Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Austin | II 36f Action/Ryle/Austin: actions are very different - szneezing, to win wars: life is not simply a sequence of actions. - Excuse does not match every verb - a way to characterize actions - e.g. "voluntarily". AustinVsRyle: this is not a characteristic of actions such as "truth," not of assertions - rather a name of a dimension. >Voluntarily/Ryle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Behaviorism | Rorty | I 115f Behaviorism/VsRyle/Rorty: 1) It is impossible to give a description of behavioral dispositions which does not consist in an infinitely long list. >Lists. 2) "Necessity", of whatever kind, does not depend on "meaning" here, but simply reflects the fact that we usually characterize behavior in a certain way. Necessity as little a "linguistic" or "conceptual" one as the necessary link between the redness of the stove and the fire in the stove. ((s) behavior depends on description.) 3) It is merely a philosophical paradox that only comes to the mind of someone who is chased by instrumentalist or verificationist dogmas, and is constantly eager to reduce any non-observable to the observable to avoid any risk to believe in something unreal. >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities. I 115 Rorty: all three are justified, yet you get the feeling that the behaviorism is on to something right. But you will not say one day, "Okay, no feelings, i.e. no mental states, i.e. no people". >Sensation, >Mental states, >Person. I 116 Behaviorism: important point: he makes it clear that the question of the harder philosophers: "Are there mental states or are there no mental states?" are thus more pointless the more often they are asked. RortyVsRyle: he should have said that >incorrigibility is simply a function of the practice of justification. It was wrong to speak of a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of feelings. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Behaviorism | Sellars | Rorty I 118 SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities. >Operationalism. 2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ("built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. >Sensations, >Experience, >Appearance. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) >Two Dogmas/Quine, >Empiricism/Quine, >Analyticity/Quine. Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. >Dispositions/Ryle, >Gilbert Ryle. Just as wrong as the instrumentalistic approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...". >Instrumentalism, Cf. >Constructivism, >Sense data. --- Rorty VI 182 Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference. --- Sellars I XXIXf Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism. Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way. Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior. >Observation, >Observation language, >Mental Objects, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of Thought, >Mentalism. I 91 Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts). >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Consciousness | Rorty | Rorty I 60 Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it. III 37/38 RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. >Mental states/Dennett, >Consciousness/Dennett, >Mental states/Ryle, >Consciousness/Ryle. Rorty: there is no medium. VI 176 Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point. Frank I 584 Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 Rorty I 132 Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person. >Mind/Mind state. III 37 Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality. >Mind. III 67 Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. Reason/Kant: general principles FreudVsKant: return to the special. Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic. VI 147 Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Dispositions | Rorty | Frank I 594 Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true. - Then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore. >Physicalism, >Realism. Frank I 595 Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism. Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 --- Rorty I 115 Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness. >Sensation, >Necessity, >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless. I 119 Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Everyday Language | Cavell | I (a) 39 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself. We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories. I (a) 40 Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language. >Skepticism. How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning). So we need to understand his position from within. I (a) 41 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway. >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. --- II 170 Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...." Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations. Type III statement: Generalizations. Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do. >"voluntarily"/Ryle. II 172 Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements. MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech. CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken. >Memory. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: II 174 E.g. Austin: a voluntary gift. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Forms of Thinking | Sellars | Rorty I 118 SellarsVsRyle: the parallel indication of macro/micro-phenomena does not force upon us the operationalist hypothesis that there cannot be micro-entities. >Operationalism. Rorty I 261 Sellars: each model has its comment. >Models, >Model theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Knowledge | Hare | II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: it may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. E.g. how a particular word is used, or a particular dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but this should not be extended to speech situations. >Situations, >Communication. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: in language, however, this is perhaps clearer than anywhere else. E.g. if we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is needed. For example, a child may have learned the use of the word "father", and uses it correctly, but perhaps cannot tell how it is used because it has not yet learned the use of "to mean"! >Explanation, >Use, >Meaning (Intending). Henle confuses the ability "to decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". This is a confusion of mention/use (doing without knowledge). Hare: anyone who does not know how to use the term "logical true" could do the former, but not the latter. II 143 Menon/Socrates: question: what is the good? Menon: how can you look for something if you do not know what you are looking for, and when you have found it, how do you know it is what you were looking for? (Knowledge/saying). II 151 Socrates: if we already knew, we would not have asked the first question. So philosophizing can never begin, or it can never lead to a conclusion. Solution/Hare: the solution lies in the distinction between knowing how a dance is danced and the ability to also tell how it is danced. Before beginning the investigation, we can do the former but not the latter. We could start because we could do the former all the time. VsMenon: you already know what the good is, i.e. you can pick it out. >Knowledge, >Knowing how. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 15 Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common language use and rule following instead of "facts" and truth conditions. >Language use, >Language community, >Rule following, >Facts, >Truth conditions. IV 19f "Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past. - Therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition". - So far only finitely many cases have been followed. An extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future. N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Beliefs. IV 23 Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation". 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem. IV 27 N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all! IV 35ff Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past. >Dispositions. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all. a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another. IV 37 b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions! IV 47 Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist. IV 63 Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience. >Content. IV 65 Example experience: the beginner has another experience than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud. - But: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading. IV 72 Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet there is a problem of access to these entities: it is not clear whether I grasp the right sense. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Lexicon | Quine | VI 81 Dictionary/Lexicon/Quine: does not describe objects, but use of words - is not about synonymy of terms - is not about cognitive equivalence of sentences. VII (c) 49 Lexicon/Quine: shows couples of synonymous sequences (no monopoly on meaning). II 65 Lexicon: the lexicographer will often use a so-called "meaning distinction": he will call several partial synonyms, some of which fit into subcontexts, others into others. The contexts must then be kept apart with reference to the topic. II 99 Lexicon: the definition of words in the lexicon is nothing more than a recursive definition of sentence meanings. Russell's examination of incomplete symbols continues and extends to classes. II 139 Lexicon of Predicates: You can define an identity in any theory, even in one without classes and elements. This is the method of exhaustion of the Lexicon of Predicates. Trivial example: Suppose we have only two undefined single-digit predicates. F and G as well as a two-digit predicate H and no constant singular terms or functors, only quantifiers and truth functions. Then we can define "x = y" as Fx bik Fy.Gx bik GY.(z)(Hxz bik Hyz.Hzx bik Hzy) which ensures substitutivity in atomic contexts. Now the entire logic of identity can be derived. The method can be applied to any finite lexicon of undefined predicates and it defines real identity or an afterimage indistinguishable from it every time. Undistinguishable in terms of the corresponding theory. >Predicates/Quine. II 139/140 How will it work if our approach to explain identity by exhaustion of the predicates is generalized? Let us assume a rich lexicon of predicates. Certain predicates will be desired in terms of properties, in particular "has". Others will be superfluous (e.g. property "be pink" or property "divisible by four"). Ryle branded such predications as category confusion. Russell and Carnap the same. QuineVsRyle/QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsRussell: for years I have represented a minority of philosophers who prefer the opposite direction: we can simplify grammar and logic by minimizing our grammatical categories and maximizing their scope instead. II 141/142 Are all cases actually due to "has"? If so, the exhaustion of our encyclopedia would be done in no time at all, which would result in all properties being identical if exactly the same things "have" them. In this case, properties are extensional. We might as well read this "has" as being-contained and call properties classes. But they are classes as multiplicities, not as a unit. Because we declare it "ungrammatical" to present them as elements of other classes. They occur only through their values. However, if there are desired contexts of property variables that are not due to "has", it should be possible to create a list and thus individualize properties. >Properties/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Memory | Hintikka | II 224 Memory/tacit knowledge/HintikkaVsRyle: one can also use one's own memory as a source of knowledge. This is what Sherlock Holmes does with his conversation partners ("deductions"). >Memory/Ryle. >Discussion on Researchgate. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Mental States | Rorty | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes. >Dualism, >Monism, >Cartesianism. Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. >Materialism, >Physicalism, >Functionalism. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Emotions, >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Objects of belief, >Psychological theories on personality traits. I 77ff State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs). This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. Cf. >Mental objects/AI research. I 80 Def Neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - Reality accessible with intuition (Bergson). Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer). The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James). >Skepticism, >Skepticism/James, >Bergson. I 106f RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help. >Substance, >Substratum. Frank I 581 Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Sensation, >Event, >State. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 Rorty I 60 Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness. >Ancient philosophy. Idea: new with Locke - this only makes epistemology possible. >Idea/Locke, >Ideas. I 117 Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports. >Mental states/Ryle, >Ryle, >Incorrigibility. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Mind | Chalmers | I 11 Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. >Cognitive psychology, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Behavior. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on. >Spirit, >Mental states, >Experience. b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour. ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts. >R. Descartes, >Causal Explanation. I 14 Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) (1) who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987 (2)). >G. Ryle, >Dispositions. ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself. >Sensation. But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering. >Memory, >Thinking, >Desires, >Beliefs. ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job. >Weakness of will. 2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957 (3), Geach, 1957 (4)) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle). >P. Geach, >R. Chisholm. 1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 2. W. G. Lycan, Consciousness, Cambridge 1987 3. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 4. P. Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Motives | Ryle | Danto II 323 Motive/Ryle/Danto: motives are not causes. Motivational explanations are law-like sentences. >Reason/Cause. AnscombeVsRyle: this is only possible for generalizations - a design for a one time lie would dispose one to constant lies. >Disposition. Ryle I 110 ff Motive/Ryle: motives are not accompanied by feelings! They are dispostional, not causal and are to be recognized by regularity, lawlike - alien motives are recognizable as well as own motives. >Regularity. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Non-Existence | Hintikka | II 37 Non-existent objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. >Possibilia. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka/thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Model theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid? >Fictions. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Relevance. II 38 Ontology/language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on the ontological status? >Ontology. Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional! Model Theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. Acceptance/acceptability/inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. Singular Terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms requires us to use an existential generalization. And thus also requires a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. > II 39 Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.) >Existence statements. II 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because Montague assumes the domain of individuals to be constant). Individual Domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. Problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for". ((s) That is, that both are looking for the same unicorn). >Objects of thought, >Cob/Hob/Nob exmaple/Geach. Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual? |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Non-Existence | Parsons | Hintikka I 37 Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. >Possibilia, >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. >Syntax. Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Semantics, >Model Theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply? >Fictions, >G. Ryle. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Criteria, >Relevance. I 38 Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones! Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. >Conclusions. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. >Acceptability, >Inferences. Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. >Singular terms, >Ontological commitment. HintikkaVsParsons. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Perception | Fodor | Rorty I 255 FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectancy system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent of the physical uniformities of stimuli among one another. >Stimuli. Rorty I 255 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe be so abstract at all? Presumably, we must be able to identify similarities. But then we do not need the idea of a "non-abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this. E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the contents of a package of chocolate cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: so if we talk about "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires the postulation of other control systems or they are not learned at all. >Learning. Either: 1) There is infinite regress, because what is true for recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back at Ryle: people have an ability that they have not learned. Rorty I 269 Fodor rehabilitates the traditional British theories of perception: "it is an empirical question whether psychological processes are computer processes! If they are, our perception must work in a way that a description of the environment that is not done in a vocabulary whose terms represent values of physical variables, is calculated on the basis of a description made in such a vocabulary. >Perception, >Vocabulary. I Rorty 269 Fodor: why should there not be stimuli for the whole organism? Then you could discover a stimulus variant "bottle". Perception requires the choice of an independent vocabulary for the representation of the inputs. Fodor's thesis: all perceptual knowledge is transferred by the activity of sensory transducers. Rorty I 269 Fodor: if we do not want to realize the talk of the information processing, we need to use something that our subject need not necessarily know as its input. Rorty question: could it turn out that the input is not completed on the retina but half way or elsewhere? Fodor presumes: yes, it just depends on which design of the black box the organism can best be considered to be split into converter and processor, so that the best theory comes out. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Privileged Access | Rorty | I 119f Dosposition / SellarsVsRyle / RortyVsRyle: Ryle's error was: to assume that a proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states showed that there were no internal states in reality. >Sensation, >Necessity, cf. >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Wittgenstein (PI § 308), the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things, and leave open what their nature is. >Incorrigibility, >First Person, >Introspection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Privileged Access | Searle | I 118 SearleVsRyle: VsPrivileged Access: for a spatial metaphor I would have to differ from my inside, but I do not. >Cf. >Authority of the first person, cf. >Incorrigibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Pauen | Pauen I 91 Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? >Mental states, >Generalization, >Experiences, >Everyday psychology. Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions. >Behavior, >Dispositions. Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts. >Thoughts, >Internal states. Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. >Behaviorism, >First Person. We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology. Cf. >L. Wittgenstein. I 105 VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience. I 106 Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions. >Attributions, >W. Sellars. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Seeing | Ryle | I 336 f Seeing/vision/Ryle: we can only see something in a lifelike way that we do not really see. RyleVsHume: Hume confuses this: presentation is (falsely) seen as the perception of ghosts or as an echo of perception (shadowy). I 366 Seeing and hearing is not an activity. It is neither observable nor unobservable. ((s) LuhmannVsRyle: observation of observation). >Perception/Ryle, >Seeing, >Aspects, >Perspective/Ryle, >Observation. cf. >Observation/Luhmann. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Sensations | Sellars | I XIIf Sensation/Sellars: is not passive. >Perception/Sellars, >Appearance/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Sensory impressions/Sellars. I 9 Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols). - Sensation is also factual knowledge. Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant. - Sensation is neither epistemically nor physically. - It is not to be equated with thoughts. >Facts/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Thoughts I 46 Sensation/Sellars: sensation is no idea. Learning: is activity. Experience: relates to an object. >Ideas, >Learning, >Experience/Sellars. I 77 Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error. >Terminology/Ryle. SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable. >Intersubjectivity. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Thinking | Dennett | II 58 Thinking/Animal/Dennett: Can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ... Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in English? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon. II 157 Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment. Cf. >Speaking. II 202 DennettVsRyle: Notorious are Ryle's assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place. II 190 Speech/Thinking/Dennett: No thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness. E.g. A dog has no concept of cat as an animal). >Thinking without language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Thinking | Ryle | Dennett II 201 DennettVsRyle: Ryle's assertions are notorious, thinking could only take place in the public world and should not take place at a personal place. Cf. >Thinking/Dennett. --- ad Ryle I 29 Language/thinking/Ryle/(s): monologue requires dialogue. >Dialogue. Ryle I 317 Thinking/Ryle: we learn how to derive something from already established facts, e.g. in reality we like to play chess, cycle, or learn to recognize goalposts, namely by practice, perhaps supported by some instruction. >Ability. I 386 Thinking/Ryle: thinking is no self-talk. It is not a symbolic operation (at least not consciously). >Self-talk, >Consciousness, >Unconscious. Ryle: Dealing with symbols must not be an application. Also thoughtless speech makes sense. >Symbols, cf. >Thinking without language, cf. >Speaking/Ricoeur. I 390 Thinking/Ryle: thinking is a) work b) a disposition to opinions, results of work - there is nothing hidden. >Disposition/Ryle, >Knowledge, >Recognition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armstrong, D. | Rorty Vs Armstrong, D. | Frank I 583 Incorrigibility/RortyVsArmstrong: no epistemic notion of truth: that not to say "implies its own truth". >Incorrigibility. Instead: conventional standards of the respective culture!Later: RortyVsRorty: should science produce a disagreement Ex retinal images with the reports of a person: as in hallucination the representation may then indeed be false, without rendering the report of the hallucinating subject wrong! Rorty: "There are no recognized methods to resolve doubts about p if p fits into a pattern of sincere reports of the subject S, even if p does not fit into a general theory". I 584 Rorty adjusts to the "ontology of the man on the street", who would have a hard time without mental entities in the foreseeable future. Rorty thesis: before we give up incorrigibility, we may one day abandon the mentalist speech. I 589 mental state/Armstrong: This term refers to what is being caused by certain stimuli and causes certain reactions - whatever that may be. I 590 RortyVsArmstrong: if that were true, we could never understand the contrast between a) materialism and dualism or b) the mental and the physical or c) materialism and behaviorism. I 591 mental state/Armstrong: Ex a specific condition of the liver can cause ill-tempered behavior. Problem: What characterizes mental states compared to others? Complexity? I 592 Problem: if the complexity of the cause to achieve complex effects is missing. Sufficiently complex processes occur only when the causal chain has reached the brain. Solution/Armstrong: our notion of a mental state is the notion of a "cause, the complexity which reflects the complexity of the behavior that it is capable of producing". RortyVs: confuses the degree of complexity of physical and mental states. RortyVsArmstrong: presupposes already, it were part of our concept of the mental state that it must be identified with one or another physiological process. I 595 Identity theory/Rorty: its significance lies in the statement that the entities of which one has always thought that they could not be physical, now turn out to be physical. If materialism is made a truth a priori this pointe is missing. VsArmstrong: when in his "ontologically neutral" analysis the mental is a mere deputy (and nothing in itself), then one side of the distinction is missing. There is nothing that could turn out to be identical to physical particles! RortyVsArmstrong/RortyVsRyle: mental entities that yby their nature can not be physical must be maintained, because otherwise no identity could be adopted. Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: unlike the realist, the phenomenalist cannot explain dispositions. ((s) otherwise circular because dispositions can also only be described). He can not explain why counterfactual conditionals are true. I 607 The Mental/RortyVsArmstrong: whether an entity is mental does not determine whether it explains behavior, and whether a property is mental, can not determine whether it is the property of a physical entity or not. Only feature: incorrigibility. Incorrigibility/Armstrong: A believes that p logically implies (p). Fra I 608 RortyVsArmstrong: I want to avoid necessities. 1. because of Quine's doubts about "natural" necessities). 2. Otherwise we would conclude that the meaning of the terms "thinking" and "thought" made it impossible to have false opinions, what one believes. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Behaviorism | Identity Theory Vs Behaviorism | Lanz I 279 Identity theory: the attempt to defend the status of mental phenomena as inner episodes in light of the weaknesses of behaviorism (RyleVs), without falling back into dualism. Elements of conscious experience are identical to processes and states in the brain. Lanz I 281 Identity theory VsBehaviorism (Place / SmartVsRyle: sensations = physical states) - later: Lewis / Armstrong: even thoughts). |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Behaviorism | Sellars Vs Behaviorism | I 89 Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts. I 90 Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior. SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. I 91 That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior. So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts. I XXIX Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism. I XXX Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form. I XXXI Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Disposition Theory | Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory | Stegmüller IV 34 Disposition/Mind/Ryle: mean, meaning, intentionality: are not occurrences in consciousness, but abilities, dispositions. IV 35 I.e. in the case of plus/quus as of grue exactly the same mental history runs off together with identical mental states and consciousness processes. Conclusion: the decisive dispositions were acquired in the past. The difference then does not only exist in the present, it already existed in the past! RyleVsKripke: then I would also have used the standard function of addition in the past. IV 35/36 KripkeVsRyle: triple criticism: 1. External criticism: denies that any assumptions about dispositions are relevant at all. The problem is not understood at all. How can he invoke disposition as justification? An instruction to myself shows nothing at all. VsVs: a) I just have a hypothesis about myself. VsVsVs: why should precisely this hypothesis of countless other possible ones be the right one? IV 37 VsVs: b) We let the past rest. Right is what seems right to me now! WittgensteinVsVsVs: this leads to the fact that one can no longer speak of "right" here! 2. Internal criticism: (some people mistakenly think that Wittgenstein himself represented them): consists in specifying a criterion for a function F, which I mean by such a symbol. Def "Finity Problem"/Stegmüller: the finite cannot simply be transferred to the infinite. (Not only experiences, but also dispositions are finite). IV 38 Def "quus"/grue/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Re-Definition: the skeptical problem is reproduced: the function is the quaddition that corresponds to the addition for all pairs that are sufficiently small to be added by me, and returns the result 7 for the others. Thus I have always had the same dispositions. VsDisposition Theory. Disposition Theory/Stegmüller: a) can try to defend itself by understanding disposition not literally, but as an idealization of actual practice. Ceteris paribus disposition. KripkeVs: then I would have to make more and more fantastic assumptions about what I would do if this and that happened to me. IV 39 b) The idealization could be interpreted differently: "if I had the ability..." KripkeVs: that becomes circular. It assumes that the function I mean is something fixed. The "fact" would have to be assumed that I have a very specific intention! Dilemma for the disposition theory: a) Either only disposition for a finite number of cases, or b) Idealization of the reaction. Problem: ba) if these conditions are specified precisely, nothing can be said about my reaction. bb) a fact is assumed. IV 40 KripkeVsDisposition Theory: it leaves no room for possible errors! The disposition theorist cannot defend himself here by saying that there is a gap between what he meant and what he "should mean". Because the "function that he actually means" is not fixed for him from the outset by a table independent of the disposition. IV 41 Rather, in the opinion of the dispositionalist, the function can be read from disposition. For this reason, the disposition, to make mistakes must be part of the overall disposition. Def "Skaddition"/Kripke: would be the disposition of our person including the disposition to make mistakes. IV 42 Rule/Competence/Kripke: Competence cannot explain rules because it requires rules. (This does not apply to VsChomsky). VsDisposition Theory: Similarities can also be based on the fact that we sometimes make mistakes. IV 47 Addition/Disposition Theory/Kripke's Wittgenstein: (see above "external criticism (1)"): Suppose it were true that by "+" I mean addition. Problem: what is the relation between this assumption and the kind of answer I will give to the question !117 + 159"? Disposition Theory: all variants falsely state that it is this and that descriptively comprehensible relation. Mean/intention/normative: but if one understands to mean in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should say in the future, that is normative, not descriptive. This is the main point VsDisposition. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Dodwell, P.C. | Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. | I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Rorty Vs Fodor, J. | I 245 Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply. I 256 Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves! RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned! Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) I 277 Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>contingent a priori/Kripke). |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hare, R.M. | Ryle Vs Hare, R.M. | Hare II 138 Rules/Hare: we cannot discover the rules of the dance by dancing it. This contains two demands at once. 1) that the dance is Tango 2) that it is danced properly Körner: an execution may be relevant while being uncharacteristic. II 141 but not necessary that the tango is danced like that (historical, contingent fact) although there is a correct description, it is not synthetically a priori. II 142 Ryle: it may be that we know how a particular dance is performed without being able to say it VsRyle: but not in speech situations. HareVsVs: when we explain the use of an expression, we do not need to use it ourselves. Then we can see its use in all contexts, without being able to tell how it is used. Difference: a) decide whether a statement is logically true b) use term in a "logically true" way II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: it may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. Example How a particular word is understood, or how a particular dance is performed. HenleVsRyle: but we should not extend this to speech situations. II 143 It is not clear that we can always know how a word is used, even if we cannot tell how it is used. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Ryle Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 204 Knowledge/Recognition/RyleVsHegel: The distinction betw Trial and Done verbs (tasks and services) frees us from another theoretical nuisance: "know", "realize", "solve" cannot be used with adverbs such as "mistakenly" and falsely or "incorrectly", you cannot know something wrong, it is a different grammar. ((s) HegelVsRyle: Phenomenology, Preface - Hegel there: we can definitely know something wrong E.g. imperfect geometric drawings.) |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Identity Theory | Ryle Vs Identity Theory | Pauen I 89 RyleVsIdentity theory: category error: refers to inner events to explain outward behavior. PauenVsRyle: harmless practice like "interface", "data highway". It is by no means always a mistake to use a term outside its normal context. Of course, Ryle also accepts metaphors, but he has no useful criterion for distinguishing permitted metaphors from impermissable ones. Even the everyday language transcends everything that Ryle considers to be permissible. Disposition/VsRyle: E.g. even with headaches, someone could refrain from taking a tablet. E.g. one could take an umbrella to give it back to someone without believing it rains. One could fast in spite of starvation, etc. I could enter a music store to buy notes for someone else, etc. I 90 When asked for reasons, it is impossible to arrive at a complete list. This would, however, be necessary if the meaning of a mentalistic expression is actually to be understood in the disposition analysis. Each of these sentences also contains a mentalistic expression. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Malcolm, N. | Rorty Vs Malcolm, N. | Frank I 610 Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility. >Certainty, >incorrigibility. Rorty I 238 MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here. I 239 RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior. I.e. applies 2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions. |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Ryle, G. | Anscombe Vs Ryle, G. | Danto II 323 Motif/Ryle: tryed to refute that motifs can be causes. Motif: Disposition. A statements about a disposition is not an explanation of causes! E.g. I can say the glass was broken, because it was hit against the table (cause), but I can also say that it was broken because it was fragile. Ryle: Motif statements are law-related judgments. AnscombeVsRyle: if that were the case, then a specific motif could not possibly trigger a specific action only once in the life of a person! E.g. a person who uses the visit of an aunt only once as a white lie would be necessarily considered as predisposed to lie in general. However, motifs may be unique incidents (VsDisposition). Then no prediction can be derived from the motifs. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Armstrong Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz I 282 Def dispositions/Ryle: nothing more than pairs of environmental effects and modifications of behavior. E.g. "x is fragile = x will break when it is dropped." ArmstrongVsRyle: one element is missing: the structural basis of the disposition, the state of the object with which the disposition is identical. This state is causally responsible for the breaking. It is the task of science to elucidate the nature of such conditions and causes. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Ryle, G. | Austin Vs Ryle, G. | Vendler I 243 Voluntary/Ryle: this word is only used for acts that seem to be the result of a person's guilt. AustinVsRyle: you can also make a gift voluntarily. Voluntarily/Cavell: middle way between Austin and Ryle: the action must at least be suspect. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Davidson Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 639 Asymmetry/Authority/First-person perspective/Third person/Davidson: pro Ryle: every attempt at explaining the asymmetry by knowing something in a certain way must lead to skepticism. DavidsonVsRyle: instead of explaining the asymmetry, he simply denies it. But since it obviously exists, one should not draw the conclusion that there is no first-person authority from the lack of a particular way of knowing something. >First person/Davidson. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Ryle, G. | Dennett Vs Ryle, G. | II 203 DennettVsRyle: notorious are his assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and should not take place at a personal place. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Fodor Vs Ryle, G. | II 118 Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking. Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.# --- Rorty I 256 Compliance/seeing/correspondence/behavior/Ryle: here you have to do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other! RyleVsVs/Rorty: Ryle might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it is just the notion of the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this. Infinite: e.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned! Either: 1) There is infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an unlearned ability. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ryle, G. | Kripke Vs Ryle, G. | I 53 KripkeVsRyle: The usual argument doubts that the essentialism makes sense, and says that the answer to the question whether a property of an object is accidental or essential depends on how the subject is described. This argument is therefore not of the opinion that all the properties are accidental. If you have a identity criterion, then the question whether Nixon has specific characteristics in another possible world is a well-defined question. Sometimes, in the case of numbers, it might seem easier (but even here it is argued that identity criteria are given completely arbitrary). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Ryle, G. | Lewis Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz I 282 LewisVsRyle: psychological expressions are expressions for causal roles. Science is likely to identify the actual carriers of these causal roles as brain conditions. Lewis I 34 Everyday Psychology/LewisVsRyle: it has never been a newly invented scientific theory introducing terminology. The story that expressions for mental were introduced as theoretical terms is a myth! (>Sellars myth of our Rylean ancestors). Lewis: but although it's a myth, it can be a good one or a bad one: a good one if our names for states of mind actually mean exactly what they would mean if the myth were true. Note: Two myths that cannot be true together can be good together. Lewis I 35 My myth says: Names of color sensations are T-terms introduced by names of colors used as A-terms. Another myth says conversely: color names were T-terms introduced by names of color sensations used as A-terms. The two myths cannot be true together, because what should have been there first, the color or the color sensation? But they can both be good! We may be dealing with a compass. But, so what? |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Ryle, G. | Rorty Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 597 Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently. >Cartesianism, >Dualism. Fra I 598 That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area. b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings. If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no >mind body problem. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Ryle, G. | Searle Vs Ryle, G. | I 118 SearleVsPrivileged Access/SearleVsRyle: this is a spatial metaphor, like a private room, but I would have to distinguish myself from the room which I enter. There is no sort of a room accessible by me. >Priviledged access, >first person. While I can observe another person just like that, I can however not watch their subjectivity! What is worse: I 119 I cannot observe my own subjectivity because every speech observation itself is what should be observed. V 216 "Voluntary"/Ryle: "voluntary" is normally used in connection with any acts of which it is generally believed that they should be avoided. V 217 SearleVsRyle: there are normal or standard situations. The explanation has nothing to do with the analysis of special words, but forms a moment of explanation of the operation of assertions. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Sellars Vs Ryle, G. | I XXXIII Propositions/thoughts/RyleVs "category mistake": as beliefs, desires or motives thoughts are no space temporally localized events or states. Therefore, they cannot occur as antecedents or causes of actions. SellarsVsRyle: he suggested to understand mental predicates like "to be convinced", "to believe" etc. as expressions of dispositions but without acknowledging that again there is an explanation like in the way of the Freudian ego or super-ego . Belief/Ryle: to be convinced means to behave in a certain way. I XXXIII Disposition/explanation/to appear/Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how once can also explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. His tie seller John developed a kind of theory, which specifically refers to the language behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. I 77 Inner episode/category mistake/SellarsVsRyle: inner episodes are by no means a category mistake, they can even be very well "speak" with the means of intersubjective discourse. And in fact through a critical examination of inner episodes of a different kind, namely with thoughts. I 79 Episode/tradition: modern empiricism: a) thoughts are verbal or linguistic episodes. SellarsVs: there is not enough language behavior to explain all thoughts. b) To think/tradition: be any form of "intelligent behavior" both linguistically not linguistically. RyleVs: actually no episodes but hypothetical or mixed-hypothetical-categorical facts about this or other behavior. ((s) This seems to be by Ryle, but Ryle is not explicitly mentioned here by Sellars). SellarsVs: Problem: whenever we refer to a component of non-habitual behavior as intelligent, we seem then to think it necessary to thereby refer to a thinking. (hidden circle. VsRyle). I 88 Category Mistake/Sellars: e.g. to assume that the combustibility of wood is so to say latent burning. SellarsVsRyle: nevertheless, not every non-observable episode is the consequence of category mistakes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ryle, G. | Verschiedene Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz in Metz I 279 VsRyle: his analysis is not convincing for elements of conscious experience as feelings or perceptions or mental images or thoughts that are currently occurring. E.g. pain: here something is present to the the consciousness when it is neither recognized thorugh behavior nor verbal utterances. Hare II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: we may know something without being able to say what we know. For example, how a certain word is used, or a certain dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but you should not extend that to speech situations. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used here, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: but in language it may be clearer than anywhere else. For example, when we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is used. For example, a child may have learned to use the word "father" and use it correctly, but may not be able to say how it is used because it has not yet learned to use "to mean"! Henle confuses the ability "To decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true or not with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". Confusion Mention/Use. (doing without knowledge). Hare: who does not know how to use the expression "logically true" could do the former, but not the latter. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Schiffer Vs Ryle, G. | I 266 Meaning Theory/M.th./Schiffer: some of them offer a reductive analysis of semantic terms, but that does not work. I 267 We learn more about our cognitive apparatus, if we ask why our m.th. fail. We also learn something if we only try a concept analysis. E.g. if we try to complete the following scheme, which is impossible: "x presents in y gdw ..." But:. SchifferVsRyle: "Analytical" connections between concepts do not bring us much further. It would be nice if we knew everything about the conceptual roles of our semantic and mental terms, but I do not see how we could find out more. M.th./Schiffer: some philosophers see it here just as their task to give an "explanation" rather than a conceptual analysis or meaning analysis of semantic concepts. E.g. M.th./Semantics/Devitt: (Devitt 1981,68): the problem of semantics is given in part by human speech behavior. The main problem of semantics is to explain the semantic terms that occur in the semantic theory. What is it for an inscription to have meaning? Why is this sound sequence true?. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Ryle, G. | Hintikka Vs Ryle, G. | II 224 Memory/Tacit Knowledge/HintikkaVsRyle: you can also use your own memory as a source of knowledge. That is what Sherlock Holmes does with his interlocutors ("deductions"). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Ryle, G. | Solipsism Vs Ryle, G. | Chisholm II 31 Perception/SolipsismVsRyle/RutteVsRyle: actually a reasoning problem: what is the reason for success/failure to conclude that external factors are the cause? Every perceiver believes in it. The only opposite position is solipsism. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ryle, G. | Vendler Vs Ryle, G. | Vendler I 239 RyleVsLinguistics: brings no benefit to the philosophy. Cavell ditto. VendlerVsRyle. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Chisholm Vs Ryle, G. | I 69 Privileged access/ChisholmVsRyle: each of us has it: every person is so that they can attribute certain properties directly to themselves. (s) VsChisholm: uses the term "self" here, although he declared it impossible to form propositions with it. But these are no propositions that "carry their location with them" ((s)), but rather sentences that contain the reflexive pronoun in general. Chisholm: However, we have not explained privileged access by the use of "I" as many philosophers do, but vice versa I 70 Use of the first-person pronoun through direct attribution. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ryle, G. | Cavell Vs Ryle, G. | II 170 Everyday Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say..." Type II statement: the addition of explanations to Type I statements. Type III statements: generalizations. II 171 AustinVsRyle: for example a gift can be given voluntarily (without being guilty) but that is not something you should normally not do. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (Type II statement): he is generally entitled to do so, but especially with regard to his example "voluntarily" the generalization goes wrong: II 174 (E.g. Austin: voluntary gift). Austin Thesis: we cannot always say of actions that they are voluntary, even if they were obviously not involuntary either. CavellVsRyle: he has not completely neglected it, his mistake is that he characterizes these actions incompletely and those where the question cannot arise wrongly. He does not see that the condition for the use of the term "voluntarily" applies in general. II 175 He falsely assumes that "not voluntary" means "involuntary". Cavell: this is also overlooked by utilitarianism. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Solipsism | Skepticism Vs Solipsism | Chisholm II 31 Wahrnehmung/RutteVsRyle: eigentlich ein Begründungsproblem: was spricht an Erfolg/Mißerfolg dafür, auf Außendinge als Verursacher zu schließen? Jeder Wahrnehmende glaubt daran. Einzige Gegenposition: der Solipsismus. VsSolipsism/Rutte: hat eigene subjektinterne Prüfprobleme. Er glaubt an vergangene und zukünftige eigene Erlebnisse, an Verläufe und Ordnungen. Er verläßt sich auf Erinnerung und methodisches Vorgehen. Er möchte künftige Erlebnisse aufgrund von Ordnungen prognostizieren und muß daher als Mills "permanente Empfindungsmöglichkeiten" glauben. Er macht genauso starke Behauptungen wie der Realist. II 32 Seine Beweislast wäre nur geringer, wenn er sich der Behauptungen über die Welt enthielte. II 37 SkepticismVsSolipsim: glaubt zuviel: es gibt überhaupt keine Erkenntnis und Vernünftigkeit. Der hier vertretene Standpunkt räumt sowohl dem Realisten als auch dem Solipsisten eine rationale Haltung ein, wenn sie nur gläubig und glaubensbereit ist. II 41 Realismus: will über den Erlebniserfolg hinaus auch Wahrnehmungserfolg. D.h. er will auf Außendinge schließen können! Dazu muß er aber an die Außenwelt glauben, da er sonst nichts zu überprüfen hätte. VsSolipsism: verhält sich dagegen inkonsequent (also unvernünftig), wenn er mit diesem Erfolgsziel seinen Glauben an den Realismus ausdrücken würde. Beim Streben nach Erlebnis Erfolg wäre der Solipsismus also überflüssig, er könnte sich einer Stellungsnahme enthalten. RealismVsSolipsism: Asymmetrie: während der Solipsismus etwas Inkonsequentes und damit Überflüssiges ist, kann man das vom Realismus nicht sagen. Er ist nicht in jedem Fall überflüssig. Wir dürfen bei ihm bleiben, wenn wir ihn schon vertreten. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Wittgenstein | Kripke Vs Wittgenstein | I 43 E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference. KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something). I 70 KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly. NS I 39 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases? Wrong solution: through meaning Wrong solution: through disposition NS I 40 Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions. KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity). 2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer? Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times. New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution: Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24). Putnam III 219 Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism. PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless. Stegmüller IV 35ff Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one - IV 37 b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition. IV 39f KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Ryle | Versus | Brandom I 340 BrandomVsRyle: VsPrivileged Access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Privileged Access | Versus | Brandom I 340 Kant: BrandomVsRyle: Vsprivileged access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection - on the other hand, later in the text: per. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Linguistics | Versus | Vendler: I 239 RyleVsLinguistics: no benefit for philosophy - Cavell ditto - VendlerVsRyle. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experience | Nagel, Th. | III 26 Erlebnis/Nagel: These alle Wesen haben spezifische Erlebnisse, die nicht mit den Mitteln jener psychologischen Begriffe darzustellen sind, die wir in der ersten Person, subjektiv, verstehen könnten. Das bedeutet aber nicht, daß wir nicht über Erlebnisse auf eine ganz allgemeine Weise nachzudenken vermögen, die jedoch kein subjektives Verständnis einschließt! Wir müssen sie aber auch weiterhin als subjektive Erlebnisse betrachten ï·" nicht bloß als Verhaltensdisposition oder funktionale Zustände. (NagelVsPutnam, NagelVsRyle)! |
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| method. Behaviorism. | Sellars, W. | I XXXI Def methodological behaviorism / SellarsVsRyle / Sellars: does lead a mental Termini overlooking the observable behavior, but does not hold it firmly, that these terms should be defined in terms of the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
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| Vs Operationalism. | Sellars, W. | Rorty I 118 SellarsVsRyle / Rorty: the parallel statement about macro and micro phenomena does not compel to the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro entities. |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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