Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Circular Reasoning | Quine | II 76 Conditioning: conditioning cannot be learned for its part. XI 102 Psychology/knowledge/Quine/Lauener: why should we not trace back everything to psychology. QuineVs: science should not be justified by a discipline that belongs to itself. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimulation is the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: that used to seem circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we simply have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which studies exactly this connection. >Psychology/Quine, >Science/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epistemology | Quine | XII 86/87 Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms. b) applicability/validity: by truth. II 35 Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them! II 36 Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology. V 15 Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle. V 17 Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.) VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness. V 38 Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it? X 12 Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology. X II 86 Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience. XII 87 a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience. Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment. b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution. Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions. Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham: XII 88 Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term. Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions: XII 89 Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have. Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. >Epistemology/Carnap. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Epistemology/Quine: old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.) This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data. This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Psychology | Quine | V 58 Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. >Science/Quine XII 92 Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. >Epistemology/Quine: Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. >Epistemology/Quine XI 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. I 44 Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case. I 154 Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Time | Husserl | I 78 Time Consciousness/Husserl: time consciousness is no permanent specific awareness unit. I 79 1. Primordial Impression/Husserl: the primordial impression is the starting point or the first sensation. It has "just passed, but it is still present in the consciousness". 2. Retention/Husserl: retention is not arbitrarily extensible, it restrains. 3. Protention/Husserl: protention is the anticipation perspective. "Zeithof"/Husserl: the originary time field is constantly changing. I 82 HusserlVsPsychology: the constituting consciousness itself must not be thought again as a temporal sequence. >Terminology/Husserl, >Time-consciousness. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Folk Psychology | Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology | Schwarz I 147 Analytical Functionalism/Terminology/Schwarz: this is how Lewis's position is sometimes called because of its holistic characterization. (Block, 1978(1), 271ff). Schw I 148 "Analytical": because the characterization of causal roles in Lewis is supposed to be analytical. But if functionalism is to be understood as Vs Identity theory, then Lewis is not a functionalist, but an identity theorist. Standard objections Vs functionalism do not affect Lewis at all: e.g. mental states: Mental states/Lewis: for their characterization it also needs an essential connection to the perceived environment etc. Therefore there is no danger that we would have to attribute feelings to the Chinese economy. (>DennettVsSearle?). On the other hand, it does not only depend on input-output relations, so that machines that behave externally like us, but are internally completely different (E.g. Blocks (1981)(2) "Blockhead", Searle: e.g. Chinese Room (1980)(3), would have desires, pains and opinions (> E.g. Martian pain). Pain/VsLewis/VsFolk Psychology: if we want to know what pain is, we should ask pain researchers and not the man on the street. Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Schwarz: Thesis: that we interpret the behavior of our conspecifics with the help of an internalized set of rules and principles and not, for example, through mental simulation. This is completely wrongly attributed to Lewis. He never expressed his opinion on it. Everyday Psychology/Lewis: is not a special "theory". It only assumes that we have opinions and expectations about mental states but not necessarily about conscious ones. (1997c(4): 333, early: "Collection of Platitudes" (1972,§3)(5). LewisVsPsychology: that would be a change of subject. We want to know whether a biological state plays the role we associate with "pain". Schw I 149 SchwarzVsLewis: the contrast may be less strong, some pain researchers might know better what pain is. E.g. depression. 1. Ned Block [1978]: "Troubles with Functionalism". In C.W. Savage (Hg.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2 .Ned Block [1981]: “Psychologism and Behaviourism”. Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43 3. John Searle [1980]: “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417– 457 4. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 5. David Lewis [1972]: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Psychology | Hume Vs Psychology | I 135 Principles/Hume: principles cannot emerge from experience either, rather the experience itself must be understood as a principle! HumeVsPsychology: relations cannot be derived from experience; they are not the product of a genesis, but the effect of principles. Experience is not constitutive for Hume, principles are constitutive. >Principles/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Psychology | Quine Vs Psychology | XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sense irritation (stimuli) are the only thing, why should we not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: that used to look circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we must simply refrain from deducing science from observations. If we want to understand only the connection of observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also from science which examines precisely this connection. XII 91/2 Rational Reconstruction/Epistemology/Quine: pro: creativity should be appreciated that lies in the possibility to translate science into logic, set-theoretical and observation terms. Important argument: this would show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. Psychology/Quine: cannot preform such a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observational concepts, because we did not grow up with learning this. That is why we should insist on the rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalist concepts superfluous at the end. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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