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Incompleteness | Serres | Sokal I 203 Incompleteness/Society/Debray/Serres/Bricmont/Sokal: (M. Serres,"Paris 1800"(1): according to Debray... societies organize themselves only under the explicit condition that they are based on something different from them, something that is beyond their definition or boundary. They cannot satisfy themselves. He describes the foundation as religious. With Gödel he completes Bergson.... SokalVsSerres: the so-called "Gödel-Debray principle" is just as irrelevant to the history of science as it is to politics. >Incompletenes, >Self-reference, >Circular reasoning, >Foundation, >Ultimate justification, >Incompleteness/Gödel, >Kurt Gödel. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, or >Thorne, >Gribbin, >Hacking. 1. M. Serres, "Paris 1800" in: M. Authier (Ed.) Elemente einer Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p, 636f |
Serres I M. Serres The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author![]() |
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Serres, M. | Davidson Vs Serres, M. | I (b) 22 A proposal boils down to interpreting the rest of the sentence that follows "believes" as a complex adverb. DavidsonVs: no human has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from that. But apparently, we understand the sentences, because we understand the words contained in them. I (e) 95 DavidsonVsSerres: The reason why the senses are not of outstanding theoretical meaning is that the causal role they play is due to an empirical accident. The causal links between thoughts and objects of the world could also have been achieved in a very different way without it having made a difference in terms of content or veracity of the belief. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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