Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

[german]

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:

Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term

The author or concept searched is found in the following 59 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Abortion	Rawls	Gaus I 97 Abortion/Rawls/Waldron: Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. Interestingly some of the discussion in Political Liberalism of the abortion example showed how difficult it is to apply this stricture in practice. In a footnote to the original edition Rawls inferred, from the fact that anti-abortion laws usually rest on controversial religious grounds, that liberty in this regard was required (1993⁽¹⁾: 243n). WaldronVsRawls: But he quickly had to concede that that was a mistake (1996⁽²⁾: lv), for three reasons. 1) (...) we are not entitled to assume liberty in such an area as the default position, any more than we are entitled to conclude that foetuses do not have souls from the fact that political liberalism is unable to countenance religious arguments to the effect that they do. 2) (...) although there might be good neutral arguments for a right to choose abortion in the first trimester, we must not assume that there are no contrary arguments or no way of opposing abortion rights that does not run foul of the strictures of political liberalism. Many opponents of abortion will insist that their arguments for protecting human foetuses are continuous with arguments (that they insist any theory of justice must acknowledge) for protecting all human life, particularly in its most vulnerable forms. 3) (...) the fact that a religious doctrine may not be appealed to in order to justify restrictions on abortion doesn’t mean that such doctrines are altogether beyond the pale. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, new edn. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Beginning	Sandel	Brocker I 672 Beginning/Initial State/Criteria/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: what is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of a initial state for a society to be built in Rawls? Problem: there is already a certain philosophical anthropology underlying it, which presupposes that social relations, that intersubjectivity is not constitutive for the identity of subjects at all.⁽¹⁾ 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Climate Justice	Cosmopolitanism	Norgaard I 325 Climate Justice/Cosmopolitanism: The cosmopolitan approach argues that obligations of justice apply across borders as well as within, deriving these obligations in some cases from actual causal interrelationships (e.g. Pogge 2002)⁽¹⁾, sometimes from universal extension of the same egalitarian premises that ground nationally entered theories of justice (Singer 1972⁽²⁾; Caney 2005b(³⁾), or both (Beitz 1979⁽⁴⁾; Moellendorf 2002(5)). Rejection of such obligation typically relies on the argument that either a shared culture (e.g. Rawls 1999)⁽⁶⁾, shared nationality (Miller 1995)⁽⁷⁾ or a shared sovereignty (Nagel 2005)⁽⁸⁾ is required for the existence of obligations of justice, though proponents of such views —‘communitarians’ taken loosely—do usually advocate beneficence towards persons outside the community. Norgaard I 326 Climate Justice/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Cosmopolitism: While not all the philosophers who have written on climate change are otherwise engaged in debates about cosmopolitanism (…) most conclude that claims of justice do apply to the international distribution of the costs and benefits of climate policy. However, many authors have still found it necessary to engage John Rawls's famous dismissal of cosmopolitan justice claims (Rawls 1999)⁽⁶⁾; most conclude that the inescapable causal relationships of climate change render Rawls's position no longer supportable, if it ever was (see e.g. Vanderheiden 2008)⁽⁹⁾. >Climate Costs/Cosmopolitanism, >Climate Costs/Shue/Singer. Cosmopolitanism/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Nagel/Miller/Rawls: Rawls argued that the social ties required to make possible a contractarian theory of justice, like that of ‘original position’ bargaining, do not exist across national borders, and that only ‘well‐ordered societies’—in practice, nations—could plausibly be bound by such a standard of justice. The theories of Nagel and Miller make similar claims on slightly different grounds. VsRawls: (…) such an argument fails when the status quo involves the imposition of significant cross‐border harms, as from greenhouse pollution; any rejection of international justice claims therefore becomes a de facto endorsement of the right to do harm to non‐citizens, which Rawls did not in fact endorse. And of course the fact that, considered as a resource, the atmosphere is not territorially bound (that is, it is a globally ‘open access’ resource) implies a need for global cooperation, providing further justification for cosmopolitan obligations (Vanderheiden 2008⁽⁹⁾; Moellendorf 2009 ⁽¹⁰⁾). 1. Pogge, T. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2. Singer, P. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–43. 3. Caney, S. 2005b. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Beitz, C. R. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5. Moellendorf, D. 2002. Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 6. Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Nagel, T. 2005. The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113–47. 9. Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Moellendorf, D. 2009. Global Inequality Matters. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Coercion	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 200 Coercion/Political philosophy/Morris: State power is closely associated with force, as we see from the popularity of the Weberian definition. >State/Weber. Many theorists think states are necessarily or essentially coercive. 'States are ' 'grounded" in force in the sense that, by definition, they are coercive: they coordinate behavior through the use or threat of force' (Levine, 1987⁽¹⁾: 176); 'State-power is in the last analysis coercive power' (Geuss, 2001⁽²⁾: 12); 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws' (Rawls, 1996⁽³⁾: 136). The view that governments must wield force or that their power is necessarily coercive is widespread in contemporary political thought. State/Coercion/MorrisVsWeber: The incompleteness of Weberian definitions of the state is only part of my objection to them. (>MorrisVsWeber; >State/Morris) The second concern is about understanding coercion or force to be part of the concept of the state. >Coercion/Morris. MorrisVsRawls: Why might we think, with Rawls, that 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions'? Perhaps because of the conjunction of law and sanction. But that connection is not necessary. Some laws are not enforced by sanctions (for instance, laws governing the obligations of officials, laws establishing powers, constitutional laws). Attempts to understand the law in terms of the coercive commands of a sovereign are implausible (see Austin, 1885⁽⁴⁾, for the classic formulation of this position; and Hart, 1994⁽⁵⁾, for the classic refutation). >Command/Hart. 1. Levine, Andrew (1987) The End of the State. London: Verso. 2. Geuss, Raymond (2001) History and Illusion in Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 4. Austin, John (1995 t 18851) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Hart, H. L. A. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Coercion	Morris	Gaus I 200 Coercion/Morris: connected. Consider a 'state' without law, or one whose jurisdiction was not territorial. We would not consider it to be a genuine state. Law and territoriality are essential properties of states, part of the concept of a state. >State/Morris. Coercion: Contrast these properties with coercion or force. We can conceive of a state which does not employ coercion or force. There is nothing in the nature of a law which requires that compliance be assured coercively. It does not seem to be, then, a conceptual truth that states are coercive. MorrisVsRawls: Why might we think, with Rawls, that 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions'? Perhaps because of the conjunction of law and sanction. But that connection is not necessary. Some laws are not enforced by sanctions (for instance, laws governing the obligations of officials, laws establishing powers, constitutional laws). Attempts to understand the law in terms of the coercive commands of a sovereign are implausible (see Austin, 1885⁽¹⁾, for the classic formulation of this position; and Hart, 1994⁽²⁾, for the classic refutation). >Sanctions/Morris, >Law/Morris. 1. Austin, John (1995 t 18851) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Hart, H. L. A. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Communitarianism	Walzer	Mause I 198 Communitarianism/Walzer: puts the community above the autonomy of the individual. WalzerVsRawls: Walzer does not establish principles. Assumptions such as that of a primordial social state or the idea of individuals who are free of historical, political and social references are too abstract or too far removed from life.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Communitarianism	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842⁽¹⁾: 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)⁽²⁾ (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)⁽³⁾, with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932⁽⁴⁾: 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)⁽⁵⁾provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)⁽⁶⁾. Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)⁽⁷⁾, Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)⁽⁸⁾, Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)⁽⁹⁾, and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)⁽¹⁰⁾ - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)⁽¹²⁾, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)⁽¹³⁾, and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)⁽¹⁴⁾ also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983⁽⁹⁾: xiv, 5). Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996⁽¹⁵⁾ Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses. 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)⁽¹⁶⁾. In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993⁽¹⁷⁾: Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989⁽¹⁸⁾ : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986⁽¹⁹⁾; 1992⁽²⁰⁾), Gewirth (1996⁾⁽²¹⁾, and Mason (2000)⁽²²⁾ do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992⁽²³⁾: 133; Friedman, 1992⁽²⁴⁾). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Consequentialism	Sen	Gaus I 418 Consequentialism/Sen/Weinstein: Sen concedes that his modified consequentialism turns even Williams into a consequentialist (though Williams would likely respond that, with Sen, we have an unholy hodgepodge that is no longer remotely consequentialist). Perhaps Sen's theory of equality can assist us here. >Equality/Sen, >Egalitarianism/Sen. SenVsDwoorkin/SenVsRawls: Sen rejects Rawlsian primary goods equality and Dworkin's resource equality as well as welfare equality in favour of capability equality. Capability equality is a modified needs account of equality similar to Miller's. (>Egalitarianism/Miller). For Sen, functionings and capability functionings determine well-being. That is, a person's life goes well when she not only manages to do various things (functions) but also possesses the where-withal (capabilities) to choose to do these things from many alternatives. >Capabilities/Sen. Equality/Sen: Everyone deserves equal basic nourishment but not equal happiness. Freedom itself is elementary, too, and therefore everyone also deserves equal basic freedom or capability equality. Consequentialism: In sum, morality is complex though fundamentally 'consequence-based'. Moral evaluation measures how effectively freedom and rights are promoted, duties are honoured and well-being is maximized. And these metrics are prermsed, in turn, on all enjoying the basic capability equality of 'being adequately nourished, having mobility' and 'taking part in the life of the community' (Sen, 1993⁽¹⁾: 36—7). Weinstein: Notwithstanding the intricacies of measuring behaviour according to such diverse consequences, we still might insist that Sen's consequentialism is consequentialist in name only. 1. Sen, Amartya (1993) 'Capability and well-being'. In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 30-53. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Contract Theory	Nussbaum	Brocker I 900 Contract Theory/NussbaumVsRawls/Nussbaum: Nussbaum does not consider John Rawls' contract-theoretically founded approach, which spells out basic resources in the sense of primary goods, to be convincing. An approach based on resources rather than capabilities cannot address special demands and differences. In this respect, Nussbaum criticizes Rawls's contextualist turn, by which he limits his conception to Western tradition contexts, as a false answer to critique (cf. HonnethVsRawls, Honneth 1992)⁽¹⁾. See >Capabilities/Nussbaum, >Capabilities/Sen. 1. A. Honneth »Einleitung«, in: ders. (ed.), Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften, Frankfurt/M./New York 1993, 7-17. Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Contract Theory	Sandel	Brocker I 675 Contract Theory/Sandel: for the political philosophy of modern times from Hobbes to Kant, the idea of contracts is so attractive not least because, according to its model, the establishment of states and legal systems can be thought of as an act of a free agreement of previously unattached individuals with different interests and life plans. The formal nature of the procedure and the free consent of all parties is crucial. SandelVsRawls: Rawls is not, however, concerned with justifying the establishment of a state and legal order in general, but with justifying certain substantive principles of justice. Problem: Rawls then has to justify certain principles in content with a purely formal criterion. He succeeds only by dropping the idea of justification by negotiation in favor of a derivation of principles from his implicit subjectivity theory (see Subjectivity/Sandel). See Veil of Ignorance/Sandel. The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset.⁽¹⁾ 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 130, 132. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Desert	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 227 Desert/Political Philosophy/Lamont: Like resource egalitarians, desert theorists (Pojman and McLeod, 1998)⁽¹⁾ emphasize responsibility and the minimization of the influence of factors over which people have little control. Their primary moral notion is not equality, however, as it is in resource egalitarianism, but the notion of deserving (though desert theories normally require a background of equal opportunity). VsRawls: Desert theorists seek to correct Rawls's failure to appreciate the extent to which individuals are responsible for, and hence deserving of, the fruits of their labour (Miller, 1976;⁽²⁾ 1989(3); 1999⁽⁴⁾; Sher, 1987⁽⁵⁾; Sterba, 1980⁽⁶⁾). They argue that the role of luck in determining our success is not significant enough to undermine a legitimate class of claims to deserve greater distributive shares on the basis of greater effort or a more valuable contribution towards the social product (Lamont, 1994⁽⁷⁾; McLeod, 1996⁽⁸⁾; Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾; Richards, 1986⁽⁹⁾; Sher, 1987⁽⁵⁾). Central to the theories is the ideal of people as agents who have the capacity to choose responsibly for themselves. People exercise this capacity to influence others' treatment of them and to act in ways that bring into the world goods and services that others find valuable. >Desert theories/Lamont, >Inequlities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Pojman, Louis P. and Owen McLeod, eds (1998) What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Miller, David (1976) Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Sher, George A. (1987) Desert. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Sterba, James (1980) The Demands of Justice. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 7. Lamont, Julian (1994) 'The concept of desert in distributive justice'. Philosophical Quarterly, 44:45—64. 8. McLeod, Owen (1996) 'Desert and wages'. Utilitas, 8: 205-21. 9. Richards, Norvin (1986) 'Luck and desert'. Mind, 95: 198-209. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Difference Principle	Sandel	Brocker I 674 Difference Principle/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: the difference principle states that social and economic inequalities only have a right to exist if they bring the greatest possible advantage to the least beneficiaries in a society. ⁽¹⁾ Sandel: does not deny that in an assumed initial situation for a society to be established (see Veil of ignorance/Rawls), this leads to subjects choosing in their own interest a principle that is as advantageous as possible for the less beneficiaries (since they do not know whether they themselves will belong to the less beneficiaries). See Rawls/Nozick). Solution/Sandel: one can only defend Rawls against Nozick's accusations if one assumes that the talents that lead to different social and economic positions are not at all the talents of individual individuals, but talents that are ascribed from the outset to the community of all subjects behind the "veil of ignorance. ⁽²⁾ Problem: that would run counter to Rawl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (See Subjectivity/Sandel); more entries on >difference principle. 1. John Rawls, Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,1975, (engl. 1971) p. 96. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 101, 141. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Distributive Justice	Anderson	Gaus I 231 Distributive justice/ Resource-based view (RBV)/Elisabeth Anderson/Lamont: in arguing for equal political status, Elizabeth Anderson (1999), in contrast to Rawls, resource egalitarians, and desert theorists, criticizes the prominence placed on luck and choice in the contemporary distributive justice literature. (VsResource-based view, VsRawls, VsDesert theories.) Equality/Elisabeth Anderson: Even though she supports egalitarian ideals, the point of equality, in her view, is not to compensate for different amounts of luck, but to express an ideal of political equality in which all members of the citizenry are publicly recognized as equally valuable and of equal status. Redistribution: Redistribution might be required to ensure public institutions effectively express political equality, but equality in the distribution of resources, whether to rule out luck or to hold people responsible for their choices, is not, according to Anderson, the primary or even legitimate aim of liberal redistributive institutions. Lamont: Anderson's arguments align her to a significant degree with a number of other political theorists, including communitarians and some feminists, who argue for the primacy of political recognition and equality over the more directly material policies Gaus I 232 of many other theorists. Problems: One of the challenges for this group is to give the details of the policies designed to give effect to their theories. 1. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Ander I Chris Anderson The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More New York 2006 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Rawls	Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)⁽¹⁾, such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993⁽²⁾: ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993⁽²⁾: 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993⁽²⁾: 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993⁽²⁾: 57, n. 10) >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism see >Pluralism/D’Agostino.) 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977⁽³⁾: 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases Land thatl this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993⁽²⁾: 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philo- sophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. (1) Cherniak, Christopher (1986): Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (2) Rawls, John (1993): Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. (3) Kuhn, Thomas (1977): The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Waldron	Gaus I 90 Diversity/society/toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Waldron: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life (…), we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. Toleration/Locke/Waldron: (...) part of the Lockean defence of religious toleration is built up on religious foundations: ‘The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion,’ says Locke, ‘is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light’ (1983⁽¹⁾: 25). >Toleration/Locke. Problem/Waldron: Maybe you cannot see what is really important about toleration except from a perspective that invokes particular values and particular philosophical conceptions. Gaus I 91 Hobbes: Another may opt for a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, emphasizing justificatory premises that all members of a pluralist society may be presumed to accept, whatever the differences in their ethics or world view. And the phrase ‘may be presumed to accept’ may be glossed in various ways, ranging from the idea of universally accessible reasons and reasoning to some fairly aggressive account of basic human interests, like the survivalist account developed by Hobbes (1991)⁽²⁾. >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 94 Individualism/Rawls/SandelVsRawls/Communitarianism/Waldron: (...) the individualism of Rawls’s thin theory drew criticism from communitarian philosophers, who repudiated the implicit assumption that individual plans of life are chosen by persons unencumbered by prior commitments and allegiances. Those who thought of themselves as essentially members of a particular family or community or people might find it hard to accept a theory of justice oriented at foundational level to the well-being of persons conceived as liberated from all such attachments (Sandel, 1982)⁽¹⁾. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽³⁾: 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2 , and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke, Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Equality	Singer	I IX Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment. --- I 16 Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example: Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London): --- I 17 Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray The Bell Curve, 1994. Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences? Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university? P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case. Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice) if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike. --- I 18 Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter. 2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality. Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities. --- I 19 VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments. --- I 20 Suffer/Interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. --- I 20 Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. --- I 21 Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race.	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Good	Rawls	I 396 Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good. --- I 397 Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods. (See Public Goods/Rawls). In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure. The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons. --- I 398 In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory. --- I 399 In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence. Definition Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition. 1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average⁽¹⁾. 2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X. 3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole. --- I 400 See footnotes 2-15. --- I 423 Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan. --- I 424 However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc. --- I 426 Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are^{(16)(17)(18)(19)}. --- I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. --- I 431 VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies^(20)(21)(22). --- I 435 In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon). --- I 437 Definition Good Person/Definition Moral Value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other. N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced. Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail⁽²³⁾. --- I 438 RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established. --- I 446 Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen. --- I 447 Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing. (1) See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67. (2) Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, vk. III, ch. 1-63. (3) Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol. IV, pp. 425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt. I. (4) See H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177. (5) H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I, ch. IX and bk. III, ch. XIV. (6) F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II. (7) Joshua Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II. (8) H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927), bk. II and III, esp. ch. VIII and IX. (9) W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955). (10) J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I and III; ch. VI. (11) For the naturalistic value theory see: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III. (12) See also R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), ch. XX-XXII. (13) As well as C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III. (14) Rawls' own approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, Mind (1950), vol. 59, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI. (15) Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 35 (1961). (16) Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. (17) See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. (18) G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78. (19) R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. (20) See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53. (21) W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92. (22) I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248. (23) See R. M. Hare, Geach on Good an Evil, Analysis 17(5), p. 109ff.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Good	Sandel	Brocker I 677 Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. ⁽¹⁾ Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. ⁽²⁾ 1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975) 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Individualism	Rawls	Gaus I 94 Individualism/Rawls/SandelVsRawls/Communitarianism/Waldron: (...) the individualism of Rawls’s thin theory drew criticism from communitarian philosophers, who repudiated the implicit assumption that individual plans of life are chosen by persons unencumbered by prior commitments and allegiances. Those who thought of themselves as essentially members of a particular family or community or people might find it hard to accept a theory of justice oriented at foundational level to the well-being of persons conceived as liberated from all such attachments (Sandel, 1982)⁽¹⁾. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽²⁾: 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 However, not all dissensus is regarded as reasonable. Problem: Waldron: Unfortunately, as Rawls uses it, the term ‘reasonable’ is ambiguous (...). >Reason/Rawls. (1) Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2) Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Individuals	Walzer	Mause I 198f Individual/Communitarianism/Walzer: Representatives of communitarianism (like Walzer) always see the individual instead as part of a specific society with a specific history and culture. Moral ideas are always shaped by this history and the specific culture. Even more: the principles of social justice must build on this history if they are to be considered legitimate. ⁽¹⁾ WalzerVsRawls. 1.Bernd Ladwig, Gerechtigkeitstheorien zur Einführung. Hamburg 2013, S. 163.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Inequalities	Rawls	I 100 Inequality/Rawls: there is a principle of remedy for individuals who are disadvantaged because of their natural endowment, at least for the first few years of school. --- I 101 To my knowledge, however, this principle has never been more than a prima facie principle⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾. Rawls: However, the principle of remedy must always be taken into account, no matter what other principles we follow. Difference principle/Rawls: secures resources, e. g. for the promotion of disadvantaged people. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). It has the same intention as the principle of remedy. --- I 102 The basic structure (of a society to be built) can be arranged in such a way that natural inequalities, which cannot be changed, have an effect for the benefit of the most disadvantaged. Nature/natural distribution/Rawls: is neither fair nor unfair. What is fair or unfair are the institutions that deal with this distribution. In justice as fairness ((s) Rawl's approach), members agree to participate in the fate of others. --- I 103 VsRawls: now one could argue that the preferred ones expect a bigger gain for themselves if they agree to the arrangement. RawlsVsVs: however, this requires a cooperation scheme. --- I 104 It is nobody's merit to be able to take a certain position in a community through natural talent or disadvantage. Since no right to a certain cooperation scheme with advantages for the better follows from this, it is the difference principle that can be accepted by all. The concept of merit simply cannot be used here. --- I 171 Inequality/Economy/Economics/Mathematics/Rawls: we must not underestimate the continuing effect of our individual initial conditions, talents and our original place in society and trust that mathematically appealing solutions would at some point provide a balance. Resolution/Rawls: our principles of justice must remedy the situation (see Principles/Rawls). --- I 226 Inequality/politics/economy/Rawls: thesis: the effects of injustice in the political system are much more serious and long-lasting than market irregularities. Political power expands rapidly and becomes uneven. Those who take advantage of this can easily move into positions of power by taking advantage of the apparatus of state institutions and law. Equal suffrage is not a secure means of combating this⁽³⁾. (1) See H. Spiegelberg, "A Defense of Human Equality" Philosophical Review, vol 53,1944, pp. 101,113-123. (2) D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Liberty", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 51,1950-1951, pp. 187f. (3) See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays, (New York, 1935) pp. 293-305.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Institutions	Nussbaum	Brocker I 895 Institutions/NussbaumVsRawls/Nussbaum: Rawls' liberal institutional doctrine lacks the ethical foundations to convey its values.⁽¹⁾ 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 45 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Intersubjectivity	Sandel	Brocker I 672 Intersubjectivity/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: In its supposed primordial state, Rawls presupposes a certain anthropology for a society to be established, which assumes that intersubjectivity or social relations are not constitutive for the identity of subjects. Rawls then assumes that people already possess their identity and individuality independently of and prior to the social relationships and historical locations in which they stand. Brocker I 673 Moreover: for Rawls, people's goals and purposes can never be constitutive for a subject's identity. Brocker I 676 If we include the dimension of intersubjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice, which would then be administered for all time, as it were, only by politics and jurisprudence. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community. ⁽¹⁾ 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice	Hayek	Mause I 197 Justice/Hayek: HayekVsRawls: Hayek's philosophy of freedom sees redistribution as an inadmissible interference in the autonomy rights of individuals and therefore rejects them because of their negative effects on social justice. ⁽¹⁾ Hayek's thesis: the overriding norm is that of individual autonomy. Terms that limit this autonomy need to be justified. For example, re-distribution: does not stand up to this justification, as the market is unsurpassedly efficient for Hayek. Market/Hayek: For the market to function optimally, all it needs is equal rights for all market participants, maximum contractual freedom and a minimum social security system. Any further redistribution measures would not only suppress the incentive to secure one's own existence. Nor would it have any legitimation either: possible unequal exchange results of the market are an unintended consequence of individual action and, due to the lack of intentionality, cannot justify any follow-up responsibility. ⁽²⁾ VsHayek: he does not take into account that interest groups can influence pricing or that a large number of services are not provided via the market. ⁽³⁾ Mause I 203 Justice/Theories of Justice/Hayek: Where Hayek relies on the principle of performance justice, Rawls focuses on equal opportunities, while Sens' principle of participation justice comes very close to need justice. ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾ RawlsVsHayek, HayekVsRawls, SenVsRawls, RawlsVsSen, SenVsRawls, SenVsHayek, HayekVsSen. 1. F. A. von Hayek, Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Tübingen 1971. 2. W. Kersting, Kersting, Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 60-63. 3.I. Becker, R. Hauser, 2011. Soziale Gerechtigkeit – ein magisches Viereck: Zieldimensionen, Politikanalysen und empirische Befunde. Berlin 2011, pp. 31-34. 3. Sven Jochem, Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin 2009, p. 68. 4. Cf. Rieger, Elmar, und Stephan Leibfried, Kultur versus Globalisierung: Sozialpolitische Theologie in Konfuzianismus und Christentum. Frankfurt am Main 2004, p. 44.	Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Justice	Barry	Gaus I 294 Justice/international relations/Barry/Brown: limiting (Barry, 1989)⁽¹⁾. Barry's (...) account of 'justice as impartiality' has substantial international implications; >Justice/International political theory. Impartiality/Barry: impartiality requires that the vital interests of each be put before the non-vital interests of anyone, which means that the existing distribution of wealth, and the environmental degradation characteristic of contemporary capitalism, must be regarded as unreasonable and unjust. The inescapable conclusion is that the advanced industrial world should slow down, or put into reverse, its growth and transfer resources to the poor via a system of 'progressive' global taxation (Barry, 1994⁽²⁾; 1998⁽³⁾). >Inequalities/International political theory; cf. >Taxation, >Tax Competition. BarryVsRawls: >Justice/International political theory. Cf. >Justice/Rawls, >Distributive Justice/Rawls, >Justice/Beitz. 1. Barry, B. (1989) 'Humanity and justice in global perspective'. In B. Barry, Democracy, Power and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 2. Barry, B. (1994) Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Barry, B. (1998) 'International society from a cosmopolitan perspective'. In D. Mapel and T. Nardin, eds, International Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 144-63. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Liberalism	Gaus I 96 Justice/Liberalism/Waldron: we should not understand the strategy of the political liberal as a strategy of attempting to suppress all basis for disagreement about justice. Political liberals should think about justice as a topic that naturally evokes disagreement even when the influence of rival comprehensive conceptions is left out of account. ((s) For the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism see >Liberalism/Waldron.) Rights/law/society/Waldron: The fact that one major source of dissensus is removed should not lead us to assume - what many political theorists mistakenly assume about rights - that what is just and unjust can be determined in some realm of principle that is beyond politics, some arena of philosophical argument where political procedures like voting will not be necessary. Like individual rights, justice remains an intensely contested issue, and though the contestation may be diminished it is not eliminated by the strategies that the political liberal proposes. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. responsibilities. So political liberalism also has implications for what this sharing a conception of justice amounts to. Example: (...) e.g., a left liberal like me ((s) Jeremy Waldron) may not say, for example, to a Social Darwinian that even the feeblest person is entitled to our compassion because he is created in the image of God. I must find some way of putting my point about equality that can be affirmed even by people who do not share my religious convictions. Equally a Christian conservative may not justify laws restricting abortion on the grounds that foetuses have souls, since this too is rooted in a comprehensive conception he cannot expect others to share. Gaus I 98 (...) the dative element (...) - that political justification be understood as justification to each and every individual -can be understood in more than one way. a) It may be understood as a requirement that the justificatation of political arrangements should be directed to the good or interests of each and every one who is subject to those arrangements. I shall call this the ‘interestregarding’ interpretation. b) Or it may be understood as a requirement that the justification of a political decision be plausibly reckoned likely to persuade everyone who is subject to the arrangements. I shall call this the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation, because it understands ‘justification to X’ as justification that seeks to hook up with premises to which X is already committed. Rawls/Waldron: Clearly Rawls’s political liberalism assumes what I have called the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation of the requirement that political justification must be justification to each and every individual. >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: However it is also important to see that interestregarding interpretation of justifiability to all can be maintained even if the premise-regarding interpretation is given up. >Liberalism/Waldron. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Honneth	Brocker I 790 Justice/HonnethVsRawls/Honneth: In contrast to other theories of justice, Honneth places the constructive role of social conflicts and the significance of the sources of "self-respect" ⁽¹⁾ to be opened up intersubjectively in the foreground for the question of social relations. See Self-Respect/Rawls. 1. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt 1979, p. 479-486 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice	Pettit	Brocker I 858 Justice/PettitVsRawls/Pettit: Pettit has stylized himself as a republican opponent of Rawl's theory of justice. He wants to oppose Rawl's model (see Justice/Rawls) with its own model, which "in a more substantial way" elaborates the ideas of freedom and social justice. ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Rawls/(s): is based on principles instead of "contents". Brocker i 859 RichterVsRawls: Pettit's model appears weak precisely where the concrete allocation of functions to public participation for the purpose of defining and controlling options for action by the state is concerned. Moreover, ironically, Rawls and Pettit's models resemble each other at precisely those points where Pettit claims to present the alternative to liberal political theory. It is Rawl's principle of difference that makes it possible to solve the problems raised by Pettit. ⁽³⁾ See Difference Principle/Rawls. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 2. Philip Pettit, Beyond Rawls, 2012, 107ff 3. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 1975, S. 96 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice	International Political Theory	Gaus I 294 Justice/International political theory/Brown: The reinvigoration of theories of justice begun by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice⁽¹⁾ (...) here, the technicalities of Rawls's scheme will be taken for granted, and the focus will be on their international implications (Brown, 1997⁽²⁾; 2002a⁽³⁾; 2002b)⁽⁴⁾. International justice/Brown: of the 'difference principle'. International society is not a 'co-operative venture for mutual advantage'; individual societies are assumed to be bounded and self-sufficient, and so there is nothing that could provide the basic materials for redistribution required by the notion of international distributive justice. VsRawls: For a theory of social justice to have nothing to say about the extraordinary inequalities that exist between societies appears perverse. International Justice/BarryVsRawls: Brian Barry this is symptomatic of wider problems with Rawls's project. International justice poses problems that are structurally similar to those posed by, for example, intergenerational justice and environmental justice; in each case the central notion of a contract based, at least in part, on the search for mutual advantage by the contractors, cannot easily respond to the interests of those who cannot be present as contractors, which category includes foreigners. Moreover, the requirement that arrangements be, in some sense, based on reciprocity is equally if not more limiting (Barry, 1989)⁽⁵⁾. >Justice/Barry, >Jutice/Beitz, >International relations/Pogge. Gaus I 295 Borders/boundaries/refugees: Since existing boundaries are clearly not the result of any kind of contract - nor are they 'natural' - what, if any, justification can be given for the norm which assigns to state authorities the right to control such borders, and thus creates categories such as 'political refugee' and 'economic migrant'? Pogge⁽⁵⁾ suggests none, and the majority of cosmopolitan liberals agree (Barry and Goodin, 1992(6); O'Neill, 1994⁽⁷⁾). However, as most cosmopolitans also agree, there are obviously practical problems with such a position, and liberal nationalists such as Michael Walzer and David Miller argue that Rawls was essentially correct to assume that distributive justice can only be a feature of bounded communities (Miller and Walzer, 1995⁽⁸⁾). A socially just society will involve redistribution of resources, and the willingness of citizens to redistribute depends crucially on the existence of a sense of community (Miller, 1995)⁽⁹⁾. Equality/inequality/justice/Brown: problem: a world of socially just communities might still be a radically unequal world. Can such a state of affairs truly be just? Liberalism/Brown: There is an impasse here which is symptomatic of a wider set of problems for contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism (Brown, 2000a)⁽³⁾. The distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is difficult to justify rationally, but a politics without this distinction, a politics without borders, is, in the world as it is, unattainable and undesirable, unless a libertarian conception of liberalism be taken to its limits, as Hillel Steiner (1992)⁽¹⁰⁾ advocates. >Hillel Steiner. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Brown, C. (1997) 'Review essay: theories of international justice'. British Journal of Political Science, 27:273—9. 3. Brown, C. (2000a) 'On the borders of (international) political theory'. In N. O'Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition. London: Routledge. 4. Brown, C. (2000b) 'Cultural diversity and international political theory'. Review of International Studies, 26: 199-213. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 6. Barry, B. and R. E. Goodin, eds (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 7. O'Neill, O. (1994) 'Justice and boundaries'. In C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe. London: Routledge, 69-88. 8. Miller, D. and M. Walzer, eds (1995) Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 486—93. 10. Steiner, H. (1992) 'Libertarianism and the transnational migration of people'. In B. Barry and R. E. Goodin, eds, Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Beitz	Gaus I 294 Justice/international relations/Beitz/Brown: BeitzVsRawls: Beitz offers two reasons why Rawls is wrong. Cf. >Justice/Rawls, >Distributive Justice/Rawls. 1) even if we accept that states are separate self-contained societies, their representatives would insist on a more wide-ranging contract than Rawls envisages. But, 2) since states are not self-contained there is no reason to look for a second contract between them; instead Rawls's full account of justice should be applied worldwide, including a global 'difference principle'. >Difference principle/Rawls. Ad 1) Beitz's first argument concerns the treatment of 'natural' resources. He argues contra Rawls that the representatives of states meeting in the second original position would not agree to a rule that confirmed that natural resources belong to the states whose territory encompasses them; risk-averse representatives would introduce a rule that distributed the world's resources equally, via some kind of global wealth tax. This is, on the face of it, a rather strong and widely supported argument; (...), Barry also argues for a global tax system (>Justice/Barry), though without employing the veil of ignorance or a second original position, while Hillel Steiner (1999)⁽²⁾ Gaus I 295 derives a similar idea for a redistributive global fund from libertarian foundations. (>Justice/Steiner). The main problem with these proposals is that they could produce unintended and counter-intuitive results; as Rawls (1999)⁽³⁾ points out in his later defence of his position, the wealth of a state is only very loosely, if at all, correlated with its material resource base. 2) Beitz's second position is that, as a result of interdependence, the world must now be treated as a single society, which means that Rawls's full account of social justice applies, with no necessity for a second contract between state representatives. VsBeitz: the problem here is that, however interdependent the present world order may be, it can hardly be seen as a co-operative venture for mutual advantage given the gross inequalities it generates. The international economy is certainly based on the idea that everyone benefits from economic exchange, but it would be a particularly enthusiastic neoliberal who argued that this applies across the board to all interactions between rich and poor. BeitzVsVs: Beitz has now acknowledged the strength of this criticism and effectively abandoned much of the Rawlsian justification for his cosmopolitanism in a later article - but not the cosmopolitanism itself, which he now grounds in a Kantian account of the moral equality of persons (Beitz, 1983)⁽⁴⁾. To some extent, Beitz's original position is restated by Thomas Pogge in his Realizing Rawls (1989)⁽⁵⁾. >International relations/Pogge. 1. Beitz, C. R. (2000) Political Theory and International Relations (1979), 2nd edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Steiner, H. (1999) 'Just taxation and international redistribution'. In I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer, eds, Global Justice: NOMOS XLI. New York: New York University Press, 171-91. 3. Rawls, J. (1999) The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Beitz, C. R. (1983) 'Cosmopolitan ideas and national sovereignty'. Journal of Philosophy, 80: 591-600. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Kant	Sandel	Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Kant	Gaus	Gaus I 111 Kant/contractualism/Gaus: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998⁽¹⁾: ch. 5). Gaus: A fruitful project for Kantian liberalism is to integrate the more direct version described above with the contractual argument (Reiman, 1990(2); Gaus, 1990⁽³⁾: Part II). >Person/Reiman. Some basic moral principles may be directly derived from our conceptions of ourselves as moral persons (i.e. a basic right to noninterference), while other moral principles (say, concerning specific schemes of property rights and distributive justice) may be justified via a contractual argument. 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Reiman, Jeffrey (1990) Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1990) Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Law	Kant	Brocker I 670 Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences. Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom. RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites. Brocker I 671 SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 304 Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical. Höffe I 306 Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work. For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings. What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"⁽¹⁾. Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people. KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant. 1.Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Liberalism	Kant	Brocker I 670 Liberalism/State/Kant: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead based himself entirely on a theory of the right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel. See Law/Justification/Kant. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism	Sandel	Brocker I 668 Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls. Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all. A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia), Brocker I 669 are usually called teleological. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them. B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. example. HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself. Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life. Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom. State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good. Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself. SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. ⁽¹⁾ Brocker I 676 SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. ⁽²⁾ 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x. 2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism	Gaus	Gaus I 100 Liberalism/Gaus: The distinction between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalisms (...) has become central to contemporary political theory. >Liberalism/Waldron. Comprehensive liberalism: versions: - liberalism as a secular philosophy; - liberalism as a philosophy of the good life; - liberalism as a political theory derived from a specific moral theory; - liberalism as itself a distinctive theory of the right or justice. Liberalism as a secular philosophy is a distinctly radical conception, which in some ways is the paradigmatic ‘fully comprehensive’ liberalism. On the other hand, liberalism as a theory of right is much more cautious about the extent that human reason converges; its more modest versions shade off into Rawlsian political liberalism. GausVsRawls: Thus I shall argue that the ‘comprehensive’ liberalism of A Theory of Justice (1971)⁽¹⁾ was a distinctly ‘partial’ comprehensive view, which was not as comprehensive as many other varieties of liberalism. Gaus I 101 Throughout the last century, liberalism has been beset by controversies between, on the one hand, those broadly identified as ‘individualists’ and, on the other, ‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or ‘organicists’ (for scepticism about this, though, see Bird, 1999⁽⁵⁾). Gaus I 102 (...) the last 20 years have witnessed a renewed interest in collectivist analyses of liberal society - though the term ‘collectivist’ is abjured in favour of ‘communitarian’. Gutmann: Writing in 1985, Amy Gutmann observed that ‘[w]e are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic’ (1985⁽³⁾: 308). Starting with Michael Sandel’s famous (1982)(4) criticism of Rawls, a number of critics charged that liberalism was necessarily premised on an abstract conception of individual selves as pure choosers, whose commitments, values and concerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self. >Rawls/Sandel. What is important for our purposes is that these debates focus on whether liberalism entails an individualist theory of humans in society, or whether its political and moral commitments can be conjoined with various conceptions of the self and the social order; it is thus a debate about just how ‘comprehensive’ liberalism really is. Gaus I 103 Liberalism becomes identified with the promotion of a certain sort of self-realizing individual, one who develops her nature, is rational and suspicious of custom, experiments with different ways of living and is not prone to conformism. Cf. >Mill/Gaus, >Individual/Mill, >Individualism/Rawls, >Perfectionism/Rawls. Gaus I 104 It is a mistake to try to define liberalism; liberal theories are complex clusters of conceptual and value commitments. But surely a crucial criterion for describing a view as ‘liberal’ is whether freedom is the core conceptual commitment (Freeden, 1996⁽⁶⁾; Gaus, 2000a⁽⁷⁾). >Freedom/Liberalism. Gaus I 105 Moral theory: (...) a liberal theory of the good life and morality must be distinguished from a commitment to liberalism built on a moral theory; these two distinct conceptions of liberalism are often lumped together as ‘comprehensive’ liberalism. Liberal political principles can be derived from moral theories that themselves are not intrinsically liberal. [There are] three such theories: utilitarianism, Hobbesian contractualism and value scepticism. >Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bird, Colin (1999) The Myth of Liberal Individualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Gutmann, Amy (1985) ‘Communitarian critics of liberalism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14: 308–22. 4. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Freeden, Michael (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Gaus, Gerald F. (2000a) Political Theories and Political Concepts. Boulder, CO: Westview. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Overlapping Consensus	Rawls	Gaus I 93 Overlapping Consensus/Diversity/individualism/Rawls/Waldron: what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980⁽¹⁾: 518–19). Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice⁽²⁾ was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽³⁾: 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn, and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1 , C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993⁽³⁾: 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: The idea of overlapping consensus assumes that there can be many routes to the same destination. Geographically the metaphor is plausible enough, but when the destination is a set of moral principles, and ‘routes’ is read as reasons for the acceptance of those principles, then the matter is less clear. Unlike legal rules, moral propositions are not just formulas. A principle is perhaps best understood as a normative proposition together with the reasons that are properly adduced in its support. On either of these accounts, the principle of toleration arrived at by the Christian route is different from the principle of toleration arrived at by Mill’s route. And this is a difference that may matter, for a theory of justice is not only supposed to provide a set of slogans for a society; it is also supposed to guide the members of that society through the disputes that may break out concerning how these slogans are to be understood and applied. >Justice/Liberalism, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. (1) Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. (2) Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (3) Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Overlapping Consensus	Waldron	Gaus I 96 Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls/Waldron: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsOvverlapping consensus: The actual examples of overlapping consensus for a pluralist society provided in Political Liberalism are laughably easy by comparison. Both Kantians and non-Kantians might favour democracy, Rawls says, and both Christians and secularists may well oppose slavery (1993⁽¹⁾: 122–5). The hard part comes when we try to establish an overlapping consensus among (say) Christian fundamentalists, Hindus, secular humanists, scientific determinists, and members of the dot-com generation on the definition of ‘equal opportunity’, the use of economic incentives, and the distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty. (...) it was not hard to see that insistence on a strong theory of desert might mean that a theory of justice would have to buy into social and religious controversies about virtue. But it was much more difficult to know what to do with that point, or what would be a fair or a neutral way to move on from it. Can we imagine an overlapping consensus on problems like that between (say) the Protestant work ethic, the notion of apostolic poverty, and ideas of the fundamental solidarity of community? It is easy to despair of answering questions like this under the conditions that Rawls’s later work has emphasized. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Pluralism	Rawls	Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)⁽¹⁾, such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993⁽²⁾: ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993⁽²⁾: 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993⁽²⁾: 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993⁽²⁾: 57, n. 10) >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism see >Pluralism/D’Agostino.) 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977⁽³⁾: 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases Land thatl this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993⁽²⁾: 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993⁽²⁾: 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philosophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. 1. Cherniak, Christopher (1986) Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977) The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Politics	Sunstein	I 42 Politics/Sunstein: should politics be made according to survey results? The theorem of Condorcet makes the question seem less pointless than it appears at first glance. (See Decision Theory/Condorcet). However, this only applies to yes/no questions within groups whose members are most likely to be correct in their majority. This may be the case in consultative bodies in companies, or in certain specialist areas when a panel of experts is consulted. However, it would not work if the population of a country, such as the United States, were asked whether the Kyoto Protocol should be signed. --- I 44 In many areas, people are subject to systematic mistakes. However, the question remains whether group discussions help. (See Democracy/Sunstein). Functioning democracies delegate certain issues to expert committees. ((s) See MorozovVsJarvis and MorozovVsShirky. --- I 45 In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups. ⁽¹⁾ The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more extremely polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented. --- I 46 In addition, the respective groups found greater homogeneity. --- I 49 Group discussion/John Rawls: Thesis: The advantages lie in the combination of information and increasing the range of arguments. ⁽²⁾ SunsteinVsRawls: see above. 1. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006). 2. 8. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 358–59.	Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017
Politics	Sandel	Brocker I 676 Politics/Principles/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/Sandel: Taking into account the dimension of inter-subjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice that would then, as it were, only be administered by politics and jurisdiction for all time. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community. Brocker I 677 Thus Sandel is in the tradition of Aristotelianism and republicanism. ⁽¹⁾ (RepublicanismVsKant, RepublicanismVsLiberalism, AristotleVsKant). HegelVsKant/Rothhaar: this is also an echo of Hegel's criticism of Kant: Kant neglects the subjects' inter-subjectivity; for Kant, the subject is ultimately oriented towards the transcendental subject. ⁽²⁾ (See Intersubjectivity/Sandel, Principles/Rawls.) Politics/Morality/Sandel: Sandel's design of a political philosophy strongly recalls the concept of "morality" that Hegel develops in the basic lines of the philosophy of law. ⁽³⁾ The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. 1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 4-8. 2. Steven B. Smith, Hegel Critique of Liberalism. Rights in Context, London/Chicago 1991, p. 4. 3. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge/New York 1991, p. 202. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics	Pettit	Brocker I 858 Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"⁽¹⁾ as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts. ⁽²⁾ ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets" (See also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good. John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought. ⁽³⁾ RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building. PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 S. 53 2. Ebenda S. 63 3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, S. 108 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Principles	Rawls	I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. --- I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. --- I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. --- I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria⁽¹⁾. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role⁽²⁾. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. --- I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. --- I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. --- I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. --- I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. --- I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. --- I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. --- I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. --- I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). --- I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. --- I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. --- I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... --- I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. --- I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. (1) Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. (2) Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Principles	Rescher	Rawls I 317 Prinzipien/Gerechtigkeit/RescherVsRawls/Rescher: Statt des Differenzprinzips könnte man das Kriterium des Durchschnittsnutzens abzüglich eines Bruchteils der Standardabweichung setzen(Siehe N. Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York, 1966), pp. 35-38.) Damit wird stärker auf die Schwächeren Rücksicht genommen als beim Durchschnittsprinzip.	Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Rationality	Scanlon	Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998⁽¹⁾: 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996⁽²⁾: 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996^(3): ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998⁽¹⁾: ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Rawls	Nozick	Brocker I 674 Rawls/NozickVsRawls/Nozick: Rawls' difference principle boils down to that the better-off with their talents are used as a mere means of improving the social and economic situation of the worse-off. However, this would run counter to the deontological-Kantian claim. ⁽¹⁾ See Difference Principle/Sandel, SandelVsRawls. 1.Robert Nozick, Anarchie, Staat, Utopia, München 2006,(engl. 1971) p. 300f. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Rawls	Sandel	Brocker I 673 Rawls/Subject/Individual/Metaphysics/Subjectivity/Individuality/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Sandel criticizes Rawl's conception of an assumed starting point for a society to be built (see Veil of Ignorance/Rawls, Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Sandel): 1. Rawls fails to achieve his own goal of reconstructing Kant's practical philosophy free of metaphysics and without reformulating the subject's specific theory. On the contrary, Rawls presupposes a specific theory of the subject ("mutual disinterest", subjectivity and identity independent of the subject's goals and purposes). ⁽¹⁾(See Subjectivity/Sandel). 2. this leads to an impoverishment of the possibilities of human self-conception in the political community. ⁽²⁾ 3. with this, the approach of Rawls is simply wrong, because people cannot understand each other in this way at all. ⁽³⁾ 4. The concept of Rawls' initial state is in contradiction to other elements of his theory, especially to the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) and to his contract theory. (See Contract Theory/Rawls). See also Difference Principle/Sandel, Rawls/Nozick. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 65 2. Ibid. p. 177 3. Ibid. p. 65. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Reason	Scanlon	Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998⁽¹⁾: 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996⁽²⁾: 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996⁽³⁾: ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998⁽¹⁾: ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Reciprocity	Singer	I 61/62 Ethics/Reciprocity/Compensation/Equality/Plato/P. Singer: Plato lets Glaucon say in the state: "It is by nature good to commit injustice, but to suffer it is bad, and the latter in a stronger way than the first. So if you have experienced both, you should come to avoid both. --- I 62 Socrates disproves this view of Glaucon in the dialogue. P. SingerVsRawls: Glaucon's conception is still to this day found in the work of John Rawls and David Gauthier. It leads to the exclusion of animals from the sphere, which is subject to our own ethical standards, because animals cannot behave in the way we behave towards them. Therefore, no reciprocity can be assumed in our relationship with them. In order to deal with this problem, we must distinguish between explanation and justification.	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Reflective Equilibrium	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 226 Reflective equilibrium/Political philosophy/Lamont: theorists, the general population, and hopefully politicians, engage in a collective cognitive process through discussion and debate in order to come up with principles and policies to better cohere with the moral judgements and beliefs of the people. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls. Of course, theorists can achieve such an equilibrium only by finding out what people believe (Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾: chs 3—4; Swift et al., 1995⁽²⁾). Fortunately, over the last couple of decades, there has been a sustained effort to collect the data necessary to this project (Elster, 1995⁽³⁾; Hochschild, 1981⁽⁴⁾; Kluegel and Smith, 1986⁽⁵⁾; Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾). Miller: David Miller (1999⁽¹⁾: ch. 4) has surveyed the empirical studies, partly summarizing the findings as follows: in people's thinking about social distribution, (there is) a tendency to favour more equality than presently exists in liberal democracies. This is partly to be explained by considerations of desert and need: people do not regard income inequalities of the size that currently obtain as deserved, and at the bottom of the scale they think it unfair that people cannot earn enough to meet their needs. (1999⁽¹⁾: 91) Frohling and Oppenheimer: In a series of experiments conducted to see what distributive principles people would choose, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992⁽⁶⁾) presented the subjects with four principles for distributing income: (l) maximizing the average income, (2) maximiz- ing the minimum income, (3) maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (no income to fall below $x), and (4) maximizing the average subject to a range constraint (the gap between top and bottom incomes not to exceed $y). Maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (or safety net) was chosen by the vast majority of individuals, while maximizing the average was a distant second. Lamont: The alternative used to gauge support for the difference principle - maximizing the minimum income - had very little support. Rawls: So while Rawls (1993⁽⁷⁾: 8) popularized the theory of reflective equilibrium, his own theory of distributive justice gains little support from it. VsRawls: Some critics of his difference principle provide one reason for this. Although the argument, outlined above, for the difference principle gives moral weight to reducing the influence of factors over which people have no control, it gives little positive weight to choice and responsibility. Under the difference principle, the social structure is designed to maximize the position of the least advantaged group (characterized by Rawls, 1972⁽⁸⁾: 97, as the bottom socio-economic quartile), no matter what choices individual members of that group have made. If the general public has a stronger view of the moral weight that should be given to responsibility, as Samuel Scheffler (1992)⁽⁹⁾ has argued they do, then the degree of support the public believes is owed to the disadvantaged will depend on whether the disadvantage is due to a disability, a lack of motivation, or an individual lifestyle choice. Such considerations have influenced resource egalitarians and desert theorists (...). >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive justice/ Resource-based view (RBV), cf. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Swift, A., G. Marshall, C. Burgoyne and D. Routh, (1995) 'Distributive justice: does it matter what the people think?' In James R. Kluegel, David S. Mason and Bernard Wegener, eds, Social Justice and Political Change. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 15—47. 3. Elster, Jon (1995) 'The empirical study of justice'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 81-98. 4. Hochschild, Jennifer L. (1981) What; Fair: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith (1986) Beliefs about Inequality. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter. 6. Frohlich, N. and J. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Appoach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Selection	Rawls	I 426 Selection/Evolution/Abilities/Aristotelian Principle/Rawls: Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities to a greater extent, the more they realize these abilities and the more challenging (complex) they are^(1)(2)(3)(4). --- I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. --- I 431 VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies^(5)(6)(7). (1) Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. (2) See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. (3) G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp.76-78. (4) R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“, Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. (5) See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53. (6) W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92. (7) I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Self	Sandel	Brocker I 676 Self/Sandel: Sandel thesis: for the identity and individuality of subjects, their respective self-understanding as members of a community and bearers of a story, as well as their beliefs of what constitutes good for people, is constitutive. ⁽¹⁾ SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: N.B.: if these moments of community are not "possessed" and thus ultimately remain external, but rather constitute the identity of subjects, then people cannot "leave them behind them" when they enter the "space of the political". SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. ⁽²⁾ 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 179 2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Sidgwick	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 414 Sidgwick/Political philosophy/Weinstein: Sidgwick's significance for contemporary political theory has been enormously undervalued. John Rawls's Theory of Justice is, to a considerable extent, a critical response to Sidgwick. When Rawls says we 'often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism', the utilitarianism he has in mind is Sidgwick's (1981⁽¹⁾: viii). Contemporary political theorists must take Sidgwick seriously if they take Rawls seriously (...). BarryVsRawls: If Barry is right in insisting that we live in a 'post-Rawlsian' world, then navigating this world requires that we take better account of Sidgwick. Utilitarianism/Sidgwick: Sidgwick's 'classical' utilitarianism was also a form of liberal utilitarianism in so far as Sidgwick held, like Mill, that utility was best promoted indirectly via intermediary moral principles. Hence, Rawls's attack on 'classical' utilitarianism is warfare against a straw man. For Sidgwick, the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality generally constituted appropriate happiness-maximizing guides and therefore needed modest critical refinement. Sidgwick nevertheless held, like Mill, that 'as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will be the Utilitarian's duty to aid in improving it' (1981⁽¹⁾: 476). Common sense: More recently, Rawls has embraced Sidgwick's healthy reverence for common sense. Following Sidgwick, Rawls holds that our moral intuitions play a critical role in justifying and systematizing our political principles. Whereas Sidgwick justifies and systematizes common sense by appealing to utility, Rawls deploys the veil of ignorance as a justificatory and systematizing filtering device (...). Sidgwick: For Sidgwick as well as Rawls, common sense tames radical reform. The utilitarian reformer ‚will naturally contemplate (established morality) with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth . he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced.‘ (1981⁽¹⁾: 475). In sum, for Sidgwick, utility was best maximized indirectly via healthy but not uncritical deference to the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality. >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick. 1. Sidgwick, Henry (1981 [1907]) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Slavery	Rawls	I 167 Slavery/average benefits/Rawls: against the principle of average benefit one could argue that it requires the same risk acceptance from all. Since in the beginning there was never a situation in which all parties involved could agree, the principle should be rejected. Extreme example: A slave keeper could argue that in the circumstances of his society, the institution of slavery is necessary to produce the greatest average happiness. Furthermore, he would argue that he himself, in the initial situation of a society to be established (in which all parties involved stand behind a veil of ignorance with regard to their later position in society), would have voted for slavery with the risk of ending up as a slave themselves. Rawls: At first glance, this could be dismissed as absurd, one could think that it makes no difference what he chooses; as long as individuals have agreed to a concept of justice with real risks, no one is bound to such requirements. Contract theory/Rawls: if one takes the view of contracts as a basis, however, the argument of the slave keeper is correct: it would be a mistake if the slaves wanted to answer that the argument was superfluous, since there is no actual choice and no equal distribution of opportunities. The treaty doctrine is purely hypothetical: if a version of justice were chosen in the initial situation, its principles would be those that were applied. It is not an argument that such an understanding was not intended or would ever be. We cannot have both: a hypothetical interpretation without concrete information about the result... --- I 168 ...and later by reassessing the risk, rejecting principles we no longer want to have. G. HarmanVsRawls/Rawls: Gilbert Harman pointed out to me that I had made this mistake myself⁽¹⁾. Solution/Rawls: The theory of justice as fairness refutes the slave owner argument already in the initial situation. (See also Principles/Rawls). Here, according to the theory of justice as fairness, we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice, then the imponderables can be circumvented: Cf. --- I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. (1) See G. Harman "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice", Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C. J. Friedrich and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1963.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Society	Neo-Republicanism	Gaus I 175 Society/Neo-republicanism/Dagger: (...) civic virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus- tained. NeorepublicanismVSLiberalism: But the neorepublicans also tend to believe that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. As Sandel says, 'the civic or formative aspect of our LAmericanJ politics has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen' (1996(1): 6). SandelVsRawls: This 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and the decisions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society in which individuals fail to understand how much they owe to the community. 1. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Subjectivity	Sandel	Brocker I 672 Subjectivity/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: In its supposed primordial state, Rawls presupposes a certain anthropology for a society to be established: in Rawls, the identity of subjects is not determined by their social relationships and just as little by inter-subjectivity. This is connected with the fact that in the assumed initial situation there should be a "mutual disinterest" between the subjects. ⁽¹⁾ Brocker I 673 Goals/Purposes: according to Rawls, should also not be constitutive for the identity of a subject. Rawls's subject has its goals as something external. This would be the "concept of a subject of property that is already individualized and given before its purposes". ⁽²⁾ Self/Rawls/Sandel: Sandel describes this concept of a subject as that of an "unencumbered self" (3). See Rawls/Sandel. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48. 2. Ibid. p. 59 3. Michael Sandel “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” in: Political Theory, 12/1 1984, p. 86. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Universalism	Rawls	Gaus I 93 Universalism/Rawls/Waldron: : „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980⁽¹⁾: 518–19). Waldron: that amounted to a withdrawal from moral universalism in one direction: Rawlsian justice was not a theory for all societies, but a theory for societies like the United States. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice⁽²⁾ was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. (1) Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. (2) Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Veil of Ignorance	Rawls	I 136 Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case. I 137 This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation. On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche. I 138 There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known. I 139 The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage. I 140 The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere. I 141 Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved. I 142 Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness. I 143 Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). I 166 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Veil of Ignorance	Sandel	Brocker I 672 Veil of Ignorance/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Rawl's "Veil of Ignorance" in an assumed >initial state of a society to be built, in which people do not know what role they will later play, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. SandelVsRawls: Problem: How do the conditions of the original state come about if they are not the result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the non-empirical conditions of the possibility of freedom, as in Kant? Rawls: assumes a "mutual disinterest" of people in their original state. Sandel: Question: What is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of an initial state? ⁽¹⁾ See Beginning/Sandel, Intersubjectivity/Sandel. Brocker I 675 SandelVsRawls: behind the veil of ignorance there is no negotiation at all, since the subjects assumed by Rawls have no different interests at all. The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. ⁽²⁾ See Contract Theory/Sandel. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48. 2. Ibid. p. 130, 132. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Rawls, J.	Habermas Vs Rawls, J.	Rorty II 89 HabermasVsRawls: He requires proof of transculturally valid premises for the superiority of the liberal West.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rawls, J.	Verschiedene Vs Rawls, J.	Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) Moral / Rawls: sees in Hegel the precursor of his own "political liberalism". HeidbrinkVsRawls: This suppresses that the process of procedural agreement presupposes the "collective purpose" that it is intended to create. (> Circle).
Rawls, J.	Mackie Vs Rawls, J.	Stegmüller IV 206 Altruism/Rawls: ( "justice as fairness"): Rawls feins that creatures are not guided by sympathy, but only by self-love, "rational egoist". IV 207 Rawls/Stegmüller: the "veil of ignorance" goes back to J. Harsanyi. VsUtilitarianism: initially, subjective preferences are unknown. MackieVsRawls: nevertheless, the result is something similar to utilitarianism: each rational egoist presumes, probably rightly so, that he is more likely to belong to the broader group of luckies than to the smaller group of unfortunates and accordingly schemes disadvantages for "the others." Instead: search for a compromise that is acceptable to everyone involved. Society/MackieVsRawls: but now this compromise is identical to U3, the third stage of universalization. IV 208 RawlsVsMackie/Stegmüller: Rawls would not accept that, since his model is not an immediate guide to action. Def morality in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: restriction of the self-interests of the agents.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Rawls, J.	Cavell Vs Rawls, J.	I 31 RawlsVsPerfectionism/RawlsVsEmerson: unjust celebration of strong and inventive individuals at the expense of the weak. CavellVsRawls: this is too limited to the social, cultural and political order. He only demands the maximization of the given culture and forgets to ask about the conditions for anything to be considered a successful cultural engagement. I 32 CavellVsRawls: it is not the question how we can get more and more of the same, but how to find culture at all. Emerson: "Conversion of the world" ~Finding true goals. Def Self/Cavell: to articulate the reasons and conditions by which one's own position in the world becomes understandable means to be a subject.	Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Rawls, J.	Newen Vs Rawls, J.	New I 157 Def Just/Basic Order/Rawls/Newen: just is a basic order if the participants themselves have agreed on it under fair conditions. Original State/Society/Rawls/Newen. Precursor: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. Rawls: 1) The contract parties make a final choice of a basic order 2) They choose the order from a list of historical influential candidates that they can modify 3) the contract parties think rationally 4) they have the three higher-ranking regulatory interests. 5) they have general economic and psychological knowledge 6) they make their choice behind the veil of ignorance: they do not know their place in society. I 158 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: Point: leads to an endorsement of the Maximin principle. Principles/Rawls/Newen: the two principles would be supported by someone if their enemy can assign them a place. (Rawls ThdG 233). Newen: with that, Rawls builds on Kant. I 159 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: is released gradually, each with reference to decisions already taken on a level. Justice/Justice Theory/Rawls/Pogge/Newen: a conception of justice that people with different worldviews obey together neither needs to affirm nor deny its own capacity for truth. Justification/Pogge: it is enough for it to distinguish it as the most sensible or appropriate for our political culture. (Pogge, John Rawls, p 173). I 160 VsRawls/Newen: people are more influenced by emotion than Rawls believes. Should people heavily influenced by emotion be excluded from the order? I 161 VsRawls: he is at risk of falling behind the procedural fairness of the Enlightenment which ensures that all people can participate in the constitution-making process on an equal footing, regardless of race, opinion, and education. VsRawls: this leaves open the possibility of a "justice expertocracy". UntilitarianismVsRawls/EnlightenmentVsRawls: they consider the political autonomy also of non-experts a priority. VsRawls: cannot submit a concept for the (inhomogeneous) world population.	New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Subjectivism	Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism	Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework.	Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989