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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavioral Economics | Kahneman | Mause I 63f Rational-Choice/Behavioral Economics/Kahneman: An economic theory that follows the rational choice approach needs fewer axioms. Such a theory is simpler overall. However, new theoretical building blocks are always needed in order to better explain lifeworld situations. This path is followed by Behavioral Economics, which empirically analyses systematic cognitive bias in the processing of information (Kahneman 2012 (1); Camerer et al. 2003 (2); State of research: (3)(4) Rational Choice/New Development: the theory has been reinterpreted as a normative theory, because it tells us how to behave if we want to maximize our benefits. Thus it is no longer tautological like the descriptive variant. >VsRational Choice. Politics: The idea that both parties and voters are benefit maximizing and democracy has no intrinsic value is one of the central assumptions of (almost) all rational-choice-inspired democracy theories and election analyses. 1. D Kahneman, Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken. München 2012. 2. Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, und Matthew Rabin, Hrsg.. Advances in behavioral economics. Princeton 2003. 3. Wittek, Rafael, Tom Snijders und Victor Nee, Hrsg. The handbook of rational choice social research. Stanford 2013 4. Oppenheimer, Joe. Principles of politics. Cambridge 2012. |
EconKahne I Daniel Kahneman Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken München 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Rational Choice | Forbes | Gaus I 61 Rational choice theory/Forbes: The rapid development of rational choice theory and research has been the most dramatic change in professional political science since the 1950s. Its root problems - the fairness of games of chance, the unpredictability of strategic interaction, the merits of different voting rules, the peculiarity of spatial competition - have more or less lengthy histories. Around 1960 the techniques that mathematicians and economists had developed to deal with these problems crystallized as a distinctive outlook and set of principles. The principles can be summarized in three words - individualism, rationalism, and formalism. Rational choice theorists seek to explain collective outcomes by individual choices, which are generally assumed to derive from fixed preferences that are basically self-regarding. Individual actors are assumed to be rational in the limited sense, roughly, of having clear goals (being able to rank the possible outcomes of their choices coherently) and being willing and able to do whatever is necessary (within given constraints) to satisfy them. (...)it is assumed, any satisfactory explanation of what happens in these confusing situations must have the form of a mathematical model that reveals the implications of instrumental rationality. Gaus I 62 VsRational choice theory: Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, after reviewing rational choice studies of American politics up to the early 1990s, concluded that their achievements were ‘few, far between, and considerably more modest than the combination of mystique and methodological fanfare surrounding the rational choice movement would lead one to expect’ (1994(1): 179). WaltVsRational choice theory: Stephen Walt (1999) offers a similarly harsh assessment of the contributions of game-theoretic models in international relations. Geraldo MunckVsRational choice theory: the ‘value added’ by formalization may be ‘relatively minor’ (2001(3): 191). Rational choce theoryVsVs: One reaction to these and other criticisms has been to retreat from the demanding assumptions about instrumental rationality used in building simple models and to adopt instead more realistic assumptions as a basis for building ‘second generation models of empirically grounded, boundedly rational, and moral decision-making’ (Ostrom, 1998(4): 15). Gaus I 63 Solutions: (...) Kenneth Shepsle (1995)(5) endorses the combination of ‘hard theory and soft assessment’ represented by rational choice theory, in contrast to the ‘soft (or no) theory with hard assessment’ favoured by its critics. The ‘hard theory’ offers real insight, he maintains, while ‘statistical political philosophy’ offers only unintelligible correlations. Similarly, Peter Ordeshook (1993(6); 1995(6a)) and Emerson Niou and Ordeshook (1999)(7) make a distinction between science and engineering that amounts to saying that abstract models need not fit any easily observable regularities in order to be illuminating. Institutions: Institutions can be understood as ways of constraining individual maximizing behaviour, to reduce this potential instability (Miller, 1997(8): 1193–8; Weingast, 1996(9)). But how could such constraining institutions develop on the basis of individual self-interest? The recent and much discussed volume on Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., 1998(10)) is essentially an offshoot of this ‘new institutionalism’. Individuals: (...) are assumed to be free and reasonable, at least potentially, and not just the victims of blind causation. Nomothetic/idiographic: Seen from this angle, rational choice theory represents a return to an ‘ideographic’ mode of inquiry from the currently dominant ‘nomothetic’ conception of science (Bates et al., 1998(10): 10). >Nomothetic/idiographic/Windelband. 1. Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro (1994) Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Walt, Stephen M. (1999) ‘Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies’. International Security, 23 (4): 5–48. 3. Munck, Geraldo L. (2001) ‘Game theory and comparative politics: new perspectives and old concerns’. World Politics, 53: 173–204. 4. Ostrom, Elinor (1998) ‘A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action’. American Political Science Review, 92: 1–22. 5. Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1995) ‘Statistical political philosophy and positive political theory’. Critical Review, 9 (1–2): 213–22. 6. Ordeshook, Peter C. (1993) ‘The development of contemporary political theory’. In William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinch and Normal J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation, Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 6.a. Ordeshook, Peter C. (1995) ‘Engineering or science: what is the study of politics?’ Critical Review, 9 (1–2): 175–88. 7. Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1999) ‘Return of the Luddites’. International Security, 24 (2): 84–96. 8. Miller, Gary J. (1997) ‘The impact of economics on contemporary political science’. Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 1173–1204. 9. Weingast, Barry R. (1996) ‘Political institutions: rational choice perspectives’. In Robert E. Goodin and v Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds, A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–90. 10. Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, JeanLaurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast (1998) Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rational Choice | Kahneman | Mause I 63f Rational-Choice/Behavioral Economics/Kahneman: An economic theory that follows the rational choice approach needs fewer axioms. Such a theory is simpler overall. However, new theoretical building blocks are always needed in order to better explain lifeworld situations. This path is followed by Behavioral Economics, which empirically analyses systematic cognitive bias in the processing of information (Kahneman 2012 (1); Camerer et al. 2003 (2); State of research: Wittek(3), Oppenheimer(4). Rational Choice/New Development: the theory has been reinterpreted as a normative theory, because it tells us how to behave if we want to maximize our benefits. Thus it is no longer tautological like the descriptive variant. >VsRational Choice. Politics: The idea that both parties and voters are benefit maximizing and democracy has no intrinsic value is one of the central assumptions of (almost) all rational-choice-inspired democracy theories and election analyses. 1. D Kahneman, Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken. München 2012. 2. Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, und Matthew Rabin, Hrsg.. Advances in behavioral economics. Princeton 2003. 3. Wittek, Rafael, Tom Snijders und Victor Nee, Hrsg. The handbook of rational choice social research. Stanford 2013 4. Oppenheimer, Joe. Principles of politics. Cambridge 2012. |
EconKahne I Daniel Kahneman Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken München 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Movements | Social Choice Theory | Gaus I 268 Social movements/Social choice theory/rational choice theory/West: recognition of the potential rationality of collective action is (...) reflected in theoretical attempts to explain social movement activity. Resource mobilization theory: in the USA, in particular, the influential paradigm of 'rational choice theory' has applied the methods of neoclassical economics to the explanation of social behaviour, giving rise to 'resource mobilization theory' (RMT) (...). RMT treats social movements as more or less successful attempts by individuals to mobilize human and other resources for the sake of collective goals. The availability of resources, the capacity of 'political entrepreneurs' to mobilize these resources and the 'political opportunity structure' of the surrounding political system, all contribute to the distinctive trajectory of success and failure, growth and decline - or 'life cycle' - of movements (Oberschall, 1973(1); Tilly, 1978(2); Zald and McCarthy, 1987(3)). Problems: (...) RMT addresses the formal properties of social movements in general, rather than the substantive characteristics of new social movements in particular. It considers general preconditions, problems and determinants of collective action. But like other rational choice theories, it has nothing to say about the particular goals, values or ideology of new social movement agents (Piven and Cloward, 1992(4)). 1) VsRational choice/West: Rational choice theories may be able to deduce theorems predicting the 'rational' choices that agents make on the basis of particular 'preferences', but they are notoriously unable to cast light on the formation of these preferences or their possible replacement by others (Hindess, 1988)(5). 2) VsRational choice: Rational choice approaches have, for example, been much engaged by the 'problem of voting' - the apparent irrationality of exerting even minimal effort when the chances of influencing the outcome of elections are infinitesimally small (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993)(6). They must surely have difficulty, then, in understanding why people expend considerable long-term effort and even undergo serious (sometimes mortal) risk for the sake of political goals. Gaus I 269 Recently, indeed, there has been consideration of such concepts (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995)(7). >Rational decision, >Rationality, >Altruism. 1. Oberschall, Anthony (1973) Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2. Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 3. Zald, Mayer N. and John McCarthy (1987) Social Movements in an Organizational Society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 4. Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward (1992) 'Normalizing collective protest'. In A. Morris and C. M. Mueller, eds, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Hindess, Barry (1988) Choice, Rationality and Social Theory. London: Unwin Hyman. 6. Brennan, Geoffrey and Loren Lomasky (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pum Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Johnston, Hank and Bert Klandermans, eds (1995) Social Movements and Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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