Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 142 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Geach I 223
Abstraction / FregeVs: mere abstraction of differences does not create (identical) properties - Geach: E.g. Def "surmen" are identical if their surnames are identical - so that is actually a subset of people, but the same man when abstracted from differences - GeachVs: that would not explain the word "surman" - Solution / Quine: "Tangibility": properties had little sense when you used "red" etc. only as names of properties - GeachVsQuine: then we get all the problems with classes: E.g. "The property, to be a prop that does not apply to itself" - would be parallel to Russell’s antinomy.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Actions Davidson Glüer II 108
Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation.
Glüer II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws.
Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved
I 726
Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent.
Brandom I 727
She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow).
I 728
Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs.
Brandom I 957
Accordion Effect/Success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action - Example Mountain Climber.
I 958
Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURD: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded.
I 729
Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine.
I 957
Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). - Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established.
Glüer II 92
Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object.
Glüer II 96
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable - 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted - MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
Glüer II 110
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - (s) because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers - (s) something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Analyticity/Syntheticity Fodor IV 57
Meaning/Quine: not from speaker meaning, not from acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean - in this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori - So there are no analytic sentences - Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this.
IV 177ff
Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps "gradual A"? - Fodor/LeporeVs: would presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity: Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences just about express propositions, because "John" refers just about to John - not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous" - no inference from -cows are dangerous and -brown things are dangerous- "therefore then no compositionality.
IV 186
Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, yet none of the individual features is defining - "E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow " - hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails - Important Argument: even if your reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes!.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Analyticity/Syntheticity Searle V 18
Analyticity/Quine: E.g. I do not know whether the statement ’Everything green is extended’ is analytic - Searle: sophisticated: one can deny that the >sense data are extended - SearleVsQuine: conversely, to show that the criteria for A are missing, we must already understand A. ---
V 19
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine. we understand analyticity, otherwise we could not find such good examples.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Analyticity/Syntheticity Strawson Wright I 198
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Attributive/referential Millikan I 215
Descriptive/Referential/Description/Classification/Millikan: one can force a descriptive description to function referentially, e.g. "He said that the winner was the loser". E.g. (Russell): "I thought your yacht was bigger than it is." ---
I 216
Solution: "the winner", and "bigger than your yacht" must be considered as classified according to the adapted meaning. On the other hand:
"The loser": probably has only descriptive meaning.
"Your yacht": is classified by both: by adapted and by relational meaning, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) E.g.: "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras lies in Nicaragua".
MillikanVsQuine: this is not, as Quine believes, obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational meaning in this context.
Referential/descriptive/Belief attribution/intentional/Millikan: There are exceptions where the expressions are not descriptive, but also do not function purely referential, but also through relational meaning or intension.
For example, "the man who drove us home" is someone who is well known to the speaker and listener. Then the listener has to assume that someone else is meant because the name is not needed.
Rule: here the second half of the rule is violated for intentional contexts, "inserted any expression that receives the reference".
This is often a sign that the first half is injured: "a sign has not only reference, but also meaning or intension, which must be preserved. Why would you use such a cumbersome description ("the man who drove us home") instead of the name?

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Beliefs Millikan I 5
Belief/Wishes/Intention/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language.
---
I 13
Beliefs: to the extent that our meanings and our abilities to recognize things are correct and valid,... ---
I 14
...most of our beliefs and judgments are true. ((s) > Beliefs/Davidson). ---
I 62
Belief/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the inner nature of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.). But not two people with the same interconnections must have the same beliefs. ---
I 63
2. Not all the internal hardware is in use, if one believes something. Belief/Have/Use/Millikan: I can have a belief while I do not use it. For example, I hardly ever need the fact that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I brush my teeth.
Discovery/Belief/Millikan: For example, a mathematician who is awake and is looking for a proof and finally finds it: one cannot say of him that he already believed it before!
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly so that a listener, if asked whether the speaker intended that he obeys the command, will surely immediately answer "yes".
---
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief while being obedient. ---
I 67
Belief/Millikan: Thesis: if one believes something, one usually beliefs through observation judgments. Problem: background information that might deter one of the judgment is not necessary an infomation of which a denial would be used in the normal case to support the belief!
---
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/Observation/Quine: Thesis: both are irreversibly connected to each other.
MillikanVsHolism.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: these intentions should not be understood as a mechanism.
Indeed:
E.g. An engine: one can also regard an engine as a hierarchy, whereby higher levels can stop lower ones. As a user, I need to know little about how the lower levels work. ---
I 127
Belief/Intention/Millikan: Beliefs are inner intentional icons, perhaps sentences in an inner language. ---
I 300
Belief/Truth/World/Recognition/Millikan: the basic things we need to learn to distinguish when we want to acquire true beliefs about the world are properties and substances. Properties/Property/Millikan: this also includes actions (acts) like e.g. sitting.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Causal Theory of Knowledge Brandom I 310ff
Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge - Goldman: Resident of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant - Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn E.g. - ((s) the method does not change when many dummies are used.). ---
I 312
Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. ---
II 149
Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. ---
II 149 f
Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant.
---
II 152
Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?) - BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. ---
II 155
Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Completeness Quine X 80
Completeness Theorem/deductive/Quantifier Logic/Quine:
(B) A scheme fulfilled by each model is provable.

Theorem (B) can be proven for many proof methods. If we imagine such a method, then (II) follows from (B).

(II) If a scheme is fulfilled by every model, then e is true for all insertions of propositions.
X 83
Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the sentences,
X 84
that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods produce true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the proposition produced by these proof procedures.
1. VsQuine: this usually triggers a protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of proof" is uninteresting in itself. It is only interesting because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth.
2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by reference to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its basis. It becomes empty.
QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: the principle of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place.
X 100
Fake theory/quantities/classes/relation/Quine: is masked pure logic. Mathematics: begins when we accept the element relationship "ε" as a real predicate and accept classes as values ​​of the quantified variables. Then we leave the realm of complete proof procedure. Logic: quantifier logic is complete. Mathematics: is incomplete.
X 119
Intuitionism/Quine: gained buoyancy through Goedel's incompleteness evidence.
XIII 157
Predicate Logic/completeness/Goedel/Quine: Goedel proved its completeness in 1930.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Concepts Geach I 26ff
Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept.
I 220
Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). - Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". - What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human bein is timeless".
I 226
Concept/Frege: purely extensional view - therefore not "sense of the name", but reference of the predicate. - ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) - But: Extension/Frege: Object - Concept/Frege: not an object - reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. - "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name.
I 228f
Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise " ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise" - sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity" - sentences about concepts need a quantifier.
I 230
Concept/Geach: cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. - VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x" - Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'."
I 234
Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction is unnecessary! - GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Concepts Quine Rorty I 216
(According to Rorty): concept, meaning: Quine: only a type of intention. And all intentions are to be overturned. "Means", "believes" and "wishes" have no behavioral equivalent; "opinion" and "desire" are just as dispensable as the terms "concept" and "intuition". RortyVsQuine: concepts and meaning are harmless as long as they are postulated to explain our behavior. They only become harmful when they are supposed to be the source of a certain kind of truth.
Rorty VI 170
Language/World/Quine/Rorty: Vs separation between the conceptual and the empirical.
Stroud I 216
Conceptual Sovereignty/Quine/Stroud: meagre input: light/dark, temperature variations, etc. rich output: theories about the world - Sovereignty: we discover something about the meagreness and thus discover the extent to which science is our "free creation".
Quine VIII 25ff
Quine/Concept: the word (!) "horse" can be seen as a designation of a certain characteristic, which is an abstract combination of characteristics. Qualities/Existence/Quine: the special existential statement "There is a thing that is horse" (not a horse) does not indicate that there are horses, but that there is the characteristic.
IV 419
Concept/Quine: Quine deliberately chooses no observation concepts as starting points, since sentences have semantic priority over predicates! Sentences are first and foremost determined by sense data, not by concepts.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Conceptual Schemes Davidson I (c) 41/42
Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear - conceptual relativism: the conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty".
I (c) 44
DavidsonVsQuine: there are no last data, therefore no subtraction.
I (e) 87ff
Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism.
I (e) 96
Scheme/Contents: have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair - then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing.
I (e) 98
Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality.
Glüer II 133
Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma).

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Conceptual Schemes Quine VII (a) 10f
Conceptual Scheme/Quine: in various conceptual schemes we judge differently. e.g. that red houses, red sunsets and so on have something in common - minimum acceptance: the conceptual schemes bring our raw experience into an order. Simplicity depends on the conceptual scheme. Each conceptual scheme can be regarded as fundamental. Our physicalistic conceptual scheme simplifies our countless unconnected sensations.
VII (d) 78
Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we are born into it, but we can change it. However, we cannot escape by an objective comparison with a non-conceptual world - it is meaningless to understand the conceptual scheme ((s) which is then assumed to be non-conceptual) as a reflection of reality.
I 208
Identity/Hume: "We cannot say that an object is the same as it is, unless we mean that an object existing at one time is identical to itself than at another time". QuineVsHume: Identity sentences run empty as long as the conceptual scheme for physical objects is not yet included.
I 469
Words and their graphical representations are, in contrast to points, kilometres, classes, etc., tangible objects of a popular order of magnitude on the marketplace. Where people with different terminology communicate with each other in the best possible way.
II 58
Conceptual Scheme/Third Dogma/DavidsonVsQuine: Davidson says that I make a mysterious use of "conceptual scheme". In my opinion, it is part of colloquial language and does not perform a technical task.
II 59
A triad conceptual scheme - language - world is not what I have in mind, but, like Davidson: language and world. Terminology/Quine: Elsewhere I have proposed a measure of the spacing of a conceptual scheme. (Perhaps better: conceptual distance from languages). The definition is based on the differing length of translated sentences. If there is a pair of acceptable sentences in a translation, choose the shorter sentence. Length ratios are then to be determined.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Conceptual Schemes Rorty Horwich I 454
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVscorrespondence/Rorty: we get rid of all these intermediate elements together with the correspondence: - E.g. conceptual scheme, "perspective", language, culture, "point of view", "tertia" - this intentionalist terms are the sources of skepticism.
Horwich I 454
Scheme/content/conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the dualism scheme/content: possible forms: "conceptual frame", "intended interpretation": these are not causally linked to the things they organize - they vary independently of the rest of the universe - without them we look at our own beliefs as in the Radical Interpretation.
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with the RI makes a correspondence relation, "intended beliefs" etc. superfluous. >Radical Interpretation.
Rorty I 300
Conceptual scheme/3rd dogma/ Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemes became something transitory, the distinction between scheme and content itself was in at risk. - Then science does not become possible through an a priori contribution of our knowledge.
I 330
Conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: talk of the scheme or conceptual system attempts to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and therefore has to fail - then there would have to be an "alternative conceptual scheme" that would be true, but untranslatable. - That is incomprehensible.
I 338
Rorty: there is no neutral basis from which various schemes can be compared. - Nor do we have the right to assume a common scheme. - Solution: without 3rd Dogma (scheme/content) we restore the direct reference to the objects.
VI 64
Conceptual schemes/point of view/Putnam/Rorty we must always use a specific system of concepts (we cannot do otherwise) - but we must not claim that this is actually not the way in which things behave.
VI 127
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVs3rd Dogma/Rorty: we must stop sorting statements by whether they are "made" true by "the world" or by "us". - DavidsonVsVs conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsQuine.
VI 129
Conceptual scheme/content/Rorty: the distinction is not to be confused with the distinction "is"/"seems to be". VI 135 We can not specify which "moves" of nature belong to the scheme and which belong to content.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correctness Millikan I 308
Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction?
Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same.
Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity).
---
I 309
Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment.
Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world.
Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast.
E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence.
Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Correspondence Theory Field I 229
Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme.
I 250
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. - Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths.
II 199
Correspondence Theory/ontological commitmentQuine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation.

IV 416
VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? - Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values ​​are "correct. - Field pro "epistemic relativism".
I 419
RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Correspondence Theory Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: No thing makes sentences true (> truthmakers). - Quine: stimuli do not make it true, but lead to beliefs.
II 85
Science maintains a certain claim to a correspondence theory of truth, thanks to the connection with observation sentences; ethics, on the other hand, obviously has a theory of coherence.
VI 112
Proposition/Actuality/Correspondence/Quine: a more cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences should then correspond as a whole.
VI 113
But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: for an explanation of the world, objects are needed in abundance, abstract as well as concrete, but apart from such a false foundation of a correspondence theory, facts do not contribute the least. We can simply delete "it is a fact that" from our sentences. ((s) > Facts/Geach).
VI 115
Correspondence Theory/Quine: as the theory of >semantic ascent already suggests, the truth predicate ("is true") is a link between words and the world.
X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like the correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk.
QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence exists only between the two intangible elements to which we have referred to as intermediaries between the English sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact.
VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the links (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: very good. As long as we do not have to assume propositions.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Cross World Identity Quine II 158f
The identification between possible worlds depends on the predicates. For bodies the identification also depends on space location, composition etc. - Therefore not "cross world". - "The same object" is meaningless -> We need singular terms instead of predicates.
II 149
Possible World/Quine: a vivid way, to assert an essentialist philosophy. In order to identify the subject in a world, essential properties are needed.
Hintikka I 137
QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of Cross Word Identification. Cross World Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If there are no identity conditions, there is no point in asking whether an individual is "the same as" one in another possible world.
HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism.
World lines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Yet they are not arbitrary. Their limitations are given by continuity of space and time, memory, localization, etc.
I 138
It may even be that our presuppositions turn out to be wrong. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines covering all possible worlds that we need in the Alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of the quantified Alethic Modal Logic is impossible. But for reasons deeper than Quine assumed.
Cross World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible.
Quine/Hintikka: has recently even acknowledged this with restrictions.
Solution/Hintikka: Cross World Identification as re-identification.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
de dicto Searle II 249
De dicto: only concerning the mental contents - de re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto.
---
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irreducible belief de re: is between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto beliefs - (much stronger thesis). - >Brains in a vat: purely de dicto - SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head. ---
II 262
General desire for a sailing boat: de dicto - for a more specific: de re. ---
II 263
SearleVsQuine: Then in the general case allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object) - de dicto/Burge: E.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ..." -Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re- counterpart - the same man can belong to >satisfaction conditions for very different perceptions. ---
II 268
Thesis, there are forms of >intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

de re Searle II 247
De dicto: concerns only the mental contents. - De re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto.
II 271
De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: is a distinction between different types of report. - Intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves - there is no "de re-setting". - Only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry). ---
IV 182f
De re/de dicto/Searle: not two different beliefs - Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit himself - Ralph cannot express this difference. - The >truth conditions are the same.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Definability Quine VII (g) 131
Def Ideology/Quine: what ideas can be expressed in a theory? I.e. what is definable? Example: theory of real numbers: infinite ontology, but finite ideology: addition, division, multiplication, rationality, algebraicity, etc.
Two theories can have the same ontology and different ideologies. Example:

(1) The real number x is an integer

That can be expressed in one theory, but not in another!
VII (g) 132
Due to Goedel's incompleteness theorem for the integers, we know that Tarski's performance would have been impossible if (1) could have been translated into the notation of T. Ontology/Theory/Quine: the ontology of a theory can even include objects that are indefinable in this theory.
For example it can be shown that the theory T includes the whole real numbers, although (1) cannot be expressed in its notation.
Ideas/Quine: "Ideas of ideas" we can drop them completely together with "ideology" (expressability). We are more interested in definability (in a theory).
VII (g) 135f
Definition definable/Quine: a general term t can be defined, in any part of the language that includes a sentence S such that S contains the variable "x" and is met by all and only the values of "x", of which t is true - E.g. "whole" is not definable in T.
XI 76
Analyticity/Synonymy/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: these terms can only be defined among themselves. We have nothing to break out of this circle with.
XI 122
Diversity/Distinguishability/Definability/Mark WilsonVsQuine/VsDifferentiality/Lauener: LauenerVsWilson: Quine mistakenly assumes that two theories R and RT are different iff their union is logically incompatible.
Wilson: this is unsatisfactory, because T and RT can be considered formalizations of the same theory, and yet they are not logically equivalent, because their languages are interpreted differently.
Interdefinability/Theory/Wilson: two theories are interdefinable if each can be defined within the other, otherwise they are different. For example, one theory with mathematical vocabulary, the other with physical vocabulary. In addition, no superfluous properties may be introduced.
Quine: ditto. In addition, the application of a theory should not be confused with the theory itself.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Definitions Quine Rorty I 302
Definition: Quine’s attack on the first dogma had made it doubtful. Operational definition: along with Sellar’s doctrine that a "sensory fact" is a function of socialization it became twice as questionable with Quine’s holistic attacks.
- -
Quine I 327
Definition: instructions for transformation, reinstate singular term - are flexible, without truth value gaps. - -
II 109
Carnap quasi-analysis: encompasses a full reduction through definition - QuineVs: assignment of sense qualities to spacetime points must be kept revisable - therefore it is not attributable to definitions. - -
VII (b) 24
Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: abbreviation - or more economic vocabulary (then longer chains) - Part and whole are bound by translation rules - Definition key is neither for synonymy nor analyticity.
Ad X 70
Definition/object language/meta language/Quine/(s): the term which is defined, cannot stand in the object language, even if the rest of the definition is (not always) in the object language.
X 84
Definition/VsQuine: from appropriate method of proof is of no interest, because the property of being provable by a particular method is uninteresting. It is only interesting in connection with the completeness theorem. QuineVsVs: logical truth is not mentioned there.
X 101
Context Definition: introduces merely a facon de parler. That creates eliminability at all times without ontological commitment.
XIII 43
Definition/Quine: Lexicon entries are a distant echo of what philosophers and mathematicians call definition. Lexicon/Dictionary/Quine: is intended to facilitate our conversations.
Def Definition/Quine: to define an expression means to explain how to do without it.
XIII 44
Defining is eliminating. Definition/Quine:
a) an expression.
b) an object.
One way is reduced to the other, because we define people by defining "people" and numbers by defining numbers or the word "number".
Expression/Definition: Definition of expressions is the broader term, because expressions like "or" are also included.
Object Definition/Object: this is what we talk about when we think more about the nature of an object.
Elimination/Quine: the concept of definition as elimination is especially helpful when definitions are not compatible as in the case of natural numbers. This also applies to the many possible definitions of the ordered pair. All that is required is that x and y can be uniquely obtained from .
Definition/Quine: has several purposes: sometimes to elucidate the use of the established language,
XIII 45
sometimes an idiolect, sometimes philosophical considerations. Definition: if it requires translation from one structure to another, this can enable us to enjoy the advantages of each by switching back and forth. (See singular terms).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Essentialism Kripke III 375
Necessary de re (Quine: = "essentialism") is incomprehensible - other authors: de re must be reduced to de dicto (also belief de re).
Kripke II 215
de re/Essentialism/Kripke: E.g. a claim de re is the claim that the real number of planets (nine) necessarily has the property of being odd. Kripke: Essentialists like I am think this is true! (KripkeVsQuine),
Also: when we say for example "Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him" we mean that Jones' opinion has a certain content, namely that the richest debutante will actually marry him.
de dicto/Kripke: (Example) Here we believe of a girl who is (in fact) the richest in Dubuque that Jones believes of her that she will marry him.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Essentialism Lewis IV 32
Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential properties are not description dependent - QuineVs: that is just as congenial as the whole modal logic - LewisVsQuine: that is really congenial - and irrespective of analyticity. Cf. >Analyticity, >essence, >essential properties, >modal logic.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Essentialism Quine Lauener XI 58
QuineVsEssentialism/Quantification/Lauener: quantification takes no account of the terminology - e.g. Fx is true if there is an object that satisfies that, no matter how it is called - e.g. 9 is the successor of 8 whether it is the number of planets or not.
Lauener XI 175
Essentialism/singular term/general term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other: i.e. between expressions that have a reference ((s) reference object) and expressions that have an extension ((s) a specifiable set). Quantification into opaque contexts/solution/FollesdalVsQuine: to be able to quantify into opaque contexts, we then have to make these contexts referentially transparent and at the same time extensionally opaque ((s) obscure)!
Essentialism: that is what essentialism means:
Def referential transparency/Follesdal/Lauener: what is true about an object applies to it, no matter how we refer to it.
Def extensional opacity/Follesdal/Lauener: among the predicates true of an object, some apply necessarily and others accidentally.

Quine VII (b) 21
QuineVsEssentialism: what is considered essential is arbitrary: a rational biped must be bipedal (because of its feet), but it does not have to be rational. The latter is relative.
VII (h) 151ff
QuineVsModal Logic: The modal logic makes essentialism necessary, i.e. one cannot do without necessary features of the objects themselves, because one cannot do without quantification. Actually, there is nothing necessary about the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference (reference).
VII (h) 156
> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=203974&a=$a&first_name=W.V.O.&author=Quine&concept=Barcan-Formula">Barcan formula: You have to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if you want to allow quantified modal logic. ((s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist.)

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Essentialism Rorty I 295
First dogma/Quine/Rorty: "essentialism": the idea that one might, by determining the nature of the issue in question, between the thing that was talked about earlier, and distinguish what is said about it - which is not possible - Second dogma: that a neutral observation language for verification / falsification was possible. (It is not). Cf. >Two Dogmas.
I 218
Essentialism/PutnamVsQuine: why shouldn't we just say: translation according to the manuals that have this feature? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that does not fit into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the person concerned". (Subjective Convenience).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Essentialism Stalnaker I 71
Essentialism/Today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism - QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object.
I 72
Essence/Essentialism/Essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: Thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent -
I 74
Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates - reason: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). Is a theorem, but not its substitution instance (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). - (if something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x - Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained.
I 85
Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about it are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Existence Searle V 165f
Existence/ontology/criterion/AlstonVsQuine: his translations (e.g. a) "length-in-miles-from" or b) "(Ex)(E is a ...)" - 1. Alston: E-assumptions depend on statements, not on sentences - QuineVsVs: the translation shows that the prerequisite is made only seemingly 2. AlstonVsQuine: the translation would allow to say everything possible, when you only reform it accordingly.
V 168
Searle (like Alston): no criterion of mere notation - (s) general direction: Searle: facts, not language is decisive - SearleVsQuine: E.g. then you can claim all the knowledge (W) and yet only presuppose this spring here: one defines a predicate P(x) = this spring and W - then one takes (W) as an axiom and this spring = this spring as an axiom, then "this spring = this spring and axiom (W) "then "P (this spring)" then "(Ex)(Px)" - problem: the knowledge can be represented in paraphrases, which then would have to have the same ontological prerequisite as the original - (s) QuineVsVs: the conditions are only made seemingly - AlstonVsQuine: ~ what someone says is important not how he puts it.
V 172
Ontological/epistemic/Searle: E.g. "are there terrible snow men?" is an epistemic, not an ontological question.
V 173
Existence/ontology/Searle: there are no classes of irreducible existence conditions. >Ontology/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Extensionality Simons Chisholm II 185
Extensionality/Quine: space time points instead of "durable goods" - SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) not learnable - Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects (> entia sukzessiva). - SimonsVsChisholm: better accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter - more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. ---
Simons I 3
Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place - then we are dealing with continuants. continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event - (see below) everything that can have mass.
---
I 11
Extensional mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: characteristic property: relationship "part-of-or-identical-with" corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship - Overlapping: can be used as the only fundamental concept - limiting case: separateness and identity. ---
I 105f
Part/VsExtensional mereology/Simons: 1. whole sometimes not one of its own parts - 2. sometimes not transitive - 3. existence of "sum-individuals" not always guaranteed - that means, since the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong - 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. ---
I 106
5. provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects - Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". ---
I 117
Extensionality/Simons: is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle - Proper parts principle. ---
I 28
Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y - solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). - Simons: coincidence of individuals: temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually) -> superposition: at the same time in the same place.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987


Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Formal Language Hintikka II 141
Formal language/logic/canonical notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should consider the logical language as our mother tongue, and do not place too much emphasis on the translation into the everyday language. It is all about semantic clarity anyway.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Gavagai Brandom I 576
BrandomVsQuine: Sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong. ---
I 578ff
Gavagai/BrandomVsQuine: if you want to use singular terms for (rabbit) parts, there must be predications of them, which do not only address them through the wholenesses in which they appear - if "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects that it sorts - there must be a term for "the same Gavagai" (in the derived scheme) - no natural language can be as non-autonomous that it needs a richer meta-language (of the theorist) - only artificial languages can do without it. ---
580 I
Solution/Brandom: it is about accuracy of inferences, not superficial stimuli. VsQuine: since no natural language can be non-autonomous in this sense - only artificial languages whose use is specified in a richer metalanguage can be that - a straightforward translation is to be preferred.
BrandomVsQuine: this is about correctness of inferences, not about Quine’s thin base of surface stimuli.
Gavagai: how do you distinguish whether the rabbit fly or the flash of bright stumpy tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, it does not depend on the RDRDs(reliable differential responsive dispositions) and the corresponding causal chains, but on their inferential role.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Gavagai Field II 201
Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Theory/Reference/FieldVsQuine: the indeterminacy does not only refer to the absolute sense. - either a) to the absolute - b) to the relative reference. Absolute reference/Field: here there is no fact which decides what Gavagai has as an extension.
---
II 202
Correspondence theory/indeterminacy/Gavagai/Field: new correspondence theory: partial signification: Gavagai has the relation of partial signification - a) to the quantity of rabbits - b) to the quantity of rabbit parts. - This is only interesting, if one can explain truth with it. - Then "is" is either identity relation or partial identity. Indeterminacy: is then the thesis that there is no fact that decides about it. - This does not mean that there is no disquotation scheme. - Modification: "signifies partially a and partially b".
Partial signification/everyday language: E.g. "tall man": 180-185cm?
---
II 204
Problem: relativized signification and denotation leads again to the myth of the museum. - For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation manual M: T signifies {x I Fx} relative to M iff M T displays to a term which signifies y (or {x I Fx}). Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Quine needs a connection between "rabbits" ((s) not "Gavagai") in our language and actual rabbits. But his indeterminacy thesis denies the existence of such a one which does not consist at the same time equally well out of rabbit parts.
---
II 216
Gavagi/metalanguage/Field: we need defined expressions for the description of the partial extension: - E.g. "Rabbit" partly signifies the set of rabbits and partly the set of the unseparated parts of rabbits. - Question: how can this be understood by someone for whom the last two tokens of "rabbit" are indeterminate? - N.B.: the sentence is just as understandable and has the same truth conditions when the meta language is indeterminate. ---
II 220
Gavagai/indeterminacy/Field: the addition of "is an unseparated part of" to language reduces the indeterminacy. - (This comes from an inflationary view).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Gavagai Peacocke I 84
Gavagai / EvansVsQuine: his proposal, to interpret rabbits as unseparated rabbit parts has the consequence that what is always true of a unseparated rabbit part, also is true of another unseparated part of that rabbit - then there are no limits to vagueness - the price of denying that is to make the identification of predicates empirically unlimited - this also applies to the attribution of actions.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Generality Quine I 10
Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). ---
I 238
Plural: abstract singular terms: "lions are dying out" - Disposition "eats mice" (31). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not properties! "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would apply to classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 415
Properties: not every general term necessarily speaks of properties or classes - properties and classes acceptable as values ​​of variables. ---
IX 194~
Universality/Quine: ambiguous: a) different indices applicable - b) undivided quantification throughout an exhaustive universal class. ---
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/universality/Quine: These basic statements are general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - one cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the precondition of the use of singular sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Generality Russell Tugendhat I 377
Existence/Russell/Tugendhat: R interprets the singular predicative statement as an existential statement and this as a general (overall) statement - already anticipated by Kant and Frege - then e.g. Present King of France etc. is always wrong.
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/Quine: Thesis: basic statements are always general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - you cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the explanation of the use of singular sentences.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Generality Strawson IV 68
generality / Strawson: the question of general categories of things or concepts is not logical answerable - it needs Epistemology.
Tugendhat II 25 ~
generality / StrawsonVsQuine: general statements can only be understood as singular statements. Existence of individual things (particulars) has already been assumed.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Holism Brandom I 666
Meaning/Holism/HarmanVsQuine: Example: If the sun passes behind a cloud, does that change the meaning of my words? At least, the conditional "If a cloud hides the sun, then p" obtains a different potential to transform my definitions - Brandom: difference: whether change in significance or in content. ---
I 666
Social Holism/Brandom: Demands that understanding of the semantic content whose approval has such significance depends on the capabilities of the account holders to use relations between the different perspectives.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Holism Davidson McDowell I 188
DavidsonVsQuine: Even if the "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence into the individual sentences, this does by no means show that rational responsibility cannot be divided into sentences, sentence by sentence. Therefore the experience must really be interpreted as a tribunal. >Tribunal of experience.

Davidson I (e) 113
Holism/Davidson: the ones of the purely linguistic meaning and the elements of his/her utterances, which are purely attributable to the beliefs of the speaker, cannot be neatly separated.
Glüer II 75
Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: a number of logical relations are also always constitutive in terms of the meaning - otherwise we could never talk about the same object.
Glüer II 78
But reasoning relations between beliefs are not comprehensible in a purely formal-logical way - the fewest beliefs emerge as logical truths from other beliefs.
Horwich I 463
Truth/Holism/DavidsonVsDummett: Truth always goes beyond the evidence for the Holism - then understanding never shows up in the manifestations which Dummett means.
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Identity Geach I 218
Identity/GeachVsFrege: is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). - VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. ---
I 226
Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. ---
I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema.
(1)l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. - From this we derive the law of self-identity:
"l-a = a".
Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us:
(2)l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a"
---
I 240
Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. ---
Tugendhat I 37
Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects.
Habermas IV 158
Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient.

1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Identity Goodman I 21f
Definition Identification/Goodman: based on the division into entities and kinds. - The answer to the question: "The same or not the same?" always has to be: "The same what?".
I 142
(16) In the relevant correct system each point correlates with a combination of a vertical and a horizontal line. (17) In the (one other) corresponding correct system no point correlates with a combination of any other elements.
Moreover, since the isomorphism neither guarantees identity nor excludes it (although it is guaranteed by it), means (16) no positive or negative determination on something other than straight lines, and combinations of straight lines, while (17) does not determine itself on anything except to points.
I 140
(14) Each point is generated by a vertical and a horizontal straight line. (15) No dot is formed by straight lines or something else.
I 142f
Are (14) and (15) about the same points? Is the screen on which a spot moves the same as the one on which no spot moves? Is the seen table the same as the pile of molecules?
I 145
Goodman: The answer to such frequently asked questions in philosophy is a strong Yes and a strong No. The realist will oppose the conclusion that there is no world. The idealist will oppose the conclusion that conflicting versions describe different worlds. Goodman: both views are appealing. Finally, the difference between them is purely conventional!
Goodman IV 21
Individuation/Quine: > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Individuation">individuation is defined by a bundle of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (the identity) and the "same" and "another" derived from them.
IV 21
GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to explain that the interpretation of these particles cannot be made without consideration of the thing-places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems.
IV 77
There is no way to individuate a world, except with the help of a version.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Identity Quine I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". - (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a)
in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa.
From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with:
(2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a.
---
Geach I 240
But Geach per relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
Identity/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap.
---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity).
2. disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms.
---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII (d) 65ff
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Conditions Hintikka II 143
Uniqueness condition/W-questions/answer/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous) is, first, that (8) must imply (7) (6) Who is the man over there?
(7) I know who the man over there is.
E.g. it is Sir Norman Brook.
(8) I know the man there is Sir Norman Brook.
Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG).
II 144
Problem: for that we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x).
(Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually)
"I know who Norman Brook is."
II 145
HintikkaVsQuine: Quine does not recognize the role that my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: Quine says that these conditions can also be transferred to belief, knowledge, etc.
Quine: Hintikka wants the subject to know who or what the person or thing is. Whom or what the term designates.
HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I would only use one kind of uniqueness condition.
Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (belief, seeing, knowledge) is one of analogy, not of identity.
Solution: the sets of compatible worlds are respectively different ones in the case of knowledge, seeing, memory, belief!
II 146
Identification/belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: every world of belief will contain innumerable bodies and objects that are not recognizable at all, simply because the believer believes that his world contains a countless number of such objects. Identity: Questions about the identity of these objects are meaningless.
Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how should one exclude them?
Solution: one would have to limit the range of the variables to such objects, over which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea.
Problem: How should one determine how clear these ideas must be?
HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple when we quantify over individuals in doxastic worlds:
E.g. Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything, Jack believes":
Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify over inhabitants of such worlds by simply using a quantifier within the operator.
((s) i.e. that Jack, but not we differentiate?).
Problem: it could be that we want to consider the inhabitants as our neighbors from the actual world w0. ("Qua neighbors").
Hintikka: but that is a problem for itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions.
Problem: it rather lies in the notation of the conventional modal logic, which runs from the outside to the inside and which does not allow the evaluation process, to ever turn around so that it runs from the inside outwards.
Solution/Saarinen: the solution is "retrospective" operators.
Solution/Hintikka: it may be that we can trace back an individual from w1 to w0, even if it does not fulfill the uniqueness conditions. (These require that an individual is identifiable in all worlds.)
HintikkaVsQuine: the latter is mistaken that the question of identity is meaningless if the uniqueness conditions are not all fulfilled.
On the contrary: it has to be meaningful so that we are able to see that the conditions are not fulfilled!
Uniqueness condition/Hintikka: if the uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, it means only that we cannot find an individual in every world.
II 150
Truth conditions/Uniqueness conditions/Hintikka: the truth conditions of the uniqueness conditions are very different from the truth conditions for other types of the most simple sentences. World lines/Hintikka: world lines can therefore be drawn in different ways, without tipping over the remaining semantic situation.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Idiolect Dummett I 144
Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre - Example, Londres Example, Pierre believes London to be ugly but Londres to be beautiful) a translation is no hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead of idiolect). - (DummettVsQuine: idiolect not a priority. > Idiolect/Quine).
III (c) 145
Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares himself responsible of the common usages - without fully dominating them.
III (c) 150
The concept of Idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Idiolect Quine Dummett I 139
Idiolect/Quine: has priority over the concept of community language - never sure that the meanings are the same. ---
Dum I 139
Quine: Meaning and accepted theory are not distinguished. >Two Dogmas. Davidson: radical interpretation: idiolect is from specific time and situation. > Radical interpretation/Davidson.
---
Dum I 141
DummettVsQuine, DummettVsDavidson: not the idiolect, but common language has priority. Idiolect/Dummett.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Indeterminacy Chomsky II 325
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine/Chomsky: According to this theory all the suggestions for the translation should be able to be "compatible with the totality of speech disposition, but incompatible with each other." (Q + O, 27) - Chomsky: that is not possible because of the problems associated with the probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside of a language - Quine: circumvents the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning".
II 325
Translation ambiguity, vagueness: ChomskyVsQuine: Disposition either in terms of stimulus, or in relation to the total corpus of the language: then all sentences are equally likely - (reference classes).

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Indeterminacy Field II IX
Indeterminacy/Correspondence/Lewis/Kit Fine/Field: Indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. - Solution: Supervaluation for vague languages. - On the other hand: indeterminacy is a problem for deflationism (within one's own language) (Quine). - Some authors VsQuine: the assertion of an indeterminacy within one's own language is incoherent. - indeterminacy/mathematics/Field: exists in quantity theory, but not in number theory. ---
II 180
Indeterminacy/reference/conceptual change/theory change/Field: Thesis: "Mass" was undefined and still is today. Two textbooks of the Special Relativity Theory can differ by understanding mass as "eigen mass" or "relativistic mass". Then this is either the same or different in all reference systems. ---
II 192
Indeterminacy/theory/Quine: scientific terms are meaningless outside their theory. > Immanence of truth. - Truth always only in relation to a conceptual scheme. - An objective (non-relative) concept of truth could only be attempted in terms of denotation and signification, but this cannot be done if these concepts are relative to a reference system. FieldVsQuine: Denotation is a perfectly objective relation that exists between expressions and extra-linguistic objects.
Referential indeterminacy/Field: only shows that denotation is not well-defined in certain situations.
---
II 271 ff
Incorrect translation/Brandom/Field: E.g. Root - 1 not "i" and "-i". (+) ---
II 355
Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. - Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. - New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. - Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism)
---
II 359
Indeterminacy/translation/system/Field: For example, assuming two speakers have different assumptions about natural numbers. Then the one must ultimately assume that the other has a wider concept than he himself. Problem: Asymmetry: A foreign concept, which is assumed to be a further, cannot be translated back into its own language. - ((s) There might be an unintended interpretation.) - Field: we also have indeterminacy of the reference on each side.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Indeterminacy McDowell I 184
Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine: the results of "conceptual sovereignty" are far from being determinable by means of scientific facts about the "empirical meaning". ---
I 184
McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third Dogma, it has fatal consequences for Quine: for his reasoning, he needs the maintenance of the dualism endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. ---
I 189
Theories language/observation language/McDowellVsQuine: now it can be that both are actually distinguishable. Then the observation meaning of a single theoretical theorem would be indeterminate.    But we could not derive a general meaning indeterminacy from this. If we try to do that, we are confronted with the Third Dogma.
  Then we stand in front of a borderline of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into the theory and let the experience speak no language at all. Then, of course, the rational relation is lacking.
We need this rational relationship, however, for Duhem's argument. This can only be of a local nature now.
  As we pave our way through the Third Dogma, we tailor Duhem's thoughts to the right size. (> Theory/McDowell).
---
II 64
Indeterminacy/underdeterminedness/Conceptual Design/McDowell: the choice of a schema is always underdetermined by the data - requires terms that the subjects have not acquired. - This is not possible according to the strong verificationism, this equates verification with susceptibility for evidence. Conceptual design/McDowell: we need that in realistic science.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Indeterminacy Quine Rorty I 227
McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation.
ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations.
((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done.
---
Quine I 257
Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. - An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). ---
I 283
Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." ---
I 285
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). ---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). - Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. ---
VI 69
Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. ---
XII 60
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. - Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers - (> shifted ostension). ---
XII 62
Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker better differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). ---
XII 97
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. - ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.)

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Individuals Russell V ~ 38
Def Individuals/Russell: constructions of sense-data or sense experience - (is irrelevant for logic).
I 53
Single class/ Frege/Peano/RussellVsQuine: unequal Individual: "i'x" the class whose only element is x" so: i'x = y^ (y = x) : "the class of objects identical to x".
I 74
Def Individuen/Principia Mathematica/Writing/Russell: Items that are neither propositions nor functions. Letters: a, b, c, x, y, z, w
I 132
Def Individuen/Principia Mathematica/Russell: a term that can occur in any set of atoms. Def Universal/Principia Mathematica/Russell: Term that occurs like the R. (In R1 (x) R2 (x,y) R3 (x,y,z) R4 (x,y,z,w)....

III 127
Def Absolutely simple individuals / Russell: are unchangeable, but not necessarily of eternal duration. Def Individuen/Russell: are completely independent from each other and their names are actual names and vice versa.

VI 77
Knowledge/Existence/Russell: sometimes you know the truth of an existential statement without being able to give an example: They know that there are people in Timbuktu. This shows that existential statements do not say anything about a particular individual, but only about a class or function.
VI 80
Identification/Russell: an identification does not necessarily have to describe an individual, it can also be a predicate, a relation or something else.


Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Innateness Churchland Fodor IV 76/77
Innate/Churchland: relatedness to a particular language is unlikely. ---
IV 78
ChurchlandVsQuine: we have no reason to believe that there is an "anglophone hyperspace" with an anglophone hyper-area for English sentences. Fodor/Lepore: it is very unlikely that the grammar of English would be innate.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Inscrutability of reference Newen, A./Schrenk, M. Newen I 76
Inscrutability/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. inscrutability of reference: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts fulfil the same observation situations. - 2. inscrutability of translation: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts: can a) "be the same" b) "be part of the same thing". In each case in the foreign language. That is proceeding the inscrutability of reference - 3. underdetermination (if a theory) by the data: (corresponds to the translation inscrutability): there may be rival theories that fit to the same set of observations - VsQuine:. it never comes to radical translations because many aspects of the language are evolutionarily formalized in the brain and cannot vary greatly -. (ChomskyVsQuine) - Then there is only the 3. inscrutability.


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Intensions Carnap VII 146
Extension/Carnap: E.g. class of all blue objects - E.g. intension of "blue" in English: the quality of being blue - intension, not extension makes us understand statements.
VII 149
Intension/Carnap: the analysis of the intension for a natural language is just as reliable as that of the extension! QuineVs: pragmatic intension terms are unclear and mysterious.
VII 150
Quine: that is in principle, it is not only about the generally accepted technical difficulty of the determination. Carnap: Question: Assuming that the linguist can determine the extension, how can he also determine the intension?
In any case, this is a completely new step:
For example, suppose that two field linguists have reached complete agreement on the extensions of the natives.
Now it is still possible to attribute different intensions to the predicates thus fixed extensionally!
Because there is more than one and possibly infinitely many different properties, whose extension in the given area is just the extension for which the predicate in question has been determined!
Example (s) If all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the dogs were picked out.
Carnap: In addition, quadruped could be meant if the descriptive word is unknown. The whole extension would also be covered.

VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatism/CarnapVsQuine: the determination of intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be tested by observing language habits.
Extensionalist thesis / QuineVsCarnap: the determination of intension is ultimately a question of taste, the linguist is free because it cannot be tested. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise either.
Quine: the completed encyclopedia is ex pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the end of the foot. But we can take advantage of it!
If, on the other hand, we delay a definition of synonymity in the case of the lexicon, no problem arises, nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.

Intensionalist These/Carnap: pro: Example translation manual: the linguist begins:

(1) horse, horse
another linguist enters:

(2) Horse, horse or unicorn

since there is no unicorn, the two intentions have the same extension! ((s) Disjunction: for the extension two intentions can be assumed, if one is empty, like unicorn).
Extensionalistic thesis/Quine: if it is correct, there is no way to make an empirical decision between (1) and (2).
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist not only has to calculate the real cases, but also the possible ones. ((s) David Lewis: applies modality not to objects, but to intensions, e.g. facts or characteristics!).
Ambiguity/Intensions/Carnap: Ambiguity can be overcome by providing suitable explanations and examples. For me there are no objections against modality.
But it is also not necessary:
For example, the linguist could simply describe cases to the native that he knows are possible and leave open whether there is something that fulfills the descriptions. (So e.g. describe a unicorn, or point to a corresponding picture, etc.).
The affirmative or negative answer will form an affirmative case for (1) or (2).
This shows that (1) and (2) are different empirical hypotheses.
Intension/Carnap: all logically possible cases of determination come into consideration. Also causally impossible! (>unicorn example).

VII 158
Intension/Carnap: scope of a predicate, truth conditions. So that the speaker can attribute the predicate Def analytical: if the intension includes all possible cases for the speaker
Def synonymous: two expressions with the same intension for a speaker
Def language/Carnap: system of related dispositions.

Newen/Schrenk I 120
Def Intension/Carnap: = truth conditions - Def Extension/Carnap: = truth value.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Introduction Strawson I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing (Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing).
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech - one can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not.
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating.
I 193
Assertive mode primary.
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode).
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated.
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular.
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement.
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding.
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.)
I 238
When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed.
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease".
I 239f
Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce - class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete - (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight - (2) have no factual weight.
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) - predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself.
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact.
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions.
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition - new: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars - then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced - where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal?
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1.
I 263
Both theories independ, but connectable.
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur - E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 - Problem: What is at the end of the chain? -> Feature-universals.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Justification McDowell I 18
Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations.   A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts.
  B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions.
  This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative".
---
I 31
Justification/Judgment/McDowell: the relations through which judgments are justified can only be understood as relations in the space of concepts (reasons).       It is one thing to be free from guilt, and another to have a justification. Free from guilt: the raw influence of causality (the effect of the world on our senses) withdraws itself from the control of spontaneity.
      It is an excuse for someone if he was driven by a tornado to a place where he did not have anything to look for.
But what we want is: that the exercise of spontaneity is subject to a control exercised by the world itself, but so that the applicability of spontaneity is not undermined (by no longer being the cause of excuse).
Justification/McDowell: every concept which is now constituted by the fact that it consists in a justification relation to a merely present must be a purely private concept.
---
I 161
Justification/Quine: cannot be done through experience. Only by events which are subject to natural laws. McDowellVsQuine: Contradiction: If experience is not within the order of justification, it cannot be exceeded by world views. This, however, requires "conceptual sovereignty."

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Kant Putnam VI 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself.
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense is component of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly.
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary.
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I (c) 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?

I (f) 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
I (f) 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
I (f) 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Knowledge Dummett Husted IV 456
DummettVsQuine: knowledge manifests itself in practice: two speakers, same view. >Manifestation. - Quine/Davidson: > indeterminacy of translation; > radical interpretation.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Language Chomsky I 279ff
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". ---
II 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement.
II 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics - several analytical hypotheses not only possible but necessary - ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions - Aristotle: rather associated with actions - VsQuine: not evident that similarities can be localized in a room - principles, not "learned sentences".
II 333
VsQuine: cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential.
II 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught. ---
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? - Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite - Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them - Meaning/VsGrice: We can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. ---
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: no natural kind.

Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Language Dummett I 11 ff
Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto)
Husted IV 448
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition".
2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use".

McDowell I 152
Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary.
Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit.

Dummett III (b) 81
Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences.
III (c) 145
Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them.
III (c) 150
The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa.
Horwich I 461
Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett.

1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Language Quine X 134
Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths).
VI 17
Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this.
VI 63
Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc.
VI 64
The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis).
VI 65
Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other.
Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe?
VI 66
In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours.
VI 67
When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes.
VI 105
Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism.

VII (b) 26
Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation)
2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary.
Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings.
Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language.
Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other:
External language: redundant in grammar and vocabulary. Economical in terms of the length of strings.
Partial language "primitive notation": economical in grammar and vocabulary.
VII (b) 27
Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes.

VII (dc 61
Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed.

VII (d) 77
Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms.
In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities.
VII (d) 78
Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!)
Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language.
Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship.
VII (d) 79
Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself.

X 34/35
Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages.
Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences.
Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world.
X 42
Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme.
ad X 62
Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language.
X 87
Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure).
Dependence on language and its grammatization.

XI 114
Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences.
Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful).
XI 115
Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise.
XI 116
Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations.
Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language.
((s) >Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist).
Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content.
Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions.
But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network.

V 32
Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour".
V 59
Language/Quine: Ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words.
Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke).
Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same?
V 89
Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Language Acquisition Chomsky I 281
Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. ---
I 283
Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. ---
I 285
VsGoodman: Learning a second language is not that different. ---
I 299
Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. ---
II 324
Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association - ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Manifestation Dummett II 82/83
Manifestation/Dummett: knowing the truth conditions is not something you do, it does not show.
II 96
Manifestation/undecidable/Dummett: e.g. if a skill is never exercised, there can be no truth condition for a corresponding subjunctivic conditional.
II 97
Manifestation/Knowledge/Truth Conditions/Dummett: it is unreasonable to deny that someone who is able to recognize a straight stick by seeing it also knows what it is for a never seen stick to be straight.
Husted IV 456
Manifestation/Translation/Uncertainty/DummettVsQuine: if knowledge is manifested in practice, two speakers have the same opinion.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Meaning Davidson I (c) 64
Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning VsDescartes: senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsScepticism)
I (c) 47
Def meaning (interpretation): the meaning of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language. This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVsSocial nature of meaning: idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam/Kripke: causal theory: correct link between word/object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences.

Rorty VI 419
DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Davidson rejects the notion of "stimulus meaning": this would be like Newton’s attempt to climb to the "Newton of the mind". Instead: distal theory of meaning. There is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology.

Dav I 95
Causal theory of meaning: meaning does not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSkepticism).
I 99
DavidsonVsPutnam: that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds, but due to broad social character of language.
Glüer II 50
Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: the interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - (multiple languages = truth - theories) possible - Def Meaning/Davidson: then consists in being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language.
Glüer II 51
Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities (pro Davidson : Meaning is not fixed ultimately) - consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language becomes ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.
Frank I 672
Sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not only external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings are not in the head, but rather simple propositional attitudes.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning McDowell I 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (See also >content/McDowell). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
I 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (>distinction schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning".
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).   Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community.
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community.
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. ---
II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts.
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Meaning Rorty Horwich I 449
Meaning/DavidsonVsDummett/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Dummett an Quine agree with the basic principle - that meaning must be reduced to experience - or to the given or stimuli (i.e. intermediary between conviction and objects). - Problem: >skepticism: meaning is then epistemical - Truth and Meaning be separated -
I Horwich 464
Meaning/Wittgenstein/Davidson / Rorty as entities: should play a dual role as cause and at the same time justification - e.g. >sense data, e.g. >stimuli.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Mention Wessel I 220
Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects.
I 286
Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content) - Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field) - Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? - Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".
I 313
Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object - Berg: mention, name: used - mention: = quote (quotes) - instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A".
I 352
Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B - 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term - (s) density cannot be true or false.
ad I 352
Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.
I 35
"Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part - Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts - Wessel: here not applicable - Because intensional rules allow very similar to extensional, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements.
I 353
Planets/Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence only identity sentences evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. - WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus).

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Metaphysics Strawson Newen/Schrenk I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysics, VsRevisionists metaphysics - Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day action and speaking. Definition revisionists metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This contradicts the everyday thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is only about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
I 151
Person/Strawson: further fundamental element of our everyday ontology. They have physical and psychological characteristics and are neither reducible to the one nor to the other. ---
Schulte III 436f
Strawson: descriptive metaphysics: examines our conceptual scheme and terms such as space, time, identification, recognition, etc. - fundamental contrast: individual/general (Strawson pro individual) - particular basic position - Priority: particulars which are associated with sortals: sortal: universal with counting principle or distinction principle.
Schulte III 441
Conceptual scheme: concepts like space and time must be given, so that a coressponding experience is possible for us.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Method Chomsky I 278
Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset.
I 297ff
Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning.
I 303
Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. ---
II 316
Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated.
II 321
Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data.
II 323
Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language.
II 324
VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Natural Deduction Geach I 143
Calculus of natural deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> existence introduction) - but no quantification over them. - GeachVsQuine: he can not treat names any more as "covert descriptions".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Naturalized Epistemology Stroud I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. ---
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. ---
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. ---
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too. ---
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Nominalism Rorty I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Nominalism Bigelow I 97
Sets/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come in again through the rules of composition through the back door. ---
I 98
Example instead of refers to the set of rabbits
he could say
applies to all and only rabbits.
"All and only"/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): is a nominalistic avoidance of sets.
BigelowVsNominalism: one could say that this is just an abbreviation for "the crowd of all and only rabbits".
To apply/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: "applies" needs to be discussed further before this paraphrase could prove anything ontologically. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, > semantic ascent).
Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether you believe in them is one of those things. The semantics does not decide on this.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Non-Existence Hintikka II 37
Non-existent objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
II 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: it's about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional!
Model theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
II 39
Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.
II 103
Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But Problem:
Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn).
((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)
Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for".
((s) that is, that both are looking for the same unicorn.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?)

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Non-Existence Parsons Hintikka I 37
Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
---
I 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones!
Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Norms Davidson Rorty VI 189
Norms/standards/Davidson: (according to Brandom): it is not required that practices that are not contained in an alternative practice (be it fictional), are checked against a norm. - The pursuit of truth cannot lead beyond our own practices (Sellars ditto).
I 66
DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is oriented to the first person, and thus Cartesian. Neither do I think we could do without at least some tacitly adopted norms. Davidson pro Quine: his courageous approach to epistemology presented in the third person.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Object Putnam FIeld IV 409
Object/thing/language/Internal Realism/world/Putnam: thesis: objects themselves are also made as they are discovered. -FieldVsPutnam: Then you would have to regard non-seperate parts as language-dependent, but they are language independent. ---
Putnam I (i) 247
Realism/reality/objects/Spacetime Points/Putnam: Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the spacetime region, which it occupies? - Quine: the chair and his constituent electromagnetic and other fields are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. - KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, however, have the same mass (E.g. statue/clay) - the chair could take another spacetime region. - QuineVsKripke: this evidence is worthless because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. - Lewis: Quine is right, in terms of the chair, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.- LewisVsKripke: not the chair, but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. - Putnam: it is nonsense to ask whether the chair is identical with the matter or coexists with it - no convention: if the chair is blue - Convention: whether it is a spacetime region, and if we have to decide that. - Spacetime points: are imagined by some authors as predicates - then the spacetime region is a set of properties. - Putnam: that is a matter of opinion - (> Four-Dimensionalism).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Objects (Material Things) Quine III 270
Item/Thing/Object/Quine: is the sum of the simultaneous instantaneous states of distributed atoms or other small physical particles in space at any given moment. And over time it is the sum of its successive momentary states.
QuineVsHeraclit: we can climb into the same river twice. What we cannot do is go twice to the same time stage of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to get in.)
III 271
Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of time periods to be compared.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: accepting things only means choosing a certain language. It is not believing in those things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in that it only expresses a language choice. QuineVsCarnap: Language and theory cannot be separated in this way. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.

VII (a) 18
Objects/Quine: their existence is postulated in order to simplify access to the stream of experience.
VII (d) 66f
Objects/Particulars/Thing/Hume: the idea of physical objects arises from an error of identification. Every moment we really invent a new object!
QuineVsHume: we do not need to share that.

IX 35
Object/Class/Quine: every thing for us is a class, after we declared individuals in Chapter 4 to be their own elements, it follows that every class is a class of classes, and that every thing is in a class of classes. Benefit: wherever a free variable has a meaning, a set abstraction makes sense. Therefore, we can henceforth use Greek letters instead of variables in the free places.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Observability Peacocke I 90
Observability / Peacocke: Thesis: o. is a property of certain terms and not of other terms - the phenomena that are crucial to the concept of observability, are the ones corresponding to the individuation of Fregean thoughts and their constituents: the phenomena of cognitive significance and the epistemic possibility - that has nothing to do with the correct use of the word "observe".
I 103
Observability / PeacockeVsQuine: does not depend on the sophistication and training of the observer nor with the level of science - ((s) because of Peacockes stronger emphasis on the perceptual component.)

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Ontological Commitment Davidson Horwich I 463
DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine/DavidsonVsFacts: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics - they belong to the dualism of scheme/content. >Scheme/content, >facts/Dummett, >metaphysics.

Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Ontological Commitment Kripke III 379
"There is"/Interpretation/Ontology/"Ontological Commitment"/Kripke: can it even be a meaningful question whether someone who says "There are people" is "committed to a viewpoint" that such things as people exist? (KripkeVsBrandom). It is simply the case that "There are people" is true when there are people. What other question is there? (KripkeVsQuineans, epigones of Quine; Quine himself, on the other hand, is about formulations like "there are 3 meters between...").
Kripke: one could perhaps claim that in some rare special cases "there are" is only superficially reminiscent of "There are rabbits" and then brings with it no "ontological commitment", and one could even try substitutional quantification to show this. But it would be something else to say that "there are rabbits" is not true iff there are rabbits.
This is analogous to denying that "John is tall" is true, iff John is tall.
"Ontological Commitment"/Kripke: was not developed for "There are rabbits".
Now someone might think it was developed for first level referential language, and the question is whether English should be translated into such a referential language or into a substitutional one. The latter does not make any ontological specifications.
KripkeVs: the question is nonsense: we haven't learned a formal language like our mother tongue. In some logic books the crazy notation "(Ex)" is explained either in such a way that one gives an example: "(Ex)Rabbit(x)" means. "There is an x that is a rabbit" or
III 380
by a formal definition of fulfillment (as here, see above = Def fulfillment/Kripke: "(Exi) Rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s' that deviates from s at the most i-th place that fulfills "Rabbit (xi)".
((s) Example "Cat3 is not on the mat" differs from "cat1-5 is on the mat" in the third place.)
Then the quantifiers are assumed to go over a non-empty area and the technical term "non-empty" is explained by saying that D is not empty iff there is an element of D.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Ontological Commitment Quine Lauener XI 130
Ontological Commitment/Quine/Lauener: only exists when an object is common to all differently re-interpreted domains - (while retaining the interpretation of the predicates) - the theory only presupposes objects if it would be wrong if the objects did not exist - E.g. "objects of any kind whatsoever": here one is commited to dogs if each of the domains contains one or the other dog.
XI 48
Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: substitutional quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables.
XI 49
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: precisely with this we disguise ontology by not getting out of the language.
XI 133
Ontology/Modality/LauenerVsQuine: it is noticeable that in its formulations occur intensional expressions such as "must occur among the values of the variables", "must be true of" etc. Or psychological connotations such as "we look at". ChurchVsQuine: the expression "ontological commitment" is intentional. (>Intensions).
XI 158
Ontology/ontological obligation/Quine/Lauener: Lauener: unsolved problem: the relationship between ontological obligation and ontology. For example, two modern chemical theories, one implies the existence of molecules with a certain structure, the other denies them. Question: do they have the same ontology despite different commitments?
Quine/Lauener: would probably say yes and say that one of the two theories must be wrong.
((s) Then they have rather the same obligation than the same ontology).
LauenerVsQuine: my attempts to solve these problems make me believe that not only the quantified variables (with the objects) but also the predicates play a role.

Quine VII (a) 12
Ontology: the bound variable is the only way to impose ontological obligations on us. Example: we can already say that it is something (namely the value of the bound variables) that red houses and sunsets have in common.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Ontology Davidson Glüer II 94ff
Quine: Ontology is only about physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object VsEvent ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier-theory": no events, not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of characteristics.
Glüer II 121ff
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Distinguishing between event token and description. Quine: "No entity without identity"
The radical interpretation does not necessarily lead to uniform ontologies for all speakers.
Ontological categories: for Davidson: persons, material objects, events.
Ontology/Davidson: as a superordinate principle, is necessary whenever we recognize a grammatical category to which we must assign an infinite number of expressions - so we need events and objects: objects allow us to get adjectives under control - events: the same for some adverbs.
Glüer II 134
Ontology/Davidson/Glüer: Thesis: People, material objects, events. Question: could these ontological categories vary? - No, probably not in a way that different sorting makes sense.
Glüer II 137
Ontology/mental/physical/Davidson: is description-independent. - Intentionalist as well as physical discourse are based on the same event ontology.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Ontology Searle I 33
In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong.
I 40
Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle.
I 78f
Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else.
I 118
The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity.
I 182
The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
I 183
This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought.
The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.

II 68
Representation: There is no ontology tied to representation.
V 163
Ontology: Main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites?
V 164
Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless.
Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes the and only the entities that it says exist. (Does not have to be done explicitly.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
---
Stalnaker I 181
Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Opacity Quine I 263
Opacity: not "belief" is opaque, but the "that"! (Kronecker-Example) - ((s) CresswellVs?). ---
I 268
Opaque context: no significant function - Frege: "Name of a thought", "name a property", "name of individual concepts" - Russell: "propositional attitude". ---
I 270
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation, not appointed a Lion - Relative Term: the police chases a man. ---
XI 175
Quantification in opaque contexts/FollesdalVsQuine: we would then have to make opaque contexts referentially transparent (what is true, is true of the object regardless of the givenness) - and at the same time make extensionally opaque (some properties are necessary, other accidental) - this is the essentialism. ---
Perler / Wild I 103
Referentially opaque/Quine/Armstrong: basic: shows actual content of beliefs, not coreferentially replaceable expressions - transparent: substitutability by coreferential expressions: suitable for the attribution of attitudes to animals.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Pain Lewis Frank I 129
Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true.
Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450
---
Lewis I 39f
Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently. ---
I (c) 41
Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed.
I (c) 42
Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state.
I (b) 33 ff
Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ... ---
I (c) 40
Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role.
I (c) 42
Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization. But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (> concepts,> identity).
I (c) 42
The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different. Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator!
I (c) 52
Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states. If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain.
---
Schwarz I 146
Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:> theory of reference.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Perception Quine Münch III 296
Definition Perception/Quine/Schnelle: getting aware of an irritation.
Münch III 298
Quine, "the animal responds to the semi-circle on the screen" - SchnelleVsQuine: how does he know that? - Maybe it just avoids pain.
Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126.

Quine VI 2
Perception/Quine: Input: not objects, but activation of our sensory receptors. - We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences. Stimulus influences instead of observation and instead of documents.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: is neurophysiologically recordable in principle - beliefs cannot be recorded.
V 15
Perception/Quine: this is about form, not about stimuli (these fall under reception).
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavioral criteria. It shows itself in the conditioning of reactions.
V 33
Similarity/perception/ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perceptual similarity brings ontological clarity: perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted.
V 36
Perception Similarity/Quine: one is inclined to speak here of similarity in certain respects.
V 37
Quine: this is convenient in practice, but dispensable in theory, if you extend similarity as above by many digits. Learning/Perception/Similarity/Perception Similarity/Quine: in learning, different degrees of similarity must play a role.
N.B.: otherwise any enhanced reaction would be conditioned equally to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar!
N.B.: it follows from this that the standards of perceptual similarity must be innate.
VI 1
Perception/Language/World: our systematic theory about the outside world has evolved over generations. It allows us to predict future sensory stimuli. Thus, amidst the maze of stimuli, we have a theory that helps us to verify predictions.
VI 2
Perception/Observation/Quine: what is observation is not easy to analyze. Our input does not consist in objects, but in the activation of our sensory receptors. We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences, and renounce the objects! (Also on corresponding singular terms).
Def Stimulus Influence/Quine: the temporally ordered set of all perceptual receptors of the subject that are activated at an event.
VI 3
Observation/Quine: this is how we manage to renounce the term "observation" as an independent technical term! (In favour of stimulus influence).
VI 26
Perception/Quine: I have always spoken of neuronal receptors and their stimulation and never of sense data. (>Naturalized Epistemology). Sense Data/Quine: are cartesian! >Cartesianism.
VI 86
Perception/Learning/Language/Quine: two of Otto's perception situations that it is raining will differ not only in time, but also in neuronal terms. They are probably too complicated to be described neuronally at all, since there are many different signs of rain.
But there must still be some common neuronal characteristic for the class of these processes, because after all it was stimulus generalizations that were responsible for Otto learning it.
Then we can transfer this class to a whole population. However, it is even more inaccessible because the nervous systems of different individuals are networked differently.
VI 89
Perception/Criteria/Quine: of things: Example "x perceives that p". Problem: the light in which we see an object always comes from the sun or another source.
VI 90
Can we resort to criteria? No: because we also want to allow a bowl to be perceived by the fact that it is reflected in something.
Solution: focal point: we want to distinguish between seeing a glass and seeing through this glass. But causal relationships and focal point are not yet sufficient. Some part of the surface of our bowl would satisfy this condition no less than the whole bowl itself.
VI 91
So we need whole sentences to get through them to the terms.
VI 92
Perception/Quine: For example "x perceives that p" drives the speech of perceptions to undreamt-of heights. So we should even notice that Newton's laws imply Kepler's! But condition: only on the occasion of the situation in which we take note for the first time that p, they say of us, we noticed that p.
VI 93
Perception/Quine: is only one event in a subject at a time. We register foreign perceptions through the behavior of a subject and our empathy.
VI 94
It is more difficult to empathize with the belief of others: although we understand the belief of the dog that he will get his food, how do we understand that someone believes in transubstantiation during the Eucharist? >Behaviorism.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: we have already seen that a neurological generalization of our perceptions is not possible because of the different situations, viewpoints and different neural networks. Nevertheless, every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms! However, this does not apply to belief.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Phenomenology Nagel I 49
NagelVsRorty, NagelVsSubjectivism: seeks a phenomenological reduction of thoughts, to get out of them - can not succeed - conceptual schemes fail for the same reason: I can not say "p, but I do not know if it s true". - > conceptual scheme/Nagel; NagelVsQuine.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Pierre (Londres-Example) Dummett I 144
Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre-Example, Londres-Example) translation is not a hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead idiolect) - (> VsQuine: idiolect has no priority).
((s) Explanation/(s): Piere believes that Londres is beautiful but he heard that London is ugly.)

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Possibilia Husserl Hintikka I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: the speech about human experience makes the acceptance of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized Possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need it to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Possibilia Hintikka II 40/41
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. Possible worlds/Leibniz/Duns Scotus/Hintikka: such considerations led Leibniz and Duns Scotus before him to distribute the unordered set of non-existent individuals to divided worlds.
The totality of all non-existent objects is a non-well-formed whole.
Non-existent objects/possible objects/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are not some of these non-existent objects in our own actual world? Hintikka: thesis: yes, some of these barely possible objects are in the actual world.
Bona fide object/Hintikka: a bona fide object can exist in a possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which world line can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather being well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow that an object can exist in several worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different worlds can be identical when are they identical then?
II 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: the speech about human experience makes the assumption of Possibilia necessary. (Unrealized Possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl, the essence of human thought is in a relationship to unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need possibilia to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds is the corresponding model theory.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Predicates Geach I 110
Predicate/Geach: "predicables": spurious: E.g. "--- smoked a pipe" - "5 is dividable by 5 and by one", as well as for "3...". Predicate: real: "Russell smoked a pipe" - the identity of predicates with reflexive pronouns is not assured.
---
I 216
Predicate/Geach: must never be confused with names - the term does not denote the object. ---
I 224
Predicates/Geach: more common property of sentences - but not actual expression in the sentence. ---
I 224
"Stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say a predicate "stands for" a property or it is its name. ---
I 224
Predicate/Geach: does not appear as an actual expression in the sentence. - Geach: there is no identity criterion for predicates. - One cannot know whether two predicates stand for the same property. - Equality of use is necessary condition for same reference. - ((s) That is, the extension but not the intension is equal!) - GeachVsQuine: therefore one should not identify properties with classes. ---
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I call predicates only like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables". - I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates in which regard the two objects are indistinguishable in a given theory - if distinctions can be made in an extended theory, then the l-predicate does not change its meaning - E.g. "uniform" for (different but not at all differentiated) tokens of words, later the tokens are distinguished, but are still "uniform".
---
I 301
GeachVs two-name theory: error: that if two names denote the same thing, that they then allow the same predicates. ---
I 301
Predicate/Geach: Predicates such as "become" can only be assigned to concrete terms.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Prediction Millikan I 314
Prediction/Forecast/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we map the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, yet not of the experiences on our nerve endings. Confirmation/Prediction/Millikan: a perception judgement implies especially itself. E.g. if I want to verify that this container holds a liter, I do not have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.
That is, I do not have to predict certain sense data.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Process/Flux Simons I 124f
Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level - Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process - we have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. - Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers - or: absolute space - or introduction of "is co-fluvial with" - this could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as" - thus the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. - Error: trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged.
---
I125
Time stage/flux stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man - one does not bath in a flux stadium - consequent description in four-dimensionalism only by higher beings - for us not decidable - Terminology. Process ontology here = four-dimensionalism. - Simons: not impossible, only language different. ---
I 127
SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: convenient representation of the Minkowski space, but representation is not an ontological argument. ---
I 126
Process/Geach/Simons has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts - not the whole process - hence no change - E.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Proper Names Geach I 46f
Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. ---
I 143
Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). - But not quantification over it. - GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". ---
I 155
Names/Geach: not knowing the causal chain is important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. - Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). - GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". - Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". ---
I 162
Quasi-names/Geach: in encyclopedias, for foreign gods - (Geach pro) - Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - No "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. ---
I 208
Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. - Quasi quotation: is not a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Proper Names Strawson VII 16
Names/Strawson: proper names have no meaning. Ignorance of the name is not linguistic ignorance. ---
I 222
Names/adjective/Strawson: also names can be adjectival: E.g. Napoleonic, Russian, even with auxiliary verb is a Hitler. ---
I 224
But: Napoleonic gesture is not connecting gesture with Napoleon but between gesture and similarity principle of the summary which is made possible by Napoleon - but: Ramsey we probably say wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates, but not: wisdom sokratizes (wrong) - particular cannot be predicted - Solution: Language has a pseudo-universal: be feature of. ---
I 226
Only pseudo-universal. otherwise regress: characterized through being characterized by... ---
VI 386 ~
Names/general term/Strawson: cannot be derived syntactically. ---
VII 113
Names/Strawson: Meaning not object - (confusion of utterance and use) - Reference: Expressions plus context - referencing does not mean to say that you refer - (steps). ---
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell/VsQuine: Summit of circularity: names to treat as camouflaged descriptions - names are chosen arbitrarily or conventionally - otherwise names would be descriptive. ---
VII 122
Quasi names/Strawson: Glorious Revolution, Blue Grotto, Patriotic War.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Properties Strawson IV 67/68
properties / Strawson: one could concede that attributes and properties are ontologically of secondary importance - reference to characteristics presupposes the reference to objects but not vice versa - IV 69 VsQuine: quantification over properties: e.g. "there is a property that no thing has: perfection"- IV 67 reference / Strawson: particulars are possible without reference to properties.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Propositional Attitudes Searle II 28f
Propositional attitudes/Searle: their conditions of satisfaction are fixed by the propositional content. - No desire or belief without satisfaction conditions (i.e. there is no regress). >Propositional content, >conditions of satisfaction.
II 244
Propositional attitude/Searle: Special cases: "know that", "prove that", "see that" are intentional verbs, but also "success verbs".
II 260
Searle: I do not know any convincing distinction de re/de dicto in application to propositional attitudes.
II 270/271
SearleVsQuine : (SearleVs attitudes, which are allegedly irreducible de re). The belief in such settings stems from a Wittgenstein diagnosis. Our language provides two ways to report propositional settings: with de re reports or with de dicto reports. Example Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy (de dicto).
Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy (de re).
Since these two reports may even have different truth values, we believe that there must also be a difference in the phenomena (erroneously).
The following dialogue is completely absurd:
Quine: As for the man with the brown hat, Ralph, do you think he's a spy?
Ralph: no, Quine. You asked me if I had one of the re-convictions, but it's not the case that I think the man with the brown hat is a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto conviction - I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Propositions Quine I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains in place even after singular term! - Proposition resists change of the truth value. - Proposition remains nameless in x0p. Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
I 343
Modal logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = proposition.
I 347
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? This denotes nothing.
I 355
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (>Gavagai). - Proposition eliminated: synonymy indefinable - scientific truth indefinable (only within the theory) (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, §16).
I 358
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different.
I 358
Proposition as bearers of truth: no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves. Sentence: The door is open- bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. - what could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).
---
VII (f) 109
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements. ---
VII (h) 157
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition "The number of planets is > 7" - is unequal the proposition "9 > 7". ---
X 32
Proposition/object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even variable over object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (No semantic ascent necessary). ---
XII 39
Sentence/proposition/propositional attitude/translation/ChurchVsQuine: if a sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent. - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. - Quine: I still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: to artificial.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Proximal Theory Davidson I (c) 53
Proximal/Meaning Theory/Davidson: same meaning with the same stimulus patterns - distal: same objects - here it must be translated several times - 1. Comparison of the linguistic response to changes in the environment - 2. Own sentence that the radical interpreter himself/herself would express.
I (c) 53f
Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: are same objects and causes for speakers - here several times translation - DavidsonVsQuine: the proximal theory leads to classical skepticism - e.g. Gavagai: both could mean the same, whereby the same circumstances make all sentences true for one and for the other one all false - proximal/Quine: evidence is primary - Distal/Davidson: truth is primary: the meaning is linked to the truth conditions - Quine/DummettVsEvans: do not align meaning on truth conditions. - DavidsonVs: too simplified, every theory must relate meaning to truth and to evidence - Evidence/Davidson: are relations between sentences. - (no last data, only observing sentences) - VsDistal: Problem: there are probably several candidates for the position of the common cause item. E.g. every more comprehensive segment of the universe to the birth of the speaker for the utterance of "this is red". And so it would be the cause for any other disposition of the speaker - that would equal the meaning of all observation sentences.
I (c) 58
Proximal: does not guarantee that our theory of the world applies at all - difference proximal/distal: as between meaning theories which a) assigns to the evidence (proximal, stimulus pattern) or b) to the truth (distal, objects) the primary status - Quine pro a) (proximal)
I (c) 58
QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: meaning does not come from truth conditions - instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects - this is simplistic, since every meaning theory has to relate meaning to truth and to evidence.
I (c) 59
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: skepticism, relativization on the individual - cartesian.
I (c) 59
Evidence/Davidson: must be relations between propositions - the theory cannot support this from the outside.
I (c) 61
Proximal meaning theory - similar to Descartes, Dummett, Frege - stimulus patterns instead of objects are decisive.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: idiolect is also in principle interpretable (via causal hypotheses).

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Proximal Theory Quine VI 57
Proximal/distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be located in the common world than on the private outer surfaces of the body. The world should be the common cause. Better a common situation than a rabbit or any body. We should adopt an ontology of situations.
VI 58
Proximal/distal/QuineVsDavidson: I'd rather stick to attaching our irritations to neural input. I am particularly interested in the question of the transport of perceptual indicators from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (though not the interpreted individual) to freely refer to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects.
VI 59
"Common situations" are too vague for me.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Proximal Theory Rorty VI 421 f
Stimulus/distal/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty rejects the notion of a "stimulus meaning". - Instead: distal theory of meaning - there is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology. >Distal Theory.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Proximal Theory Proust Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

I 227
Proximal/Proust: primitive creatures such as the lumpfish (sea snails) react to a proximal state of the receptors.
I 227
Proximal/Proust: e.g. Snail: a snail can only process information when there is contact with its receptors. Distal: Birds and mammals need no contact with their receptors. Therefore, they can develop completely different spatial terms! (VsQuine).
I 228
Space/Animal/Thinking/Proust: intuitive, space is a kind of empty framework for possible perceptual content. The relation which is of interest to us is the occurrence at the same place, i.e. the equivalence class for all perception experience that affect the same localization in the environment.
Proust: this relation is interesting because it does not presuppose either the concept of space or the concept of a concept. It is purely logical.
Proust: the occurrence in the same place is also essential as a basis for the recognition of objects.
I 229
Definition Calibration/Proust: Calibration is adaptation of an auditory pattern to a visual. ((s) Coordination of sensory impressions.) Proust: this mechanism is essential to correct the sensory inputs.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Radical Interpretation Davidson I (d) 70f
Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson: first, to find out the topic independently, then ask whether true - because the situation, which usually gives rise to belief, also determines the truth conditions.
I (e) 112
Radical Interpretation/Davidson: it is not about a creation of a relationship formulated in meta-language between utterances of two languages, but about a structurally revealing theory of the interpretation of an object language - the reference to the known language is omitted.
Glüer II 40
Translation/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: Translation knowledge is not interpretive knowledge - E.g. Nabokov "My sister, do you remember the mountain and the tall oak, and the Ladore?" - translation of the Russian sentence "..." - from the fact that this is correct, it does not follow that I only understand one of the two sentences.
Glüer II 40
Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: mutual dependence on belief and meaning - not one without the other can be opened up - starting point: minimal belief: that a sentence is true at a certain time (occasion) - a) opportunity sentences: allows construction of hypothetical truth-equivalences.
Glüer II 66
Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsQuine: there is a general truth subordination -> Externalism: the belief contents are not independent from the world.
Frank I 626ff
Radical Interpretation/Davidson: the content of mental states is not to be determined independently from the linguistic behavior - the truth of the believed sentences is presupposed - otherwise no evidence can be derived from the environment and behavior would be meaningless. - The knowledge of the truth conditions is presupposed by the speaker, otherwise behavior cannot be interpreted. See other autors on externalism.
Frank I 634 +

Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Reality Davidson I (e) 90
Reality/World/Quine: proximal theory (the meaning is localized at the nerve endings) shut off from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes/DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one cannot specify what the evidence actually was evidence for.
Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.
Glüer II 126
World/Reality/Reality/Glüer: new: "see change" in contemporary philosophy, revision of the relationship of the human mind to the rest of the world. From the "subjective" to the "objective". On the object side, the world thus, there are no objects that could be represented. Fact/tradition/glower: there are material objects and events, but a true proposition claims not only that they exist, but that they are in a certain relationship to each other, also called fact. >Facts/Davidson.
Glüer II 127
DavidsonVsRepresentation: such a representation relation cannot exist. Because there are no facts! Any attempt to analyze the correspondence of facts and beliefs leads to the fact that we must say that a true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world, with the overall reality. We experience nothing in this way. >Representation/Davidson.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Recognition Hintikka II 209
Re-identification/Hintikka: with this problem situation semantics and semantics of possible worlds are in the same boat again. Situation semantics: situation semantics rather veils the problem. For overlapping situations it assumes, e.g. that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine and Hintikka consider re-identification as hopeless because you cannot explain how it works.
Re-identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that's why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: this is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But ignoring the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Recognition Millikan I 13
MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings. ---
I 299
Consistency/Millikan: the test of them is at the same time a test of our ability to identify something, as well as the test on the fact that our concepts map what they are supposed to map. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. This is not the problem of deciding how to split an exclusivity class.
---
I 300
E.g. to decide when red stops and orange starts. Instead it is about learning e.g. to recognize red under other circumstances.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Reduction Quine XII 92
Definition Reduction Sentence/Carnap/Quine: weaker than definition: provides no equivalent sentences without the term in question, but only implications.
XII 93
No full explanation but only partial explanation. Implication here: the reduction sentences name a few sentences that are implied by sentences with this term and imply some other sentences, that imply sentences with this term. - This does not provide a genuine reduction, but a fictional story of language acquisition. ((s) > "Rylean Ancestors").

VII (a) 19
Conceptual Scheme/Reduction/Quine: we want to see how far a physicalist scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalist one. The latter has epistemological priority.
The choice between conceptual schemes is guided by purposes and interests.

XI 143
Reduction/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: for ontological reduction, it is not extensional equality that is decisive, but the preservation of the relevant structure. For example Frege's, v. Neumann's and Zermelo's definitions do not produce equivalent predicates, but are nevertheless suitable for reduction, because all three represent a structure-preserving model of arithmetic.
Extensional Equality(s): ensures the uniformity of the quantities considered. The reduction then takes place at the description level. It would not reduce the ontology.
XI 146
Reduction/Theory/Quine/Lauener: by the condition that an n-tuple of arguments applies to a predicate exactly when the open sentence is fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values, we avert an impending trivialization. We can do this by determining the proxy function. If the truth values of the closed sentences are preserved, we can actually speak of a reduction to the natural numbers. (Ways of Paradox, p. 203).
XI 145
Def Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: is a function that assigns each object of the original theory a function of the new theory. Example "The Goedel number of".
This need not be expressed in one theory or another. It is sufficient if we have the necessary means of expression at the meta level.
Reduction: from one theory to another: so we need a special function for this
XI 146
whose arguments are from the old theory and whose values are from the new theory. Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: does not need to be unique at all. Example: Characterization of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory:
We map the universe U in V in such a way that both the objects of U and their proxies are contained in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be defined as
background theory, within which its own ontological reduction is described.
XI 147
VsQuine: this is not a reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we may presuppose this for the duration of argument U (>Ontology).
Lauener: that brings us to >ontological relativity.
Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires a super-countable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range.
This would require a much stronger framework theory, which could no longer be discussed away absurdly as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal.

XII 60
Specification/Reduction/Quine: we cannot find a clear difference between specifying one item area and reducing that area to another. We have not discovered a clear difference between the clarification of the concept of "expression" and its replacement by that of number. ((s) > Goedel Numbers).
And now, if we are to say what numbers actually are, we are forced to reveal them and instead assign a new, e.g. set-theoretical model to arithmetic.
XII 73
Reduction/Ontology/Quine: an ontology can always be reduced to another if we know of a reversibly unique deputy function f. Reason: for each predicate P of the old system, there is a predicate of the new system that takes over the role of P there. We interpret this new predicate in such a way that it applies exactly to the values f(x) of the old objects x to which P applied.
Example: Suppose f(x): is the Goedel number of x,
Old system: is a syntactical system,
Predicate in the old system: "... is a section of___" an x
New system: the corresponding predicate would have the same extension (coextensive) as the words "...is the Gödel number of a section whose Goedel number is___". (Not in this wording but as a purely arithmetic condition.)
XII 74
Reduction/ontological relativity/Quine: it may sound contradictory that the objects discarded in the reduction must exist. Solution: this has the same form as a reduction ad absurdum: here we assume a wrong sentence to refute it. As we show here, the subject area U is excessively large.
XII 75
Löwenheim/Skolem/strong form/selection axiom/ontology/reduction/onthological relativity/Quine: (early form): thesis: If a theory is true and has a supernumerable range of objects, then everything but a countable part is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of variables without any sentence becoming false. This means that all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And this in turn can be reduced to a special ontology of natural numbers. For this purpose, the enumeration, as far as it is explicitly known, is used as a proxy function. And even if the enumeration is not known, it exists. Therefore, we can regard all our items as natural numbers, even if the enumeration number ((s) of the name) is not always known.
Ontology: could we not define once and for all a Pythagorean general purpose ontology?
Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either of numbers only, or of bodies only, or of quantities only, etc.
Problem: suppose, we have such an ontology and someone would offer us something that would have been presented as an ontological reduction before our decision for Pythagorean ontology, namely a procedure according to which in future theories all things of a certain type A are superfluous, but the remaining range would still be infinite.
XII 76
In the new Pythagorean framework, his discovery would nevertheless still retain its essential content, although it could no longer be called a reduction, it would only be a manoeuvre in which some numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. We do not even know which numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: this shows that an all-encompassing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and opaque versions of old methods and problems. >Proxy function.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Reference Quine Rorty I 219f
Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning.
RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer.
---
Quine I 273
Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference.
I 166
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man.
I 273
Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object is not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair.
Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f.
---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the space time portion, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation.
Putnam II 194
Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. ---
Quine I 129
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. ---
VII (g) 130f
Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. ---
Lauener XI 175
Reference/Extension/Singular term/General Term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Relative Clauses Geach I 106
Complex terms/Relative Clause/Geach: the relation of pronoun-antecedent analog to the variable-operator is ambiguous - solution: resolution by an additional pronoun: "if", "and" etc. - ((s) It is not about unity but about dissolving the unity.) - Symbolic language/Geach: (e.g. quantum theory): can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. y belongs to the class of Ps: different depending on whether with equality sign or epsilon: for a class x, y belongs to x and if something belongs to x, it is P. - E.g. wrong: "Only a woman who has lost any sense of shame is drunk". - right: "A woman will only become... if she .." otherwise it follows: Men never get drunk. ---
I 120
Relative Clause/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "man who killed his brother"/"man, so that..." - "So that"/Principia Mathematica/Russell/PM: "so that" is an undefined basic concept in Principia Mathematica, GeachVsQuine: equally unclear - Geach: "so that" cannot be distinguished from "and" in quantifier notation. - E.g.: "The woman whom every Englishman appreciates is, above all, his mother": The relative clause here is not a general term: otherwise all appreciate the same mother! But in "... his queen ..." solution/Geach: this has nothing to do with the relative-clause, but with the range of application expressions. >Latin prose theory: >terminology.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Scheme/Content McDowell I 186
Schema/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of ​​a structure that must be found in every comprehensible conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of scheme and world.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Self- Reference Searle II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged. >Twin earth. Self-reference/Frege: "completing sense": intentional contents are never undetermined (SearleVsQuine: no undetermined sailboat can be desired). >Fregean sense.
---
II 275F
Indexicality/completing Fregean sense/Heimson/SearleVsKaplan: I, you, this, here, etc. always have a form of self-reference: they always express an intentional content because the speaker refers to a particular entity - this is Frege's "sense of proper names". >Heimson example. ---
II 278
Self-reference/Searle: E.g. there is a hand, and because there is a hand it is causing this visual experience - the self-reference is shown, but not seen - the one of the indexical statements is also shown but not claimed. ---
II 284f
SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential - they express different levels of intentional content - the use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it applies. ---
III 62
Circles: only problem in definition, not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need to define the word. - Linguistic explanations are no circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sensory Impressions Sellars McDowell I 168
Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine).
---
I IX
Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). ---
I XXIII
Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). ---
I XXIII
Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. ---
I XXIX
Theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. ---
I XXXVII
Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. ---
I XL
First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars).
Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates.
  These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...".
---
I 101
"Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. ---
I 103
Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. ---
I 106
Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). VsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning.
---
II 328
Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Sentence Meaning Quine V 62f
Definition Sentence Meaning/Quine: the meaning of a sentence is in the observations that would confirm or refute it.
X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk. There is only agreement between the two intangible elements to which we have referred as intermediaries between the German sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact.
VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the intermediaries (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: very good. As long as we don't have to assume propositions with this.
Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as a meaning of sentences as an abstract entity with its own right.
Some authors: consider them as what is true/false and between which the implications exist.
X 20
Sentence Meaning/Quine: it is completely unclear (which is often claimed) that sentences have the same or different meaning.
XI 85
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Lauener: exhausts itself accordingly in the consequences that the sentence can have for the sensory experience.
XII 89
Sentence Meaning/Partial Sentence/Subclause/Term/Word/Meaning/Use Theory/Quine: whole sentences are undeniably meaningful, and therefore also the use they make of their partial expressions.
IV 425
Uncertainty of translation: when we talk about the so-called analytical hypothesis (translation manuals), we are talking about the meaning of sentences. - In contrast, the term "inscrutability of reference" is concerned with words or expressions below the sentence level (subsentential).
VI 142
Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This shows the uncertainty of the translation. See also >Propositions/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Sentences Quine I 252f
"Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - An expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference. - Every truth function is denotation-transparent.
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after the elimination of the singular term. - The proposition resists a change of the truth value. - The proposition remains nameless in "x0p".
I 337
Sentence: is not the class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed sentenceswould be = zero class (all would have the same meaning). - A sentence is not a property of expressions either. - Solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs. - Partial sign: class of expression incidents.
I 336
Words describe - sentences do not (no singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. ---
Prior I 35
Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. ---
Quine VII (f) 109ff
Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. ---
X 31
Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize - (and we cannot do that through objects). ---
X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. ---
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. - Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Sets Bigelow I 47
Sets/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: we may no longer need any other universals if we allow sets. Because you can do almost anything with sets that mathematics needs. Armstrong: he believes in universals, but not in sets!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: for science we need more universals than sets, for example probability and necessity.
---
I 95
Universals/Sets/Predicates/Bigelow/Pargetter: if a predicate does not correspond to a universal, e.g. dogs, we assume that they correspond to at least one set. Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: but even then we cannot assume that each predicate corresponds to a set!
Set/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, there is no set X containing all and only the pairs for which x is an element of y. (paradox).
Universal Set/Universal Class/Bigelow/Pargetter: can also not exist.
Predicate: "is a set" does not correspond to a set that contains all and only the things it applies to! (Paradox, because of the impossible amount of all sets).
Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are still glad if we can assign something to most predicates, and therefore set theory (which originates from mathematics and not from semantics) is a stroke of luck for semantics.
Reference/Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: set theory helps to impose more explanatory force on the reference in order to formulate a truth theory (WT). It remains open which role reference should play.
---
I 371
Existence/sets/set theory/axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: none of the following axioms secures the existence of sets: pair set axiom, extensionality axiom, union set axiom, power set axiom, separation axiom: they all only tell us what happens if there are already sets. Axioms/Zermelo-Fraenkel/Bigelow/Pargetter: their axioms are recursive: i.e. they create new things from old things.
Based on two axioms:
---
I 372
Infinity axiom/Zermelo-Fraenkel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (normally formalized to contain the empty set axiom). Stands for the existence of a set containing all natural numbers according to von Neumann. Omega/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our mathematical realism, the sets in the sequence ω are not identical to natural numbers. They instantiate them. That is why the infinity axiom is so important.
Infinity axiom/Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: the infinity axiom has real ontological significance. It ensures the existence of sufficient sets to instantiate the rich structures of mathematics. And physics.
Question: is the axiom true? For example, suppose a quality of "being these things". And suppose there is an extra thing that is not included. Then it is very plausible that there will be the qualities of being "those things" that apply to all previous things plus extra things. To do this, these properties must first be available. Moreover, if we are realists about such properties, such a property can count as an "extra thing"!
---
I 373
This ensures that if there is an initial segment of, the next element of the sequence also exists. Infinity: but requires more than that. We still have to make sure that the whole of ω exists! I.e. there must be the property "to be one of these things", whereby this is a property instantiated by all and only by Neumann numbers. That is plausible in our construction, because we use sets as plural essences (see above) to understand.
Problem: we only have to guarantee a starting segment for the Neumann figures. That should be the empty set.
Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: how plausible is their existence in our metaphysics?

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Singular Terms Strawson Substitutions/Strawson / (s):
of singular terms: reversible
of predicates: not reversible.
---
I 198
Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: (Singular Term) can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not - singular term: quantifiable, Generic Term: not quantifiable - StrawsonVsQuine: not so important. ---
I 198
Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms - Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth" - on the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher" - StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things - solution/Quine: in reality distinction between singular term and predicates - general term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status - decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. ---
I 203
"a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. ---
IV 63
QuineVs singular Term: eliminable StrawsonVsQuine.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Skepticism Quine Quine II 37
Skepticism: confusion between truth and evidence - as such not incoherent (glau, time t) - doubt also still immanent. ---
Davidson I 54
"Everything could be different"/skepticism/Stroud: It could be that everything is to be different than we imagine. - Quine: that would be a distinction without a difference: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned to stimuli, the relations to the evidence remain unchanged - preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. - (s) then everything was different yesterday already. ---
Stroud I 223
Skepticism/Knowledge//Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, you cannot invoke any part of it. - That makes sensual experience necessary. ---
Stroud I 225
Skepticism/Quine: the tradition has not even recognized its strength. The doubt about knowledge stems from knowledge itself - the solution as well. Illusion: is only relative to the previously accepted assumption of real bodies.
---
I 227
Quine/Stroud: does not make the mistake of Austin: (distortion of meaning, see above) - It’s not about the meaning of a given term. - Quine goes to the roots (language learning). ---
I 228
Skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. ---
Stroud I 228
Skepticism/Quine: if science is true, it can never say whether the world is the way we perceive it due to the meagre inputs - then just as little knowledge would be possible as if science was wrong. ---
Stroud I 231
Skepticism/QuineVsSkepticism: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual options. - Solution: reflection takes place within science, not beyond it. ---
Stroud I 248
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: if all beliefs were only projections from meager data (underdetermination) - Knowledge: is then a combination of many subjective and few objective factors - then all hypotheses are real competitors - no objective superiority. - This is exactly the view of traditional epistemology. ---
Stroud I 248
QuineVsSkepticism: if we deprive philosophy of its external view, it is sufficient in order to exclude the total skepticism - (naturalized epistemology). StroudVsQuine: This does not work as long as we consider our own knowledge as projection beyond the data.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Statements Quine Quine: "any statement may be revised".
Fodor IV 44ff
Statement/semantic holism/Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: Quine consistently avoids to say what a statement is. - A formula or a proposition or something that relates to the semantic value. - a) if they are formulas (morpho-syntactical), one and the same statement have different meanings. - Formulas come true in a different way in confirmations than sentences. - It is pointless to ask whether one form confirms the other. - Confirmation depends on the meanings - Identifying statements with forms (formulas) contradicts the Quine-Duhem-Thesis - it would not be substantial.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Stimuli Rorty I 192
Stimulus/Quine/Rorty: also stimuli are "Settlements" like all the rest according to Quine.
I 250
Def Observation sentence/Quine: a sentence that all speakers judge in the same way when exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive within a language community to differences in past experiences. RortyVsQuine: Quine excludes blind, insane, and occasional dissenters.

VI 29
"Internal Representation"/Rorty: Representatives: Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, David Papineau. Biological interpretation. Evolution. The ability of organisms to react differently to different stimuli. Rorty, Armstrong, Dennett, SellarsVs: Perceptions are not "experiences" or "raw sensations", but dispositions for the appropriation of convictions and desires.
VI 170
Reality/Rorty: a statement like "The theory is successful because it advances to something real" is as useless as Dennett's example "We laugh because of the merriment of the stimulus".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Superposition Simons I 128
Superposition/Simons: different individuals with identical parts at the same time in the same place. - SimonsVsQuine: instead of "content of one portion RZ" - Such occupiers must be continuants anyway. - Events: among them the extensionality principle is fulfilled - masses: need different meanings of "part". ---
I 211f
Superposition instead of coincidence: E.g. Ring/Gold. - E.g. person/body. - Not two individuals, but relation one-much. - They are not identical, but take the same space - E.g. Ring/Gold: different stories. ---
I 223
Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of material can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions. - ((S) So intensional). - Existence conditions: are determined by the sortal term. - (lo linguistically) different existence conditions: things can last for different times. - And still be at the same red. - E.g. (s) an astronaut in the orbit can become uncle. ---
I 237
Superposition/Doepke/Simons: whenever a and b are superimposed, they must have a common part, they must be composed entirely of a third party, c.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Synonymy Chomsky II 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: false idealization: not "equality in the terms" causes synonymous expressions - not assertibility conditions (circumstances) but it is about distinguishing between langue and parole, between competence and performance.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Syntax Geach I 116
Syntax: Replace salva congruitate: Word chain remains correct when it is replaced. - QuineVs: Replacing changes Syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, iff and only if the earth is a disk. - different ranges: a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence - b) complex predicate - then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. - ambiguity: "An astronomer ... iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). - (Different brackets are possible). ---
I 116
Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's 1. Insight: spurious names: problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist. - GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions. ---
I 120
3. syntactic insight Quines: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)" - This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> relative-clause. ---
I 126
4. syntactic insight Quines: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. - Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or ...". - Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true". - Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Terms Strawson I 197
Term / StrawsonVsQuine: not linguistically: a thing.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Theories Field I 249ff
Theory/object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities. ---
I 262
Physics/theory/Language/ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses. Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number.
This distinguishes the predicates in the family.
NominalismVs: these are too many predicates.
---
II 46
Theory/truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. - Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. - Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t". ---
II 187
Ideal theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960, 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: - Problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. - reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. - Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood to single sentences. FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless".
Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted.
FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Theories McDowell I 188
Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (E.g. here is a black swan) cannot be distributed among the sentences of the theory. ---
I 189
This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our observation language is distinct form our theoretical language, so that the relevant experience is not already expressed in the theoretical language. ((s) See indeterminacy/McDowell.)

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Theories Sellars I XXII/XXIII
Theory/SellarsVsQuine: the database itself is part of the theory. Sensory impressions or sense stimulations are we Sellars quasi-theoretical entities of an everyday theory of perception. ---
I XLIII
Theory/language: the language of the scientific world view must preserve the basic structures of the everyday world view. For example, colors are homogeneous properties. (But not according to the scientific image). So Sellars later creates the concept of Sensa, which only occurs in sentient organisms. Where the ordinary human perceives something blue, on the side of science occurs the sensum. Sensa themselves are not colored, just as the states of feeling are. Colored alone are the objects of the everyday world. Also not the physical objects. Otherwise one would have to isolate a colored surface and ask for its thickness, which leads to contradictions.
---
I 74
Reification of the methodological distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse, incorrect substantive distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical existence. ---
I 85f
Theory/tradition: thesis a theory explains laws by deriving theoretical correlations of these laws from a small amount of postulates about hidden entities. - SellarsVsTradition: the assumptions of a theory are not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. - ((S) uninterpreted: because supported by unobservable.) - Definition Model/Sellars: the description of a range of known objects that behave in the usual way. - A model gets a comment. - This restricts analogies. - Sellars: continuous transition to the everyday world. ---
I 87
SellarsVs logistical picture of forming theories: most explanations did not arise from the head of the theorists as a finished product. Between science and everyday life, there is a continuous transition. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the terms of inner episodes. ---
I 100
The entities imported from the theory are states of the perceiving subject, not a class of individual objects.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Thinking Dummett I 93 ff
DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations.
I 105
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity) - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl s noema.
I 137 f
Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express.
I 141
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevails.
III (e) 209
Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Time Geach I 303
Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices" (> four dimensionalism). - Space/time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". - It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ---
I 314
Space/time/Geach: are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. - Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. ---
I 316
Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. - I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". - One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. - If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Translation Quine Rorty I 217
Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience).

Quine I 90
Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning.
I 81
Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction.
I 117
Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic.
I 129ff
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences.
I 368
Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations.
I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. ---
II 34
Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. ---
II 37
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. ---
II 61 ff
Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. ---
VII (c) 60f
Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). - Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Functions Rorty I 230
Truth-function/extension/intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are not particularly suited to display the final structure of reality. - The distinction extension / intension is not more interesting than between nations and people.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Truth Predicate Grover, D. L. Horwich I 356
T-predicate / Generalization / Semantic Ascent / Quine (1970): the T-predicate is nto needed, to generalize e.g. "Dick is mortal," "Tom s ...", ((s) that goes with "x ") but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both., where "a" stands for a whole sentence and not "x" for an individual). - Camp/Grover/Belnap/CVGBVsQuine: without quantification over sentences, where a characteristic (truth) is attributed. (BelnapVsQuine, GroverVsQuine, CampVsQuine)
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truthmakers Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: no thing makes sentences true (VsTruthmaker) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs.
II 217 ff
Truthmaker/making true/QuineVsCresswell/Quine: Cresswell poses his metaphysical question as follows: "What is it that makes one physical theory true and another false?"
Quine: I can do nothing but answer with unhelpful realism that it is the nature of the world.

Cresswell, however, helpfully adds that this question is often asked in the epistemological sense: How can we know that one theory is true and the other is false?
That is a completely different question, and it must be taken more seriously. One obstacle still lies in the verb "to know". Does it have to imply certainty, infallibility? Then the answer is that we cannot know.
But if instead we ask why belief in one theory is more justified than belief in another, our question has substance.
A complete answer would be a complete theory of observational evidence and the scientific method.
Cresswell quotes Quine briefly and quickly that the final decision lies with the Court of Arbitration of Experience.
II 218
CresswellVsQuine: "Quine's metaphors about the arbitration will never be executed as far as we feel is necessary". Cresswell compares Quine's view with Russell's logical atomism and rightly finds both incompatible. "Quine does not value a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of any other. Quine: that is correct.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience (!) but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience in that their use is learned by direct conditioning on the stimulation of sense receptors. Moreover, simple observational sentences are in most cases actually independent of each other. QuineVsAtomism/QuineVsRussell: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my view, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the observation propositions. Their connection with the sentences of observation is more mediated and more complex.
II 219
Cresswell burdens me with a realm of reified experiences or phenomena, which stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that affect our nerve endings from real objects of the outside world.
III 57
Def Fulfillability/Quine: a sentence-logical scheme is called fulfillable if there is an interpretation of the letters it contains that makes the scheme true. Otherwise unattainable.
I 425
Facts/Object/making true/Quine: one should not take facts as objects just to have something that makes sentences true.
I 426
Facts: Tendency (though not in those who perceive facts as true propositions) to imagine facts as something concrete. Facts are what makes sentences true. For example, "The King's Boulevard is one kilometre long" and "The King's Boulevard is 50 metres wide" are true. In this case they describe two different facts, but the only physical object that plays a role here is the King's Boulevard. We do not want a quibble, but the fact that the meaning of concreteness in the facts is "concrete", does not make facts particularly appealing to us.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Twin Earth Searle II 89
Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? - (Qualitatively identical visual experiences) - how to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on Earth before, may fulfill the conditions - SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person. ---
ad II 255
Twin Earth: Putnam(s) not a different type of water (tradition) but a different type of liquid. ---
II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired). ---
II 316
Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Two Dogmas Fodor IV ~ 45
Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine/Fodor: if confirmation is reversible and meaning depends on confirmation (Peirce), then their statements may have their significance not essentially - PeirceVsQuine: confirmation constitutes meaning and therefore can not be contingent. - Then see Quine-Duhem Thesis and Peirce's theory of incompatible - but Two Dogmas seems to becommitted to both.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Two Dogmas Millikan I 321
Knowledge/Context/Holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: does not all knowledge depend on "collateral information" as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we then test individual concepts independently of the rest?
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan: Thesis: Our statements on the external world do not stand alone before the tribunal of experience, but only as a corpus.
It follows that no single belief is immune to correction.

Test/Review/MillikanVsHolism/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs stand never before the tribunal of experience.
---
I 322
It is therefore unlikely that such a belief will ever be supported or disproved by other beliefs.
Confirmation: only confirmation: by my ability to recognize the objects that occur in my settings.
From the fact that beliefs are related does not follow that the concepts must also be related.
Identity/Identification/Millikan: The epistemology of identity is primarily precedent to that of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Underdetermination Chomsky II 337
Underdetermination/Indeterminacy/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine: each hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Underdetermination Rorty I 227
Underdetermination/data/McDowellVsQuine: if truth is underdetermined by the totality of the observable, then it must be independent of them. - But then one would have to include biology, while we exclude translation. Cf. >ChomskyVsQuine >Theories/Quine.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Unit Set Russell I 54
Singular Class/Unit Set/Frege/Peano/RussellVsQuine: non-individual: "i x" the class whose only element is x "ie: i x = y ^ (y = x): "the class of objects that are identical with x".

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Universals Strawson I 88
Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls. ---
I 176
Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted - particulars can never be predicted. ---
I 215
a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names - b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars - but also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). ---
I 216
Example of characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death - see copula/Strawson. ---
I 251
Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates - pro "nominalism" - StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions. ---
I 250
Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water - no subject-predicate sentences - here no characterizing-universals, but types of material - also no type-universals - the least to make any empirical statements - introduction with demonstrative - N.B.: does not require particular - E.g. Cat essential feature: a) for the same cat, b) for another cat. ---
I 277
Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time "). ---
I 279
Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Variables Prior I 30
Number variables/Prior: no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things φ and exactly 4 things ψ, then more things are φ than ψ. Then "3" no name but inseparable part of verb operator"Exactly 3 things __".
I 33
Variables/Quine: (bound) can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things - E.g. "For a φ, φx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing.
Quine himself does not do that but he has "E" for "is element of".
I 35
Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? - It depends on how we stand for" understanding: a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute)
b) or object Peter
PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence.
ad I 93 (external):
Sentence variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - Tractatus 3.312: It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Wittgenstein: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle's innovation "a" for a whole sentence. ---
I 148
Bound variables/Prior: represent logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x φ-s, 2. nothing else than x φ-s and 3. it is not the case that x ψ-s". ---
I 164f
Bound variable/PriorVs American logicians: not any stands for a name.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Verification Millikan I 297
Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that...
---
I 298
...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one.
Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys.
Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify.
Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism.
---
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
---
I 312
Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,... ---
I 313
...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
---
I 317
Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things.
Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan: No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa.
This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees".
---
I 318
Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake.
---
I 320
Test/Review/Theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Verificationism Esfeld I 62 ~
Holism / FodorVsQuine: Verificationism refers to Verbal - confirmation holism in cotrast contrast on cross-language: propositions - EsfeldVsFodor: beliefs combine both.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

World Lines Hintikka II XVI
World line/cross-world identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow some objects not only to exist in certain worlds, but also that their existence is unthinkable there. That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain worlds. Problem: This is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (belief logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and by description.
---
II 20
World line/Hintikka: world lines should connect the counterparts of an individual in different worlds. If we have a network of world lines (in relation to a subject of knowledge), then we have truth conditions for quantified sentences in an epistemic logic of the 1st level.
II 22
World line/epistemic logic/knowledge logic/acquaintance/description/knowledge/Hintikka: there must be two types of world lines: A) public: knowledge through description (psychological: semantic memory).
B) private: knowledge through acquaintance. E.g. visual perception (including memory). Only related to a subject. (Psychological: episodic memory).
These world lines are then bound to a scenario.
Quantification: Problem: we need two pairs of quantifiers then.
Spelling: (∀x)/(∃x) for the public, descriptive - (Ax)/(Ex) for the private world lines established by acquaintance. Then
(2.5) (Ex) {b} K (d = x)
I.e. in a visual perception situation, b can find a niche for d under his visual objects.
More generally: b is known with d, b knows d.
II 59
World line/Hintikka: we use world line instead of Frege's "way of being given".
II 105
World lines/possible worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there are two sets of world lines for a set of worlds, which also connect each individual to an individual in another world, but the two sets differ in which individual is connected to which one. Perception/observation language/observation concepts/Hintikka: for perception verbs we need such a possibility ((s) Because it can be that one mistakes an object for another.)
II 148
World lines/identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: Thesis: the world lines must be drawn before the conditions are applied at all. The drawing of the world lines is never a part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise it would be circular). Truth-conditions/atomic/atomic set/Hintikka: for my theory the interplay of truth values of atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows, e.g. how the truth values of sentences of the form
"knows + a-W-word" sentences depend on the truth values of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
(18) (∃x) K (b = x)
(19) (Ex) K (b = x)
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is that these conditions are always indexed (indexical), i.e. that they are context-dependent. That is, that it is only in a certain situation whether an individual is the same. Or whether it is analog to one that would criticize traditional truth tables because some of the sentences that they serve to put them together are, for their part, blurred.
Epistemic logic/Hintikka: the epistemic logic, however, is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 103 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fraassen Vs Analyticity EMD II 133
How-Question/Frege/Dummett: belongs to epistemology and not to theory of meaning. Sense/DummettVsFrege: this seems obvious at first glance. But if the meaning is not related to the method of verification, why does Frege not allow two analytically equivalent sentences to have the same sense?
EMD II 134
Analyticity/FregeVsQuine/Dummett: He had a well-developed theory of analyticity. Whereas, if two analytically equivalent sentences may differ in sense, there is no criterion for identity.
FregeVs/Dummett: Of course, if the concession were granted (which one?), it could not be maintained that the senses of sentences (the thoughts) are objects of beliefs. I.e. the sense is the reference of the propositional attitudes.
DummettVsFrege: but this thesis itself requires the assumption that sense is connected to the way of knowing how or to the belief reasons.
Question: Can we say that the sense only determines the object, i.e. the "what", or also the "how" or "why" it is believed?
Problem: At first glance, the two are too closely interlinked to be seen individually. Why should two things A and B not have the same sense? The only possibility seems to be that X can believe (or know) one thing without believing (or knowing) the other (opaque context).
What makes this at all possible is that the reasons of the expressions may be different.
It follows that a difference in the reasons of expression includes a difference in the belief objects.
II 135
DummettVsFrege: his fault is to have failed to insist that the theory of meaning must explain what manifests the recognition of the speaker.
II 136
Theory of Meaning/MT/Verification/DummettVsFrege: a verificationist theory of meaning explains meanings in terms of the actual ability to recognize the truth of propositions.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Benacerraf, P. Reductionism Vs Benacerraf, P. Field II 214
Reduktion/Denotation/BenacerrafVsReduktion/Field: (Benacerraf, 1965): Problem: hier kann es mehrere Korrelationen geben, so daß man unmöglich von dem „wirklichen Referenten“ von Zahl-Wörtern sprechen kann. mögliche Lösung/Field: jemand könnte sagen daß es nicht wichtig ist, daß die Zahl-Wörter gerade auf diese Objekte referiert, es ist hinreichend (könnte er sagen), daß wir die Rede über Zahlen durch die Rede über Objekte ersetzen können. (Quine 1960. § § 53,54).
FieldVsQuine: das würde die Lehrsätze von Euler und Gauß zu Sätzen erklären, die mit ihren Zahl-Wörtern auf nichts referieren und letztlich falsch wären.
Benacerraf/Field: scheint damit jede Reduktion auszuschließen.
ReduktionismusVsBenacerraf/Field: Autoren, die glauben, daß es abstrakte Gegenstände gibt, die keine Mengen sind, (d.h. Zahlen) könnten sagen: alles was Benacerraf damit zeigt, daß es eine eineindeutige Relation gibt. Zur Reduktion braucht man aber nur eine Erklärung zahlentheoretischer Wahrheit in Begriffen einer Korrespondenz zwischen Zahlwörtern auf der einen Seite und physischen Objekten und/oder Mengen auf der anderen Seite. (Mit einer Verallgemeinerung gilt das auch für Gavagai).
II 214/215
Bsp „prim“: relativ zu jeder  -Sequenz s die mit den Zahlen korreliert ist, signifiziert „prim“ ((s) nicht partiell!) die Prim-Positionen von s. Pointe: dann ist ein Satz wie Bsp „Die Zahl zwei ist Cäsar“ weder wahr noch falsch (OWW).
FieldVsBenacerraf: seine Beobachtung ist also umgehbar. Wir können mathematische Wahrheit bewahren. (>Wahrheitserhalt).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Brandom, R. McDowell Vs Brandom, R. Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Carnap, R. Quine Vs Carnap, R. Carnap VII 151
Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! (?)
However, if in the case of the lexicon (?) we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
Carnap VII 154
Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of ​​the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate.
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects.
Carnap VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Lanz I 271
QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories!
I 272
There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. ---
Newen I 123
Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically.
I 124
Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap).
Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli.
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities:
1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval
2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection.
This only applies for occasion sentences.
I125
Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers.
QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words.

Quine I 73
QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way.
I 74
Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference:
Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet.
Quine: theory has primarily to do with records,
Carnap: to do with terms.

I 466
For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general?
I 467
This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas?
However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers.

Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts.
It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form.
QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".)
Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania."

IV 404
Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself).
IV 416
QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology?
V 28
Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities.
V 29
Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning.
QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences.
V 30
Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.)
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms.
QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role).

VII (b) 40
But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience.
QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values ​​are revised in the same sense.

X 127
Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter.
Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect:
1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything.
2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation.
Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory.
QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world.
Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate.
X 133
We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge!

XI 99
QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences.
XI 129
Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values ​​of the variable.
Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values ​​of variables.
To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination).
XI 130
Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence.
XI 138
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference.
XI 142
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.

XII 69
QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope.
Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity.
Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G."

XII 89
Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).)
Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic.
XII 91
Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction.
Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts.
QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement.
XII 92
QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities.
But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts.
CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions.
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession.
2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization.
Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed.
Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism:
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences.
Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts!
Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories.
pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N. SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).

Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.

IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.

VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.


1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Coherence Theory McDowell Vs Coherence Theory Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Compositionality Schiffer Vs Compositionality I 220
SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?.
E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3).
Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory.
PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms.

I XV
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.).
I 137
Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false:
I 138
Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye.
I 144
SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct.
In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics.
Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding!
I 182
SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.)
Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories).
I 192
SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality.
E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions.
(2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics.
E1: is not a fully-developed natural language.
I 193
Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language).
B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions).
Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it.
µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white.
Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language.

I 195
Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices)
M: Mentalese for Harvey
conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it).
Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof:
(3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol"
((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed)
(4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup
((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML)
and
(5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup
((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning).
I 196
Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics,
b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5)
We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary:
Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Correspondence Theory Quine Vs Correspondence Theory VI 112
Proposition/Fact/Correspondence/Quine: a better cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences then should correspond as a whole.
VI 113
But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: Although a host of objects is needed for an explanation of the world, namely abstract and concrete ones, but apart from the pseudo-foundation of such a correspondence theory facts do not in the least contribute. We can simply cross out "It is a fact that" from our sentences.

X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: apparently the same as fact: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That rings of correspondence theory, but as such it is but empty talk.
QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: here: empty talk. The correspondence exists only between the two non-tangible elements to which we referred as intermediate members standing between the German sentence and the white snow: meaning and fact.
VsQuine: it could be argued that this is taking the intermediate members (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
When speaking of meaning as a factor of truth of the proposition, we can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" would be applied in English to green things. And the reference to a fact is just an expression. Quine: very good. As long as we do not have to assume propositions for that.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Davidson, D. Dummett Vs Davidson, D. Dummett I 28ff
DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth.
DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!.
I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing.
I 146
Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use.
Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so.
I 187
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions.

Avramides I 8
DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability).
I 9
This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning.
I 87
Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist.
DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered.
Solution: "Translation without end".

II 108
Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom.

Putnam I 148
Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in.
Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously.
VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Davidson, D. Fodor Vs Davidson, D. IV 68
Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like!
IV 69
Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: Also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well.
Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side.
QuineVsDavidson: shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: E.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. (x is white and LT).
could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof".
This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem.
E.g. Assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a WT, which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives.
That seems to be a holistic consequence.
Vs: but that’s premature.
Language/Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: Thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation!
I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct WT by that evidence which observation allows.
Fodor/Lepore VsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all!
Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior:
1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible.
IV 74
Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, is therefore not in the epistemic situation of radical interpretation.
It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions.
From the perspective of radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist. (> hermeneutic circle).
These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc.
IV 84
Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: his idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language!
IV 98
"Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true!.
IV 100
Principle of Charity/Radical Interpretation//RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that. 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions
2) are syntactically atomistic.
The interpretation of such expressions can not be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts.
IV 101
we do not know whether such forms exist. E.g. Maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable.
> Behavior/wish IV 120ff.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Davidson, D. Quine Vs Davidson, D. Davidson I 42
QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible.
Davidson II 92
Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology).
II 97
An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences.
II 98
Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique.
QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates.

Quine II 56
Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth.
QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world".
Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction.
Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory.
Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas.
Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence.

VI 57
Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own.
VI 58
Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects.
VI 59
"Common situations" are too vague for me.
VI 62
Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves!
VI 63
      In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way.
VI 136
Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms.
VI 137
If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory).
In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis.
Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts.
VI 138
Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true.
VI 139
Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory.
The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially.
VI 140
It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true.
XI 156
Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R. I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.

Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Duhem, P. McDowell Vs Duhem, P. I 188
Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex here is a black swan) can not be distributed among the sets of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning!
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our language of experience is distinguishable from the language of theory, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory.
I 189
Language of theory/language of observation/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are in fact distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But from that we could derive a general indeterminacy of meaning! If we try that, we face the third party dogma.
Then we are facing a borderline case of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into theory and don't allow experience to speak any language at all. Then, of course, a rational relationship is missing.
However, we need this rational relationship for Duhem's argument. It can only be of a local character.
By paving our way through the third dogma, we lop Duhem's thoughts to the right size.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Empiricism Davidson Vs Empiricism I (c) 48
Evidence/Davidson: what exactly is the role of evidence (in Quine: triggers that are perceptible to the senses)? In Quine not clear; we need to find out how sensual stimuli determine the meaning - the content - of observation sentences.
I (c) 60
Evidence/DavidsonVsQuine: We cannot say that the sensual stimuli are the evidence, because the actor can neither observe them nor know about them! (> Anderson: People do not see the stimuli!) Nor can it be said that the sensual stimuli supplied the evidence, because the beliefs they cause are no general evidence, but are themselves based on such evidence.
Evidence/Davidson: There is apparently nothing that could be described as such evidence, but that’s not very important. According to Quine, the theory of evidence does not need to worry about evidence, it can be satisfied with examining the relationship between the sensual stimuli and their affirmation and negation. (> internal/external.)
Quine: Two main theses of empiricism:
1) "all the real evidence of the sciences are sensually given evidence."
2) "any memorizing word meanings must ultimately be based on sensually given evidence."
DavidsonVsQuine: that amounts to nothing more than to a colorless empiricism, with the triviality that the sense organs are crucial.

Glüer II 130
Davidson: Empiricism lives of the distinction between conceptual scheme and content, conceptual schemes are the ways to structure experience, category systems intended to impart form to the sense-data, viewpoints from which individuals or cultures overlook the "passing show". "Uninterpreted given".

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Extensionality Prior Vs Extensionality I 48
Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being a value of a bound variable" is only a unproven dogma.
Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions like "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the simple ones.
In particular, it is said that "X believes that __" should not fall into the same category as "It is not the case, that __".
I.e. supposedly they not both single-digit links.
Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then every composite sentence, which only differs in that it has S1 as a sub-sentence where the other one has S2 has as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value.
This is the "law of extensionality".
PriorVsExtensionality: if the law was true, the following two sentences would have to mean the same thing:
a) "X thinks the grass is pink"
b) "X thinks the grass is purple"
But everyone knows that you can think one thing without thinking the other.
Point: "X thinks the grass is pink" is not a true composite sentence with "grass is pink" as a component.
Technically speaking:
It is no real function with "grass is pink" as an argument.
Extensionality/Prior: but, apart from a certain narrow-mindedness, I cannot derive from this that the law of extensionality is wrong.
One must admit that there is a long and interesting history of logic in which it is true, just like classical mechanics in physics.
I 49
On the other hand, if its defenders speak of intuitive and immediate knowledge of its truth, then I can only say that I have contrary intuitions. Extensionality/Extension/Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz/Prior: both schools tell us that if you drop extensionality, you must admit that some propositions are then neither true nor false.
This is justified in classic logic by the fact that there are only four cases
a) "true p" is always true, no matter if "p" is true or false,
b) "false p": reversed
c) not p: reverses the truth value
d) "asserts p": true if p is true, otherwise false.
Furthermore: if "p" and "q" have the same truth value, then function of "p" has the same truth value as the function of "q".
Now, if a function does not obey the law of extensionality, it cannot be one of these four, and if there are other besides these, there must be more than two truth values. (PriorVs).
Vs: the first step of this argument already presupposes what it is to prove: namely, that the only property of "p", on which its truth value depends, is its truth value.
E.g. "If X thinks that p" was a function of "p".
But there are no functions that are false with true arguments.
I 50
But why should the truth value of a function "p" not depend on of other properties of "p" than its truth value? To say that this was impossible is to say that for each function fx of a number x, the question whether x > 0 depends on whether x is > 0, which is simply false.
E.g. fx = x 1: because in some cases, where x > 0, e.g. x = 2, is x 1 > 0, while in other cases, e.g.: x = 1, x is 1 not > 0.
So whether this function of x itself is > 0 does not depend on whether x itself is > 0, but whether x > 1.
Likewise, whether X believes that p does not depend on whether it is the case or not that p.
Prior: why ever not? ((s) Both are true, but the analogy does not need to be true.)

I 101
Protothetics/Protothetic/Lesniewski/Prior: our system is a fragment of Lesniewski's "Protothetics". (20s). 1) normal propositional calculus, ((s) p,q..u,v,>,...)
2) quantifier logic
3) normal identity laws.
Full protothetics also includes the law of extensionality. (Tarski seems to support it, because it has proved his independence.)
PriorVsExtensionality.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Field, H. Quine Vs Field, H. Field I 128
Quine-Putnam-Argument/VsField: we must assume the truth of mathematical statements in order to be able to do academic work. >indispensability argument). FieldVs: the only way around this: show that the nominalistic resources for good science are adequate. This is not a consequence of conservatism.

Field II 202
Partial Signification/Field: is not so unusual: we often apply it implicitly in the case of vague expressions. Ex what is the extension of the term e.g. "big man" in German? There is no fact which decides whether 185 or 180 cm. Solution: "big man" partially signifies a set and partially other sets. Namely, the sets of shape
{xI x is a person taller than h}.
FieldVsQuine: that is quite unlike in Quine.
QuineVsField: it is not necessary to abandon the normal semantic concepts of denotation and signification. Instead, we can make them relative.
(1) for a foreign language: here we do not have to refrain from talking about the signification of a foreign word. But we must say that relative to the obvious translation manual ...
FieldVsQuine: but apparently that makes no sense. (1) seems to suggest that we could explain relative signification as:
(2) saying that a term T used in one language signifies the amount of rabbits, relative to a ÜH M, actually means that M translates T as "rabbit".
FieldVs: that is not sufficient.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Four-Dimensionalism Wiggins Vs Four-Dimensionalism Simons I 115
WigginsVsFour Dimensionalism: the difference between a four-dimensional cat process and a sum of cat partial processes is
I 116
that the later phases of the sum may be unconnected, but those of the cat process may not be unconnected. Sum: can divide - Process: cannot
Process; cannot divide, sum: can divide.
Sum: can divide, even if this does not happen.
Process: cannot divide itself. (Logically impossible).
Modality/de re/Sum/Process: So sum and process differ in the modality de re, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects.
WigginsVsQuine: the modality is even referentially transparent in this case.
I 120
Tibbles-Example/Simons: i): the rejection of i) (or h)) allows to reject step (2). Tib and Tibbles coincide mereologically to t', but it is also sufficient to assume the super position of the two as a fact. The positive reason for never identifying Tib and Tibbles is Leibniz's Law: they differ because they differ in the qualities they have to t. (Tib = cat without tail).
I 121
g),e): their rejection blocks the step to (5). That tibbles to t' = Tib to t' then no longer means that they are identical to t. f): his refusal means reformulating identity with sortal predicates: E.g. Tib is the same cat as Tibbles to t' and the same cat part as Tib to t'. But we cannot conclude that Tib is the same cat as Tibbles to t' or the same cat part as Tibbles to t'.
This blocks the transitivity.
d): denying it means denying that Tib (and tail) exist to t, so the question does not arise what they are identical to what exists at the time.
Problem: if Tib comes into existence in an accident, how can it be identical with the previously existing Tibbles?
van Inwagen: accepts a) and b) and h) as well as classical identity. Therefore he must either deny that something (Tib) begins to exist or reject it like Chisholm: c).
Chisholm: Vs c).
Solution/van Inwagen: Tibbles gets smaller when the tail is gone, but the only thing that starts to exist is Tail (as a whole). SimonsVsInwagen, van: is against the common sense and unnecessarily radical. It is much easier to refuse h) or i).
Chisholm/Simons: is less radical in terms of identity logic or continuants, but more radical than just denying h) or i). Because denying c) blocks the argument already in step (2). Tibbles and Tib are not identical to t', although they are very closely connected, because at the time they are both constituted from the same mereologically constant ens per se.

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Four-Dimensionalism Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism Simons I 120
Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense:
Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts.
Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects).
Simons I 124
Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times.
ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity.
2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together.
ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober.
Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t").
3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example
River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension.
ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process.
I 125
Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with").
Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular.
VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants.
Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples.
Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new".
Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place.
Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river.
Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly:
Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers".
SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career.
Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language).
Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure.
I 126
Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension.
I 127
Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Quine Vs Frege, G. Quine I 425
VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them.
I 209
Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object)
"a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object.
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs).
I 264
according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ...
I 265
Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited.
I 266
Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function.

II 201
Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear.
II 202
"So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write:
"{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment).
(i.e.​​the inversion of "so that").
Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes!
We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality.
The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular.
II 203
It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory:
(1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx})
This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic!
III 98
Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates.
III 99
Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences.

Applying: Terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs.
III 100
Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person.
Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension.
QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes").
Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes.

VII (f) 108
Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are.
Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities.
VII (f) 109
Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71).
Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements.
Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language:
Names are one kind of expression and statements are another!
QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and
"p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements.
Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme.
"p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111)
VII (f) 115
Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names.
IX 216
Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT!
Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again.
NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction.
Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands.

Ad 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks).
XI 55
QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")".
QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy).
2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization
(Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7))
comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G. I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)

I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having".
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Frege, G. Wessel Vs Frege, G. I 27
Syntactics/Syntax/Wessel: some claim that syntactics examines "meaningless" signs. (Klaus/Buhr, 1969) WesselVs: this is a distorted idea of language: one cannot separate syntax, semantics and pragmatics at all: there are no "meaningless signs", because a physical object that means nothing is not a sign.
Semantics: the meaning of the term "table" cannot be addressed as a special object to look for somewhere.
WesselVsFrege: one cannot say: "The meaning of the term "Müller" goes for a walk".
I 157
Truth Value Gaps/Wessel: exist when the object to which properties are to be assigned or denied does not exist at all. WesselVsFrege: a sentence with an empty subject term is not meaningless, it can also not be true, but therefore it does not have to be without truth value.
I 352
Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Geach, P. Quine Vs Geach, P. V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions.
V 18/19
Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning.
V 89
Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning.
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?".
E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time.
Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear.
QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech.
Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30)

V 129
Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses.
Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him."
Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it.
Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term!
This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence.
Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten").
Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis).
Or with "when he" or "since he".
V 130
Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all.
Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g.
Everyone who owns a donkey beats it;
Some donkey owners do not beat them.
Problem: that would turn into nonsense:
Every donkey owner beats it
Some donkey owners do not beat it.
Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he":
Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it.
Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences)
A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him.
Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference.
Solution/Geach:
A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her.
Quine: pro Geach.
((s) sequence of main clauses.)
V 131
Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido)
(2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y).
(3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y))
(4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y).
QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky.
QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example.
The child is torn between analogies,
V 132
which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause.

Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Goodman, N. Bigelow Vs Goodman, N. I 47
Quantities/Quine/Goodman/Bigelow/Pargetter: it could be that we, if we allow quantities, do not need any other universals anymore. Because almost everything that mathematics needs can be done with quantities. Armstrong: in contrast believes in universals, but not in quantities!
BigelowVsQuine/BigelowVsGoodman: for science we need more universals than quantities, E.g. probability and necessity.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Grice, P.H. Quine Vs Grice, P.H. Wright I 198
Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions.
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth.
QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Hintikka, J. Quine Vs Hintikka, J. I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory.
I 137
QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world.
HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism.
Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc.
I 138
It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed.
Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible.
Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations.
Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification.
I 139
Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes.
I 140
Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby
(2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby)
Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E).
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from
(3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby)
i.e.
(3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby.
... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise:
(4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x)
i.e.
(5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is.
Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke).
Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is.
HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it.
I 141
Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway.
I 145
HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc.
Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates.
HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition.
Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity.
Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time.
I 146
Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless.
Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them?
Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited.
Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be?
HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds:
Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes":
Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator.
((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish).
Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors").
Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions.
Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out.
Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above)
Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds).
HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met.
On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met!
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world.
Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same.
I 147
Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic.
HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play.
Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form
(18) (Ex) K(b = x)
and equally of
(19) (Ex) K(b = x)
become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences!
Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description.
I 148
World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form
"knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred.
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.

I 160
Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same.
The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question.
I 161
Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Hobbes, Th. Rorty Vs Hobbes, Th. II (f) 125
Nominalism/Rorty: NominalismVsMetaphysics. > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Nominalism">Nominalism. Hobbes: Linked nominalism erroneously with materialism. >Materialism.
Quine still connects him with that.
Language/World/Order/RortyVsHobbes/RortyVsQuine: that leads to contradiction if they think that by words for the smallest particles of matter nature will be dissected in a manner that is not possible with other words!
A consistent nominalism must emphasize that the forecast success of such a vocabulary has no importance for the "ontological rank".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Holism Rorty Vs Holism I 190
Holism/Rorty: exmambple: Sellars: it may turn put that there are no colored objects at all.
RortyVsHolism/RortyVsQuine/RortyVsSellars: these holistic statements sound pointless and paradoxical, because the accuracy in question requires a theory privileged representations.
Pro: justification is not a function of particular relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is holistic by nature, as it were.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Holism Millikan Vs Holism I 10
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning.
I 11
Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism.
properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world.
MillikanVsNominalismus.
I 13
MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed.
For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories.
Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid,
I 14
most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not.

I 67
conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction!
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other.
MillikanVsHolismus.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However:
Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels.

I 298
Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify.
Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism.
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens.

I 318
Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses.
I 319
Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used.

I 321
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Kant Putnam Vs Kant VI 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello).
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly.
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary.
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I (c) 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?

I (f) 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
I (f) 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
I (f) 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kant Quine Vs Kant Danto I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.

Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!

Quine VII (b) 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII (b) 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.

Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.

Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
Stroud I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
Stroud I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
Stroud I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kaplan, D. Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D. I 206
Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.).
Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here.
I 207
Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values.
Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b)
StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts.
Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts.
Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts.
Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension.
Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit.
I 208
Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally.
II 5
Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but
b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w.
Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated.
Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index
Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while
Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values.
2. Kaplan second modification:
Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited:
Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.)
Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w..
II 6
Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this.

II 10
Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens.
This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur.
This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues.

II 162
de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction.
de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification.
Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge.
Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions
1. for the content
2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief.
KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal.
StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise.
Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined.
StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach.
2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects).
II 163
At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w..

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. Putnam I 247
Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality":
Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25).
Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies?
Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region.
KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region!
QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague.
Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.
LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).).
Putnam: so there are three questions:
1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region?
2) Is the matter identical to the fields?
3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions?
Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is!

Quine II 209 ff
Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic.
Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models.
II 210
They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify?
The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling:
"As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160)
QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be.
Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow.
Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states.
... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality.
QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning.
II 210f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kripke, S. A. Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A. II XIII
Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1).
Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized.
Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics,
II XIV
in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant.
I call them "epistemology of logic".
II XVI
Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats.
World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted.
2) world lines can be drawn in two ways:
a) object-centered
b) agent-centered. (Essay 8).
Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11)
II 2
Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options).
Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities.
Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed.
HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house.
Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF.
II 3
KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0).
Hintikka: technically it is of course possible.
"Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics.
new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0.
Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world).
Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D.
II 4
HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another.
Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line.
World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located.
Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w.
Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said:
Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic).
Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds.
This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy:
Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic.
Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense.
Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke).
The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is.
II 12
Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic.
But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities.
Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are.
II 13
Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics.
II 77
Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers.
II 84
KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict.
World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations.
II 86
HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section).
II 116
Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual.
HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions.
Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?".
Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective
II 117
Kripke: on public identification.
II 195
Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular:
Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things:
a) transitivity within a possible world.
b) between possible worlds.
The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter.
To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument.
II 196
Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience.
And then fission cannot be ruled out.
II 209
Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works.
Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent!
World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning!
Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world!
IV 389
He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason?
2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself?
If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason!
KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency.
Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different.
The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible.
Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist.
IV 392
This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either:
1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them.
2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed!
Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world.
Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through.
MackieVs: that is not true at all!
IV 393
We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Lewis, D. Martin Vs Lewis, D. Arm II 182
Abwesenheit/Lewis: wie Quines "Anbetrachten" nur eine facon de parler eine "happenstance of idiom". MartinVsLewis/MartinVsQuine: das muß man überhaupt nicht deontologisieren.
Anbetracht/Martin: ("sake"): ist der angenommene Nutzen von etwas, durch Instantiation eines Zustands oder einer Bedingung durch eine Aktion oder Unterlassen. Es genügt, daß wir ungefähr wissen, nach was in der Welt wir Ausschau halten sollen, wenn von "Anbetracht" die Rede ist. Auch wenn meistens herauskommt, daß es in Begriffen der theoretischen Physik nicht darstellbar (zu vervollständigen) ist. Aber auf der Ebene, wo wir über die beobachtbare Welt reden ist solche Vollständigkeit unnötig.
Abwesenheit/Löcher/MartinVsLewis: auch hier ist eine Deontologisierung überflüssig.
Lösung: statt "wie die Dinge sind" sollte man besser sagen: "Wie die Welt ist" oder "Wie es ist" entweder zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, oder auch ganz allgemein. Dann werden "Dinge" gar nicht erwähnt.

Arm II 183
MartinVsLewis: aber der Satz "Es gibt keine Falschmacher für "es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine"" ist genauso ein negativer Existenzsatz. Lösung/Martin: es ist kein negativer Existenzsatz über Dinge, sondern es geht um einen Zustand einer Raumzeit Region. Der Satz über die Abwesenheit von Falschmachern braucht einen Satz über einen Weltzustand als Wahrmacher.
Problem: und zwar genauso wie "Es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine". Daher kann er auch nicht gebraucht werden, um zu zeigen, dass der letztere Satz keinen Zustand als Wahrmacher braucht.
II 186
Leere/Abwesenheit/MartinVsLewis: dieser will immer den Doughnut ansehen und nicht das Loch. Das kann man aber durchaus konkreter fassen: Bsp wenn wir ein Hemd ohne Flecken aussuchen, dann halten wir nicht nach dem reinen Nichts Ausschau, sondern nach der Abwesenheit von Flecken.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Metaphysics Dummett Vs Metaphysics Horwich I 463
Metaphysics/Frege: the only solution for disagreement here is semantic ascent. Dummett: pro:
Rorty: we can go further and prohibit language philosophy to re-establish the alleged contrast between "objective reality" and "useful fictions".
DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics. They belong to the duality scheme/content. (1)


1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Modal Logic Quine Vs Modal Logic Chisholm II 185
QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants).
---
Lewis IV 32
QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description.
QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic.
LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial.
---
I 338
But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic.
Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity.
---
I 339
(1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows:
(2) "9 > 4" is analytically.
It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction:
"If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)"
if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional.
C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication".
Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators.
Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable.
---
I 339
Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator.
If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all.
---
I 340
An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate?
---
I 341
It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4
Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque.
The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other.
Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent.
(4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw).
---
I 342
(This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p".
Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is:
(5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x
as
(6) x = y and x exclusively
then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6):
(7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y)
However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p.
---
I 343
The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. ---
I 343
Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret
(8) [9 > 4] is necessary
(Brackets for class)
and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction.
One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible.
---
I 344
Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9.
This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets".
This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say
(§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II).
But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object.
E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified?
Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary.
---
I 344
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent.
Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.)
---
I 345
But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality.
There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define
"P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))".
Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties.
But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic.
---
VI 41
Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators.
Quine: without modal operators:
  E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future."
((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx).
Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators.
---
VI 102
Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. ---
VI 103
Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence).
---
VI 104
QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. ---
XI 52
QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. ---
XI 53
Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity.
2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p"
3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx".

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Nominalism Bigelow Vs Nominalism I 62
NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proved him here. But he is the only way to solve the problem of the similar and the different (problem of quantities) (namely with the 3 levels).
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be able to be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to assume complex relational predicates as primitive.
I 97
Quantities/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come back in through the back door because of the rules of composition.
I 98
E.g. instead of refering to the quantity of rabbits, he might say it applies to all and only rabbits. BigelowVsNominalism: one could say this is just an abbreviation for "the quantity of all and only the rabbits". Be true/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter. "Is true" must be discussed further before this paraphrase could proof something ontological. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, > semantic ascent). Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether one believes in it, is not sure. The semantics does certainly not decide that.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. I 37
Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
I 38
Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi).
N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history).
((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.)
Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another.
World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds.
Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical?
I 42
Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example:
(1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll
one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that
(2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x.
And therefore
(3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll.
(2) and (3) say the same thing as
(4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was.
But this is not entailed by (1).
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects.
The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness.
However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons.
Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x".
Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails.
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.

IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Popper, K. Quine Vs Popper, K. Quine XI 32
HolismVsPopper/Quine/Lauener: holism prevents extreme falsificationism.
XI 106
QuineVsPopper/Lauener: less extreme attitude: allows the psychological moment of acquiring conditioned reflexes, i.e. to live up to habituation and learning.
XI 125
Observation Sentence/Convention/QuineVsPopper/Lauener: observation sentences are not temporarily fixed by conventions, but they are maintained by a conservative strategy, as long as nothing speaks against it. Quine pro Popper: all sentences are in principle revisable.
Standards/Quine/Lauener: should belong to the inventory of nature, but not to science.
XI 126
LauenerVsQuine: Problem: how do you explain to the step from "being" to "ought". (>Naturalistic fallacy).
XII 95
Falsification//Holism/QuineVsPopper: only shows that one or more statements of a network are false, but not which.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Putnam, H. Quine Vs Putnam, H. Schurz I 211
Realism/Philosophy of Science/Schurz: two kinds: a) metaphysical
I 212
b) hypothetical constructive realism: Thesis: the question of whether a theoretical term (TT) refers cannot be decided a priori. It depends on the success of the concept in empirical insight. Then realistic question of reasons converges with the instrumentalist question of meaning!
Miracle Argument/PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsUnder-Determinacy: (pro realism): it would be a miracle if theories that have long been empirically successful, were not also realistically true.
Underdeterminacy/QuineVsPutnam/QuineVsRealism: Thesis: it is always possible to construct empirically equivalent theories T* to a given theory T with greatly different or even incompatible theoretical superstructure, so that it is impossible for T and T* to be true at the same time. However, such empirically equivalent theory transformations are always post hoc.
Miracle Argument: (Worrall 1997 153ff, Carrier 2003 §4): can only be valid if we mean by empirical success the ability to make qualitatively new predictions.
CarrierVsQuine/WorrallVsQuine//Schurz: no post hoc constructed theory T* was ever able to do that.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Quine, W.V.O. Block Vs Quine, W.V.O. Fodor/Lepore IV 184
Block/Fodor/Lepore: is not a holist himself and accepts the distinction analytic/synthetic. BlockVsQuine: pro distinction analytic/synthetic. (> Stock).
His argument in favor is perhaps to avoid the holism by proposing a principle of individuation, which is coarse enough to individuate inferential roles.
Block can recognize what we have said about the connection between analyticity and compositionality.
Conceptual role/CRT/Block: the problem: a criterion for individuation of inferential roles is not in sight.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 577
E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units.
I 578
BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur.
I 579
Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of ​​"the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme).
The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups.
I 580
VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough.
BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli.
I 601
Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing.
I 666
BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective.
II 217/218
The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism).
II 224
BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings.
BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Burge Vs Quine, W.V.O. Wol I 260
Names/Christening/Burge: Thesis: (as Kripke): a name is true when the object has been named in an appropriate manner. The name itself goes into the conditions of its applicability. In this, names differ from many predicates. E.g. the predicate "is a dog": an object could also be a dog, if the word "dog" was never used as a symbol.
But an object could not be a Jones, unless someone used "Jones" as a name.
E.g.
(2) Jones is necessarily a Jones
(3) This entity named "Jones" is necessarily an entity named "Jones"
Both turn out to be wrong! Names behave like ordinary predicates: they do not necessarily apply to objects.
I 261
BurgeVsQuine/BurgeVsRussell: we avoid the artificiality by we not assuming that names abbreviate any predicates, nor produce artificial predicates. Our theory also seems to counter the accusation that proper names do not convey information on the subject and do not attribute properties.
Burge: you give at least the information that E.g. someone was called Aristotle.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 173
Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.(1)
1. J. R: Flor, "Ernst Mach: Der Vater des Wiener Kreises" in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

VII 147
Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures).
VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones.
VII 153
CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4).
VII 154
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Quine XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things is only to choose a certain language. It does not mean to believe in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be a value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning as it only expresses a choice of language. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be so separated. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.
Stroud I 221
Dream/Quine/Stroud: Quine does not exclude the possibility that we dream all the time. (>Descartes). Skepticism/Empiricism/Carnap: cannot be answered empirically.
Knowledge/Carnap: however, there may be empirical studies that show how we arrive at knowledge.
Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: is supposed to do that.
CarnapVsQuine: N.B.: precisely because it is an empirical investigation, it cannot answer the traditional question of the philosopher.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 319
Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion.
((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity.
Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages.
II 320
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case.
II 321
Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined.
II 324
Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty:
II 325
Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes).
II 326
Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other,
II 327
so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations.
Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13)
ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning.
Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined.
II 328
ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept.
II 329
Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation.
II 330
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences".
II 333
VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive.
II 343
Language may not be taught at all.
II 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances.
ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance.
It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless.
II 337
Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others.
II 337
Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. ---
Quine V 32
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.)
Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances.
Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence.
QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions.
---
V 33
We find this through the procedure of question and consent. ---
Quine XI 115
Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. ---
XI 116
Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations.
Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language.
((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist).
Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content.
Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions.
But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network.

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Churchland Vs Quine, W.V.O. Fodor/Lepore IV 78
ChurchlandVsQuine: we have no reason to believe that there is an "anglophone hyperspace" with an anglophone hyperspace for English sentences.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. I (c) 41
Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations.
I (c) 55
So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) -
I (c) 64
DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides.
I (d) 66
DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person.
I (e) 93
 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language?
McDowell I 165
McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason.

Fodor/Lepore IV 225
Note
13.> IV 72
Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quine, W.V.O. Dennett Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 132
de re/de dicto/DennettVsQuine: hopeless philosophical doctrine that there are two different types of belief. The only exception: E.g. I have to follow an object with my eyes before I can describe it. "Priority of tracking before the description."
But we can also take the most direct, most primitive cases of tracking with the senses in the de dicto mode: "the what-ever-it-is" that is responsible for the current pixel cluster. (> Disjunction)
De re/De dicto/Dennett: the difference is in the point of view, not the phenomenon.

Münch III 343
DennettVsQuine: too strongly behavioristically bound. What happens to the task of the translator, if you separate yourself from behaviourist terminology?
Münch III 362
Gavagai/Dennett: Quine presupposes that the linguist has already convinced himself of the communicative nature of the natives. (s) Question: can behaviorism presuppose communication at all?.


Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Quine, W.V.O. Dummett Vs Quine, W.V.O. Dummett I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer considers the language of a particular individual as a starting unit, but the disposition to language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevalent
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding of the private and non-communicable knowledge depend on a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is rather tempting to consider an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a move means is not derived not from the players’ knowledge of the rules, but from the rules themselves.
Fodor/Lepore IV 34
Language Philosophy/Fodor/Lepore: current status (1992): 1. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because the distinction analytic/synthetic must be maintained nevertheless. (VsQuine).
Representatives: DummettVsQuine: the smallest language in which the proposition that P can be expressed is the one that can express those propositions with which P is analytically connected.
2. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because even though the distinction analytic/synthetic cannot be maintained because there is a different way of distinction for those propositions, which are constitutive of content, and those that are not.
3. It may turn out that holism follows the assumption that semantic properties are anatomical, but that semantic properties are not anatomical at all! This would mean that the semantic atomism was true.

If 3 should be true, someone needs to invent a new story about the relation symbol/world that is not based on similarity or behaviorist stimulus-response scheme,.
Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: what we doubt is that the previous arguments show that atomism could not be true.
But we want to be moderate. ("Modesty is our middle name").

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 27
Modallogik/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: wir können auf ML nicht verzichten, wenn wir den Holismus präzise ausarbeiten wollen.
I 61
semantischer Holismus/SH/EsfeldVsQuine: wir brauchen ein besseres Argument für ihn als da aus Two Dogmas: denn es ist noch nicht klar, ob er am besten zum Typ B (top down) gezählt werden soll. Quines einziges Argument dafür ist der von ihm vorausgesetzte Verifikationismus (Bedeutung als Methode der Verifikation).
Two Dogmas: Schluß: wenn ich die Grenze zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Aussagen ablehne, verpflichte ich mit einem strikteren Pragmatismus: jeder hat einerseits sein wissenschaftliches Erbe und andereseits ist er einem unaufhörlichen Sperrfeuer sinnlicher Reize ausgesetzt. Die Anpassungen dieses Erbes sind, sofern sie rational sind, pragmatisch.
I 64
Erfahrung/Quine: (seit W + O) begrifflich! Aber VsKuhn! Statt dessen: Beobachtungsaussagen stehen außerhalb des semantischen Holismus. Jede dieser Aussagen hat eine Bedeutung unabhängig von den anderen. Hier ist Bedeutung nicht eine Eigenschaft, die an Beziehungen zu anderen Aussagen oder Überzeugungen gebunden ist.
EsfeldVsQuine: es ist jedoch unklar, wie eine Trennung zwischen Beobachtungsaussagen und Theorieaussagen bestehen kann.
I 66
semantischer Holismus/Esfeld: folgt nur, wenn die Bedingungen dafür, Überzeugungen zuzuschreiben, zugleich die Bedingungen dafür sind, die den begrifflichen Inhalt der Überzeugungen determinieren. Quine: geht vom Bestätigungs Holismus zum Bedeutungs Holismus.
VsQuine: setzt Verifikationismus voraus.
EsfeldVsVs: man könnte sagen, daß das Argument für die Verbindung eine transzendentales ist.
Transzendental/(nach Kant): die notwendigen Bedingungen dafür, daß man jemand Überzeugungen zuschreibt, sind zugleich die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dafür, daß der Sprecher Überzeugungen hat. Das läuft darauf hinaus:
Esfeld These: von einer anderen Person interpretiert zu werden ist eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, daß eine Person Überzeugungen hat.
Transzendental/Stroud: (1968): transzendentale Argumente implizieren eine verifikationistische Prämisse!
I 67
Esfeld: ein Argument für die These könnte sein, daß begrifflicher Inhalt öffentlich ist. Wenn wir hier Wittgenstein folgen, reicht das aus.
I 116
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Quine/"Ontologische Relativität": in der Muttersprache können wir Unbestimmtheit letztlich vermeiden, wenn wir ihre Wörter wörtlich verstehen. EsfeldVsQuine: der soziale Holismus zeigt hingegen, warum wir uns mit der Muttersprache zufriedengeben können.

I 366
Bedeutung/Unbestimmtheit/Holismus/EsfeldVsQuine: (2.3.4, 2.3.1) inferentielle Semantik kann begrifflichen Inhalt durch normative Pragmatik bestimmen. (Keine Unbestimmtheit mehr). Überzeugungs Holismus: (4.2) außerdem Perspektive auf eine direkten Realismus.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Field Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 129
Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory.
I 241
Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact.
IV 407
Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld I 62
FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both.
Fodor II 114
Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar.
Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely:
IV 52
Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.).
IV 76/77
Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note
IV 237
13> IV 157 o
Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!.
IV 218
Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Frege Vs Quine, W.V.O. Quine III 297
Numeral/Numbers/Quine: the singular terms as names for numbers can be constructed in the form of abstracts. E.g. Def 0: is the class of all and only those classes that contain no elements.
"0" for "a^~(Ex)(x e a)".
III 298
i.e. 0 is the class whose only element is the empty class. ((s) FregeVsQuine: empty class yes, but not as an element). ((s) 0 here without quotation marks, i.e. not numeral?). Def One/Numeral/Quine: 1 is the class of all classes a, each of which contains exactly one element y:
"1" for "a^(Ey)(x)(x e a . ↔ . x = y)".
Def "Two"/"Three"/"2"/"3"/Numeral/Quine: can then be explained by "1 + 1", "1 + 2", etc., as soon as we have a definition of "+" (plus sign).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Goodman Vs Quine, W.V.O. IV 21
Quine: individuation is determined by a bunch of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (of identity) and its derived "same" and "other". GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to declare that the interpretation of these particles can not be made without consideration of the places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems.
IV 22
E.g. sunset. Whether we see the same thing as yesterday, depends on whether we are employed with the identification of suns or sunsets. (> description).
Quine V 30
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to a finally mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I am, unlike the two, satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary of which some of the physical basic predicates were initially learned by using the dispo way of speaking. (Heuristic role).

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Hacking Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 278
Semantic Ascent/Quine/Hacking: fashion trend: "Do not talk about things, but about the way we talk about things."   VsTheoryladenness of Observation. Hacking pro.
I 301
Observation/Quine: depending on the community in which you are staying; already recognizable by the fluency of dialogue. Observation/HackingVsQuine: is a skill, not something that is present in a community.
I ~ 300
QuineVsTheoryladenness of Observation! Observations are that on which the witnesses on site agree. HackingVsQuine: the competence to assess the discoveries of Karoline Herrschel (comets) had only she herself and, to a lesser extent, her brother Willhelm.
       How is it that an experiment comes across as convincing? Observation has precious little to do with that!

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Harman Vs Quine, W.V.O. Brandom I 666
Gilbert HarmanVsQuine: E.g. If a cloud passes the sun, will it change the meaning of my words? At least the conditional "If a cloud is from the sun, then p" gets another potential to transform my commitments.
Rorty I 220
HarmanVsQuine/Rorty: (Two Dogmas): the behavioral treatment of "truth by virtue of meaning" in this essay is actually uninteresting (Harman): E.g. "the president went to Vietnam" and "Johnson went to Vietnam".

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Kant Vs Quine, W.V.O. Danto2 I 133
KantVsQuine: synthetic judgments a priori can be seen prior to any exploration of the world. By this he linked the mere possibility at all to doing philosophy. Because it is not an empirical science. E.g. That bachelors are unmarried only expresses what is included in the term.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Quine, W.V.O. Kaplan Vs Quine, W.V.O. Stalnaker II 162
De re/Belief/Attribution/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Attribution/Kaplan: (like Quine) no particular belief is attributed.
De re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re attribution: existential quantification.
Truth Conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: attributions of de re are only true if the believer must stand in a relation of acquaintance.
Reinforcement: the name must denote the individual. Example "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt but there are additional conditions
1. for the content
2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. N.B./Stalnaker: It is still possible that all conditions are fulfilled by two different names. This allows the examples to be described without having to attribute contradictory beliefs.
KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases where Quine's analysis was too liberal.
StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise.
Acquaintance/Attribution/Stalnaker: in semantic analysis acquaintance is self-evident, without it one cannot believe anything. One cannot believe a proposition without capturing the occurring expressions in the terms in which they are defined.
StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. the requirement of acquaintance loses its motivation, however, if it is grafted onto the Quinnian approach.
2. Kaplan retains the artificial assumption that de re attributions do not attribute a particular belief and that they are bound to sententialism (sentences as objects of belief).
II 163
At least they must be sentence-like objects with name-like constituents.
D. Kaplan
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Kripke Vs Quine, W.V.O. III 368
Ramified ed Type Theory/vTT/QuineVsRussell/Kripke: Is intended for propositions. QuineVsRussell: Does not give significant ontological improvement vis-à-vis normal set theory.
KripkeVsQuine: Our ability to apply the substitutional quantification at higher levels (in strong resemblance to vTT) shows that it is not irrelevant to semantic paradoxes. The failure of not branching brought in problems for the pseudo substitutional language.
III 411
KripkeVsQuine: Uses criteria to reduce and others to revalue his favored things, and does not discuss why he uses these criteria.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O. IV IX
LewisVsQuine: Realism in relation to unrealized possibilities.
IV 27
Possibility/Quine: Vs unrealized possibilities: the identity criteria are not clear. LewisVsQuine: But identity is not a particular problem for us.
Individuation/possible worlds: in every world, things in every category are as individual as in the actual world.
Identity/Possible World: Things in different worlds are never identical. (Because of P2)
The counterpart relation is the correspondence of identity across worlds (cross world identity).
Lewis: while some authors say they can do different things in different worlds and have different properties, I prefer to say that they are only in the actual world and in no other worlds but that they have counterparts in other worlds.

IV 32
Essentialism/LewisVsQuine: we actually have the ability to say which properties are essential regardless of description. And also regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any other descriptions of the thing. For example, the single-digit sentence φ and an object that is designated by the singular term ζ
To say that this attribute is essential means to claim the translation of N φ ζ (N = necessary).
IV 147
Centered possible worlds/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, "Propositional Objects"): For example, a cat that is chased by a dog wants to go to the roof to be safe.
de dicto: the cat wants a state of affairs, which is the class of all possible worlds in which it is on the roof. It fears the class of all possible worlds where the dog catches her.
Problem: Crossworld Identity. Question: which of the many similar cats in the many possible worlds (with many dogs and roofs) is it? Some cats are on roofs, some in the dog's claws. Does the cat belong to both the desired and the feared conditions?
Solution: centered possible world: pairs consisting of a world and a designated time in space, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds. In fact, the gravitational center is the cat's pineal gland.
No centered world belongs to two classes (desired and feared). It would be problematic if the wish were fulfilled under one centering and not fulfilled under another.
Quine: does not accept this solution in the end. He prefers the shared theory that the objects of "simple settings" are classes of stimulus patterns, while the more complex settings are linguistic.
LewisVsQuine: the benefits of unified objects (properties only) should not be given away.
Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more precisely a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats.
Let X be a class of centered worlds, Y be a property. Then the class corresponds exactly to the centered worlds that are centered on a cat with the property Y.
It cannot be centered on two different cats. To rule that out, we can redefine centered worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant in it.
Quine/Lewis: he has actually replaced propositions by properties through centering.
IV 148
I'm not sure what his reasons are. They are not the same in relation to Catilina and the Great Pyramid (> ontological relativity) (here he wants to avoid the counterpart relation) but certainly in the cat example. Possible World/LewisVsQuine: big difference: by possible world I simply mean big individual things, of which our actual world is one.
Possible Worlds/Quine: means certain abstract entities, certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers. ((s) space-time points).
Quine/Lewis: I suspect that he at least distinguishes our concrete world from the abstract "replacement world" that it represents! Let's call it "updated ersatz world" to distinguish it from the world itself.
Lewis: Variety of concrete worlds.
Quine: Variety of abstract ersatz worlds, one of which represents our special one.
Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to everyday language than "how it could have been".
Lewis: the actual ersatz world is special only because it represents our concrete real world. And it is special not only from its own point of view, but from every world.
One could assume the following now: therefore it is not contingent special, because contingency is variation from one possible world to another.
LewisVs: in this way it looks like it is a non-contingent fact, which is updated by the many possible worlds. And that is wrong!
((s) Then every fact in the actual world would be necessary, every movement. >Determinism.)
Schwarz I 46
Possibility/LewisVsQuine: there must be a theory of what would be true under these or other conditions. But not only because they are needed for the analysis of dispositions and causality.
Schwarz I 132
Def Event/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b,171): Suggestion: to identify them with the space-time region in which they occur. Vs: this is too coarse-grained for effects and causes. For example, if a ball flies through the air and rotates, then flight and rotation occupy the same region, but only flight causes the window to break.
Counterfactual analysis/counterfactual conditional/CoCo/Possible World/Similarity/Lewis: the next possible world in which rotation does not take place are not the next possible worlds in which flight does not take place. The two events correspond to the same space-time region in the real world, but not in all possible worlds. ((s) "Next" is not decisive here).
Event/Identity/LewisVsQuine: Modification: Events are identical if they occupy the same space-time region in all possible worlds.
Def Event/Lewis: is then the class of all regions (in all possible worlds) in which it happens. (1986d).

Schwarz I 220
Def Analytical Truth/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: a sentence is analytical when its primary truth conditions cover all situations. Schwarz: More interesting is his thesis that practically every sentence can empirically prove to be wrong. Our theories cannot be divided into a revisable empirical and an unrevisable analytical component.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Quine, W.V.O. McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 162
McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions.
On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview.
I 184
McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects.
I 185
McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine.
I 186
Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema.
I 188
DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning.
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory.
I 189
Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma.

Esfeld I 63
Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system.
VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system?
2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"?
Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system!
Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs.
Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors!
Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs).
Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason?
I 64
(S.McDowell I 157ff).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Prior Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 37
Higher-Order Quantification/Prior: It's true, we still have to admit that "for some p, p" is no idiomatic (real) Indo-European. But it is still not difficult to find ordinary language equivalents!
We have common quantifiers, nominal and not nominal ones, as "whoever" from "who" or "wherever" from "there", or "somewhat", etc.
Grammatically, this corresponds to the adverbs: "I met him somewhere," e.g: in Paris. that's alright.
Quine: could say: then we would be "ontologically committed" to the existence of "places" as of ordinary objects.
PriorVsQuine: but we do not need to respond to that!

I 48
Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being the value of a bound variable" is just a unproven dogma.
Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions such as "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the single ones.
In particular, it is meant that "X believes __" should not fall into the same category as "It's not the case, that __".
I.e. they are both supposedly not single-digit constructions.
Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then each composite sentence, which differs only in that it has S1 as sub-sentence where the other has S2 as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value.
This is the "law of extensionality".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Putnam Vs Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld I 57
Analytical/synthetical/Quine/Esfeld: quantum mechanics is a strong argument for Quine to abolish the separation between the two. One can doubt whether it is reasonable to change the law of the excluded third.
N.B.: but it is not an argument against such suggestions to assert that a sentence represents an analytical truth. >Analyticity/syntheticity.
Esfeld I 58
However, the simple availability of such a proposed amendment cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason for that there is no separation between analytic and synthetic. (PutnamVsQuine). ---
Putnam V 117
PutnamVsQuine: I think he went too far in some respects: he claimed that "no statements are immune against revision". This is obviously wrong: because under which circumstances would it be rational to say "not every statement is true", i.e. to accept "all statements are true"? Such revisions cannot be unlimited, otherwise we would have no idea of something that we can call rationality. Apart from trivial cases (e.g. "not every statement is true"), we cannot be sure that it will never be rational and not in any connection to drop a statement (rightly in a particular context) that is a "necessary" truth.
---
Rorty I 218
PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals (analytical hypotheses) that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of physics of the day, is so insignificant that "it exists merely in the eyes of the person concerned." (Subjective convenience). >Analytical hypothesis.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Quine Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 131
Def Unfounded/Quine: is a class if it contains an element that contains an element.... ad infinitum without ever reaching firm ground. QuineVsQuine: self-criticism: my "New Foundations" and "Mathematical Logic" both contain unfounded classes. I could argue that there is no principle of individuation for such classes. They are identical as long as their elements are identical, and they are identical as long as their elements are identical ..., without stopping.
Our study shed light on a strange comparison between three degrees of stringency. a) table, b) with Russell's definition we can define the identity of properties, however, c) the individuation of properties is still not okay. This suggests that
a) specification makes the most stringent demands,
b) individuation is less strict, and
c) the mere definition of identity is even more undemanding.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 191
Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist:
I 192
"Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated.
I 222
Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology.
I 223
Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in?
I 225
RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences:
1) There is such a thing as an ontology.
2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status.
3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning.
4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point.
5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference.
RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism.
I 226
Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles.
I 231
RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of ​​the idea" than necessary.
I 250
Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants.

IV 24
RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network.

VI 212
RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. Prior I 39
Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica: here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. ---
I 40
The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.)
Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx".
But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ".
Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur.
E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander."
logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__".
ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies).
Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property"
logical form: "For a φ, φ __"
"Σφφ". (Σ: there is a)
Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order.
Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's".
Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols.
That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems.
E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..."
"If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact.
Symbolically:
1. CΠφNφxNψx.
---
I 41
"If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx
Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong)
3. CΠφNφx.
The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory.
Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions).
Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented:
E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong.
logical form:
1. CΠpNpNq
by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp
and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?)
3. NΠpNp,
Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself.
And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2.
RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order".
VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom.
By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again.
Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification.
Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements).
E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form)
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences.
Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves.
E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc.
RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between
"p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters.
Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Searle Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 20
SearleVsQuine: Occasionally mistakes in philosophy entail mistakes in the linguistic philosophy. Beliefs that - when it comes to what linguistic signs mean - there are no facts that go beyond speech pattern behavior. (Quine 1960(1)): it is no question of fact, if anyone, you or I, say the "Rabbit" meaning a rabbit by it or a separate part or a portion of the rabbit story. (> Gavagai).
II 269
Generality/de re/de dicto/representation/SearleVsQuine: he confuses the distinction between particular and general propositional attitudes of re and such de dicto with a distinction between attitudes. No one may have wish for something indefinite, without somehow representing the object itself. (E.g. "General sailboat" as the object of my desire.).
II 270/271
SearleVsQuine: (SearleVs attitudes that are supposedly irreducible de re). Belief in such attitudes is due to a Wittgensteinian diagnostic. Our language provides two ways to report about propositional attitude: with de re-reports or de dicto-reports. E.g. Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. (de dicto)
Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy. (De re).
As these two reports can even have different truth values, we believe that there must be also a difference in the phenomena (falsely).
The following dialogue is completely absurd:
Quine: as far as the man with the brown hat is concerned, Ralph, do you believe that he is a spy?
Ralph: no, Quine. You asked me if I have one of the re-conviction, but it is not the case that I believe of the man with the brown hat that he was a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto-belief: I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy.
SearleVsQuine: the opinion that intentional states are somehow intensional themselves is based on the confusion of logical properties of reports of intentional states with logical properties of the states themselves.
Searle: there is a de re/de dicto distinction, but that is a distinction between different types of report.
V 14
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: some analytical authors: there is no adequate analysis of the concept of analyticity. Therefore, the concept supposedly does not exist: if there is no analysis and no criteria, we cannot understand him. It is illicit. (SearleVs). The definitions of analyticity and synonymy supposedly require the concept of meaning. As criterion then observable behavior is required.
V 15
SearleVsQuine: it is not enough to simply say that we lack the criteria.
V 16
SearleVsQuine: false requirements regarding the relation between our understanding of a concept and our ability to establish criteria for its application.
V 17
Criteria/Searle: how do we know that one criterion is inadequate? Criteria need projective force. They must lead to specific results.
V 18
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: reversed: instead of proving that we do not understand the concept of analyticity, is our inability to find criteria, rather just requires that we understand what is analyticity. Analyticity/Quine/Searle: Quine chose the example wisely! "I do not know if the statement "All Green is extended" is analytic or not". One can namely deny the extent of sensory data!
V 19
E.g. someone might be unsure whether a glass of chartreuse green. All this is a sign that we understand the concept of analyticity very well.
V 163
Ontology: the main question: are there criteria for ontological conditions?
V 164
Existence/Quine: "to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable." Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and inane.
Alternative criterion: a theory requires those and only those entities of which it says that they exist. (Does not have to be done intentionally.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: a notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not necessarily be taken from it. It is also possible that no translation method exists, by which it could be determined which statement is the easier or better.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion two statements that in reality include the same conditions would include different conditions! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
V 166
Fictional dialogue Quine/Alston: criteria/existence/AlstonVsQuine: (according to Searle) Q: Instead of saying, "There are four miles from Nauplion to Tolon" one should say: "distance in miles between ... = four."
A VsQuine: the first formulation does not include a condition that would not be included in the second! How could it be? The second is only a paraphrase of the first. Existence assumptions depend on statements, not propositions!
Q: The objection misses the key point: by the translation we show that the condition is made only apparantly and not necessary. The criterion itself is ontologically neutral! Furthermore, no claim to synonymy is connected to the paraphrase.
V 167
A VsQuine: that is confused: according to Quine's criterion, it seems as if every statement could be reproduced in equivalent but in the notation different statements that lead to different results according to Quine's criterion, even though the conditions are the same. Q: The condition of abstract entities in a sentence like
(2) "For the property of being a chair there is at least one example"
is completely unnecessary, since such a proposition can always be represented by a different proposition. Paraphrase:
(1)(E.g.)(x is a chair). This paraphrase shows that we got rid of the unwelcome conditions of being a chair.
V 171
Existence/ontology/AlstonVsQuine: ~ what somebody says is important for his assumptions, not how he says it. (Searle pro). Ontology/ontological condition/SearleVsQuine: so the question arises whether the concept of ontological conditions itself is so clear. Perhaps there is no class of irreducible ontological conditions. There is no abstract problem of ontological conditions. But the problem, how we know those facts which we require in our statements.
V 172
SearleVsQuine: his stilted way of expressing: "to tolerate", "to shun": it is something completely different if I tolerate or shun tobacco than if I endure or shun universals. Universals/Searle: misunderstanding that we imply anything at all: E.g. "None of us has holiness" is just another way of saying that none of us is sacred. This is quite harmless.


1. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge 1960

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Quine, W.V.O. Sellars Vs Quine, W.V.O. McDowell I 168
Sensations/Sellars: are distinguished from pieces of what is given. No direct relationship to knowledge. Active receptivity. But receptivity cannot interact in a rational way with spontaneity. (VsQuine).

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quine, W.V.O. Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. NS I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking.
Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking.
StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form.
---
NS I 150
Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility.
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental.
---
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable.
StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant.
Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object).
In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects.
Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal).
The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view.
The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things."
StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people.
---
Strawson I 252
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright.
---
I 253
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences.
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions.
StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable.
---
Strawson IV 69
StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? ---
IV 70
Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. ---
IV 71
Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Quine, W.V.O. Tarski Vs Quine, W.V.O. Field II 25
Truth/QuineVsTarski/Field: the scheme (T) is all we need. (Or additionally a translation theory). TarskiVsQuine/Field: that was not Tarski's view!
FieldVsTarki: attached too much importance to pseudo-theories like D2, A2 and F2.
Field thesis T1 adequately represents Tarski's real contribution to the truth theory.

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Wittgenstein Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 238
Logic/convention/arbitrariness/Wittgenstein:. The laws of logic, such as the records of the excluded third (SaD) and the one of the to be excluded contradiction (SVW) are arbitrary. Prohibiting the occurrence of this sentence, means, that one adopts a possibly highly recommended expression system.
In reality, contradictions are used e.g. in the statement "I like it and I do not like it". What should be the obstacle to use this expression like this?
WittgensteinVsQuine: to the objection that "opposition" is not used like this, I answer, that's right, as far as one conceives our system as primary. A recognized expression system is like a once-introduced scale. But perhaps we sometimes want flexibility.
---
VI 232
Network/WittgensteinVsQuine/Schulte: against his system of sentences that are, more or less, central depending on whether they are more formal, but more supported by experience (peripheral). Wittgenstein: not only propositions of logic belong to the foundation, but precisely also propositions about objects.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Quine, W.V.O. Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. Davidson I 55
CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III)
Kanitscheider II 23
Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism.
KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme.
Quine VI 36
VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place.
VI 51
Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism.
VI 52
Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation.
It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is!
Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations
Quine XI 146
Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as
background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described.
XI 147
VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction).
Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity.
Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range.
For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal.
Quine X 83
Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth.
Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability).
Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then:
Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps.
Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences.
Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions,
X 84
namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs.
1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth!
2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content.
QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all!
Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place.
Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important.
But even mere terms can be better or worse.
Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems.
3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped.
QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference.





Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Martin Vs Quine, W.V.O. Arm II 73
Unterscheidung/Martin: immer auf Basis von Eig nicht Objekten. Kinder und auch Erwachsene sehen davon ab, was die Eig hat. Auch wenn wir Objekte durch Raum Zeit Segmente oder Felder ersetzen sind die Eig das entscheidende, was man dort antrifft.
Eig sind dann immer noch mehr als bloße Mathematisierungen: Die Repräsentation von RZ Punkten braucht mehr als Zahlen oder Quantitäten.
Maß: jede Quantität ist von einer Eig!
MartinVsQuine: Vs dessen "Wither physical objects" ("Obj. austrocknen").
Bsp Martin: das folgende Bsp wurde in den 50er Jahren in Adelaide entwickelt und
II 74
in den früher 60ern in Harvard und Columbia weiterentwickelt. Dispo/MartinVsQuine: (Word and Object): Vs Gleichsetzung von Dispo mit (unmanifestierten) strukt. Eig mit angenommener manifestierter Dispo.
Bsp ein Fall von komischer geographischer Tatsache, die die raumzeitliche Verteilung von Elementarteilchen (ET) betrifft, Angenommen, es gibt ET isoliert in einer Region des Universums, so daß sie verschieden sind von denen in unserer eigenen Region und sie sind so entfernt, daß sie die vielen Dispo zur Interaktion niemals mit irgend etwas anderem im Universum entfalten. Sie ähneln aber nichts anderem im Universum.
disp/kat/MartinVsArmstrong: die Unterscheidung suggeriert, daß Dispo nicht real in dem Objekt seien.
MartinVsQuine: ein ergebener Quineaner sagte in einer Diskussion: "Und wenn Schweine Flügel hätten, würden sie fliegen". Ich sagte, dass wir beide nicht wüssten, ob das wahr ist und er wiederholte den Satz einfach. Ich hätte damals sagen sollen, dass Schweine dann immer noch nicht fliegen können.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Quine, W.V.O. Schiffer Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 137
Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. If John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is wrong:
I 138
either that or the alleged quantification for belief objects is not what it appears to be in the Quine's eye.
I 144
SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification.
I 235
Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer. E.g. (c) There is something that Mother Teresa, (namely modesty) is true because a substitution instance of "Mother Teresa X" is true,
namely (b): Mother Teresa has the property to be modest.
ontological commitment: at substitutional quantification: are only those of the true substitution instances.
Universals/Quine: (On what there is, 1953, 10): it is misleading to say that red houses, red roses and red sunsets have something in common.
SchifferVsQuine: for whom these everyday speech would it misleading? One can therefore say something true, assuming substitutional quantification. Similarly E.g. "there is a chance that you will win".
there are/exist/substitutional quantification/substitutional quantification/Lycan: (1979): Allowed e.g. "There are many things that do not exist". E.g. Loch Ness monster, etc.
Properties/Schiffer: in most books of Non-Platonists there is quantification over properties. ((s)> Second order Logic). Quine himself gives an e.g.
Properties/Attribute/Existence/"There is"/quantification/second order logic/Schiffer: Quine 1966, p 164): "is valid" is a verb that can be appended to the name of a sentence, and expresses an attribute of the designated sentence.
I 237
Schiffer: nobody would assume here that Quine hereby makes an ontological commitment to the existence of attributes. Solution: It is "apparent" quantification that is true, if it is understood as a substitutional quantification.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Loar Vs Quine, W.V.O. Avramides I 37
Propositional Attitude/Physicalism/LoarVsQuine: Variant: allows the propositions of A to be replaced by those of B, but nothing has changed in the way people see things. In particular, we allow the propositions of some physical theory to be replaced by propositions about belief, etc., but that does not change the way we think about each other. That is the "conservative explanation".
N.B.: not that the theorist did not change beliefs, but his cognitive situation is as if he did not. How can that be? I cannot explain it, but it happens. And it can serve as a cognitive solution for something that is considered a serious theoretical problem.
But: for the substitution to be correct, the truths of B (set of propositions) must give way to those of A (physical theory). ((s) So to become physicalistic propositions about belief).
I 38
AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsReductionism: I cannot allow the truths of B to give way to those of A. (see below chapters 3 and 4) I will show that the reasons for forcing us to hold on to propositions about belief are reasons for abandoning the imperialist (physicalist) view. This even corresponds to Loar's line.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Church Vs Quine, W.V.O. Quine XI 133
Ontologie/Modalität/LauenerVsQuine: es fällt auf, dass in seinen Formulierungen intensionale Ausdrücke wie „müssen unter den Werten der Variablen vorkommen“, „müssen wahr sein von“ usw. vorkommen. Oder auch psychologische Konnotation wie „wir betrachten“. ChurchVsQuine: „ontologische Verpflichtung“ ist intensional.
leere Menge/Identität/Existenz/ChurchVsQuine: die Annahme von Kentauren und Einhörnern kann nicht das gleiche bedeuten, obwohl die beiden Klassen die gleiche Extension haben, nämlich leer sind.
Def Existenz/Gegenstand/Theorie/Richard Cartwright: eine elementare Theorie T setzt Objekte der Art K voraus, gdw. es in T einen offenen Satz φ gibt, der a als einzige freie Variable enthält, dass
1. [(Ea) φ] ein Theorem von T ist und
2. aus den semantischen Regeln (Sprachregeln) von T folgt, dass für jedes x gilt:
φ trifft auf x nur dann zu, wenn x ein Element von K ist“.
XI 134
Lauener: dass Cartwright sich auf Sprachregeln beruft, zeigt, dass er auf Intensionen angewiesen ist, dass die Definition aber eine extensionale Interpretation der Theorie, auf die sie angewendet wird, zulässt.
Quine XII 38
Satz/Bedeutungsgleichheit/Übersetzung/propositionale Einstellungen/ChurchVsQuine/LangfordVsQuine: Problem: wenn das, was geglaubt wird, bloße Sätze sind,
XII 39
Dann überträgt sich Bsp „Edwin glaubt den deutschen Satz S“ korrekterweise in das englische „Edwin believes the German sentence S“. mit unverändertem S. Problem: eine ebenso korrekte englische Wiedergabe ist aber:
Bsp „Edvin believes,...“ gefolgt von einer englischen Übersetzung des deutschen Satzes S in indirekter Rede.
Pointe: diese beiden englischen Berichte müssen dann ebenfalls äquivalent sein, sie sind es aber nicht! Denn ein des Deutschen nicht mächtiger Brite kann sie nicht gleichsetzen.
QuineVsVs: das stützt sich auf den fraglichen Begriff der alltagssprachlichen Äquivalenz.
Quine: dennoch sollte man sprachliche Formen nicht als Objekte von propositionalen Einstellungen oder attributärer Einstellungen annehmen: das ist zu künstlich.

Chur I
A. Church
The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Foster Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 28
Possible Worlds/Quine: are quadruples of real numbers in space-time. Then the worlds are ontologically respectable. "World" can be described purely extensionally.
A world is then a set of sets of quadruples of real numbers, so that any two sets it contains represent the same space-time distribution on a relativistic concept of position and distance.
Nominalism/GoodmanVsQuine.
I 29
Possible Worlds/Foster: my own view on possible worlds is phenomenalistic and not to be presented here in the brevity. Possible Worlds/Quine/FosterVsQuine: Problem: in Quine's possible world neither "Socrates is mortal" (as purely qualitative) nor "Socratized" has place.
Each possible world has its own framework in which we can identify and recognize the material objects in it.
But not beyond the possible world.
No cross-world identity.
We do not know how to locate Socrates in another world.

Foster I
John A. Foster
"Meaning and Truth Theory"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Quine, W.V.O. Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 184
Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds.
Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based:
1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional.
II 185
Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception.
2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds.
I 186
Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are.
DavidsonVsQuine.
QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality.
3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective.
Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space.
Samples: are "small possible worlds".
II 187
Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings.
Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case).
Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual.
Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term.
II 188
Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions.
Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities.
"Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristoteles: cannot be considered independently of the way objects are specified. Wiggins: Quine mocks essentialism.
WigginsVsQuine: is his critique on the level of an unreflected acceptance of Aristotle's three-dimensional fiction of our world? Or does he claim that, even if we remain in this provincial ontology, we have the choice to choose whether we want to discriminate or not to discriminate in favor of some of the concepts under which the things we perceive fall?
II 286
Concept/Language/WigginsVsQuine: Quine's attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of concepts of substance and against chance formations could explain the certainty with which our culture deals with questions of identity in time or permanence.
II 303
WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: there is the question if we can evaluate sentences with names for all possible worlds ("necessary existence") Problem: Cross-world identity

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Quine, W.V.O. Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism".
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w..

I 201
Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable.

II 24
Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition.
Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided.
StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case.
De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague,
II 25
but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it.
Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content.

II 160
Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions).
Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual.
Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual.
StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine.
II 161
De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way?
Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe?
bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here.
Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them.
1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it.
2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions.
Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible.
Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself.
b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts.
1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat
2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach.
II 162
Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between.
II 163
De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship.
That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition.
Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set.
Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual
Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…)

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 183
Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions.
Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology.
I 184
The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense.
I 223
Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience.
Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory!
Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two?
Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope.
Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information.
Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain,
I 224
how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically.
Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal.
StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that.
"Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem.
Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular.
QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness.
"Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge.
QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all.
I 225
Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness.
Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection.
QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science.
I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies.
Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms.
Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense.

Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously.

Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here.
I 231
Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow.
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input.
I 240
Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief.
I 245
Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O. III 86
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable.
III 87
1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing.
3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing.
ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical generalization on the conditions for such a distinction.
Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) -
ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable.
Simons I 124
Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times.
ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity.
2. Argument of change: for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together.
ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober.
Either we use grammatical times like in everyday language or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".)
3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example
River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension.
ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process.
I 125
Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with").
Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular.
VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 60
Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic).
I 61
But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but:
SimonsVsQuine: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be for him as nominalists also implausible.
Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus abstract entities are still allowed by the back door.
Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables.
"∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: simply "for all".
I 123
Four dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: processes).
I 124
Substance/Quine: differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose few atoms.
I 128
Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time.
continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants.
Events/Simons: seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part.
Masses: here we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Leeds Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 376
LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/Theory/Leeds: Theories which assume that there must be a SI for our language, are based on a wrong premise, namely that the question on whether our theories "depict" the world is dependent on whether "electrons really exist". Reference/Gavagai/Theory/Relation/World/LeedsVsQuine: (Quine seemed to defend this view as well once): that "rabbit" does not really have the relation R to rabbits. (Or only in a "relative sense"). (I have criticized this elsewhere).
Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine:
1. the results of word and object do not determine an unambiguous translation
2. there is no standard reference scheme for every language, e.g. we cannot add "obtain reference" or "obtain truth" as a condition for a translation.
3. demands as "conserve the psychological isomorphism" or "conserve the linguistic role" cannot be made precise
I 377
Naturalism/Quine/Leeds: Quine's naturalism is revealed early and at the end of his work, e.g. in "Ontological Relativity". Idealism/VsQuine/Leeds: Many authors have thought him to be an idealist in disguise because it is so difficult to see that Naturalistic Instrumentalism (NI) is not inconsistent. These authors have thought that someone who is so obviously an instrumentalist cannot simultaneously believe that electrons exist in an unambiguous manner like the naturalist believes.
NI/Leeds: Is coherent at any rate. The great question is whether it is true!

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Grover Vs Quine, W.V.O. Horwich I 356
T-Predicate/truth-predicate/Generalization/Semantic Ascent/Quine: (1970): the T-predicate is not used to generalize E.g. "Dick is mortal", "Tom is ..." ((s) that is possible with "x"), but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both. Where now "a" represents an entire sentence and unlike "x" which stands for an individual). Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: pro.
GroverVsQuine/CGBVsQuine: For that, however, you need no quantification over sentences or propositions in the sense that we attribute a characteristic with the T-predicate.
Pro-sentence: is used quantificatorically here, therefore English* without T-predicate is sufficient.
Solution: for every proposition, either it is true or it is not true that it is true.
Important argument: "is true" has a dual role here:
1) It seems necessary in order to make the link "it is not true that".
2) It works as quantificatorical pro-sentence. With it, the quantifying expression is anaphorized "for each proposition".
CGBVsQuine: this should be called semantic ascent. See also T-Predicate (truth predicate).

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Kanitscheider Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 23
Ontology/Language/Human/Kanitscheider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism.
KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology rather as a research programme.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Barrow Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 58
BarrowVsQuine: if the world were deeply holistic, the following assumption would not apply:
The world can be explored locally without losing its essential structure.

Cf. Metaphysics/Barrow.

Prince of Denmark: "O God, I could be imprisoned in a nutshell and consider myself a king of vast territory."

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have