Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 40 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 185 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979 1, Winograd 1972 2). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours. I 186 Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. I 313 Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972 7): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961 3, Penrose, 1989 4): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting: VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980 5). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. I 315 Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b 6): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall. ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. I 318 For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... I 319 ...Turing machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence. I 320 This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. 1. D. R. Hofstadter Gödel, Escher Bach, New York 1979 2. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972 3. J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines and Gödel, Philosophy 36, 1961, p. 112-27. 4. R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford 1989 5. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24 6. J. R. Searle, Is the brain an digital computer? Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical association, 1990, 64: pp. 21-37 7. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. New York 1972. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Causality | Searle | I 287/88 (Note) Causality/identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Causality/Armstrong). SearleVsPlace: E.g. a liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. --- II 93 Causality/Searle: causality is not an external instance, only more experiences. II 101f Causality: e.g. pressure cooker: we can infer from steam to pressure. Through seeing there is no inference on physical objects. SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience. >Causality/Hume. II 152ff Causality/SearleVsHume: causality is real and directly observable. --- I 157 Logical causality: logical causality is not inference, but intentional content and an experience condition. There are not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Intentional contents. --- II 179 Causality: causality is part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. --- Danto I 299 Causality/Searle: causality only arises through interpretation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Chinese Room | Danto | I 272 ff Searle: denies that in terms of linguistic skills no distinction should be possible. Chinese room: the occupant does not speak the language, but acts according to established rules. The output is indistinguishable from language skills. DantoVsSearle: but perhaps the brain does not do anything else, but answer to an electrical pulse with a electrical reaction. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Chinese Room | Pinker | I 121f Chinese Room/Searle: Understanding is not symbol processing - ChurchlandVsSearle. then you can refute Maxwell’s electromagnetism: a man swung a bar magnet: then it generates electromagnetic waves, but no light - wrong to conclude, therefore light would not be electromagnetic waves - Extrapolation: then at higher frequencies there is no light. Analogy: Searle has slowed down computing so that you do not take it anymore as understanding - Pinker: if someone used all of the rules from the translation manual applying them in a matter of seconds, we would not say that he could not speak Chinese - PinkerVsSearle: he examines only the meaning of the word understanding - but you need not to use the word. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Chinese Room | Poundstone | I 353f Chinese Room/PoundstoneVsSearle: some: a book "What to do if a Chinese note...". Cannot exist, it would have to include all libraries - ((s) because it would not be a dictionary, but a book of responses) Searle: semantic understanding essential for consciousness - PoundstoneVsSearle: even without knowing what numbers are (missed first day in school) you can do maths. - We all do not know what numbers are - I 357 "System Response": the one person does not speak Chinese, but the system as a whole does - I 365 the levels book/user need to be separated. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Chinese Room | Rorty | VI 161 Chinese Room/DennettVsSearle: inverted spectra (Jackson): these examples are intended to tap our intuitive notions, strengthen or weaken the feeling of the importance of qualia, phenomena or intrinsic properties. >Inverted spectra, >Frank Jackson. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Chinese Room | Chalmers | I 323 Chinese Room/Searle/Chalmers: Searle's argument is directed against the possibility of understanding or intentionality. ChalmersVsSearle: we separate intentionality and understanding from the possibility of having conscious experiences. We split Searle's argument into two parts: (1) No program achieves consciousness. (2) No program achieves intentionality (understanding). Searle believes that (1) implies (2), others doubt that. Strong artificial intelligence: if (1) is true, the strong Artificial Intelligence thesis fails, but if (1) can be refuted, even Searle would accept that the Chinese Room argument failed. The connection of consciousness and understanding can be set aside, it is not a decisive argument against artificial intelligence. FodorVsChinese Room: (Fodor 1980) 1: Fordor considers the connection to the environment of the system. ReyVsChinese Room: (Rey 1986) 2 dito. BodenVsChinese Room: (Boden 1988) 3 Boden shows functional or procedural approaches of intentionality. ThagardVsChinese Room: (Thagard 1986) 4 dito. Chalmers: it is about intentionality (understanding) and does not refute the possibility of consciousness (conscious experiences). Chinese Room/Chalmers: the argument states that a program is not sufficient, e.g. for the experience of a red object when implemented in a black and white environment. Then consciousness needs more than one relevant program. Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsChinese Room/Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsSearle: it is the whole system to which you have to attribute consciousness, not the individual elements. SearleVsVs: that is implausible. Chalmers: in fact, it is implausible, if the inhabitant of the room should have no consciousness, but the inhabitant together with the paper. I 324 Disappearing Qualia: the argument can also be applied to the Chinese Room (... + ...) I 325 Dancing Qualia: dito (... + ...) Conclusion/Chalmers: a system of demons and paper snippets both of which can reduce the number of demons and snippets, has the same conscious experiences as e.g. to understand Chinese or to see something red. Chinese Room/Chalmers: 1. As described by Searle, the stack of paper is not a simple stack, but a dynamic system of symbol manipulation. 2. The role of the inhabitant (in our variant: the demon, which can be multiplied) is quite secondary. When we look at the causal dynamics between the symbols, it is no longer so implausible to ascribe consciousness to the system. I 326 The inhabitant is only a kind of causal mediator. 1. J. Fodor, Searle on what only brains can do. Behavioral and Brain sciences 3, 1980, pp. 431-32 2. G. Rey, Waht's really going on in Searle's "Chinese Room", Philosophical Studies 50, 1986: pp. 169-85. 3. M. Boden, Escaping from the Chinese Room, in: Computer Models of Mind, Cambridge 1988. 4. P. Thagard, The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese Room. Behaviorism 14, 1986: pp. 139-46. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Competence | Katz | Cresswell I 12 Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable. Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things: A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect. B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. --- Cresswell I 12 Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Consciousness | McGinn | I 49 Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances. Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation. I 52 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?" I 56 Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"? Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Knowing how, >Experience. I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units. On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails. >Explanation. I 74 Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world. It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings. >Philosophy. Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge. I 192 What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world? Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism. >Terminology/McGinn. II 68 If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all. I 86ff Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness. >Awareness/Chalmers. II 216 Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin. >Artificial consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Consciousness | Block | II 458 Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access-consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept) Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness. Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious. II 524 Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request. This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control. II 530 Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. ((s) Part or basis as a counterpart). II 531 Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points. II 535 Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering 2) is available for rational control of actions 3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious). p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck. Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other. Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action. p-consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations. a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes". Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain. Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness. II 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) Cultural construct! 2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects. BlockVsDennett: Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product. Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept. Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Descriptions | McDowell | I 132 Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). >Description/Russell, >Description/Searle. I 132/33 McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense". >Fregean sense, >Concept/McDowell, >Predication. I 210 McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. >Space of reason. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational). VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Extensions | Searle | II 248f Extension: Tradition: meaning has to do with the mental state. Tradition: intension fixes extension. PutnamVsSearle: intension does not firmly attach meaning. >Intension. --- V 20 Secondary extension/Goodman/Searle: allegedly, the secondary extension of "ophthalmologist" includes something that does not belong to that of "occulist". SearleVs: such statements about the secondary extension are completely irrelevant for whether two expressions are synonymous! It is simply a fact that oculist means ophthalmologist. Otherwise the criteria would be completely arbitrary. Cf. >secondary extension/Goodman. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Functionalism | Searle | Dennett I 557 Function/Searle (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle. Searle I 19 SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam): relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. Cf. >Functions. I 59 ff VsFunctionalism: functionalism eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. >Qualia, >Simulation. I 233f A machine is defined by effects and cannot be recreated from cheese. A computer is syntactically defined and can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese). Syntax is always relative to the observer but not intrinsical. However, the heart is an intrinsical pump. Also, water can be described as intelligent (lowest resistance). I 266f Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts. Causality only exists through interest-oriented description here. >Description dependence. Rules are no cause for action. >Rules. I 266 Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer. >Description level, >Levels(Order). I 269 Pattern: a pattern plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) >Causality/Searle. III 24 SearleVsMillikan: a function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: the function arose evolutionary. >Ruth Millikan. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identity Theory | Churchland | II 472 Identity Theory/Brain/Consciousness/Searle: Vs Identification of conscious states with brain states. Instead: the brain causes these states. Correlations can be an indication of causality, but they are not a reference to identity. ChurchlandVsSearle: he does not see why scientists advocate identity: depending on the data situation, it is more plausible than the assumption that a is caused by a different b. (But Searle is not a dualist). Identity instead of causation: e.g. Identity: Current is electron flow, it is not the causation of this flow. E.g. genes are not caused by base pairs of DNA, they are these base pairs. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Imagination | Holenstein | Münch III 324 Denken/Holenstein: es ist keineswegs so, wie man im Anschluss an Aristoteles jahrhundertelang geglaubt hat, dass Denken ohne bildliche Vorstellung als Fundament nicht möglich sei. Sie sind nicht nur epistemologisch entbehrlich, sondern auch beim psychologischen Entstehen von Denkleistungen. Münch III 331 Bild/Holenstein: bei einer bildlichen Repräsentation (Vorstellung) brauchen die räumlichen Verhältnisse nicht material, sondern nur funktional realisiert zu sein. Münch III 332 Homunculi/bildliche Vorstellung/HolensteinVsSearle: es ist ein beliebtes Argument gegen bildliche Repräsentation von mentalen Bildern, dass sie von Homunculi betrachtet werden müssten, die das Problem der Kodierung bloß verschieben. Holenstein: das ist eine ontologische Voraussetzung, die nicht den wissenschaftlichen Standards entspricht! Die Annahme von Homunculi bedarf einer besonderen Begründung! Statt Regress ist außerdem einfach ein geregelter Gebrauch einer physikalischen Struktur des Gehirns möglich. Münch III 336 Vorstellung/Holenstein: was wie Vorstellungen kausal auf Physikalisches einwirkt, ist per definitionem ebenfalls als "physikalisch" anzunehmen. Von mentalen Strukturen ist so anzunehmen, dass sie als funktionale Strukturen in physikalischen Strukturen verwirklicht sind. Münch III 338 Vorstellung/Holenstein: der Prozess findet "im Geist" statt, das Resultat wird in eine Welt hineinprojiziert, die sich entweder mit der Wahrnehmungswelt deckt, oder eine Alternative bildet. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Intentionality | Dennett | Rorty VI 27 Rorty: "Intentional stance"/intentional position/Dennett: The "intentional stance" is made possible through the detection of a Davidsonian pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth. >Rationality, >Language and Thought, >Truth/Davidson. Dennett I 316f SearleVsDennett: This is only an "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. Def intentional stance/Dennett: An attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind. Dennett II 46 It often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism: The fact that it was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium! E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance. E.g. Could archaeopteryx fly? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did it get up there ...? I 321 Def design standpoint/Dennett: e.g. an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later. But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that. Intentional stance/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either. >Cf. >Chess programs. Brandom I 109 Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately. I 591ff E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The example imitates the whole evolution. Dennett I 592ff Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: the robot that takes care of you must be able to act independently. - It must believe in reward, but develops self-interest. - Question: is this kind of intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs. Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes. I 596 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: No machine, no vending machine either has intentionality. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: At some point intentionality is no longer derived, but real! >As-if-intentionality/Searle. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Intrinsicness | Rorty | VI 106 Intrinsic/observer-relative/RortyVsSearle: Searle’s distinction serves no useful purpose. - Searle says: "essential" - Rorty: we ask: "essential what for?" VI 126 Intrinsic/extrinsic: we cannot decide which description applies to the intrinsic characteristics. >Description, >Observation language, >Observation sentence, >Attribution, >Essence, >Searle. VI 146 f Intrinsic/extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: one can only defend intrinsic characteristics if one can claim that knowledge of these characteristics is not identical with the knowledge on how to use the words used to describe these characteristics. >Extrinsic, >Essentialism, >Essential properties, >Language use. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Searle | III 78 Language/language-dependent/Searle: some things can be viewed independent of language: E.g. that the man crossed the line - but not that he makes 6 points with this. Institutional facts are never language independent, e.g. there is no pre-verbal way to represent the pawn as king. (Game) points are not "out there" like men and balls. SearleVsPutnam: > meanings are in the head, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Meaning/Putnam. III 79 Reasons only work because people accept them as reasons. Language independent: are status functions: e.g. one can think that this is a screwdriver because one has seen many times that things are screwed with it. ((s) QuineVsSearle: the network of our beliefs is thoroughly language-dependent.) III 82 Searle: language is necessary if the status changes without a change of the physical state of an object. --- Perler I 143 Language/Searle: language is needed for: 1. intentional states that deal with language, 2. intentional states that deal with facts, e.g. that this is a dollar note, 3. representation of spatially and temporally distant facts, 4. complex states and 5. formulations that contain descriptions, e.g. instead of "today it is warm" the date. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Language Rules | Searle | Language rules/Searle: language rules are doubted by many authors. They are actually rules for speech acts. In any case rules for singular terms are of a very different kind. VsSearle: then the relations between the analysis of speech acts and of the meaning are not clarified at all. >Meaning, >Speech act. --- IV 84 Language rules/Searle: e.g. someone who makes an assertion, commits himself/herself to the truth. ((s) > Commitment/Brandom). J. Husted "Searle" in: A.Hügli (Ed.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993, p. 253 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional / intend p)> (mean p) - SearleVsGrice: it is possible (intend p) and not (mean p) - BennettVsSearle: he has not refuted Grice - the antecedent is not satisfied - S does not literally mean what it says. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Meaning | Dennett | I 565 Example Vending Machine: A beverage vending machine that recognizes quarter dollar coins is later shipped to Brazil, where it accepts certain local coins. Thesis: The environment creates the meaning. Meaning/function/evolution/Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? I 281 Meaning/Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: The nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics", "quasi-meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules. SearleVsDennett: this is just as-if intentionality. >As if/Searle. DennetVsSearle: We must start somewhere - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance. I 282 Also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us. >Intentionality. Brandom I 110ff Meaning/Dennett: That something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Mental States | Davidson | I (b) 30 Twin Earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system. I (b) 35 False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the >propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine (falsely). It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> Measuring). My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical. >">Anomalous Monism. I (e) 99 Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings are not in the head). Frank I 626 Mind/Davidson: does not work without language, both equal. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 657ff Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as in Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice. DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Naturalistic Fallacy | Hume | Stegmüller IV 186 Is-ought problem/naturalistic fallacy/Hume: thesis: it is impossible to derive an ought-sentence solely from an is-sentences. ((s)> Moore: Moore renamed the problem to "naturalistic fallacy"). Stegmüller: if there is non-moral use there is no problem because of the hypothetical imperative: e.g. in chess, there is no problem of the transition from "is" to should. Reason: there is no expression of any new relationship! Implicit: what you want, you should. Solution/SearleVsHume: we can attach premises with obligations. Solution/Searle: it is about institutional facts. MackieVsSearle: this is a confusion of >exterior/interior problems. We cannot step outside of internalized rules. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Pain | McGinn | I 65 McGinnVsSearle: We are not able, to lead back pain to the underlying neural entities. I 71 Pain/McGinn: can only be determined by introspection. We are unable to change the focus, or apply a different meaning. >Introspection. I 226f Brain/Mentalese/language of thought/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here, semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness. >Consciousness. --- II 34 Pain/McGinnVsReductionism: pain cannot be reduced to the firing of C fibers, just as water cannot be reduced to H2O. But phenomena are what makes the mind. So mind cannot be reduced to the brain. >Brain, >Mind, >Reductionism. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Physical/Psychic | Rorty | I 139 Mentally/physically/VsEliminative materialism/Rorty: one can hardly say, "mentally" mean in reality something "that could turn out to be something physical." >Materialism, >Distinctions. I 140 Mental/mind /mental/brain / RortyVsSearle: you could say, "sensation" and "brain process" are simply two ways to talk about the same thing - two sides of what? - Something of the mental or something physical? Or from a third element? >Description levels, >Aspects. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Propositional Content | Tugendhat | I 74 Propositional content/Tugendhat: E.g. that which "he is coming", "he is coming!", "if only he were coming", "is he coming?" have in common. >Propositions, >Meaning, >Translation. Understanding: always has the structure of yes/no statements about the propositional content. >Understanding. No propositional content is: e.g. "hurrah", "thank you", "good day". I 241 Propositional content/Searle/Tugendhat: Searle does not use "p" for assertoric proposition at all, but for propositional content! (Tugendhat: as I have used [p]). - Whoever uses "p" according to Searle wants to say that the fact (SV) that p really exists. >Facts/Searle, >Statements, >John Searle. TugendhatVsSearle: it is unclear what Sac becomes. >Assertions, cf. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. I 290 Propositional content/Tugendhat. = asserted. Propositional content has no truth conditions. - Propositional content is not the proposition. >Propositions, >Truth conditions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Reality | Searle | III 168 Reality/Maturana: the nervous system (autopoietic) creates reality. SearleVsMaturana: there is a genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. III 179 E.g. someone says: "In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same. III 185 Truth/reality/Searle: truth cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. -> Aspects/Searle; >Conceptual scheme. Ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. PutnamVsSearle: there is no "ready made world". >"...if everything was different." >Berkeley. III 194 Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. >Background/Searle, >Moore's hands. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Churchland | II 464 Reductionism/Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean that a pure bottom up strategy should be pursued. I also do not mean that descriptions of higher levels would be dubious in themselves. There are clearly higher-level properties, and so there is a need for corresponding descriptions. Definition Bottom up/Churchland: is the opinion according to which one must first know everything about the molecular basis before the psychological processes can be achieved. But this is not a reductionism either. II 468 VsReductionism/other authors: A) The goal is absurd. Stereotype critique: "I cannot imagine that pain should consist of any activity patterns of neurons" ChurchlandVsVs: that is nothing more than the impotence of the imagination. II 470 Vs Reductionism: if a macro-phenomenon can be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of the components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms. The reduction of the macro-phenomenons on a single micro-phenomenon is then not possible. (> "Multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs. II 471 Reductionism/Churchland: when the mechanism of a biological process has been discovered, it may be possible to invent devices that mimic these processes. The reductive success is not denied. Just as little, perhaps, that there might be DNAs in other parts of the universe. Reductionism/Churchland: It is not easy to argue VsReductionism and not to fall into dualism. (VsSearle). |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Reference | Putnam | VI 395 Theory of Reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: the theory of reference might refute that (but not a theory of meaning). >Metaphysical realism, >Meaning theory. --- III 52f Counterfactual Conditional/reference/representation/Fodor: thesis: the actual nature of reference is explained by means of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional. Asymmetric dependence: cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. III 54 Reference comes into being by causal attachment to the world, i.e. also through images and mockups. If does not come about by cats, then it does not come about by pictures of cats. III 56 Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". N.B.: this is ultimately dependent on real cats. III 57 Fodor: if pictures do not work as a trigger, then cats also do not work as a trigger (PutnamVs). III 61 Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x (FodorVs). That leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism. III 64 PutnamVs: e.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence, because there is no world with witches. However, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). III 65 PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. III 69 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause. Otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior. But this is correct vice versa (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?). PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. III 78 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: reference cannot reduce them with the help of the terms "law", "counterfactual conditionals" or "causality". III 133 Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference, one speaks of individual sciences or everyday language causality. >Inscrutability of reference. III 140 Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. Fundamental physics cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. III 208 Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. It is only subject to causal restrictions. --- V 75 Reference: thesis: input is shaped by concepts. There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. V 79 Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): problem: what actually is reference. Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. >Externalism. --- I (a) 34 Reference: if reference is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. I (a) 35 Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed descriptions. Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. I (b) 65 Reference: in logic: reference is that what corresponds to the description. Field: Field has shown that this does not fulfill the task. I (a) 67ff Primitive Reference/Putnam: e.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): these are, in fact, feelings of the beings themselves. This amounts to the causal theory of reference. When it is expanded to absent, past or future objects this is not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. I (b) 69 Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic). That would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers. N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. I (b) 70 Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. +> Gricean intention: Grice/Avramides, > Intentions. --- Rorty I 312 (According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this. --- Rorty IV 20 ff Rorty: Relation/Putnam: early: only the causal theory of reference (not the intentional one) can save us from relativism. --- Rorty VI 123 Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: VsDifferentiation "intrinsic"/"relational". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rules | Searle | III 42 Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules. III 39 Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule? III 54 Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y. III 55 The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule. V 59 Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules. V 64 Rules/Searle: rules represent obligations. Unequal conventions play a role in the context of translation. Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention. Rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules. I 217 Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system. >Terminology/Searle. I 269 Rules: people drive right because they follow a rule, but they do not drive for that reason alone. You also do not speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist. IV 252 Rules/Searle: example promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed. Rule II: may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway. Rule III: the speaker must have the intention to. Rule IV: with the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted. VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all. >Speech act theory/Searle. IV 253 Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. >Semantic rules, cf. >Meaning postulates. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sentence Meaning | Cresswell | I 24 Illocutionary force/meaning/Searle/Cresswell: Thesis: sentence meaning is the illocutionary force (acting force). >Illocutionary acts. Cresswell: then it must be possible that the same sentence occurs with a different illocutionary force (on another occasion). >Sentences. The best thing you could then say is that sentence meaning is a function of usage contexts (conditions of use) on the force that the sentence had if it was used in the situation. >Theory of force, >Assertive force. CresswellVsSearle: but only the truth conditional semantics takes the problem of embedding seriously. >Truthconditional semantics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sentences | Sellars | II 307 Sentence/name: SellarsVsSearle: sentences (clauses) can be names (like Frege): Carnap: S (inL) means Chicago is great: ("Chicago is great" = name). >Name of a sentence, >Description levels, >Metalanguage, >Levels/Order, >Clauses, >Clause/Frege, >Clause/Searle. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sentences | Millikan | I 22 Sentence/Millikan: Sentences are reproduced units. A sentence usually has several role models. Syntactic rules: are the reproductively determined character of the sentence. They copy the grammar. >Syntax, >Proposition, >Meaning, >Picture theory. I 53 Sentence/Millikan: a sentence is never a simple element of a reproductively determined family, at least the syntactic form of words belongs to different families. Syntax: can be assumed as a large superordinate family, the individual forms belong to different families. Direct eigenfunction/sentence/Millikan: the direct eigenfunction of a sentence is derived from the stabilization functions of the elements. >Terminology/Millikan. I 90 Sentence/belief/language/thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop talking or expressing sentences with meaning. But why is it clear? We need a different explanation. Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typically intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has for a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cresswell | I 12 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: Speech Act Theory is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Speech Act Theory | Davidson | Dummett I 26ff DavidsonVsFrege/DavidsonVsSearle: the theory of force is unnecessary - description of speech acts are not necessary either - (concept of truth required). >Theory of force. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Searle | II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Supervenience | Armstrong | Martin II 132 Supervenience/Martin: we can assume"cum" instead of supervenience. MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa). - Not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa. - Rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect. Solution/Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. Salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change. >Dispositions, >Properties. Martin III 167 Supervenience/Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd. >Microstructure, >Parts, cf. >Mereology. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Supervenience | McGinn | I 68 Consciousness/Supervenience/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow an emergence theoretical explanation using mereological terms. We are unable, to trace back pain to underlying neural entities. >Consciousness, cf. >Mereology, >Explanation. In contrast to that, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((s) Because all levels are easily available to us.) I 69 States of consciousness are therefore not to be explored according to CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). We can probably grasp higher order brain functions of their constituents, but if we start from the consciousness, this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible emergence relation. We do not see an obvious consequence relation. (> Supervenience/McGinn). I 98 I/McGinn: is subject to a kind of physically induced consequence relation: are two bodies physically identical, and if one of them is a person, the other one must be a person, too. Because in terms of person-likeness there can be no difference, which would not be based on a physical difference. >I,Ego,Self, >Mind body problem. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Thinking | Nagel | I 63 Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper. I 65 Therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event. - It cannot be considered separately from its contents. - Thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle). >Intentionality/Searle, >Intentionality, >Naturalism. Nagel: The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event. I 93 ff Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking. >Description/Nagel. I 101 Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. >I, Ego, Self. One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point. Rorty VI 147 Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought. >Thinking without language. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Searle | Perler I 142 True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage. >Meta-language, >Object-language, >Intentionality/Searle. III 177 Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence. >Context dependence, >Incommensurability, >Ambiguity, >Vagueness, >Idealization. But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency. >Reality/Searle, VsSearle: >Reality/Seel, >Representation/Searle, >Underdetermination/Quine. III 185 Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. III 218 Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness. >Disquotation, >Truth definitions, >Truth theories. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analytic Philosophy | Derrida Vs Analytic Philosophy | Rorty III 218 DerridaVsAnalytic Philosophy/Rorty: "I worship this Oxford subtlety as much as its unshakeable guilelessness. They will always trust the law of quotation marks." (DerridaVsSearle). |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Block, Ned | Searle Vs Block, Ned | Metzinger II 561 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the meaning of a-conscious. Searle: A total zombie can have no consciousness at all. ((s) a-conscious/Block: access-conscious, >p-consious: phenomenal consciousness. BlockVsSearle: he packs p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference whether Armstrong's truck driver does not notice what is going on, or if he avoids accidents.) He also tried to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality, these are degrees of a-consciousness. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Chinese Room | Pauen Vs Chinese Room | Pauen I 150 Chinese Room/Searle/Pauen: (1980) would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is fundamentally unsuitable! Significant consequences: not only additional argument VsTuring test. Can be transferred to all verbal utterances, and eventually to the entire functionalism. Functional features would not guarantee meaning. VsChinese Room/VsSearle/Pauen: 1) it is possible that computers fulfill other sufficient conditions for instantiating consciousness. I 151 2) (more important): even his own argument requires the condition which he denies at the same time. When searching for the neural conditions of consciousness, one must first make sure that the organisms studied have consciousness! (Circular!). This security can only be gained through behavior. 3) The situation differs in many aspects not mentioned by Searle from the usual speaker situation. The occupant has no opportunity to respond to the speaker situation! He cannot take into account any previous questions. He cannot detect any repetitions. Variant: should it be possible to take several steps into account, a combinatorial explosion threatens. Only a much more complex system would have the necessary skills to cope with that. But it is precisely in such a case that it would no longer be plausible that the system has no awareness! Even then the system would be neither flexible nor trainable. The slightest deviation or spelling errors have devastating effects. I 152 Meaning-relevant distinctions are inseparable from irrelevant ones. ((s) These are arguments in the sense of Searle insofar as real consciousness must have just these properties.) VsSearle/(s): the arguments are directed against Searle insofar as the fiction of the Chinese Room could not go undetected. Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. I.e. in the end, the approach taken by cognitive science is the only way: to look out for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Deconstructivism | Searle Vs Deconstructivism | Rorty VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstructivism/Rorty: suppose I catch a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me, the carburetor is anyway only text and there was nothing to talk about except on the textuality of this text, then the communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: the deconstructionist intellectuals who with happiness found a job as an auto mechanic, it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. >Deconstructivism. The Deconstructivism has not changed his life, as atheism the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the mental element. Rorty VI 120 Description/action/understanding/Searle: Our practices are incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with not realistic or non representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some propositions may not be questioned without considering the practices themselves in doubt. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical flourishes that will give the practice the appearance to maintain a huge thing, namely, the metaphysical reality. Rorty VI 120 RortyVsSearle: Hard realism leads to metaphysics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dennett, D. | Nagel Vs Dennett, D. | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness. Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something. NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person. First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events. RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here. I 145/146 Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence. I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd. VI 147 NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture. VI 149 Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions. DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be! NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable. VI 150 That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel. VI 151/152 Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dennett, D. | Searle Vs Dennett, D. | Dennett I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design. SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking. Searle I 179 We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible. 1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual. E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature). But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental. 2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic. I 180 3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others. I 181 4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second. I 182 E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts. 5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts. I 183 That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought. 7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. I 184 The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Dispositions/Ryle). III 156 Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Rorty Vs Derrida, J. | III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Derrida, J. | Searle Vs Derrida, J. | Rorty III 218 Derrida/"Fido": brings associations with the "loyalty" (fidere). Cf. >"Fido"-Fido-Principle. SearleVsDerrida: he did not regard Austins distinction between utterance and use. But if he regarded, his critics would not grasp. DerridaVsSearle: E.g. to say the name "Fido" was chosen, "so that the example was docile" is a failure to observe the distinction between >mention and >use! The distinction is perhaps not useful. Searle III 169 Derrida: "In n’y pas de "hors texte"." SearleVsDerrida: is simply asserted without argument. In a subsequent polemical response to me he seems in any case to take back everything. He claims there that the whole only meant the banality that everything exists in one or another context. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dummett, M. | Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. | I 253 Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence! I 254 The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above). I 255 New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use. 2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled! The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness. I 256 Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry). I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation. II 231 TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"! II 232 Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names! II 247 Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions. TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it. DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law. II 248 Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=". Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett. TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world. Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege). II 249 Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role). II 250 Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects". Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Folk Psychology | Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology | Schwarz I 147 Analytical Functionalism/Terminology/Schwarz: this is how Lewis's position is sometimes called because of its holistic characterization. (Block, 1978(1), 271ff). Schw I 148 "Analytical": because the characterization of causal roles in Lewis is supposed to be analytical. But if functionalism is to be understood as Vs Identity theory, then Lewis is not a functionalist, but an identity theorist. Standard objections Vs functionalism do not affect Lewis at all: e.g. mental states: Mental states/Lewis: for their characterization it also needs an essential connection to the perceived environment etc. Therefore there is no danger that we would have to attribute feelings to the Chinese economy. (>DennettVsSearle?). On the other hand, it does not only depend on input-output relations, so that machines that behave externally like us, but are internally completely different (E.g. Blocks (1981)(2) "Blockhead", Searle: e.g. Chinese Room (1980)(3), would have desires, pains and opinions (> E.g. Martian pain). Pain/VsLewis/VsFolk Psychology: if we want to know what pain is, we should ask pain researchers and not the man on the street. Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Schwarz: Thesis: that we interpret the behavior of our conspecifics with the help of an internalized set of rules and principles and not, for example, through mental simulation. This is completely wrongly attributed to Lewis. He never expressed his opinion on it. Everyday Psychology/Lewis: is not a special "theory". It only assumes that we have opinions and expectations about mental states but not necessarily about conscious ones. (1997c(4): 333, early: "Collection of Platitudes" (1972,§3)(5). LewisVsPsychology: that would be a change of subject. We want to know whether a biological state plays the role we associate with "pain". Schw I 149 SchwarzVsLewis: the contrast may be less strong, some pain researchers might know better what pain is. E.g. depression. 1. Ned Block [1978]: "Troubles with Functionalism". In C.W. Savage (Hg.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2 .Ned Block [1981]: “Psychologism and Behaviourism”. Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43 3. John Searle [1980]: “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417– 457 4. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 5. David Lewis [1972]: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Kripke Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell II 151 Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions). ((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.) Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter! Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects. Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect. Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres". Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre. Stalnaker I 172 Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent. a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language. I 174 Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues. a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names b) what circumstances lead to those semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language. Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time. a) why a name has these referents and b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content). Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways. a) as meaning b) as the way how the reference is determined. By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings. I 192 Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics") Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics? Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language. Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values. Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain. Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it. Similar to Kripke: Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies. KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things. Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words. I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to: Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language. E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker") Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents. Tugendhat I 440 KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A. | I (a) 35 Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X. I (a) 36 The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect. The use of names is common. Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities. ---- I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items? E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects. Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory . Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world.. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics. Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world. Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water. This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else. I (g) 192 And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world". Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke. Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists. This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing". --- I (i) 246 Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective". --- Rorty VI 129/130 Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mill, J. St. | Searle Vs Mill, J. St. | V 144 SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names were "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Proper names. V 247 Names/SearleVsMill: (Mill: proper names have no sense). E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma can be used to make geographical, not only lexicographical assertions. Had proper names however no sense, no information could be transmitted by that! Then there were no more information than in the sentence Everest = Everest. (This is Frege's argument against Mill). Stalnaker I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969 (1)) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference" without intermediary sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his view of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and it's properties. >Reference. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt, real or alleged characteristics to transmit a language to the world. ((s)> also Kant like Searle). Searle: you cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: there can be no good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 163ff |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Millikan, R. | Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 90 Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below). Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). ((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.) VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed. Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness. Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself. I 91 Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have? The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature. MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness) I 92 does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness. N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself. Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Place, U.T. | Searle Vs Place, U.T. | I 287 Note: occasionally my views are not accepted due to a misguided conception of the relationship between cause and identity: so writes PlaceVsSearle: (Place 1988(1)): "According to Searle states of mind are both identical with, and causally dependent on the corresponding brain states. I say: you cannot have it both ways. Either they are identical or there is a causal relationship between them." SearleVsPlace: he is thinking of cases such as the following: e.g. these footprints may causally depend on the shoes of the intruder; but they cannot at the same time be identical to these shoes. But how about this one: e.g. the liquid state in which the water is there, may be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules; and it can also be a property of the system, which consists of these molecules. There is something going very well. And so my present state of consciousness may be caused by the behavior of the neurons in my brain. This condition itself is simply a higher-level property of my brain. You can after all have both. Cf. >causality/Place. 1. U. T. Place,Thirty Years On “Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 208-219 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Platonism | Searle Vs Platonism | V 170 SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered): (Ep)(p = q . p is true) According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition. 2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects. SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute. 2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here. 3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical. V 170/171 SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality. V 245/246 SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato: 1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting). 2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject. SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties. IV 80 Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction. IV 81 There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 |
| Rorty, R. | Searle Vs Rorty, R. | Rorty VI 92 SearleVsRorty/Rorty: Searle considers relativism, which he attributes to Rorty, as a threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the American universities. Rorty VI 105 World/knowledge/language/human being/reality/SearleVsRorty: Rorty seems to deny that there were mountains before there were people or before the word "mountain" appeared in the language. RortyVsVs: that is not disputed by anyone. No one believes that there is a causal chain that ensures that mountains become an effect of thoughts or words. In fact, we believe (Kuhn, Derrida, Rorty): that it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains, or whether it is only appropriate to talk about mountains. Rorty VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to convince all concerned parties that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding for those that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). Rorty VI 117 SearleVsRorty: There is a "general atmosphere of vague literary frivolity of which the Nietzschian Left is penetrated." Searle I 168 Incorrigibility: it is often said, we could not be mistaken about the contents of our mind. This is the authority of the 1st person. It has even been argued this incorrigibility was a sure sign that we are dealing with something mental (Rorty). SearleVsRorty: e.g. Sally might discover later that she was simply mistaken when she thought she loved Jimmy. I 169 By this it only follows that the standard model of error, models whose basis are the distinction between appearance and reality, do not work with the existence or characterization of mental states. We all know from personal experience, how often it occurs that we can judge somebody else better than the person can judge him- or herself, if we are for example really jealous or angry, or whether we just seem very generous. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU 1953): the bold attempt to tackle the idea of my statement, drafted in the 1st person, on intellectuals were after all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and that the question after any authority was not asked at all. When I cry out in pain, then it raises no question of my authority. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Searle, J.R. | Armstrong Vs Searle, J.R. | Searle: Lemon-Example: Searle says himself, he is not willing to admit that the American soldier means with the words "Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom" "I am a German officer". I 128 ArmstrongVsSearle: his reasoning is begging the question: that the uttered expression itself means something else. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Searle, J.R. | Bennett Vs Searle, J.R. | 2. In unconventional situations, would Searle say that the primary speaker's intention is to create a belief? I 189 BennettVsSearle: the problem remains the same. If understanding involves grasping conventions, the primary speaker's intent cannot be to be understood. Searle: Lemon-Example: a story that has the following form: (intend p) and ~(to mean p). BennettVsSearle: I claim that it does not work. This is only relevant to Grice if the speaker intends the listeners to go exactly in the opposite direction, i.e. to infer their belief that the speaker is a German soldier from their understanding of the sentence. I 190 BennettVsSearle: he has not refuted Grice's conditional: (intend p) > (to mean p). He has not presented a story in which the antecedent is fulfilled. S does not mean literally what he says. He himself does not mean that he is a German soldier. Therefore the counter-example is not at all apt against Grice. I 192 BennettVsSearle: this is safer than his original lemon-example, but less clear. The conventional meaning is not just any other circumstance, but a much more effective one! |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Searle, J.R. | Block Vs Searle, J.R. | II 560 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the definition of a-consiousness. Searle: A total zombie can have absolutely no consciousness. II 561 BlockVsSearle: he puts p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference between whether E.g. Armstrong truck driver notices nothing, or whether he avoids accidents.) Also, he tries to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality they are degrees of a-consciousness. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: question: E.g. why the thirsty Blindsight patient does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That’s right. But it’s a mistake to move from one function of the machinery of the a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: drawing the premature conclusion that p-consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is absent (without being clear what kind of consciousness it is). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Searle, J.R. | Brandom Vs Searle, J.R. | Searle: it is virtually impossible that if derived intentionality is to be understood, also a kind of "intrinsic" intentionality must be provided by the interpreter. Brandom I 114 BrandomVsSearle: he overlooks the possibility that such content can be transferred by the fact that states, actions and expressions implicitly are practically considered as intentionally rich. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Searle, J.R. | Churchland Vs Searle, J.R. | II 472 Brain/Awareness/Searle: VsIdentification of conscious states with brain states. Instead: the brain causes these states. Correlations may be an indication of causality, but they are not an indication of identity. ChurchlandVsSearle: he does not see why scientists argue for identity: it is more plausible than assuming that a is caused by a different b, depending on the data available. (But Searle is not a dualist). |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Searle, J.R. | Danto Vs Searle, J.R. | Searle: denies that in terms of linguistic competence no distinction is possible. Chinese room: the person in the room does not speak the language, but proceeds according to established rules. The output is indistinguishable from language skills. I 273 DantoVsSearle: but maybe the brain makes not more than to respond to electrical pulse with electrical reactions. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Davidson Vs Searle, J.R. | Davidson I (b) 36 John Searle: It is incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to interpret one and the same thought or utterance of a person properly. I (b) 36 DavidsonVsSearle: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. I (b) 37 The threat which Searle and Fodor believe to recognize is a completely different one: one with regard to the condition according to which the meanings intended for the identification of thoughts used entities are somehow "captured" by consciousness so that they themselves would have to point out the thoughts as different, as long as these entities are different. DavidsonVsSearle: E.g. as if the difference between 1 meter and 100 centimeters was a difference in tape measure itself. Searle II 149 Causality/Searle: From this follows that causal laws express contingent truths!. DavidsonVsSearle: therefore, it depends only on the description whether events are logically linked or not. Searle IV 98 Metaphor/Searle: Problem: that with some metaphors such as: E.g. "Sally is a block of ice" we know exactly what is meant, but for others E.g. "Sally is a prime number 17-23" we know it less. Question: how can speakers saying something if they do not say what they mean? And why do some metaphors work and others do not?. Divergence of utterance meaning and word meaning. Recognized by speaker and listeners. (DavidsonVsSearle). IV 99 Even the relation between word and sentence meaning plays a role. Metaphorical meaning is always the utterance meaning. IV 116 Metaphor/Cavell: E.g. "Juliet is the sun": the day begins with Juliet: Searle: here, background knowledge about the work is necessary. Similarity/Searle: meaningless predicate: all objects are similar in one respect or another. IV 117 There are many metaphors in which similarity does not play a role at all: sun gas ball, block of ice human Nevertheless, E.g. "Sally is a bonfire" is a very different statement than "She’s a block of ice". IV 118 Comparison theoryVsSearle: "cold" is also metaphorical. SearleVsVs: this does not sting, the difficulty is that there are apparently no literal similarities between unfeeling humans and cold objects. IV 120 The sole fact that theory is so difficult to explain makes it implausible. Nevertheless, it is no difficulty for a native speaker to understand "Sam is a pig". It does not help to say that sweet things and sweet people are pleasant. IV 107 SearleVsComparison theories: allegedly, metaphors contain a comparison or a similarity between objects which is alluded to. IV 109 Searle: absurd question: E.g. "With which block of ice do you compare Sally?". IV 110 Searle: although similarity plays a role in understanding, the metaphor is not a finding about a similarity. A metaphor can remain true, even if the similarity turns out to be wrong. (for example, because gorillas are gentle). IV 111 Solution: The statement is only about Richard. The truth conditions are not helpful either if gorillas are gentle and Richard is cold. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Dennett Vs Searle, J.R. | I 282 Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin turns it all around: intentionality is secured from bottom to top. The first meaning was not a fully developed meaning, it certainly does not show all ’essential’ properties (whatever they may be). "Quasi-meaning", half semantics. I 555 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: Computers only possess "as-if intentionality". DennettVsSearle: then he has a problem. While AI says we are composed of machines, Darwinism says we are descended from machines!. I 557 You can hardly refuse the first if you agree with the second statement. How can something that has emerged from machines be anything other than a much, much more sophisticated machine?. Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): Only products that have been produced by a real human consciousness have a function ((s)> objet ambigu, Valéry). DennettVsSearle: I.e. the wings of the aircraft, but not the wings of the eagle serve for flying!. I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be achieved by the composition of machines or the ever better structure of algorithms. I 569 DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hooks: the mind is not supposed to emerge, it is not created, but only (inexplicable) source of creation. Intention/DennettVsSearle: (E.g. Vending Machine): Those who select its new function perhaps do not even formulate any new intention. They only fall into the habit of relying on the new useful function. They do not perceive that they carry out an act of unconscious exaptation. Parallel: >Darwin: There is an unconscious selection of properties in pets. II 73 Searle: In the case of the artifact the creator must always be asked. Intrinsic (original) intentionality/DennettVsSearle: is metaphysical, an illusion. As if the "author would need to have a more original intention". Dennett: but there is no task for that. The hypothetical robot would be equally capable of transfering derived intentionality to other artifacts. Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: there certainly used to be coarser forms of intentionality (Searle contemptuously "mere as-if intentionality"). Dennett: they serve both as a temporal precursors as well as current components. We are descended from robots and consist of robots (DNA, macromolecules). All intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of systems. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Derrida Vs Searle, J.R. | I 95 Derrida: makes no distinction between everyday language and special languages. (DerridaVsSearle). Dispute DerridaVsSearle: Habermas I 229 ++ Austin: speech acts by actors: are "hollow and void in a peculiar way". Searle: such cases are parasitical for everyday use. DerridaVsSearle: how the impossibility of such a distinction between fictitious, and everyday, ordinary and parasitic ways of speaking show. HabermasVsDerrida: (DerridaVsSearle): a) little plausible connection between quotability and repeatability on the one hand, fictionality on the other: a quote is always only something secondary. Supposedly, every utterance is essentially quoted because it presupposes conventionality, i.e. repeatability according to a rule. I 230 ++ Derrida thus presupposes what he wants to prove: that every convention has not only a symbolic but also a fictitious character. Austin: everyday language is subject to other restrictions than stage action. DerridaVs. Habermas |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Grice Vs Searle, J.R. | II 32 GriceVsSearle: I want to see such a correlation only as a possibility. - Searle wanted to say with the example that the Italians should think the meaning of the sentence "Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom", is "I am a German officer". II 35 E.g. "Lemon: The guards will not come to their belief, the prisoner was German because of the sentence, but because of the whole situation. Here, there is no feature. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Searle, J.R. | Hofstadter Vs Searle, J.R. | II 707 Thoughts / cognition / Hofstadter: Thoughts are themselves causes of their flux. HofstadterVsSearle: there are no "volatile causal powers of the brain" that cannot be detained by calculation". Hofstadter: I myself consider "strong AI" (Searle) possible. II 721 HofstadterVsSearle: I can not see that there is an unbridgeable gulf between computer and mind. Per Searle: Computers use symbols or words with no real meaning. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Searle, J.R. | Kripke Vs Searle, J.R. | I 88 Searle: It is not a necessary but a contingent truth that Aristotle has ever operated as an educator. He concludes that it is necessary to use the paradigm of a bundle. KripkeVsSearle: Speaks of logical sum. Kripke: That’s what’s wrong. None of the properties is likely analytical. Hitler could have spent his life quietly in Linz. But then we would not say that this man would not have been Hitler because we use the name "Hitler" as the name for the man, even if we describe other possible worlds. (Rigid designator). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Searle, J.R. | Luhmann Vs Searle, J.R. | AU Cass. 12 Language/Luhmann: language is not eo ipso communication. This has to do with the fact that it takes two parties and understanding. The concept of communication just tries to bring together the parts. LuhmannVsSearle: parlance is no action, no plot! Because it always requires indeed an understanding, so that it can go on! (See also VsSpeech act theory). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Searle, J.R. | McDowell Vs Searle, J.R. | I 132/133 Theory of Designations/SearleVsRussell: McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle. (Intentionality). McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up this wish and to relaize what non-obvious descriptions are about. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be construed as "predicative" but as "belonging to the area of the Fregean sense." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Searle, J.R. | McGinn Vs Searle, J.R. | I 68 Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow for a emergentist explanation using mereological terms. We are unable to attribute the pain to its underlying neural entities. But in contrast, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((S) Because all levels are readily available to us. States of consciousness are therefore not to explored according to CALM (combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can well understand higher-level brain functions from its constituents, but if we start from the consciousness this explanation fails. Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible relation of emergence. We see no obvious causal relation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Searle, J.R. | Seel Vs Searle, J.R. | Die ZEIT (Issue missing) Realism / Searle: "... the world independent of us": SeelVsSearle: the concept of independence is part of our world. |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Searle, J.R. | Sellars Vs Searle, J.R. | II 307 Proposition/name/SellarsVsSearle: propositions (subordinate clauses) can be named (as Frege): Carnap: S (in L) means Chicago is large: ("Chicago is large" = name). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Searle, J.R. | Tugendhat Vs Searle, J.R. | I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or sentence are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a sentence are in turn indicated by a sentence. This of course presupposes that for the explanation of a sentence there is always already another sentence available. Meta-Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used like the second, it must be shown under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every adoption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric sentence, which is a pseudo-explanation. I 258 TugendhatVsSearle: at this point it becomes clear that his rule system ends where it should begin. Understanding/Tugendhat: whoever understands an assertion does not know if it is true, but knows how to determine it. Claim/Mean: the listener can record the speech as follows: "he claims 'that p, but he does not mean that p'". On the other hand, the speaker cannot say of himself: "p; but I don't mean that p". Searle: sincerity rule. TugendhatVsSearle: the connection with this rule and the essential rule (in its place we have here put the thesis (7) (opening move)) does not become clear with Searle. I 504 Modal Adverbs: Example "Peter runs fast". Analog problem: cars are faster in any case. So how is this "fast" explained? It depends on 1. that the object for which the singular term stands is in a certain state and 2. that this state can be classified in a certain way. Tugendhat: 1976: research has only just begun here. I 507 TugendhatVsSearle: he has stopped where the problem only begins. I 512 TugendhatVsSearle: false: to treat promise (central for Searle) sentences as on a level like statement sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Searle, J.R. | Wittgenstein Vs Searle, J.R. | Esfeld I 76 Use theory/Esfeld: does not imply that beliefs to statements can be reduced in a public speech or can be replaced by statements. Otherwise one would have to develop a theory of meaningful statements that is not referring to believe states of people. SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: believe states have priority of linguistic expressions. WittgensteinVsSearle: instead: thesis: to have beliefs and to master a public language is equally original. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Searle, J.R. | Verschiedene Vs Searle, J.R. | Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. So in the end there is nothing left but the path taken by cognitive science: to look for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible! Münch III 332 Homunculi/pictorial representation/HolensteinVsSearle: it is a popular argument against pictorial representation of mental images that they must be viewed by homunculi who merely shift the problem of coding. Holenstein: this is an ontological prerequisite that does not meet scientific standards! The assumption of homunculi requires special justification! Instead of recourse, a regulated use of a physical structure of the brain is also possible. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 Tetens IV 115 Def Meaning/Searle/Tetens: an expression has meaning if the speaker expresses meaning with it! (Mental act of "giving meaning"). Artificial Intelligence/TetensVsSearle: the machine can also do the "giving" of meaning with the help of the programmer! So not only "pure syntax" in the machine, as Searle means, but also semantics. Tetens IV 117 Tetens: let us assume that we would come to the conclusion that a machine can only behave like a human being if it completely resembles the human organism. Then we would not learn anything about humans from it that we do not already know. In this respect the artificial intelligence is philosophically neutral. Searle I 26 VsSearle: I was accused of representing "property dualism" and "privileged access" and believed in "introspection". I 27 But I did not represent that explicitly anywhere. Searle I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. VsSearle: this is sometimes confronted with the following argument: if we can imagine that the same behavior can be produced by a zombie without consciousness, then why did evolution produce consciousness at all? I 127 But it is a false assumption that every biologically inherited trait must give the organism an advantage in selection. For example, the passion for alpine skiing certainly has a biological basis that is not the result of practice or training. It may be that we have more general biological needs that are satisfied by these activities. I 288 Foot Note: There is a distinction between what is selected and what is selected for. III 39 GiddensVsSearle: against the description of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. | I 350 Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior). I 351 PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge. I 352 It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup. SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not. I 353 Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test! Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen. I 354 VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world. We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain. I 355 But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness. I 356 Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are. I 357 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism). I 358 Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition. I 359 SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart. ((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.) I 364 Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter. I 365 Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness! Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime? I 366 The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"? Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Searle, J.R. | Mackie Vs Searle, J.R. | Stegmüller IV 188 Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: one could formulate cautious assumptions to work around the problem: 1) Hans: "I hereby promise to pay you, Peter, 10 marks" 2. Hans promised, to pay 10 ... 3) Hans entered an obligation ... 4) Hans is obliged to ... 5) Hans shall ... IV 189 It is assumed that there are no competing claims or excuses. Searle: Solution by "institutional fact". institutional fact/MackieVsSearle: confused two perspectives on "institution": a) externally: Ex. in chess the rules are not internalized for the context of life. b) internally: here the rules are internalized, we cannot escape. 1. The five steps of Searle are only a description from the outside. Proposition (5) is nothing but a description of the institution of the promise from the outside. (Descriptive). IV 190 Nothing but the deduction of a statement of fact from other factual allegations. 2. Or, view it as a conclusion within the institution, then (5) is a normative statement. The difficulty then lies in the transition from (2) to (3). Then (3) would be better: "Hans made an attempt to commit to Peter ..." Yet, to get to (4) as a normative statement (3) would have would have to be available in the original version. The problem stems from the fact that we do not learn about promises externally, but always in concrete, lived situations. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Searle, J.R. | Stalnaker Vs Searle, J.R. | I 178 Identification/reference/Searle: (1969,87): ultimately by description. (description). Stalnaker: and this must then be explained by the ability of the speaker to a certain behavior. Otherwise you need a magic intentionality. StalnakerVsSearle: even if he was right, it would not provide additional premise that he needs to show the impossibility of Mill's semantics. For he does not say that we cannot have intentions on certain individuals. He only says that we need a necessary condition for it. Solution: he needs a restriction on the content of the attitudes that we can have StalnakerVsSearle: he offers instead only a restriction of the conditions under which we may have attitudes with a specific content. Mill/Stalnaker: as long as it is possible to have such intentions ((s) "direct reference") it is possible to speak and understand a corresponding language. I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference", without interposed sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his understanding of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and its properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt to transmit real or alleged characteristics of a language to the world. ((s) > also Kant like Searle). Searle: one cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that now himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: it cannot be a good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from it. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Searle, J.R. | Donnellan Vs Searle, J.R. | I 287 Names/Searle: are correlated with a set of descriptions (descriptions). The one that best meets the description, because it has the properties that are designated by the predicate, is thus the object. ((s) E.g. "Hans comes": is coming a property then?). Donnellan: Searle’s view is weaker than that of Russell. (Theory of "identifying descriptions": the answer you get if you ask: what are you refering to"?. I 288 DonnnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsSearle: now it is possible that the properties do not apply to a substantial degreeto the object to which I refer or to another one. Names/KaplanVsRussell: the idea that the reference of a proper name is to be associated with it by the descriptions that are currently connected to it is not plausible! > historical explanation. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Zink Vs Searle, J.R. | Wolf II 15 Names/ZinkVsSearle: Example Assuming that most of Aristotle's descriptions proved to be false and correct in relation to another person, then we should not say that "Aristotle" is the name of that other person, it is sufficient, "was born in 384 B.C., in Stagira". Meaning of the proper name/Zink: "The person who is actually called E.N.". (Certain identification, like Burks). ZinkVsBurks: not any property, but a predicate such as "person" with identity criteria must be included. Wolf II 167 Name/Meaning/Searle: ("Proper Names", Mind 67) no set of descriptions can indicate the meaning! The use presupposes the truth of a certain set of descriptions. But neither this set is exactly defined, nor is the meaning in the set. For then every true description of the thing would be analytically true! No discovery about it would be an empirical discovery! Possible Solution/Searle: the necessary and sufficient conditions for the meaning of the name: that it is identical to an object originally baptized in that way. II 168 SearleVs: "Aristotle" can be applied to any individual baptized this way. ZinkVsSearle: this can be eliminated by localization. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann Vs Speech Act Theory | AU Kass 12 LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory, LuhmannVsSearle, LuhmannVsHabermas: Vs Theory of Communicative Action: Question: whether one shoots understanding into the unity of communication or not. If you have a concept of communication, i.e. only the communication, i.e. only what I am doing here now, then you leave understanding out of it. Then one must take corrective measures in theory: the actor, if he/she acts reasonably, is guided by the conditions of understanding. The actor does not say something that he/she knows cannot be understood. That would mean, however, that the recipient is initially excluded from the speech act (Luhmann: speech act) or the communication. And it is only as a disciplining moment that it is returned to theory. And as a subject! LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.) |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Universalism | Verschiedene Vs Universalism | Stegmüller IV 194 Universalization/Ethics/Stegmüller: according to many philosophers, moral judgements must be universalizable, "capable of generalization". IV 195 MackieVsAnalytical Philosophy: this is not a meta-ethical, but a genuine moral-philosophical question. Three stages of universalization: Numerical differences (between persons) are irrelevant for moral judgment. That's a 2nd order statement about moral imperatives of the first order. (For the first time prescriptive principle of 2nd order: should exclude extreme egoism). IV 196 Some authors say that this is not only a necessary, but even a sufficient condition for morality. There are only formal restrictions, not material ones. MackieVs: purely formal considerations cannot adequately analyze a moral judgment. U1/Universalization/Stegmüller: Numerical differences are irrelevant. This also excludes "reverse egoism", where someone places much higher demands on himself than on his fellow human beings. Also the reference to a founder of a religion. (Irrelevance principle of numerical differences between persons). But it does not exclude that someone is discriminated against because of his sex or his skin color! U2/Universalization 2nd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: not only numerical, but now also qualitative differences are irrelevant. (skin color, sex, race, religion). IV 198 Mackie: that is characterized by the fact that someone puts himself in the position of the other. This is prescriptive, but can also be formulated descriptively: Descriptive: moral expressions have such a meaning that all judgments, both in the first and second sense, can be universalized. U3/Universalization 3rd order/Mackie/Stegmüller: also the cultural form is now irrelevant. One tries to make one's own the inner attitudes, even the taste of the other. IV 199 The prescriptive variant is identical with a form of utilitarianism. (And just as illusionary). Universalization/Ethics/Stegmüller: descriptive: at most the 1st level has found its way into the meaning of our expressions. Prescriptive: there is probably no standard that would pass the test of the 3rd order. VsUniversalization: like VsSearle: confusion of internal and external perspective. Conclusion: one cannot justify morality meta-ethically. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Rorty Vs Various Authors | V 84 Englightenment/Rorty: religion, myth and tradition can be brought into contrast to an ahistorical Something that is common to all men. GadamerVsEnlightenment/HeideggerVsEnlightenment/Rorty: man himself is historical through and through. >Enlightenment. IV 143 RortyVsSearle/RortyVsCuller: (like Derrida): both consider textbook distinctions to be terribly important. We should return to the ironic skepticism of the Phenomenology of Spirit. III 180 RortyVsMann, Thomas: "Dr. Faustus" only frilly generality. VI 364 "Significance"/"Meaning"/Stag/Terminology/Rorty: differentiation by E. D. Hirsch: Def Significance/Hirsch: position of a text in a different context. Def "Meaning"/Hirsch: what is in line with the intentions of the author at the time of writing the text. RortyVsHirsch But nothing depends on that. Rorty: It's always about putting a statement into a context! We can go about it as anachronistically as we want as long as we are aware of it. Truth/Interpretation/Rorty: the determination of the truth depends on that one puts this statement into the context of the allegations that we would be prepared to establish ourselves. Truth and meaning cannot be determined independently. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mental State | Davidson, D. | Fra I 657 DavidsonVsBurge/DavidsonVsSearle: Thesis: gives no reason to assume that ordinary mental states do not fulfill both conditions, (I) and (II). They are "inner" in the sense that they are identical to states of the body and are therefore identifiable without reference to objects and events outside the body. At the same time, they are "non-individualistic" because they can and usually become identified in part by their causal relationships to objects and events outside. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intentionality | Dennett, D. | I 281 Meaning/Dennett: Origin, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, at first purely syntactic, assume "semantics". "Quasi meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: only as-if-intentionality. DennettVsSearle: you have to start somewhere. But the first steps are not to be recognized as steps towards meaning. I 282 We also have parts that have only half-intentionality. II 147 Person/Intentionality/Dennett: Thesis: Becoming a person is the transition from a system of 1st order (beliefs and desires, but not about beliefs and desires) to a 2nd order intentional system (beliefs about own and foreign beliefs). Intentional 3rd order system: is able to want someone to believe it wants something. |
|
| Naturalism | Millikan, R. | Graeser I 125 Naturalism / MillikanVsSearle: everything - things like sentences, theories, thoughts and meanings - are part of a single world, and should be understood accordingly. It also includes an understanding of the evolution. Closely related to Searles lent (derived) intentionality. But: > representation. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Repräsentation | Millikan, R. | Graeser I 125 Representation / VsSearle: are not "mental principles". This ignores not only the natural order, but also requires an "inner interpreter". (Regress). Graeser: from here the assumptions is near that intentionality is primarily basic to the mental. But Millikan sees alternatives. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Thinking | Nagel, Th. | I 63 Thinking / Nagel: is something different than marks on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle). |
|
| Correspondence | Rorty, R. | Horwich I 452 Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: Thesis: there is no correspondence between a belief and a non-belief (Object). Rorty VI 96 RortyVsSearle: Thesis: Philosophers who deny that there is such a thing as agreement between opinion and reality at all present as little danger as theologians who deny purgatory. (VsSearle). ((s) Searle pro Korr, RortyVsKorr). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||