Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Field | Counterfactual conditionals/FieldVsCounterfactual conditional: the counterfactual conditional is too vague for physical theories or geometric terms. DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: they cannot be "just right" (barely true). - They need ascertainable facts as truth-makers (without counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual conditionals, cf. >Implication, >Conditionals, >Counterfactuals, >Theories, >Method, >Measurements, >Truth, >Truth conditions. Substantivalism/Field: can guarantee that situations where distances differ also differ in non-counterfactual aspects. . >Substantivalism. FieldVsRelationism: Relationism cannot. >Relationism. FieldVsCounterfactual Conditionals: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot be defined non-counterfactually as well. - (This is why they cannot be "barely true"). >Bare truth. Counterfactual conditionals cannot be derived from counterfactual statements about points in the plane. - Therefore, we must take them as the naked truth. - That would be no problem if you only needed a few of them. I 233 Counterfactual Conditional/explanation/Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on the non-contigent. - E.g. counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. - Nothing sensible can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. - Since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem here. FieldVsLewis: not all facts in mathematics are necessary - e.g. number of planets. >Mathematics, >Physics, >Necessity, >Facts, >Contingency. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relationism | Field | I 171 Def Relationism: Thesis: no empty space exists. Def Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. Part-relation: exists in both. >Space, >Absoluteness, >Motion, >Spacetime points. I 181 Relationism/Field: makes field theory impossible - because it excludes empty space. I 182 Putnam: Relationism can take the field as an enormous (because of the infinity of the physical forces) object. - Then for each region one part of it. - FieldVs: this trivializes the relativism. I 183 Field theory/FT/Substantivalism/Field: for the substantivalism the field is not a gigantic object, but no entity at all. Field theory: is for the substantivalism only the attribution of causal predicates to regions. I 216 Problem of Quantities/FieldVsRelationism: the only way to show that there is a (narrow) spatial relation, is to assume that the double distance itself is a spatial relation. But relationism cannot do this because it wants to define it first, and cannot presuppose it as defined. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Substantivalism | Field | I 13 Def substantivalism/Field: asserts that literal speech about space can be taken at face value, even without physical objects. Then it is also useful to say that the space is empty. >Space, >Empty Space, >Relationism. I 14 FieldVsSubstantivalism: is forced to answer a relationist in his own terms. I 47 Substantivalism/Field: (the thesis that there are empty spacetime regions). Space time regions are known as causally active: e.g. field theories such as classical electromagnetism or the general relativity theory or quantum field theory. Resnik: we should not ask "What properties of the spacetime points ..?" but "What is the structure of space-time?" FieldVsResnik: that's wrong. The theory of the electromagnetic field is also that of the properties of the parts of the space time that are not occupied by objects. I 171 Definition Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. - Definition Relationism: Thesis: there is no empty space. Part-of-relation: exists in both. >Part-of-relation. I 181 Substantivalism/Field: favors the field theory. >Field theory. I 184 Substantivalism/Newton pro: E.g. bucket experiment: shows that we need the concept of absolute acceleration and the one of the equality of place over time - (space that exists through time). --- III 34f Field pro substantivalism: there is empty space time. - Spacetimepoints are entities in their own right. - Field: that is compatible with the nominalism. - VsRelationism: this cannot accept Hilbert's axioms. VsRelationism: cannot accept physical fields. - Platonism: assumes at fields spacetime points with properties. - VsRelationism: this one cannot do it. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Absolutism | Stalnaker Vs Absolutism | I 124 absolute/Possible Worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: but that is not the sense in which we usually speak of properties and relations as absolute! Nobody would argue Vsabsolute simultaneity for the reason that simultaneity is contingent that simultaneous events could have taken place one after another. Suppose we are Vsabsolute identity in Salmons sense. Question: can we still understand the intraworldly or the poss.w.-relative identity relation as "to be the same thing" independent from the description of things? Stalnaker: there is no reason why we could not do so. Def identity/relative to poss.w./Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the domain of w. Nonexistence/predication/predication utterances/Stalnaker: problem: if the object does not exist. Thesis: I prefer a modal semantics that requires that the extension of a predicate is a subset of (things-) domains of their poss.w.. Then x=x is wrong if the value that is attributed to x does not exist (or has no counterparts). Versus: If you drop this condition (which is unusual) you allow that non-existent objects have properties and stand in relations. I 214 "Pessimistic view"/Jackson: e.g. a pessimist Vsabsolute quiescent point: Someone says, there is no absolute quiescent point, everything what we can represent by language are facts about relative position. Suppose we want to refute this: one could specify a coordinate system and a unit. E.g. take the mass centers of the earth, sun and mars, form a plane and in addition the moment of Newton's birth. Then we have an x-y plane then we introduce the units meter and second and define for each axis positive and negative directions. Then we have the means to specify absolute position as quadruples of real numbers, at least if we assume that there are absolute positions that you can specify. With that we ignore that our reference points (sun, mars could be vague). Vs: Jackson's skeptics could argue that this is not really allowed to say how things are absolute but only how they relate to the sun, earth and moon at the time of Newton's birth. VsVs/Stalnaker: but it would not be clear on what basis he replies that. I 215 We did therefore not escape the problem that all our words, even all of our representational resources come from the actual world - there is no point outside where we could look for it. Important argument: but that does not imply that the contents of whose expression we use our words, are inevitably dependent from many of the facts that our words have these contents. I 226 Relationalism/relationism/space/Leibniz/Stalnaker: Thesis: pro conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think he is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute localisation (Position, no absolute quiescent point). That means that the assignment of number triples to space points is arbitrary. RelationismVsAbsolutism/Stalnaker: the point of issue is whether the identification of spatial points is conventionally in time. Relationism: there is no absolute movement. Only change in time of the relative positions of things. Movement/Relationism/Stalnaker: Assertions about movements are totally useful here! But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). Analogy/Stalnaker: suppose someone tried to refute relationism with an argument analogous to that of Shoemaker, meaning the one of the gradual change. Interpersonal spectrum: analogous to his denial is the denial of the meaningfulness of the thesis that the universe could also be shifted one meter to the left. Such a poss.w. would only be a conventional new description. I 227 Relationism: but even he has to admit - it is then said - that the chair could be first placed alone one meter to the left, and then gradually all other objects. This is certainly not impossible. And it would turn nonsense, one would say that at the last change the initial state would at a stroke again exist. ((s) In order to meet the thesis that nothing has changed on the whole). Stalnaker: I hope no one takes this argument seriously VsRelationism. Relationism/Stalnaker: has no reason to abandon his view that the overall effect of the series of changes leaves the things as they were. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Mundy, B. | Field Vs Mundy, B. | I 199 Representation Theorem/VsRelationism: Relationism cannot take over the representation theorems from substantivalism either, because these depend on structural regularities (regularity of spacetime structure). And this regularity of spacetime is lost in relationalism. ((s) because there should be no empty sp.t., the sp.t. itself is bound to (empirically irregularly) occurring matter). Wrong Solution/Mundy: (1983): has proven a "representation theorem" which is not based on structural regularities. But that does not help heavy duty Platonism, because it generates numerical functors only from other numerical functors. That means he does not take predicates which put matter particles (point particles) in relation to each other, but a functor k: that refers particles to real numbers. E.g. For every three-point particle a real number that represents the inner product of two vectors which have one of these points as a common starting point, and the other two as endpoints. From this he extracts (several) coordinate systems, so that we have a representation theorem of species. FieldVsMundy: this does not serve the purposes for which representation theorems were originally developed, because it does not depart from a non-numeric base. Mundy: also sees that the R should not use any functions of point particles to real numbers as the basis for its formulation of physics. Therefore, he reformulates the equation: old: k(p,q,r) = a (where a is a real number) new: ka(p,q,r) so that we have an uncountable, infinite set of 3-digit space relations, one for every real number. (Mundy, 1983, p 212, 223.) FieldVsMundy: this does not solve any problem, because it’s only a notational trick. ((s) notation, orthography, paraphrasing, renaming >Rorty: "redescription" not a mere renaming, because description (language) necessitates stronger revision than replacing individual predicates with others. Potentially different number of digits). FieldVsMundy: if you really wanted to interpreted the ka’s as 3-digit spatial relations, the a’s would have to be considered as unquantifiable indices. Then we would have uncountably many primitive predicates, and thus no theory would be possible. Index/Quantification/(s): it is impossible to quantify on indices. Indices are not quantifiable. Mundy: of course, does not treat the indices as unquantifiable, but he re-writes them: k(p,q,r) = a if he wants to quantify on a. FieldVsMundy: but a quantifiable index is simply a variable that appears in a different place. And with the re-naming we do not change the fact that we have a 4-digit relation of which one term is a real number. Conclusion: With that you cannot take advantage of the difference between moderate Platonism and heavy duty Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relationalism | Substantivalism Vs Relationalism | Field I 191 Substantivalismus/Field: pro: weil er keine mathematischen Entitäten braucht – VsRelationismus: braucht moderaten Platonismus – daher uninteressant. I 196 FieldVsRelationismus/Physik: der R hat ernste Probleme, Newtonsche Physik auf dieser Basis, aber auch auf jeder anderen Ideologie zu entwickeln. Das zeigt die reformulierte Version des Problem der Quantitäten/Relationalismus/Field: man könnte meinen, daß man einfach die Definitionen des Substantivalismus übernimmt und nur statt "u ist eine Region" neu: "u ist ein Aggregat (von Materie)" I 197 und statt "u ist ein Punkt" neu: "u ist ein Materieteilchen in einem Moment" (instantaneous point particle), also ein minimales Aggregat (ohne echte Teile). Vs: aber das geht nicht, fast jede substantivalistische Definition schlägt mit dieser Modifikation fehl. Bsp Abstand: für die Prädikate C2,C3,C4 (s.o.) kann man nicht definieren, was es für Materieteilchen x und y wäre, doppelt so weit voneinander entfernt zu sein, wie die Teilchen z und w, in dem man sagt, daß es ein Teilchen u zwischen x und y gibt, so daß xu und yu kongruent mit zw ist. Denn es braucht ((s) empirisch) kein solches Materieteilchen zwischen x und y zu geben! S: nach ihm gibt es dort etwas, selbst wenn es dort keine Materie gibt: (s) die leere, für sich bestehende Raumzeit. mögliche Lösung: (s.u.) Modalität, ((s) "mögliche Teilchen"). falsche Lösung/Field: man könnte meinen, man müsse nur zusätzliche Ideologie einführen: vielleicht ein Prädikat xySzwtu, das bedeuten soll, daß der Abstand zwischen x und y der Abstand zw plus der Abstand tu ist. Daraus könnte man xyC2zw definieren als xySzwzw. Oder xyC3zw: als EuEv[uvC2zw & xySuvzw]. Vs: das geht nicht, weil wir xyC3zw auch haben könnten, wenn es sein kann, daß es kein u,v gibt, so daß uvC2zw!. Das gleiche gilt für jede angestrebte Ideologie. (s) Eingeführte Prädikate müssen auch auf etwas referieren und nicht nur "möglicherweise" referieren. VsRelationalismus: muß solche Prädikate immer als Grundbegriffe annehmen. I 201 VsRelationalismus/Beschleunigung/Field: Problem: der R hat als einzige trajektorie-artige regionen nur die aktualen Trajektorien ((s) keine bloß möglichen, weil er keine leere RZ akzeptiert). D.h. daß es nur sehr wenige verfügbare gibt! Nicht genug, um den Ansatz des Substantivalismus zu übertragen. D.h. nicht genug, um die Beschleunigungs Prädikate direkt anzuwenden. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substantivalism | Pro | Field I 184 Substantivalism: per: Newton (bucket experiment) - I 191 Substantivalism / Field: per: because it does not need a mathematical entities - VsRelationism: needs moderate Platonism - therefore uninteresting. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relationism | Versus | Field III 34 Field pro Substantivalismus: es gibt leere Raumzeit. - Raumzeit-Punkte sind Entitäten aus eigenem Recht. - Field: das ist vereinbar mit dem Nominalismus. - VsRelationismus: dieser kann Hilberts Axiome nicht akzeptieren. - VsRelationismus: kann keine physikalischen Felder annehmen. - Platonismus: nimmt bei Feldern Raumzeit-Punkte mit Eigenschaften an. - VsRelationismus: kann das nicht. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
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