Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dilthey | Ricoeur | II 22 Schleiermacher/Dilthey/hermeneutics/unterstanding/Ricoeur: [There has been a] use and abuse of the concept of speech event in the Romanticist tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as issuing from Schleiermacher and Dilthey tended to identify interpretation with the category of "understanding," and to define understanding as the recognition of an author's intention from the point of view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse. Ihis priority given to the author's intention and to the original audience tended, in turn, to make dialogue the model of every situation of understanding, thereby imposing the framework of intersubjectivity on hermeneutics. Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else. Ricoeur: This psychologizing conception of hermeneutics has had a great influence on Christian theology. It nourished the theologies of the Word-Event for which the event par excellence is a speech event, and this speech event is the Kerygma, the preaching of the Gospel. The meaning of the original event testifies to itself in the present event by which we apply it to ourselves in the act of faith. II 23 RicoeurVsSchleiermacher/RicoeurVsDilthey: My attempt here is to call into question the assumptions of this hermeneutic from the point of view of a philosophy of discourse in order to release hermeneutics from its psychologizing and existential prejudices. The assumptions of a psychologizing hermeneutic - like those of its contrary hermeneutics stem from a double misunderstanding of the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse and the dialectic of sense and reference in meaning itself. This twofold misunderstanding in turn leads to assigning an erroneous task to interpretion, a task which is well expressed in the famous slogan, "to understand an author better than he understood himself." ((s) Cf. >Meaning Change/Philosophical theories, especially >Meaning Change/Rorty. Ricoeur: Therefore what is at stake in this discussion is the correct definition of the hermeneutical task. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Speaking/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Hermeneutic Circle | Heidegger | Gadamer I 270 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger writes: "The circle must not be pulled down to a vitiosum, even if it is a tolerated one. Hidden within it is a positive Gadamer I 271 possibility of the most original recognition, which of course is only genuinely grasped when the interpretation has understood that its first, permanent and final task is not to allow itself to be dictated by ideas and popular concepts, but to secure the scientific subject in its elaboration from the things themselves"(1). Gadamer: What Heidegger says here is not at first a demand on practice of understanding, but describes the form of execution of understanding interpretation itself. Heidegger's hermeneutical reflection has its peak not so much in proving that there is a circle here, but rather that this circle has an ontologically positive meaning. Understanding/Gadamer: Whoever wants to understand a text always starts out drafting, he or she throws a sense of the whole ahead, as soon as a first sense appears in the text. Such a sense is only revealed because one reads the text with certain expectations of a certain meaning. In the elaboration of such a preliminary draft, which is of course constantly revised from the point of view of what will emerge in the further penetration of the mind, there is an understanding of what is there. Heidegger/Gadamer: That each revision of the preliminary draft is in the possibility of throwing a new draft of meaning ahead, that rival drafts can Gadamer I 272 exist next to each other until the unity of meaning becomes more clearly defined; that interpretation begins with preliminary terms that are replaced by more appropriate terms: this constant re-drafting, which constitutes the sense movement of understanding and interpretation, is the process Heidegger describes. Objectivity: There is no other "objectivity" here than the probation that a preliminary opinion finds through its elaboration. Method: One has to think of this fundamental demand as the radicalization of a procedure that in truth we always practice when we understand. >Expectations/Gadamer. Gadamer I 298 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness in hermeneutic theory to the fore. >Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential justification of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. [Schleiermacher's theory culminated in the] doctrine of the divinatory act, through which one puts oneself completely in the author's place and from there dissolves everything foreign and alienating in the text. Heidegger: In contrast, Heidegger describes the circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of pre-conception. The circle of whole and part is not brought to dissolution in perfect understanding, but is actually accomplished. Ontology/method: The circle is thus not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that guides our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but is determined by the commonality that connects us with the tradition. But this common ground is in constant formation in our relationship with tradition. It is not simply a prerequisite, under which we have always been standing, but we create it ourselves, as long as we understand, participate in what has been handed down and thereby further determine it ourselves. The circle Gadamer I 299 of understanding is thus not at all a "methodological" circle, but describes an ontological structural moment of understanding. >Perfection/Gadamer. 1. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 312ff |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutic Circle | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 193 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Ast and the entire hermeneutic-rhetorical tradition, when he recognizes as an essential basic feature of understanding that the meaning of the individual is always only ever derived from the context and thus ultimately from Gadamer I 194 the whole. This sentence applies as a matter of course to the grammatical understanding of each sentence up to the point where it is placed in the context of the whole of a literature... or of a work yes, up to the whole of literature or of the literary genre. But Schleiermacher now applies it to the psychological understanding which must understand every thought formation as a moment of life in the total context of that person. It has always been clear that logically seen here there is a circle, provided that the whole, from which the individual is to be understood, is not given before the individual - unless in the manner of a dogmatic canon (as the Catholic and as we saw, to a certain extent also guides the Reformation's understanding of Scripture), or a preliminary concept of the spirit of a time analogue to it (as Ast presupposes the spirit of antiquity in the manner of presentiment). Solution: Schleiermacher, however, explains that such dogmatic guidelines cannot claim any prior validity and are therefore only relative limitations of the circle. Basically, understanding always means moving in such circles, so the repeated return from the whole to the parts and vice versa is essential. In addition, this circle is constantly expanding, as the concept of the whole is a relative one, and its placement in ever larger contexts always affects the understanding of the individual. Gadamer I 296 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: [Schleiermacher differentiated the] hermeneutic circle of part and whole according to its objective as well as its subjective side. Just as the individual word belongs to the context of the sentence, so the individual text belongs to the context of the writer's work, and the latter to the whole of the literary genre or literature in question. On the other hand, however, the same text, as a manifestation of a creative moment, belongs to the whole of the soul life of its author. Only in such a whole, both objective and subjective, can understanding be completed. Dilthey: Following this theory, Dilthey then speaks of "structure" and of "centering in a center" from which the understanding of the whole emerges. He thus transfers to the historical world what has always been a principle Gadamer I 297 of all interpretation of texts: that one must understand a text from within oneself. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: But it is questionable whether the circular movement of understanding is so adequately understood. Here we have to go back to the result of our analysis of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. (>Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher). What Schleiermacher has developed as a subjective interpretation may be put aside completely. 1 GadamerVsSchleiermacher: When we try to understand a text, we do not put ourselves in the author's mental state, but if we want to speak of putting ourselves in the author's place, we put ourselves in the perspective under which the other person has come to his or her opinion. That means nothing else but that we seek to accept the factual right of what the other person says. We will even, if we want to understand, try to reinforce his or her arguments. 2. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) also the objective side of this circle, as Schleiermacher describes it, does not get to the heart of the matter (...): The goal of all understanding and comprehension is the agreement on the matter. Thus hermeneutics has always had the task of establishing absent or disturbed agreement. The history of hermeneutics can confirm this, if one thinks, for example, of Augustine, where the Old Testament is to be communicated with the Christian message(1), or of early Protestantism, which was faced with the same problem(2), or finally of the age of Enlightenment, where it admittedly comes close to a renunciation of consent, if the "perfect understanding" of a text is to be achieved only by means of historical interpretation. It is now something qualitatively new when Romanticism and Schleiermacher establish a historical consciousness of a universal scope by no longer allowing the binding form of the tradition from which they come and in which they stand to be a firm foundation for all hermeneutic endeavour. Gadamer I 298 Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness to the fore in hermeneutical theory. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential foundation of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. 1. Cf. for this: G. Ripanti, Agostino teoretico del' interpretazione. Brescia 1980 2. Cf. M. Flacius; Clavis Scripturae sacrae seu de Sermone sacrarum literarum, lib.II, 1676 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Hegel | Gadamer I 171 Hermeneutics/Hegel/Gadamer: In the beginning, Schleiermacher as well as Hegel are aware of loss and alienation from tradition, which challenges their hermeneutical reflection. Yet they determine the task of hermeneutics in very different ways. Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. [While,] according to Schleiermacher, historical knowledge [opens] the way to replace what has been lost and to restore tradition, provided it brings back the occidental and the original, Hegel takes a different path: Gadamer I 173 Hegel: "(...) not the real life of their existence is there, not the tree that carried them, not the earth and the elements that formed their substance, nor the climate that determined their determination, nor the change of seasons that controlled the process of their becoming. Thus, with the works of that art, fate does not give us its world, not the spring and summer of moral life in which it flourished and matured, but only the veiled memory of that reality". Hegel calls the behaviour of the later ones towards the handed down works of art an "outward action", "which wipes away raindrops or dust from these fruits and, in place of the inner elements of the surrounding, producing and inspiring of morality, erects the extensive scaffolding of the dead elements of their outward existence, of language, of history, etc., not in order to live in them, but only to imagine them in themselves"(1). The true task of the thinking mind in relation to history, also in relation to the history of art, would not be an external one, according to Hegel, if the mind saw itself represented in it in a higher way. >Spirit/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >Art/Hegel. Gadamer I 174 HegelVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Here Hegel points beyond the whole dimension in which the problem of understanding arose in Schleiermacher. Hegel raises it to the basis on which he founded philosophy as the highest form of the absolute mind. In the absolute knowledge of philosophy that self-consciousness of the spirit is completed, which, as the text says, "in a higher way" also embraces the truth of art. Thus for Hegel it is philosophy, i.e. the historical self-penetration of the mind that accomplishes the hermeneutical task. It is the extreme counterposition to the self-forgetfulness of the historical consciousness. It transforms the historical behaviour of the imagination into a thinking behaviour towards the past. Cf. >F. Schleiermacher, >Truth of Art. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, S. 524. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 171 Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: In the beginning, Schleiermacher as well as Hegel are aware of loss and alienation from tradition, which challenges their hermeneutical reflection. Yet they determine the task of hermeneutics in very different ways. Schleiermacher (...) is entirely focused on restoring the original purpose of a work in understanding. For art and literature handed down to us from the past have been wrenched from their original world. Thus Schleiermacher writes that it is no longer the natural and original, "when works of art come into circulation. Namely, each has a part of its comprehensibility from its original purpose". "Hence the work of art, torn out of its original context if it is not preserved historically, loses its significance. "He almost says, "So a work of art is therefore actually rooted in its ground, in its environment. It already loses its meaning when it is torn out of this environment and goes into circulation, it is like something that has been rescued from the fire and now bears scorch marks"(1). Gadamer I 172 Gadamer: According to Schleiermacher, historical knowledge opens the way to replace what has been lost and restoring tradition, provided it brings back the occidental and original. In this way, the hermeneutic endeavor seeks to regain the "point of contact" in the spirit of the artist, who should first make the meaning of a work of art fully understandable, just as it is usually done with texts by striving to reproduce the author's original production. ((s) Cf. the discussion of various philosophical theories on >Meaning Change). GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) the question is whether what is gained here is really what we seek as the meaning of the work of art, and whether understanding is correctly determined when we see in it a Second Creation, the reproduction of the original production. In the end, such a determination of hermeneutics is no less absurd than all restitution and restoration of past life. Restoration of original conditions, like all restoration, is a powerless beginning in view of the historicity of our being. Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel takes a different path than Schleiermacher: >Hermeneutics/Hegel. Gadamer I 182 SchleiermacherVsDilthey/SchleiermacherVsTradition/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) seeks the unity of hermeneutics no longer in the content-related unity of the tradition to which understanding is to be applied, but detached from all content-related particularity in the unity of a procedure that is not differentiated even by the way the thoughts are transmitted, whether in writing or orally, in a foreign or in one's own simultaneous language. (Cf. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey). Schleiermacher's idea of a universal hermeneutics is determined from Gadamer I 183 there. It arose from the idea that the experience of strangeness and the possibility of misunderstanding is a universal one. SchleiermacherVsTradition: (...) precisely the extension of the hermeneutic task to the "meaningful conversation", which is particularly characteristic of Schleiermacher, shows how the meaning of the strangeness that hermeneutics is supposed to overcome has fundamentally changed in comparison to the previous task of hermeneutics. Strangeness is indissolubly given in a new, universal sense with the individuality of the "you". Gadamer: Nevertheless, one must not take the lively, even brilliant sense of human individuality that distinguishes Schleiermacher as an individual characteristic that influences theory here. Rather, it is the critical rejection of all that which in the Age of Enlightenment under the title "Reasonable Thoughts" was regarded as the common essence of humanity, which requires a fundamental redefinition of the relationship with tradition(2). Gadamer I 188 Understanding/SchleiermacherVsTradtion: (...) instead of an "aggregate of observations" [it is necessary] to develop a real art of understanding. This means something fundamentally new. For now, the difficulty of understanding and misunderstanding is no longer reckoned with as occasional moments, but as integrating moments, the prior elimination of which is at stake. This is how Schleiermacher virtually defines: "Hermeneutics is the art of avoiding misunderstanding". It rises above the pedagogical occasionality of the interpretative Gadamer I 189 practice for the autonomy of a method, provided that "misunderstanding is self-evident and understanding at every point must be wanted and sought"(3). Gadamer I 191 Hermeneutics includes a grammatical and psychological "art of interpretation". Schleiermacher's own speciality, however, is psychological interpretation. It is ultimately a divinatory behaviour, a putting oneself in the writer's entire condition, a view of the "inner course of production" of the creation of a work(4). Understanding, then, is a reproduction related to an original production, a recognition of what has been recognized (Boeckh)(5), a reconstruction that starts from the living moment of conception, the "sprouting decision" as the organizing point of the composition(6). Gadamer: But such an isolating description of understanding means that the thought construct that we want to understand as speech or text is not understood in terms of its factual content, but as an aesthetic construct, as a work of art or as "artistic thinking". >Genius/Schleiermacher, >Understanding/Schleiermacher. Understanding/Schleiermacher: Schleiermacher [comes] to the conclusion that it is necessary to understand a writer better than he or she has understood him- or herself - a formula that has been repeated ever since and in whose changing interpretation the entire history of modern hermeneutics becomes apparent. 1. Schleiermacher, Ästhetik, ed. R. Odebrecht, S. 84 ff. 2. Chr. Wolff and his school included the "general art of interpretation" in philosophy, since "finally everything aims at the fact that one may recognize and examine other truths, if one understands their speech" (J. Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, (1726), p. 165). It is similar for Bentley when he demands of the philologist: "His only guides are reason, the light of the author's thoughts and their compelling force" (quoted from Wegner, Altertumskunde, p. 94). 3. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik § 15 und 16, Werke I, 7, S. 29f. 4. Schleiermacher Werke I, 7, S. 83. 5. Schleiermacher Werke III, 3, S. 355, 358, 364. 6. Boeckh, Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaft, ed. Bratuschek, 2.Autfl. 1886, S. 10. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historiography | Gadamer | I 10 Historiography/Science/Gadamer: Whatever science may mean here, and even if in all historical knowledge the application of general experience to the respective object of research is included - historical knowledge nevertheless does not strive to grasp the concrete phenomenon as the case of a general rule. The individual does not simply serve to confirm a lawfulness from which predictions can be made in practical terms. Its ideal is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness. No matter how much general experience may become effective: the aim is not to confirm and expand these general experiences in order to arrive at the knowledge of a law, for example, how people, peoples, or states develop in general, but to understand how this person, this people, this state is, what it has become - in general terms: how it could come to be that way. >Humanities/Gadamer, >Humanities/Dilthey, >Historiography/Droysen. I 340 Historiography/Gadamer: The historian behaves differently [than the hermeneutician] to handed-down texts in that he or she strives to see a piece of the past through them. I 341 The historian feels it to be the philologist's weakness that he sees his text as a work of art. A work of art is a whole world that is sufficient in itself. But the historical interest does not know such self-sufficiency. DiltheyVsSchleiermacher: This is how Dilthey felt about Schleiermacher: "Philology would like to see a rounded existence everywhere"(1). Gadamer: If a handed-down poem makes an impression on the historian, it will nevertheless have no hermeneutical meaning for him or her. The historian cannot, in principle, see him- or herself as the addressee of the text and assume the claim of a text. Rather, he or she questions the text with regard to something that the text does not want to give away of its own accord. I 400 Historiography/Gadamer: (...) the historian usually chooses terms to describe the historical uniqueness of his or her objects, without explicit reflection on their origin and justification. He or she follows only his or her own material interest and does not give any account of the fact that the descriptive suitability he or she finds in the terms the historian chooses can be highly disastrous for his or her own intention, as long as it adapts the historically foreign to the familiar and thus, even with an unbiased view, has already subjected the otherness of the object to his or her own anticipation. Unless the historian admits his or her naivety to this, he or she undoubtedly misses the level of reflection required by the object. The historian's naivety becomes truly abysmal, however, when he or she begins to become aware of the problem of the same and demands, for example, that in historical understanding one should leave one's own concepts aside and think only in terms of the epoch to be understood. This demand, which sounds like a consistent implementation of historical consciousness, reveals itself to every thinking reader as a naive illusion. The demand to leave aside the concepts of the present does not mean a naive transposition into the past. Rather, it is an essentially relative demand, which only has any meaning at all in relation to its own terms. The historical consciousness misjudges itself when, in order to understand, wants to ex- I 401 clude what alone makes understanding possible. >Meaning change, >Concepts/Gadamer. Historical Consciousness/Gadamer: To think historically means in truth to carry out the implementation that happens to the concepts of the past when we try to think in them. Historical thinking always contains a mediation between those terms and our own thinking. To want to avoid one's own terms when interpreting them is not only impossible, but obvious nonsense. 1. Clara Misch: Der junge Dilthey. Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern 1852–1870. Leipzig 1933; Stuttgart/Göttingen 1960, S. 94. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Humboldt, Wilhelm von | Gadamer | I 347 Humboldt/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is Hegel's position that [19th-century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. >Historism, >G.W.F. Hegel. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Humboldt as an author, >Absoluteness/Hegel, >Pantheism. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Prejudice | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 283 Prejudice/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Schleiermacher [writes] that he distinguishes between bias and haste as causes of misunderstanding(1). Cf. >Prejudice/Enlightenment, >Prejudice/Gadamer. [Schleiermacher] puts the permanent prejudices of bias next to the current misjudgements of haste (>Prejudice/Descartes). But only the former are interested in the scientific methodology. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: The fact that among the prejudices that fill those in authority, there can also be those who have truth - and this was inherent in the concept of authority - does not even occur to Schleiermacher. His modification of the traditional classification of prejudices documents the completion of the Enlightenment. Bias now only means an individual barrier to understanding: "The one-sided preference for what is close to the individual circle of ideas"(1). Gadamer: In truth, however, the decisive question is hidden under the concept of bias. The fact that the prejudices that determine me originate from my bias is itself already judged from the standpoint of its dissolution and enlightenment and applies only to unjustified prejudices. Even if there are also justified prejudices that are productive for knowledge, the problem of authority returns for us. The radical consequences of the Enlightenment, which are also contained in Schleiermacher's methodological beliefs, are not tenable in this way. 1. Schleiermacher Werke I, 7, S. 31 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Schleiermacher | Gadamer | I 347 Schleiermacher/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is in Hegel's position that [19th century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Schleiermacher as an author. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Schleiermacher | Ricoeur | II 22 Schleiermacher/Dilthey/hermeneutics/unterstanding/Ricoeur: [There has been a] use and abuse of the concept of speech event in the Romanticist tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as issuing from Schleiermacher and Dilthey tended to identify interpretation with the category of "understanding," and to define understanding as the recognition of an author's intention from the point of view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse. This priority given to the author's intention and to the original audience tended, in turn, to make dialogue the model of every situation of understanding, thereby imposing the framework of intersubjectivity on hermeneutics. Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else. Ricoeur: This psychologizing conception of hermeneutics has had a great influence on Christian theology. It nourished the theologies of the Word-Event for which the event par excellence is a speech event, and this speech event is the Kerygma, the preaching of the Gospel. The meaning of the original event testifies to itself in the present event by which we apply it to ourselves in the act of faith. II 23 RicoeurVsSchleiermacher/RicoeurVsDilthey: My attempt here is to call into question the assumptions of this hermeneutic from the point of view of a philosophy of discourse in order to release hermeneutics from its psychologizing and existential prejudices. The assumptions of a psychologizing hermeneutic - like those of its contrary hermeneutics - stem from a double misunderstanding of the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse and the dialectic of sense and reference in meaning itself. This twofold misunderstanding in turn leads to assigning an erroneous task to interpretion, a task which is well expressed in the famous slogan, "to understand an author better than he understood himself." ((s) Cf. >Meaning Change/Philosophical theories, especially >Meaning Change/Rorty. Ricoeur: Therefore what is at stake in this discussion is the correct definition of the hermeneutical task. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Speaking/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Theology | Barth | Brocker I 233 Theology/Barth: With his famous commentary on the Roman letters of 1922, the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) founded the "Dialectical Theology", which was to become the most successful theological movement of the 20th century. Barth's thesis: Legitimate theological knowledge may derive exclusively from the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ, as it is witnessed in the Bible, understood as a process of language. BarthVsSchleiermacher: Religious experience is to be consistently excluded as a theological source of knowledge. BarthVsIdealism: Natural or speculative reason is (also) to be excluded as a theological source of knowledge. Also BarthVsTroeltsch: History cannot serve as a theological source of knowledge. BarthVsNational Socialism: Barth's theology achieved a broader breakthrough in church politics through the struggle of the "confessing church" against the efforts of the early National Socialist state to achieve equalization. Barth's 1933 slogan of the "Theological Existence Today", which is decisive for the Church and the parish, concentrates entirely on proclaiming the sole reign of Jesus Christ and was thereby aimed at indirectly resisting the striving for totalization of the state Brocker I 234 as well as for pointing the way for the later "Barmer Theological Declaration" of 1934. >Christian Church. Brocker I 245 Theology/state/justification/Barth: Barth's basic idea: that theology "does not have to represent a theory necessarily peculiar to the various political figures and realities" (1). One can always only judge Christian-theological "from case to case, from situation to situation"(2). >State/Barth, Politics/Barth, Democracy/Barth. 1. Karl Barth, »Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde« (1946), in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998 (b), S. 56 2. Ebenda S. 58 Georg Pfleiderer, „Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht 1938)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.