Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson II 135
DavidsonVsScheme/Inhalt -DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation immer in Bezug auf ein Schema! - DavidsonVsSense data theory
Der Unterschied zwischen dem Interpreten und dem L-Sprecher besteht nicht in dem was sie sehen und fühlen, sondern in dem was sie suchen und für relevant halten.

Anomal Monism: mental event tokens sind als einzelne je identisch mit physischen event tokens, ohne daß jedoch mentale event types nomologisch identisch wären mit types physikalischer Ereignisse. Entsprechung auf Einzelebene, nicht auf Typenebene.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Anti-Realism Putnam VI 393
Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact.
Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be.
>Verification.
N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent.
>Bivalence, >Incorrigibility.
Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that.
>Observation sentence, >Reference.
Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding.
>Metaphyiscal realism.
Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies.
>Meta language, >Private language.
---
I (d) 124
Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again.
I (d) 125
It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski.
I (e) 150
Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Atomism Quine II 218
QuineVsRussell: VsLogical Atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex.
II 107
Atomic Facts/Russell: atomic facts are sense data - QuineVsRussell: they are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance/Russell: acquaintance is certain with sense data, everything else is fallible.
II 218
Atomism/QuineVsRussell/Quine: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that in my opinion the remaining truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the sentences of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex. See also >Atoms/Quine.
XIII 14
Def Sensory Atomism/Locke/Hume/Quine: e.g. Locke's "simple ideas", Hume's "simple impressions". This is a mosaic of irreducible sensory bits that can occur repeatedly. Sensibilia/Quine: should therefore again not be considered as atoms, but as types of atoms.
Atom/Quine: an atom is then an occurrence (token) of Sensibilia within the experience.
Gestalt PsychologyVsSensory Atomism/Form Theory/Quine: thesis: forms tend to come from rough (large) forms (which are not composed of building blocks).
XIII 15
Atomism/sensory/Quine: for him again the nature of the neural (neuronal) input speaks. Atom/sensory/Quine: should we then say that they again correspond to types of inputs that then correspond to a receptor? No:
Problem: with a number of species one does not get any further here: each person has an unknown and not further interesting number of receptors. Further research would not help the theory here.
Perception Atomism/Quine: that would be something one could dream of: a repertory of basic properties. Then properties would be the species. Their occurrences are the atoms.
Problem: it was shown that the wavelength of a singular color event does not determine the perceived color, but the respective environment. In addition, it has been found that there are cells which only respond when, for example, a diagonal runs from top left to bottom right, and other cells for corresponding other conditions.
XIII 16
Atomism/Technology/Quine: Atomism is important here. Example Halftone in vision/printing: dots and spaces are its atoms. Example television (TV), newspaper printing, etc. Problem: in film there is no limitation of the atoms. On two (b/w) or the basic colors.
>Colour/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Egalitarianism Miller Gaus I 417
Egalitarianism/Miller/Weinstein: Miller would resist being characterized as an egalitarian liberal; he would view this label as conflating 'simple' distributive equality with the 'complex' market socialist equality he favours.* The former stipulates that people should be equal with regard to some X and thus limits debates about equality to disputes about 'equality of what?
Walzer: Following Michael Walzer, complex equality is not about distributing some X. Rather it is a 'social ideal' about how we should treat each other as equals.
Miller: But Miller remains an egalitarian liberal nevertheless: 'An egalitarian society must be one which recognizes a number of distinct goods', ensuring that each 'is distributed according to its own proper criterion [desert, need and equality]'. As long as no distributive sphere dominates others, complex equality is secured. The real 'enemy of equality is dominance' which must be politically regulated (1995(1): 203). And dominance is nefarious because it is so harmful to individual self-development.
Cf. >Self-realization/Hobhouse.
Tradition: Miller readily concedes that his political theory draws on two political traditions: 'distributive equality from the tradition of liberalism, social equality from social democracy and socialism' (1999: 244). Consequently, Miller is a true heir to the new liberals. Equally for them, no justice principle is sovereign. Equality and need temper desert qua individual choice and responsibility, allowing all citizens real equal opportunity to develop their talents according to their own lights.
MillerVsDworkin/MillerVsSen: (...) Dworkin's and Sen's versions are egalitarian in what Miller pejoratively labels the 'simple' sense. Whereas Dworkin prefers equalizing resources, Sen prefers equalizing capabilities.
>Life/Dworkin.

* For Miller, there is 'no profound antagonism between meritocracy' and a suitably regulated market because the more egalitarian a market economy is, the more likely it allocates rewards according to merit (1999(2): 179). Also see Miller's defence of market socialism in Market, State and Community (1989)(3) and Cohen (1995(4): ch. I l) for a critical response.

1. Miller, David (1995) 'Complex equality'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197-225.
2. Miller, David (1999) Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Cohen, G. A. (1995) Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Excluded Middle Quine XIII 55
Sentence of the Excluded Middle/excluded middle/Quine: Thesis: each sentence is either true or false. You can say a lot about that, pro and contra. Set Theory/Quine: 1. Much in it does not satisfy most standards of intuitionism, i.e. it is assumed that it is neither true nor false (without truth value). This leads from classical logic to intuitionism.
>Set Theory/Quine.
QuineVsDummett/QuineVsAnti-Realism: the requirement that there must be direct evidence for or against an assertion, but it also obscures the clarity and simplicity of the sciences.
QuineVsIntuitionism: is obscure, especially when extended to mathematics.
Bivalence/Logic/Quine: the bivalence with the Sentence of the Excluded Middle is the minimal, most streamlined thing that logic has to offer. It comes from the number two, the smallest and simplest number rising from the ground.
Assertiveness/Truth/QuineVsIntuitionism: assertiveness is one thing, truth another.
XIII 56
Realism/Quine: pro: some truths can be found out, others not. N.B.: then we are also free to call the rest of the (undetectable) sentences false.
Future/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Bivalence/Quine: 3. The Sentence of the Excluded Middle has also come under fire from another side: Thesis: Contingents of predictions are neither true nor false. (See future/Quine).
VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: a further objection is: non-designating terms such as e.g. Pegasus: sentences containing such terms are neither true nor false.
Empty singular terms/Quine: we can accept this for everyday language, but not in science or logic. (See singular terms).
Vagueness/VsSentence of the Excluded Middle/Sorites/Quine: 4. Objection: vague expressions: here again I would plead for a double standard: in logic we simply want to proceed in such a way that we assume that all expressions are precise.
Determination/Quine: we can even introduce an additional convention.
XIII 57
Sorites/Quine: we save the mathematical (complete) induction by setting exact limits for what a heap is. Even if we do not specify where it goes! Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: pro: the first two objections are ignored, the other two are overcome by a double standard.
Proposition/Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: some authors resort to propositions to explain. Thesis: The lack would concern sentences, but not the corresponding propositions.
QuineVsPropositions: this is an empty game with words (see >truth).
Sentence of the Excluded Middle/Quine: is not a fact of life, but a norm that governs efficient logical regimentation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Experience Quine I 19
QuineVsSense Data Theory: immediate experience is not coherent, it is an autonomous area. >Sense data/Quine.
Stroud I 216
Experience/Truth/Quine: the distinction itself is derived from scientific research.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience(!), but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience, insofar as their use is learned by direct conditioning to the stimulation of sensory receptors. Moreover, simple observation sets are in most cases actually independent of each other. >Observation/Quine. The fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my opinion, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the propositions of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex.
II 219
Cresswell imposes on me a realm of reified experiences or phenomena that stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that act on our nerve endings from real objects in the outside world.
VII (a) 17
Simplicity/Quine: is itself ambiguous and unclear. It is a double or multiple standard. Depending on the terminology. Immediate experiences can be presented more easily in a physical conceptual scheme.
VII (b) 42
Knowledge/Quine: is a man-made network, experiences are only at the edges, in the core logic. Conflicts with experience lead to changes in the centre. New truth values are assigned to some of our statements.
The entire field is under-determined by its boundary conditions, therefore there is a large selection of possibilities, which statements are to be revised.
VII(b) 43
No specific experience is associated with specific statements within the field, except by indirect considerations on the balance of the field as a whole.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Judgments Kant Brandom I 516
Judgement/Kant: is the basic unit of consciousness. >Consciousness/Kant.
---
Strawson V 64
Judgment/Kant: a valid judgment is independet from consciousness states - Strawson: then probably no experience without concepts - the deepest principle. - >Categories: unity of consciousness.
Strawson V 63
Judgement/Kant: the same as to let fall objects under concepts. ---
Bubner I 96
Judgment/Kant/Aristotle/Bubner: judgements are not like signs in direct relation to a particular world-givenness, but they represent something, or characterize something as something. They design a certain point of view on the world, which can be distinguished from other views.
The judgment asserts that things behave as it is represented by the connection of two sentence elements.
Cf. >Predication, >Statement, >Representation/Kant.
But in this way, only separate things can be summarized!
The unity thus arises from a specially accomplished connection. It is produced in the judgment and is therefore not a givenness of the world.
This also explains the possibility of the falsehood of a sentence which is actually properly formed.
Bubner I 100
Definition judgment/Kant/Bubner: is then called the particular idea, the content of which is the determinable relation of other representations, which in turn have a content which does not emerge from the formal connection alone. >Ideas/Kant.
Bubner I 101
Judgment is, therefore, the mediate knowledge of an object, the representation of a representation of it. If, on the other hand, the content continually emerges from new representations, there would be a regress in judging.
Solution: the relation of representations must itself become the object of an idea.
Synthesis: is now the fact that this relationship can be specified, namely, that in the establishment of the relationship something own comes to consciousness, namely, the unity of the connected representations as such. That is the peculiar content of the judgment.


Gadamer I 38
Urteilskraft/judgement/Kant/Gadamer: (...) where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's inclusion of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(1). Kant/Gadamer: The basic moral meaning of this term no longer has a systematic place with him.
KantVsEmotivism/KantVsSensus communis: As is well known, he designed his moral philosophy almost in opposition to the doctrine of "moral feeling" developed in English philosophy. Thus the concept of sensus communis has been completely eliminated from moral philosophy by him.
What appears with the unconditionality of a moral imperative cannot be based on a feeling, even if by this we do not mean the detail of feeling but the commonality of moral feeling. For the character of the imperative, which is suitable for morality, fundamentally excludes comparative reflection on others. The unconditionality of the moral commandment certainly does not mean that the moral consciousness should be rigid in judging others. Rather, it is morally imperative to abstract from the subjective private conditions of one's own judgement and to put oneself in the position of the other. >Morals/Kant.
Gadamer I 39
Thus, for Kant, all that remains of the scope of what one might call sensual judgement is the aesthetic judgement of taste. Here one can speak of a real public spirit. As doubtful as it may be whether one may speak of knowledge in aesthetic taste, and so certainly not judge by concepts in aesthetic judgment it is clear that aesthetic taste is meant to be the imposition of a general mood, even if it is sensual and not conceptual. The true public spirit, then, says Kant, is taste. >Taste/ Kant.
Gadamer I 44
It is (...) by no means the case that the power of judgement is productive only in the area of nature and art as a judgement of the beautiful and sublime, indeed one will not even say with Kant(2) that a productivity of judgment must be recognised there. Rather, the beauty in nature and art is to be supplemented by the whole vast sea of beauty which is spread out in the moral reality of man.
Gadamer I 45
It is always obviously not only a matter of logical but also aesthetic judgement. The individual case in which the power of judgement is involved is never a mere case; it is not limited to being the particularity of a general law or concept. Rather, it is always an "individual case", and, typically, we say: a special case, a special case because it is not covered by the rule.
Gadamer I 46
Humanities/aesthetics/ethics/Kant/Gadamer: If one now looks at the role Kant's critique of judgement plays within the history of the humanities, one will have to say that his transcendental-philosophical foundation of aesthetics was momentous on both sides and represents a turning point. It means the breaking off of a tradition, but at the same time the introduction of a new development. It restricted the concept of taste to the field in which it could claim independent and autonomous validity as a principle of its own power of judgement - and, conversely, thus restricted the concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason. The transcendental intention that guided him found fulfillment in the limited phenomenon of judging the beautiful (and sublime) and referred the more general experiential concept of taste and the activity of aesthetic judgement in the field of law and custom from the center of philosophy. >Aesthetics/Kant.

1. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40.
2. Ebenda, S. VII.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Justice Hayek Mause I 197
Justice/Hayek: HayekVsRawls: Hayek's philosophy of freedom sees redistribution as an inadmissible interference in the autonomy rights of individuals and therefore rejects them because of their negative effects on social justice. (1) >Autonomy.
Hayek's thesis: the overriding norm is that of individual autonomy. Terms that limit this autonomy need to be justified. For example, re-distribution: does not stand up to this justification, as the market is unsurpassedly efficient for Hayek.
Market/Hayek: For the market to function optimally, all it needs is equal rights for all market participants, maximum contractual freedom and a minimum social security system.
>Markets/Hayek.
Any further redistribution measures would not only suppress the incentive to secure one's own existence. Nor would it have any legitimation either: possible unequal exchange results of the market are an unintended consequence of individual action and, due to the lack of intentionality, cannot justify any follow-up responsibility. (2)
VsHayek: Hayek does not take into account that interest groups can influence pricing or that a large number of services are not provided via the market. (3)
Mause I 203
Justice/Theories of Justice/Hayek: Where Hayek relies on the principle of performance justice, Rawls focuses on equal opportunities, while Sens' principle of participation justice comes very close to need justice. (4)(5) RawlsVsHayek, HayekVsRawls, SenVsRawls, RawlsVsSen, SenVsRawls, SenVsHayek, HayekVsSen.
>Social Market Economy.

1. F. A. von Hayek, Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Tübingen 1971.
2. W. Kersting, Kersting, Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 60-63.
3.I. Becker, R. Hauser, 2011. Soziale Gerechtigkeit – ein magisches Viereck: Zieldimensionen, Politikanalysen und empirische Befunde. Berlin 2011, pp. 31-34.
3. Sven Jochem, Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin 2009, p. 68.
4. Cf. Rieger, Elmar, und Stephan Leibfried, Kultur versus Globalisierung: Sozialpolitische Theologie in Konfuzianismus und Christentum. Frankfurt am Main 2004, p. 44.

Hayek I
Friedrich A. Hayek
The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Liberty Nussbaum Brocker I 891
Freedom/NussbaumVsSen/Nussbaum: More than Amartya Sen, Nussbaum is concerned with defining a core of certain "capabilities" as an indispensable basic asset. In other words: to "substantial" behaves "procedural" as a counter-concept.(1) >Capabilities/Nussbaum
SenVsVs/SenVsNussbaum/Dierksmeier: But it was precisely the highlight of Sen's "substantive freedom" that the procedural and participatory moment was by no means pushed to the periphery, but rather moved to the centre.
>Freedom/Sen, >Capabilities/Sen.

1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton 2010, S. 18

Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Life Nussbaum Mause I 200f
Life/Sen/Nussbaum: What is a fulfilled life is examined by the "capability approach" of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. >Capabilities/Nussbaum >Life/Sen.
NussbaumVsDistributive Justice/SenVsDistributive Justice: With its focus on practical lifestyles, the empowerment approach criticizes classical theories of justice, which ask about the distribution of rights, duties, freedoms, financial and material goods, but do not problematize whether and to what extent persons can make use of these rights and financial and material goods at all. The question is whether people are able to use goods and rights at all through education or social skills.
A good life is not significantly defined by financial or material aspects. It is about good and meaningful work, health, resilient social relationships or education.(1)
VsSen/VsNussbaum: the approach of Nussbaum and Sen has to deal with the accusation of essentialism and paternalism. Shifting the focus to a good and fulfilled life entails the danger of tipping over into normative prescriptions.
Problem: the idea of a good life is shaped by a certain culturally dependent model, but at the same time should be made culturally binding.(2)(3)
SenVsVs/NussbaumVsVs: Representatives of the capability approach counter that it is not the modes of operation as such that are the good to be promoted, but the instrumental and constitutive freedoms that increase freedom of choice with regard to the form of life.(4)
>Liberty, >Freedom.

1. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999, S 200ff.
2. Christiane Scherer, Das menschliche und das gute menschliche Leben. Martha Nussbaum über Essentialismus und menschliche Fähigkeiten. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41, (5) 1993, S. 905-920.
3. Wolfgang Kersting, Gerechtigkeitstheorien. In Studienbuch Politikwissenschaft, Hrsg. Manfred G. Schmidt, Frieder Wolf und Stefan Wurster, Wiesbaden 2013 S. 131-159.
4. Otto, Hans-Uwe, und Holger Ziegler, Der Capabilities-Ansatz als neue Orientierung in der Erziehungswissenschaft. In Capabilities – Handlungsbefähigung und Verwirklichungschancen in der Erziehungswissenschaft, Hrsg. Hans-Uwe Otto und Holger Ziegler, Wiesbaden 2010, S. 9-13.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Life Sen Mause I 200f
Life/Sen/Nussbaum: What is a fulfilled life is examined by the "capability approach" of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. >Life/Nussbaum.
NussbaumVsDistributive Justice/SenVsDistributive Justice: With its focus on practical lifestyles, the empowerment approach criticizes classical theories of justice, which ask about the distribution of rights, duties, freedoms, financial and material goods, but do not problematize whether and to what extent persons can make use of these rights and financial and material goods at all. The question is whether people are able to use goods and rights at all through education or social skills.
A good life is not significantly defined by financial or material aspects. It is about good and meaningful work, health, resilient social relationships or education.(1)
VsSen/VsNussbaum: the approach of Nussbaum and Sen has to deal with the accusation of essentialism and paternalism. Shifting the focus to a good and fulfilled life entails the danger of tipping over into normative prescriptions.
Problem: the idea of a good life is shaped by a certain culturally dependent model, but at the same time should be made culturally binding.(2)(3)
SenVsVs/NussbaumVsVs: Representatives of the capability approach counter that it is not the modes of operation as such that are the good to be promoted, but the instrumental and constitutive freedoms that increase freedom of choice with regard to the form of life. (4)
>M. Nussbaum.

1. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999, S 200ff.
2. Christiane Scherer, Das menschliche und das gute menschliche Leben. Martha Nussbaum über Essentialismus und menschliche Fähigkeiten. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41, (5) 1993, S. 905-920.
3. Wolfgang Kersting, Gerechtigkeitstheorien. In Studienbuch Politikwissenschaft, Hrsg. Manfred G. Schmidt, Frieder Wolf und Stefan Wurster, Wiesbaden 2013 S. 131-159.
4. Otto, Hans-Uwe, und Holger Ziegler, Der Capabilities-Ansatz als neue Orientierung in der Erziehungswissenschaft. In Capabilities – Handlungsbefähigung und Verwirklichungschancen in der Erziehungswissenschaft, Hrsg. Hans-Uwe Otto und Holger Ziegler, Wiesbaden 2010, S. 9-13.

EconSen I
Amartya Sen
Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Positivism Hacking I 77
Def Positivism/Hacking:
1st Verification,
2nd observation,
3rd VsCausality,
4th VsExplanation (just brings phenomena in an order that does not explain why.), 5th VsTheoretical Entities,
6th VsMetaphysics (leaves nothing that is not verifiable).
>Verification, >Observation, >Causality, >Explanations, >Theoretical entities, >Metaphysics.
I 80
PopperVs the label "positivist", VsSense Data - not VsMetaphysics: non-verifiable sentences are acceptable as a first step. That was later refuted by Popper. >K. Popper, >Sense data.
I 80
Empiricism: empiricism is concerned with measuring (theoretical entities exist). >Empiricism, >Measurements.
Positivism: positivism is concerned with seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, tasting (theoretical entities do not exist).

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Psychology Quine V 58
Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine
XII 91
Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular.
No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection.
>Science/Quine
XII 92
Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end.
XII 98
Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation.
XII 99
Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine
New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology.
>Epistemology/Quine:
Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data.
New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology.
>Epistemology/Quine
XI 100
Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input.
Priority is what is causally closer.
QuineVsAntipsychologism.
I 44
Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case.
I 154
Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Qualities Wittgenstein Hintikka I 113
Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson).
I 202
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience.
I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only.
These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).

III 141
Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Representation Davidson Glüer II 126
Davidson: there is no representation that could be true/false. - Beliefs are true if they are caused properly. >Facts/Davidson.
Davidson I (e) 96
DavidsonVsSchema/Content - DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation always in relation to a schema. >Conceptual scheme. - DavidsonVsSense data theory
Glüer II 126
Representation/DavidsonVsPresentation Mind/Object - (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: there are no facts. ((s) Like Frege: all true propositions have the same meaning: conformity with all facts of the world/"great fact"). Cf. >Slingshot-Argument.
Glüer II 127
There are no facts that could be represented. - We do not know anything through the demand for correspondence.
Glüer II 127
Representation/Externalism/DavidsonVsRepresentation: Davidson replaces private representations by intersubjectively accessible objects. - These are as public as the meanings.
Rorty VI 190
Representation/Brandom/Rorty: would like to save them from Davidson, who has thrown them out. DavidsonVsRepresentation.
VsVs: propositional contents are not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation.
>Propositions.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rights Nussbaum Brocker I 903
Rights/NussbaumVsSen/Nussbaum: In contrast to Sen, who presents rights as a prerequisite for the formulation of needs, Nussbaum sees the advantages of her theory in starting from abilities and then deducing rights. >Capabilities/Nussbaum.
Example: Development Policy/Nussbaum: in the context of international development policy, it is apparent, for instance with regard to property rights, that the outcome of
Brocker I 904
capabilities, rather than rights, sharpens the focus on the particularly disadvantaged. The approach could, for example, legitimise special programmes to create opportunities and capabilities for these disadvantaged people, while the outcome of equal rights would at least make such special programmes more difficult.(1)
The language of rights is often (erroneously) linked to the tradition of European enlightenment, which may provoke accusations of westernizing.

1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p, 98f

Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Seeing Quine XII 100
Seeing/Vision/QuineVsTradition: it is not about the problem if there is an unconscious two dimensional radiation or a conscious three dimensional perception. - instead: stimuli. Also QuineVsGestalt Psychology: if we have only stimuli, then there is no problem, whether we have a gestalt or atoms. >Gestalt theory, >Perception.
XII 100
Seeing/Quine: old mystery: Problem: how to solve the epistemological priority: The retina is irradiated two-dimensionally, yet we see things three dimensional without conscious conclusion.
Problem: what should be considered as observation, the unconscious two dimensional or the conscious three dimensional?
Tradition: here the conscious had priority.
New: now we can drop consciousness because we explain observation through stimuli.
This makes old paradoxes about unconscious data and chains of conclusions that would have to be completed too quickly obsolete.
Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Atomism.
QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. >Gestalt Psychology.
Priority is what is causally closer.
QuineVsAntipsychologism.
XII 101
Protocol Sentence/Vienna Circle/Quine: there was a debate in the Vienna Circle about what should be considered an observation or protocol sentence: a) Reports on sensory impressions
b) Elementary statement about the outside world
c) (Neurath): Reports on the relation between perception and reality.
Quine: the worst thing was that there was apparently no objective decision.
Solution/Quine: we look at them unreservedly in the context of the outside world.
Def Observation Sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors.
Problem: how to measure the distance?
Solution: Observation sentences are those that make the least use of stored information in language learning. However, there can be no total independence from stored information. >Holism, >Network/Quine, >Logical particles, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Sensations Chisholm II 190
Sensation/perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of sensation: The object appears to us in a certain way: e.g., in a red way. "Red" is not understood here as an adjective. Appearing in a certain way is a non-relational property.
II 191
Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychic aspect of the world? The existence of the non-relational states of persons requires, in turn, the existence of a mind that has these states.
Chisholm/Stubenberg: This could be met with an innocuous definition of "mental."
II 192
Def "mental"/Chisholm: that which is immediately known. It is impossible for one to be appeared to in a certain way without knowing that one is appeared to in that way. This corresponds to Chisholm expression "self-presenting". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "spiritual" states. The property need not be of material nature! Even in a world which consists only of physical objects, spiritual qualities can be exemplified.

>Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge.


Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Sensations Quine Rorty I 135
Quine: there are no feelings. (As the sun is not "rising".)
Quine V 15ff
Sensation/Quine: structured wholes (figures) - not flashes of light - VsBerkeley: Depth: is not accessible - perceived shape, not stimuli (> consciousness/Quine) - (this is within reception) - stimuli instead of sense data.
V 17
Gestalt TheoryVsSense Data - QuineVsGestalt Theory: meaning related with receptors, not with consciousness.
V 63
Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch and smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided.
Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories.
V 64
Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions ((s) circumstances), but of language ((s) > semantic ascent).
V 65
Observation Sentences/Quine: are the gateway to language and science. They usually do not talk about feelings but about external things.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sense Data Theory Dewey Suhr I 147
Sense data/DeweyVsSense Data Theory/DeweyVsRussell: The experience is reduced to the subjective act of experiencing. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. >Perception, >Experience, >Qualities, >Qualia, >Seeing, >Sensory impressions.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
Sense Data Theory Millikan I 302
Sense Data/contradiction/Millikan: a contradiction can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Object: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object.
>Identification/Millikan, >Intension/Millikan.
Sense data/MillikanVsSense Data theory: sense data cannot be the object because a sense date cannot be given in several ways. ((s) There is always only one way of givenness of a sense date, otherwise it is about several sense data).
Sense Data/Millikan: Every sense date presents itself only to one sense (e.g. touch, sense of smell). (s) i.e. it cannot be said that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object).
Millikan: one needs a fully developed theory about law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you cannot test them at all! And therefore no concepts can be developed from them. And this would be contrary to the first condition that the concepts to be tested should only form small groups.
I 312f
Sense Data Theory/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be that neither an inner nor an outer language actually describes sense data, except that the language depends on previous concepts of external things that normally cause sense data.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sense Data Theory Quine I 19
QuineVsSense-Data Theory: immediate experience is no coherent, autonomous region.
I 404
VsSensory Data: intermediate instances do not explain anything. - Not necessary for the description of illusions - not a substitute for physical objects. Double standards: linking to objects/utility - Complete knowledge of sense data guaranteed no translation.
---
II 107
Atomic Facts/Russell: sense data QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance: certain with sense-data, all other are fallible (Russell).
---
VII (b) 40
Sense-Data/Quine: is ambivalent: a) event - b) quality.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Sense Data Theory Ryle I 290 f
RyleVsSense Data Theory: there is an incorrect alignment of perception and observation and there are no flat areas of color. There are no two objects: object and date - these are not private items. The dazzle is a property of the spotlight - this is hypothetically, not categorically.
>Terminology/Ryle.
I 295
Perspective/sense data: e.g. an oblique plate looks elliptical - but we do not see the "elliptical appearance" next to the plate. There is no other subject - instead we apply a rule to the actual appearance of the plate.
Rule: is partly hypothetical, partly general: mixed categorically.

I 297
Mixed-categorical/Ryle: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. ---
Flor I 261
Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states.
>Perspective/Ryle, >Seeing/Ryle, >Perception/Ryle, >Aspects.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Sense Data Theory Sellars I XII
Sense data/Sellars: sense data cannot be candidates for the foundation of a justification practice. Problem to make them a foundation for justification: the sense data of the empiricists are single objects, but only with respect to facts one can speak of a knowledge.
>Knowledge, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Facts, >Facts/Sellars, >Observation sentences.
Knowledge: "has the form "this and that is so and so." Known is something about a single object, but not a single object itself.
Sense-data theory: is faced with the choice:
a) either sense data are individual objects, then the perception of sense data would be no knowledge.
b) or the theorist declares the feeling of sense data to a form of knowledge, but then one must admit that there are not individual objects, but facts that are known.
>Generality, >Generalization, >cf. >Generality condition/Evans.
I XXXVII
Sense data/Broad/tradition: internal objects, immediately conscious. SellarsVs: no objects, only causal consequences.
N.B.: a red sensation can also occur when the object only appears to be red.
>Sensation/Sellars.
I 15
Sense data/Sellars: can be used as a code, but not as an analysis or explanation for anything.
I 37
Sense-data theory: basic problem of how something can appear, without it being so and without it being perceived. >Appearance, >Perception.
I 47
SellarsVsSense Data: it is about public physical objects, not about private objects.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Sense Data Theory Strawson V 93
StrawsonVsSense-Data Theory: unlinked sense-data do not give a coherent picture. - But they also do not result in a picture of objects, whose relations were distinguished or distinguishable from the relations of experience about them. >Things/Strawson, >Particulars, >Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Sensory Impressions Quine II 57
QuineVsSensory qualities - people do not talk and do not think about their stimuli - it is about stimulus and response. ---
XII 87
Body/Hume: simply equated with sensory impressions - volatile - every time there is a new apple. - QuineVsHume: Problem: thus no general statements are possible and no statements about the future. (To date unsolved). Solution/Bentham: translation of whole sentences by defining context. - No more word-word equivalents.
Sentences as the primary bearer of meaning.
Definition body/object/QuineVsHume: sets of sets of sensory data.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stimuli Quine I 66/67
Stimulus: here it is about stimuli, not rabbits! - (See also problems in relation to >forgery). - Verification by society. >Gavagai.
I 67
Stimulus meaning: preliminary isolation of individual sentences for verification. VsCarnap: Advantage: distinction between the cases of unicorn and goblin is possible without preliminary decision on admissibility. >Stimulus meaning.
I 81
Stimulus meaning: objective reality that the linguist needs. - Translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. >Translation.
I 120f
Consistent sentences: stimulus meaning is more sparse - accordingly: stimulus synonymy less plumable. >VsAnalyticity.
I 126
Stimulus synonymy improved by socialization (agreement) - same goes for stimulus analyticity: But now: 2 + 2 = 4 on the same level as "There are black dogs" (>acceptability).
I 379
Stimuli are not intensional.
I 402
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy individual thing-universal - it does not matter whether it exists. Equator, North Pole. Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions.
---
II 57
QuineVsSensory qualities - people speak and do not think about their stimuli. - It is about stimulus and response. ---
V 48f
Stimulus/Response/Quine: this (polar) contradiction is mitigated by the notion of perception similarity.
V 49
Truth similarity: includes auditory similarity of words. Truth similarity: analysis ignores the different origins - stimulus reaction analysis does not.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Dennett, D. Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. II 180
DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented.
Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds".
Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content.
Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese.
Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer,
II 181
to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world.
notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes.
StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide?
Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content.
Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal.
Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes.
Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ.
narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff".
Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches:
II 182
Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction.
StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content.
Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu).
Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited.
Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects.
StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them.
E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce.
Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it.
II 183
StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions,
b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world.
E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators.
E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions.
Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior.
StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content.
II 184
Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states
Ei: a state of the environment.
Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si.
Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei.
Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment.
Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei.
Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS.
That is like Dennett understands narrow content.
Problem/StalnakerVsDennett:
1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism.
2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception).
That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is.
Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content.
Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all!
narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential.
((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?)
II 185
Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment).
Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday!
E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet,
II 186
not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases.
Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions.
Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world).
StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.).
internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing.
Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content
II 187
StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content.
StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction.

II 238
Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three.
II 239
People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions.
StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Gestalt Theory Quine Vs Gestalt Theory V 17
Stimuli/Quine: instead of sensory data. Gestalt Theory: VsSensual Atomism. VsSense Data.
Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist ((s) with stimuli instead of sensory data, but renunciation of Gestalt theory).
VsGestalt Theory: it is about the relation of the stimuli to the receptors, not to consciousness.

XII 100
Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Data Atomism. QuineVsGestalt Psychology: no matter if Gestalt or atoms push themselves to the forefront of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input.
Priority has which is causally closer.
QuineVsAntipsychologism.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Locke, J. Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. VsLocke
Locke I 26/27
Knowledge/VsLocke: Problem: the ideas have to be fixed in words, but that does not mean recognizing yet, because the words have to be processed into statements. Locke, however, develops his idea analysis first in isolation. (Thereby lengthy repetitions arise).
Locke I 42
VsLocke/VsSensualism: the critique of Locke always misses a clarification of the necessary preconditions of human knowledge in the subject itself. This is caught by Locke's introduction of reason at the end of the essay.
Locke I 66
Ethics/Locke: the suspension force is of utmost importance for Locke's ethics: the "Angel" around which the freedom of rational beings revolves. Thus the possibility of a free decision for the morally good is to be justified. (Despite hedonism). VsLocke: this is not contradictory, but not very plausible. It has been criticized time and again that the motive of moral decision is not the independent value of the morally good, but the benefit determined according to desire/displeasure. Locke never clarified this despite the pressure of his contemporaries.
Locke I 169
Sensualism/VsLocke: an old tradition of Locke-Criticism considers sensualism naive. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind that was not in the senses before".
LeibnizVsLocke: "except the mind itself!".
Curl I 170
KantVsLocke: there are a priori forms of perception that enable us to have experiences in the first place. Language/Knowledge/VsLocke: (today): Locke misjudges the irreducible linguistic foundations of empirical perception. But in his thinking the correction is already applied in order to also include abstract and general ideas under the empirically given, from which every reconstruction of knowledge must already start. (L. Krüger).
Economy/EuchnerVsLocke: Contradiction: Locke's mercantilism and its simultaneous praise of world trade.
Locke I 188
Knowledge/Reality/KreimendahlVsLocke: restricts possible statements of reality to the realm of ideas and the "nominal" entities formed by them. In doing so, he questions his own empirical program. On the one hand it is correct that there can be no knowledge without mediation of ideas, which in their complex form are human art products, while on the other hand he claims that the source of all ideas is experience (circular).
Experience/Locke: the combination of sensory experience and reflection ("inner experience").
Gravity/Locke: "Hoop and Ribbon" (Euchner: that was more naive than it should have been at the time).
Locke II 187
Complex ideas/Locke: e.g. friend: from simple ideas: human, love, willingness, action, happiness, which in turn can be traced back to even simpler ideas. LambertVsLocke: he did not recognize the necessary connections of the terms.
ArndtVsLambert: Locke was not interested in an axiomatic system. He was interested in separating the realm of "real knowledge" (mathematics) from the empirical, in which the complex idea is based solely on the observable factual co-existence of qualities.
In empiricism, no necessary connection can be observed!
Locke I 62
Law of Nature/EuchnerVsDoctrine of the Law of Nature: Locke does not treat it systematically, otherwise he would have had to deal with the following problems: the world as an order of creation,
to the legal order of political structures under the aspects of natural and human law, as well as the
the legal position of the individual,
to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason, and to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason.
Reasons why the principles of natural law and morality are recognised as binding and followed.





Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Propositions Quine Vs Propositions V 61
QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous.
VI 99
QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto.

VI 142
Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation.
X 19
Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications.
Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements.
Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend:
Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions.
X 20
Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth,
1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and
2) Snow is white.
Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1).
The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow...").
He bypasses differences between languages ​​and differences between formulations within a language.
Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather:
QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves:
False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition.
QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences.

X 32
Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences.
Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions.
Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure.
QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions.
Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p"
((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.)

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Russell, B. Carnap Vs Russell, B. VI 164
Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things."
VI 247
CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects.
Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap, this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Russell, B. Dewey Vs Russell, B. Suhr I 47
DeweyVssense data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
Sellars, W. Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. Rorty I 206
Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other.
I 207
Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism.
I 208
SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the:
Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities.
Sellars I 34
Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content.
2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism.
I 34/25
3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time.
Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content?
Sellars: admitted.
I 35
SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content!
I 36
Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing.





Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Sense Data Carnap Vs Sense Data Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: for Carnap this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Sense Data Dewey Vs Sense Data I 47
DeweyVssense-data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Sense Data Fraassen Vs Sense Data I 72
Observation/Evidence/Theory/Fraassen: if a theory is only about the observable, empirical adequacy and truth coincide. But this leads to conclusions about the structure of the observable phenomena and that goes beyond the available evidence. VsFraassen: It might be objected that I have drawn the line observable/unobservable arbitrarily. E.g. Sense data and experiences are also theoretical entities if they are not understood in the context of phenomena in advance. They are even worse, because they come from an armchair philosophy.
FraassenVsVs: I am sure that sense data do not exist, but I am agnostic when it comes to the existence of unobservable aspects of the world as it is described by the sciences. (FraassenVsSense Data).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Sense Data Husserl Vs Sense Data Dummett I 53
Noema/Husserl: Husserl perceives by the noema, but he doesn't perceive the noema nor realizes it otherwise in any way. HusserlVsSense Data Theory/Dummett: his sense data theory is therefore different from a sense data theory in the usual sense, which takes sense data as actual primary objects of consciousness.
Only the philosophy can cope with the difficult task to consider the noemata and thus can obtain their description.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Sense Data Quine Vs Sense Data I 404
When you step up for sense data, you turn against physicalism, if anything, and not against nominalism. Vs: The establishment of subjective sensations serves no sufficient purpose.
a) such objects would not be enough if physical objects are excluded.
b) (QuineVsFirth): we do not need any sense data in addition to the objects to describe with their help, for example, delusions.
c) We do not need sense data to underpin our knowledge of physical objects or to explain our comments about them. Mediating instances (for example, nerve paths) explain nothing!
I 406
VsSense Data: double standard 1) relative directness of the link between the sense data with the objects 2) Another standard, the theoretical usefulness of sense data.
I 407
VsSense Data: Complete knowledge of sense data is not sufficient to make a radical translation nor even to recognize a term as such.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Sense Data Ryle Vs Sense Data I 301
RyleVsSense Data.
E.g. someone who says: "The headlamps are blinding!" need not be blinded himself. - It is a fallacy to say that the blinding is therefore not a property of the headlamps, but a characteristic of the sense-data of blinded individual. ---
I 280
SenseData/RyleVsSense Data/Ryle: some theorists want us to turn away from robins and cheeses, and to turn to such things as looking at something and fragrances (sense data). That would mean, if I can observe this sight when I catch the sight of the robin, then I must catch something like a sight of the sight. Or a fragrance of a fragrance. Regress. E.g. When someone is watching horses racing the question is whether he had a good seat, but not if someone is itchy. Hence, also not the question whether the sensation of his itching was superficial.
---
I 282
Attention/Ryle: Observing or sighting include noticing, but noticing does not include observing. RyleVsSense data/Ryle: it was wrong from the start to compare the objects of the open observation, such as cheese and robins to objects, which are supposed to be accessible only to a privileged observation: namely, my sensations. Sensations are, in fact, not objects of observation. We do not need to build a "theater of the outside world" in order to compare it to an inner "theater", the mind.
The properties that observable objects can have, cannot be sensibly attributed or denied for sensations.
---
I 283
It is senseless to say sensations had a position, size, temperature, color, or smell. Also no place. In any case, not in response to a question such as "Where was the robin?" In a certain sense this is already the tingling in my foot or "burning in my nose" but that is a different sense than pepper grains in my nose or pointy stones under my foot.
My cringing is not hidden from the shoemaker because it is within me. On the contrary, it cannot at all be described as a needle, object within or outside public access. Or within the public object that I am myself. Likewise, letters cannot be classified as main words or time words as property words.
---
I 286
Seeing/hearing/tasting/Ryle: are not used to describe "pure" or "unmixed" sensations, for we are talking about seeing horse races and listening to trains, tasting wines. Horse racing, trains and wines are not sensations, horse racings do not stop when I close my eyes, good wines are not destroyed when I have a cold. We need, therefore, apparently ways of talking about what ceases when I close my eyes, etc.
Sense data/RayleVsSense data: the sight or the appearance of the horses actually changes as tears flow, or the taste of the wine is affected by the cold, and the sounds of the train become quieter when I cover my ears. It seems, then, that we can talk about "pure" sensations when we talk about "appearance" "sound" "taste", "fragrance", "tingling", etc.
It also seems that with these expressions we can make distinctions and exclude those sensations which are achieved by reasoning, education, memory, presumption, habit, imagination, or association. (Covering one's ears does not help in the memory).
---
I 287
SenseData/RyleVs: but what does it mean to get a momentary sight or a momentary scent? And what is the sight or smell like that you get? 1. The sight of a horse race is not a sporting event on a racing field. Just as anyone can be a witness of the race, not everyone can be a witness of the sight. (Already because of the perspective, not the point of view)
Nor can anyone else have my tingling.
Definition Sense Data/Ryle: (e.g. scent, sight, tingling, ringing) is private property of a single perceiver.
Further, the sight of a horse race is described as a short-lived patchwork of color spots.
RyleVsSense Data: but the visual appearance of things or the sight which is described as color spots can not be viewed as surfaces of ordinary flat objects. They are simply spots of color, not spots of colored plaster or colored canvas.
Tradition: the representatives of the theory of sense data agree that sense data is something private, but not in that,
---
I 288
that they are of a psychical nature or "in my mind". Tradition: the representatives now ask themselves the question: What is the fact that their recipient has it or receives it? Answer is simple: according to some, he should perceive or observe, some even say that people do not see a horse race, but only observe color spots.
---
I 290
Sense data/deception/Ryle: It is claimed, in particular, that the theory solves paradoxes in the description of illusions. If the squinting man asserts that he sees two candles and the drunk says, he sees white mice, one can now translate that the squinting one sees two "candle appearances" and the drunken one in reality "white mouse appearances". Their only error then lies in the conclusion of existence. Next: For example a forward tilted plate looks elliptical (in fact is wrong). There is an elliptical white spot in the field of view.
RyleVsSense data theory: the whole theory is based on a logical blunder, namely, the approximation of the concept of sensation to that of observation.
---
I 291
Sense data/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: Having a look at a horse race is explained by having something else, namely a color combination. Regress: If having the sensation of a horse race implies having something else, then having that other, the color spot must again imply having something else, an earlier sense-date. ---
I 294
SenseData/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: one cannot say meaningfully, one sees the appearance of a plate and not the plate itself, because appearance is already a main word for seeing. There is no other object, the "appearance" next to the plate. One does not say "I see a flat elliptical spot of white" but: "Maybe I see an elliptical and not slanted piece of white porcelain."
E.g. We can say that a closer plane looks faster than the one more distant, but we cannot say "it has a faster look". "Looks faster" means, looks as if it was flying faster. Talking about the apparent speeds of airplanes does not mean talking about the speeds of the appearances of airplanes.
---
I 298
Indeterminacy/VsSense data theory/Ryle: one who is peeking through a hole in the hedge may say he sees an area of yellow ... but will not be able to tell if it is dandelion or yellow canvas. He could only say, "I saw something yellow." Contrary to this normal use of expressions of indeterminacy, the sense data theory supports continuous talking of this kind.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Sense Data Sellars Vs Sense Data I 9
SellarsVsSense Data Theory: mistake: as with the naturalistic fallacy: to consider the reality as a fact that requires no learning! It looks indeed strange that one would have to learn a sensation of pain or sensation of color. But if the sensation is not learned, then the theorists cannot perform any analysis that assumes the acquired skills. But a classificatory distinction does not work without learning and without conceptualization, or even without the use of symbols.
I 10
SellarsVsSense Data Theory: three assumptions are contrary to each other: A. The proposition X perceives a red sense content s stating that X in a non-inferential way knows that s is red.
B. The ability to feel the meaning content is not learned.
C. The ability to know facts of the form x is φ is learned.
A and B together contain non-C; B and C contain non-A; A and C contain non-B. ((s) ratio of three propositions that in pairs respectively exclude the third.).
Three possibilities:
(1) you can drop A. Then the sensation becomes a noncognitive fact. This can, of course, build a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition for a non-inferential knowledge.
I 11
(2) One can drop B. Thus the concept of the sense data is detached from our everyday speech on sensations, feelings, itching. (3) to drop C would, however, be contrary to the nominalistic trends that were prevalent within the empiricist tradition.
Sense data/Sellars: the concept of the sense data seems to be a hybrid of two ideas:
1. the idea that there are certain inner episodes as red sensations, without a process of learning or conceptualization would have preceded. Without these inner episodes one could in some way not see!
2. the idea that there are certain inner episodes that are non-inferential content of knowledge. These episodes are necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as evidence base ("evidence") for all other empirical claims.
I 12
Right now, it does not follow that the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or epistemic fact. You are of course tempted to equate "To have the sensation of a red triangle" with the "Thinking of a heavenly city", then the former is epistemic and intentional, the latter only intentional. But this temptation can be resisted. Because you can claim that the sensation is a fact sui generis that is neither epistemic nor physically and that has its own logical grammar! Unfortunately, that was often associated with a false reasoning:
False: we might describe "seeing that a facing side of a physical object is red and is triangular," as "apparent act of seeing" of which some are not reliable. From a subjective perspective there is no indicator which ensures that any such information is reliable! By more precise information on the circumstances a class some more reliable observations can be created. But no complete reliability.
I 13
Sellars: that confuses a lot: we remember that the sensations of red triangles have exactly those advantages that they are missing the apparent acts of seeing physical surfaces. From the analogy of sensations with the "thinking of a heavenly city", one might think that sensations were in the same category as thoughts. So that both are cognitive facts. Then you will find that sensations are much closer to mental processes than external physical objects.
Mistake: to overlook the fact that one can only describe an experience as reliable when
it is also useful to refer to it as unreliable.
I 24
To appear/to seem/theory of the appearance/Sellars: VsSense data theory: assume that the facts of the form "x seems to be φ for S"
are atomically and irreducible and that you need sense data neither for its analysis nor for an explanation of these facts. (Sellars pro). The proposition that something seems to be red for someone who has the idea that he is in any relationship with something that is red, not as part of its meaning!
Sellars: to seem prima facie = to be.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Sense Data Strawson Vs Sense Data V 92
StrawsonVsSense data theory: unlinked sense data give a coherent picture. But they also do not give a picture of objects, whose relations would be distinguished or distinguishable from the relations of impressions about them.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Sense Data Chisholm Vs Sense Data II 190
Sense data fallacy/ChisholmVsSense data: false conclusion from (A) to (B): (A) There is something that seems so and so (B) There is an appearance that is so and so. E.g. This dog seems to be 10 years old. There is a dog-like appearance, which seems to be 10 years old. If you leave aside the sense data, you do not need a container. Sensation/Perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of the sensation: the object appears to us in a certain way: for example, in a red way. "red" is not understood here as an adjective. Being appeared in a certain way is a non-relational property.
II 191
Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychological aspect of the world? The existence of non-relational states of people in turn requires the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: this could be countered with a harmless definition of "mental":
II 192
Def "mental"/Chisholm: what is immediately known. It is impossible that someone is appeared to in a certain way, without knowing that one is being appeared to in this way. This corresponds Chisholm term "self-representing". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "mental" states. The property need not be of non-material nature! Even in a world that consists only of physical objects, intellectual properties can be exemplified.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Sense Data Millikan Vs Sense Data I 302
Contradiction/Millikan: can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Subject: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object.
Sense data/MillikanVsSense data theory: sense data can therefore not be the object because a sense date can not be given in several ways. ((S) There is only one givenness of a sense datum, otherwise it is several sense data).
Sense datum/Millikan: each sense datum presents itself only to one sense (Ex touch, Ex sense of smell). ((S) that is, one can not say that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object, respectively.)
Millikan: one would need a fully developed theory of law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you can not test them! And hence you can not develop concepts from them. But that would violate the first condition, that the concepts to be tested should form only small groups.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Sententialism Dennett Vs Sententialism Stalnaker II 180
DennettVsSententialismus/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs Sätze als Glaubensobjekte. (relation theory). Lösung/Dennett: "organismischer Beitrag" des Glaubenden. Neutral in Bezug auf die Weise, wie er repräsentiert wird.
Def Notionale Einstellung-Psychologie/not. Einst/Dennett: (statt propositionale Einstellungen) neutral in Bezug auf die Weise der Repräsentation. Definiert in Begriffen von möglichen Welten (poss.w.), "notionalen Welten".
Def Propositionale Einstellungs-Psychologie/Dennett: beschreibt Einstellungen in Begriffen von weitem Inhalt.
Def Sententiale Einstellungen/sent.Einst/Dennett: syntaktisch, nimmt Mentalesisch an.
Def notionale Welt/Dennett: eine fiktionale Welt, die von einem Theoretiker als externem Beobachter konstruiert wird.
II 181
Um die engen Einstellungen eines Subjekts zu charakterisieren. D.h. Mein Zwilling auf der twin earth und ich haben die dieselbe notionale Welt. Def enger Inhalt/Dennett: ist durch eine Menge von notionalen Welten definiert, die die Weise ist, wie eine Person… sei.
Notionale Welt/Stalnaker: scheinen genau die poss.w. zu sein, die in der Psychologie der prop Einst den weiten Inhalt charakterisieren. (> StalnakerVsDennett).

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Sententialism Schiffer Vs Sententialism I 120
Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes.
I 120
And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98).
2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring".
Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!.
E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!.
I 123
DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f).
2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts.
I 137
Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist.
Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory.
I 157
Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221).
Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs:
If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And:
Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited.
Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true.
Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad.
I 158
We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory.
(2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine).
(3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible.
SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Sense Data Theory Versus Fraassen I 72
FraassenVsSense Data - agnostic with respect to unobservable aspects of the world as described by science.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980