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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judgments | Kant | Brandom I 516 Judgement/Kant: is the basic unit of consciousness. >Consciousness/Kant. --- Strawson V 64 Judgment/Kant: a valid judgment is independet from consciousness states - Strawson: then probably no experience without concepts - the deepest principle. - >Categories: unity of consciousness. Strawson V 63 Judgement/Kant: the same as to let fall objects under concepts. --- Bubner I 96 Judgment/Kant/Aristotle/Bubner: judgements are not like signs in direct relation to a particular world-givenness, but they represent something, or characterize something as something. They design a certain point of view on the world, which can be distinguished from other views. The judgment asserts that things behave as it is represented by the connection of two sentence elements. Cf. >Predication, >Statement, >Representation/Kant. But in this way, only separate things can be summarized! The unity thus arises from a specially accomplished connection. It is produced in the judgment and is therefore not a givenness of the world. This also explains the possibility of the falsehood of a sentence which is actually properly formed. Bubner I 100 Definition judgment/Kant/Bubner: is then called the particular idea, the content of which is the determinable relation of other representations, which in turn have a content which does not emerge from the formal connection alone. >Ideas/Kant. Bubner I 101 Judgment is, therefore, the mediate knowledge of an object, the representation of a representation of it. If, on the other hand, the content continually emerges from new representations, there would be a regress in judging. Solution: the relation of representations must itself become the object of an idea. Synthesis: is now the fact that this relationship can be specified, namely, that in the establishment of the relationship something own comes to consciousness, namely, the unity of the connected representations as such. That is the peculiar content of the judgment. Gadamer I 38 Urteilskraft/judgement/Kant/Gadamer: (...) where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's inclusion of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(1). Kant/Gadamer: The basic moral meaning of this term no longer has a systematic place with him. KantVsEmotivism/KantVsSensus communis: As is well known, he designed his moral philosophy almost in opposition to the doctrine of "moral feeling" developed in English philosophy. Thus the concept of sensus communis has been completely eliminated from moral philosophy by him. What appears with the unconditionality of a moral imperative cannot be based on a feeling, even if by this we do not mean the detail of feeling but the commonality of moral feeling. For the character of the imperative, which is suitable for morality, fundamentally excludes comparative reflection on others. The unconditionality of the moral commandment certainly does not mean that the moral consciousness should be rigid in judging others. Rather, it is morally imperative to abstract from the subjective private conditions of one's own judgement and to put oneself in the position of the other. >Morals/Kant. Gadamer I 39 Thus, for Kant, all that remains of the scope of what one might call sensual judgement is the aesthetic judgement of taste. Here one can speak of a real public spirit. As doubtful as it may be whether one may speak of knowledge in aesthetic taste, and so certainly not judge by concepts in aesthetic judgment it is clear that aesthetic taste is meant to be the imposition of a general mood, even if it is sensual and not conceptual. The true public spirit, then, says Kant, is taste. >Taste/ Kant. Gadamer I 44 It is (...) by no means the case that the power of judgement is productive only in the area of nature and art as a judgement of the beautiful and sublime, indeed one will not even say with Kant(2) that a productivity of judgment must be recognised there. Rather, the beauty in nature and art is to be supplemented by the whole vast sea of beauty which is spread out in the moral reality of man. Gadamer I 45 It is always obviously not only a matter of logical but also aesthetic judgement. The individual case in which the power of judgement is involved is never a mere case; it is not limited to being the particularity of a general law or concept. Rather, it is always an "individual case", and, typically, we say: a special case, a special case because it is not covered by the rule. Gadamer I 46 Humanities/aesthetics/ethics/Kant/Gadamer: If one now looks at the role Kant's critique of judgement plays within the history of the humanities, one will have to say that his transcendental-philosophical foundation of aesthetics was momentous on both sides and represents a turning point. It means the breaking off of a tradition, but at the same time the introduction of a new development. It restricted the concept of taste to the field in which it could claim independent and autonomous validity as a principle of its own power of judgement - and, conversely, thus restricted the concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason. The transcendental intention that guided him found fulfillment in the limited phenomenon of judging the beautiful (and sublime) and referred the more general experiential concept of taste and the activity of aesthetic judgement in the field of law and custom from the center of philosophy. >Aesthetics/Kant. 1. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40. 2. Ebenda, S. VII. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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