropositions about belief. Avramides I 78 Meaning/Grice/reduction/psychology/semantics/Avramides: Question: must the analysis use psychological terms which are not based on the semantic concepts first analyzed? >Meaning theory. Loar: yes, you can analyze propositional attitudes without semantic concepts of public language.(1) >Meaning theory/Loar. 1. Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Propositions | Lewis | Frank I 17 Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true. >Possible world/Lewis. Def property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property. >Properties/Lewis. Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies. It makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes. But there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed as an attitude toward a proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time. E.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) Because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds. - Therefore no knowledge). Frank I 329 Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional). Advantage: non-perspectivic access. - ((s) Not everyone has their own possible worlds.) Frank I 355 Propositions: have nothing intersubjective per se. - Problematic therefore is the subjectivity of reference of the first person. >First Person, >Subjectivity, >Centered world. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV 137 Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times. IV 142 E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both. E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference > proposition / > statement). IV 145 Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions. IV 146 Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties. V 160 Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping. --- ad Stechow 42 Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Mates | I 25 Logic/Proposition/Statement/MatesVsPropositions/Logic/Mates: the structure of a proposition should not be confused with that of the corresponding assertion. E.g. "Kennedy won the election" - "he won the election" (various propositions are possible.). Also their structure is not easy to see from the accompanying statement. Thoughts/Mates: also thought may have different structures. -Not all can be divided in categories like singular subjunctive, affirming, hypothetically, etc. Judgments/Mates: a judgment is rather an "act of the mind", not in logic. Instead: in logic we should accept only statements. >Logic/Mates, >Logic, >Statements, >Assertions, >Judgments, >Thoughts. Solution: equivalence: the statement is true iff the claim that is set up with it, is true. >Equivalence. Corresponding for judgments, thoughts, etc. Index words/solution: complete with place and time. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Timelessness, >Generalization. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Propositions | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function. >Content. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. >Representation, >Language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I XVIIff SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property. Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences. Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Truth conditions. I 14 Propositions: have their truth values essentially. Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese) Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented. I 49f Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms. Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory. Propositional theory: says 1) that "p" is a real object variable 2) that propositions are their values. Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY". But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations. >Pain, >Mental representation. "Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow. Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism. >Platonism. I 51 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white. Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. I 52 Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white. Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows. >Omniscience. Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Sentence Meaning | Quine | V 62f Def Sentence meaning/Quine: the meaning of a sentence is in the observations that would confirm or refute it. X 18 Sentence meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk. There is only agreement between the two intangible elements to which we have referred as intermediaries between the German sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact. VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the intermediaries (meaning and fact) too literally. X 19 If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: very good. As long as we don't have to assume propositions with this. Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as a meaning of sentences as an abstract entity with its own right. Some authors: consider them as what is true/false and between which the implications exist. X 20 Sentence Meaning/Quine: it is completely unclear (which is often claimed) that sentences have the same or different meaning. XI 85 Sentence Meaning/Quine/Lauener: exhausts itself accordingly in the consequences that the sentence can have for the sensory experience. XII 89 Sentence Meaning/Partial Sentence/Subclause/Term/Word/Meaning/Use Theory/Quine: whole sentences are undeniably meaningful, and therefore also the use they make of their partial expressions. IV 425 Uncertainty of translation: when we talk about the so-called analytical hypothesis (translation manuals), we are talking about the meaning of sentences. - In contrast, the term "inscrutability of reference" is concerned with words or expressions below the sentence level (subsentential). VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This shows the uncertainty of the translation. See also >Propositions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Soames Vs Field, H. | I 467 Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth. Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things: (i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages. (ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically (iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes. Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example (1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true. b. Church's theorem is true c. Everything he said is true. I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists. Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example). Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say: (6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all.... I 470 SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise: (7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S. I 472 Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar. 2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation. The result is a sentence of the metalanguage: (8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S). FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong! Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions I 474 of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation. Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct. FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient. "Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9): (9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only) c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent) Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now. Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage). Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different! N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts. Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept. Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses). I 475 Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages: 1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above) 2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory. Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent. Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts). 2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference. SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)! Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1). Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except: L1: here "R" applies to round things L2: here on red things. Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages: (11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red. Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list. FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers. SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski I 476 in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true, L2: ...if A and B are true. FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning). FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior). Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts: (13) the term of a name referring to an object The term of a predicate that applies to an object. The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms ... I 477 Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b: (14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s). b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is .... Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary. SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price. Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition). New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories. SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms. Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either a) define about truth, or b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms. SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now! a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular. b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s]. Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing. Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent. Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable. SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough. I 478 It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior). Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer). (15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals). (16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc. ((s) Both times reference) Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16) that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition. I 481 Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms. Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories. Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects. ((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence). Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language). I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions. I 483 SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities. I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example Negation/Field (21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence). SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts). Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have. Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar: Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage. Solution/Soames: (22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence). "Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Functionalism | Schiffer Vs Functionalism | I XVII Functionalism/Schiffer: seems to be better than physicalism if propositions are assumed as belief objects. Belief relation: is represented functionalistically and thus physicalistically acceptable. SchifferVsFunctionalism: cannot be correct. SchifferVsPropositions. (late). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Moore, G.E. | Ayer Vs Moore, G.E. | Horwich I 52 RussellVsPropositionsRussellVsRussell: (later, Logic and Knowledge, 1956, p. 223): I used to think there were some. But that would only be shadowy additional things to facts. CartwrightVsRussell: we still do not know what the objection against them is!". Horwich I 53 Fact/AyerVsMoore: expresses himself unclearly when he says, "the fact does not exist". Properly, it should be: "There is no fact". ("There is"/Existing/"Being"). (Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 210). CartwrightVsMoore: it still remains a poor argument: it cannot be concluded that because a false belief has no fact as an object it has no object at all. What Moore meant becomes more clear in "Some Main Problems": the proposition "that lions exist" is definitely in the universe, if someone believes that, regardless of whether it is true or false. Because the expressions "that lions exist" and "the existence of lions" are names for that which is believed. (p. 260). Cartwright: at first this looks like a mistake, but it’s not: because he seems to have accepted (together with Russell) that what is believed can be named with a verb ("verbal noun"). Horwich I 54 Then we seem to have a demonstration that there is no such thing as the proposition that E.g. there is no subway in Boston. Because if there were one, there would also have to be such a thing as the non-existence of a subway in Boston. And this cannot exist, because there is a subway in Boston. Cartwright: what is the basis of this argument, the assumption that what is believed may be referred to by a verb (verbal noun)?. CartwrightVsMoore: the argument is not very convincing: Maybe the sentence E.g. "Brown believes that God exists" is synonymous with "Brown believes in the existence of God." But it does not follow that what Brown believes is the existence of God. ((s) The "object" (object of the belief) is on the one hand a sentence with "that", and on the other hand the actual existence). (FN 19). The reason for this lies in Russell’s access to propositions: (8) Brown is taller than Smith. Horwich I 56 Fact/proposition/CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: Problem: now it is just hard to see how a proposition can be anything but true! (FN 23). If in (8) Brown is linked to Smith the way it is said above, how can Brown be anything but taller than Smith?. Russell: E.g. the proposition "A is different from B". The components seem to be only A, B and difference. Nevertheless, they do not constitute the proposition when they are next to each other. The Proposition combines the parts in more ways than a mere list. (FN 24). Cartwright: nevertheless, if the proposition links the parts like this, it cannot be wrong!. Cartwright: if a proposition like (8) exists, then Brown is taller than Smith. Russell: in "Principles" he was also aware that there is a difficulty, but as a solution he could only propose: Russell: if a proposition is true, it has another quality apart from that which it shares with other propositions. (p. 49). Cartwright: this additional quality should of course be the simple, unanalysable truth. But this appeal comes too late! Either the components are linked properly, then the proposition is invariably true, or they are not, then we have no proposition at all. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93, In: Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Nominalism | Castaneda Vs Nominalism | Frank I 337 Belief/NominalismVsPropositions/Castaneda: instead sentence theories that understand belief as a relation between a believer and a particular sentence or a class of sentences. VsNominalism: Problem: There may not be enough sentence or attribute classes to carry nominalistic reductions. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Davidson Vs Propositions | Field II 167 Meanings as intentional entities/DavidsonVsPropositions/Field: (Davidson 1967): Thesis: It is impossible to come up with a non-trivial theory of these intentional entities. E.g. meanings as intentional entities. E.g. How are meanings to be combined in form combinations? Meaning Combinations/MC/Davidson: ((s) instead of syntactic combinations): the most obvious is still to assume that meaning equality requires equal MC to be constructed of synonyms parts in the same way. Then we need a link operation for meanings. Like otherwise only for expressions ((s) syntactically). Of course, we could set up something like this: E.g. for all expressions E1 and E2: if E1 means m1 and E2 means m2, thenE1^E2 means m1^m2. How exciting! We can expand this "theory" by combining meaning equality with equality of meaning characterization. Problem: this does not yet create a connection between these meanings on the one hand and truth conditions (TC) and reference conditions on the other hand. That must yet be added. E.g. nothing tells us that the meaning associated with "Plato" picks out Plato. We have to add that through another theory of reference. (Which could be disquotational). Wrong solution: it would not help to introduce the concept "Plato" in a way that no intentional entity can be "Platon" if it does not single out Plato. Vs: If we did that, it would no longer be trivial that the meaning associated with "Plato" is iPlatoni. We would need an additional explanation as to why this is so, and it is not clear why this should be self-evident. "Theory of Reference"/Field: we would have to add that for other expressions, such as predicates and logical symbols. E.g. a theory that explains how the corresponding truth functions for "or" is singled out. T theory/Field: we would then have to add a T theory that explains how the meanings of composite expressions contribute to the TC. Conclusion: Hasn’t all the interesting work been done by the theories of reference and truth, plus access to equivalence relations on the set of meaning characterizations after this is subjected to translation? Horwich I 461 "Propositional assumption"/Propositional assumption/Terminology/Dummett/Devitt/Rorty: this is how Devitt called Dummett’s assumption that language understanding consists in the knowledge that the proposition is true in L in such and such circumstances. Understanding/Truth conditions/Tr.cond/Circumstances/Situation/DavidsonVsDummett: it is hopeless to try and isolate such circumstances because of the holism. Dummett: gives a non-holistic representation of "Davidsonean truth conditions" Dummett/Devitt: tries to infer: E.g. from "X knows the meaning of S" and "The meaning of S = the TC of X" to "S knows that the TC of X are TC". Rorty: this is only possible if we construct "S knows the meaning of S" as "There is an entity that is the meaning of S, and thus X is known." This is the propositional assumption. DavidsonVsPropositions//Rorty: Davidson would not accept them. And therefore he is not a TC theorist in Dummett’s sense. Devitt: assumes that Davidson accepts the propositional assumption. Rorty: this goes back to the fact that Davidson identified the meaning of theory with a theory of language understanding in his early articles. But they are incompatible with holism, and as misleading as E.g. the metaphor that billiard balls have "internalized" the laws of mechanics. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositions | Field Vs Propositions | II 52 FieldVsPropositions: if we do not quantify on them, we cannot express the following: E.g. (8) There are many things that she thinks of him, and not all are flattering. Or (9) No one can perceive an object without believing anything about it. Solution/Field: believe* ((s) see above: believe a sentence, i.e. it simultaneously understand it). Terminology/Field: From now on we will simply write "believe", even if we understand it in the sense of believing*. Belief/Sentence/Field: belief should not be thought of as strictly based on an English sentence. We also say of beings who do not speak English that they believe that snow is white. II 53 Def believe-that/Field: a person believes that p (where "p" abbreviates an English sentence S) when he believes a sentence in his internal representation system whose translation into English is S. Translation/Field: the concept we use here in the context of representations is a pretty sloppy one. We may only assume approximate synonymy. There are complicated pragmatic considerations here. Propositions/Field: better be avoided. (see below: And thus also possible worlds). II 54 If propositions are understood as sets of possible worlds, a truth theoretic semantics is also needed, but that already contains all the interesting semantics. Semantics/Field: this is about one that attributes properties to predicates rather than attributing quantities. (see above II 41) I.e. instead of saying that someone is related to a set of possible worlds in which Russell was bald, it is better to say: he is related to a sentence that consists of a name that stands for Russell, and a predicate stands for baldness. Properties/Propositions/Putnam/Field: (Put 1969): shows that there is indeed an ontological benefit when quantifying on properties instead of propositions: a) it is needed in science, b) properties are just something completely different than meanings (propositions). E.G. two predicates like "x has a temperature of 210°" and "x has an average molecular energy..." can stand for the same property, although they have different meanings. II 163 Proposition/Behavior Explanation/FieldVsPropositions: we need sentences here, not assumed internal entities like propositions (or sets of possible worlds). We want to attribute a sentence to the actor, which we understand ourselves. Vs: but only because the explanation does not indicate which of the possible propositions (sets of possible worlds) is the right one. VsVs: this may be, but it is because our standard for knowing which proposition it is about consists in delivering a sentence that we understand and that expresses the proposition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositions | Quine Vs Propositions | V 61 QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous. VI 99 QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto. VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation. X 19 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications. Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements. Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend: Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions. X 20 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth, 1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and 2) Snow is white. Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1). The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow..."). He bypasses differences between languages and differences between formulations within a language. Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather: QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves: False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition. QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences. X 32 Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences. Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions. Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure. QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions. Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p" ((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositions | Schiffer Vs Propositions | I XVII SchifferVsPropositions: (For reasons that have nothing to do with the mind-body-problem): Belief/Schiffer: (late): cannot be a relation to propositions: E.g. Tanya's belief that Gustav is a dog: Proposition: if the propositional theory is correct, the proposition has to, in order to present the full content, so to speak contain doghood or a manner of the representation of doghood. I 43 SchifferVsPropositions: if a functional theory can also be set up with sentences or even uninterpreted formulas, propositions are surely completely superfluous. I 44 Why should an arbitrary formulation that uses propositions to index functional roles, be considered as determination of the extension of the colloquial "believes"?. I 51 Proposition/Schiffer: There are several things that can be taken as propositions: rough-grained: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values. These have no structure as functions. fine-grained: Complex that contain individuals (as components) and properties as structure. (E.g. situation semantics, Barweise/Perry 1983, Bealer 1982, Adams 1974, Lewis 1970a, Loar 1981, Plantinga 1974). SchifferVsPropositions: no matter whether to accept propositions as fine-grained or rough-grained, there are problems: E.g. Suppose (a) Ralph believes that snow is white and all theoreticians agree that one can analyze it like this: (b) B (Ralph, the proposition that snow is white). FN I 277 But they are all not obliged to (b). I 51 But they will agree that the expression "that snow is white" in A functions as a complex singular term that refers to this proposition and that the reference of this singular term is defined by the references of its components. ((s)> compositionality of reference). I 52 Then the proposition is necessarily true if snow is white. Schiffer: the two theorists may differ in whether the propositions contain their speakers as components. Function/Structure/Schiffer: if propositions are functions of possible worlds in truth value, they contain their references not as components. They do not include the entities they determine. I 70 SchifferVsPropositions/As belief content/SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsPropositional Theory/Conclusion: if the theory were true, the proposition would contain as belief content either doghood itself or a BT of it But if there were a truly language-independent property of doghood, they would belong to the biologically determined natural type and E.g. show "shmog" I 71 That doghood itself cannot be the component of propositions that we seek. That the content of natural-type-concepts should include BT, is only credible if there was a specific approach for what those BT should be at all. And we have not found such an approach. So the propositional theory (propositionalism) is wrong. Another reason against propositions as belief content: Property/Doghood/Schiffer: if there should be a non-pleonastic, voice-independent 1. property of being a dog that it would have to be the only one. But there is not. If it existed, it might not be irreducible. 2. if there were a reducible such property, there would be a property that is specifiable in phenotypic and/or genetic etc. terms that would be this property of being a dog, 3. but there is not such a property: none of Gustav's properties, however complex. But that is not so important. It only later plays a role for the existence of language-independent belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Propositions | Chisholm Vs Propositions | I 33 ChisholmVsPropositions of the 1st person: while the sentence "I am sad" remains the same even if different people express it, the propositions change: the identifying properties that are implied, are other ones. But which identifying properties are implied? One could argue: only the property of "being identical with me", the "this-ness", the haecceitas. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Propositions | Mates Vs Propositions | I 24 Proposition/Mates: should be so-called abstracts, without a spatial temporal structure. The structure of the proposition must not be confused with the structure of the corresponding statement. But this happens frequently in the literature! Problem: how to find out the structure of a proposition that depends on the statement? MatesVsPropositions: Assertion/Mates: (what is claimed by the proposition or statement): corresponding problems as with proposition: The same statement with the same meaning (!) can make different assertions: Example He won the election. Reference: if I ((s) implicitly) refer to Kennedy, or to Nixon, I make different assertions with the same statement (sentence)! Mates: conversely, I can make the same assertion with different statements (sentences): Example Kennedy has won the election. I 25 Thus, I have made the same assertion as above with "he", but I have used another statement with a different meaning. MatesVsAssertions: its structure cannot be determined simply by looking at the corresponding statement (sentence). Nevertheless, the "friends of assertions" have no inhibitions to classify assertions as singular, universal, particulate, conjunctive, hypothetical, affirmative, necessary, etc., or to say: "Assertions have subject predicate structure". Or "assertions contain descriptions". MatesVsPropositions: due to the different structure compared to the corresponding sentences, you cannot do it there either. Thoughts/Mates: the same applies to thoughts. Because of the different structure (compared to the corresponding sentences) it is pointless to say, for example, they contained descriptions, or would be negative. MatesVsThoughts: we should not use them in logic. Just so that logic is not understood as "laws of thought". Judgement/Mates: the same applies to judgments, which are the most dubious of all terms here: there are hardly two authors who say the same thing about them. For example "activity of mind"; "comparison of two concepts or objects obtained by simple perception, etc.". MatesVsVerdict: we should not use them in logic, because logic does not deal with "mental acts". I 26 Proposition/judgement/thought/statement/Mates: much of what we say about the logical properties of statements (sentences) we can easily transfer to propositions, assertions, thoughts and judgements. We only want to avoid index words like "I", "here", "now" etc... Solution: by independence through completion by place and time indications. Assertion/statement/Mates: here the equivalence between both helps: a statement is true iff the assertion made with it is true. The same applies to thoughts and judgements. The rest can be forgotten! |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
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| Propositions | Versus | Horwich I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Proposition | Field, Hartry | II 167 Meanings as intentional entities / DavidsonVsPropositions / Field: (Davidson 1967): can be no non-trivial theory of these intentional entities. E.g. meanings as intentional entities. E.g. How should meanings be combined from combinations? |
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