Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Room | Lanz | I 296 Chinese RoomVsComputer Model/VsSimulation as an explanation of skills. Chinese RoomVs computer model / VsSimulation as an explanation of capabilities: The thought experiment of the chinese room was developed by J. R. Searle to show that the mind or its activity cannot be simulated by a computer. Another consequence is that simulation cannot be used to explain (human) abilities. See also further entries for Chinese Room. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Strong Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any computation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Mind, >Experience, >Computation, >Information Processing, >Brain. I 320 A computational description of a system provides a formal description of the causal organization of this system. >Artificial intelligence, >Computer model, cf. >Neural networks. I 321 Invariance principle: every system with conscious experiences, which has the same functional organization as another system with conscious experiences, will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. There may be corresponding causal relations between electronic components like there is between neurons in the brain. Fading Qualia/dancing Qualia: we can use these kinds of qualia for arguments for the strong artificial intelligence. >Qualia/Chalmers. I 322 If there were two organizationally identical systems, one of which had conscious experiences, and the other not, one could construct a system with fading or dancing qualia that lay between these two systems. That would be implausible. If fading and dancing qualia are excluded, the thesis of the Strong Artificial Intelligence applies. (> Qualia/Chalmers). I 329 VsArtificial Intelligence/Goedel/Chalmers: in a consistent formal system which is expressive enough for a certain kind of arithmetic, one can construct a sentence which is not provable in this system. Contrary to the machine, the human being can see that the sentence is true. >Provability. I 330 Therefore the human has an ability which the formal system does not have. ChalmersVsVs: there is no reason to believe that the human is aware of the truth of the sentence. At best, we can say that if the system is consistent, the sentence is true. We cannot always determine the consistency of complex systems. >Consistency. PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Penrose 1994)(1) brings an argument on a lower level: it may be that not all physical processes are computable. >Calculabilty. ChalmersVsVs: But this is based on the above mentioned Goedel argument. Nothing in physical theory itself supports it. VsArtificial Intelligence/VsSimulation/Chalmers: what if consciousness processes are essentially continuous, but our simulations are discrete? >Simulation. I 331 ChalmersVsVs: there are reasons to assume that absolute continuity is not essential for our cognitive competence. However, it might be that a system with unlimited precision (achieved by continuity) has cognitive abilities that a discrete system does not achieve. Cf. >Analog/digital. 1. R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford 1994 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Functionalism | Searle Vs Functionalism | Lanz I 295 Functionalism/Lanz: promises a way out by adopting a level of information processing, the causal and semantic elements 'somehow' integrated. SearleVsFunctionalism/Lanz: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Cf. >functions. Lanz I 296 SearleVsFunctionalism: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Computation/computer model of the mind: if a program contains the functional analysis of a psychological ability then the machine on which the program is running owns this psychological ability. The standing behind the program functional analysis then explains what this ability is based on! (SearleVs). SearleVsComputer model: E.g. speech understanding. > Chinese room. The rules for the passenger are such that the Chinese outside get the impression that they led a normal conversation. I 296 But: the successful imitation or simulation of a psychological ability is not a sufficient condition that the simulating machine has the simulated capacity, nor that an explanation of this psychological ability was given. (> simulation/Deutsch). (>Forgery). Chinese roomVsComputer model/VsSimulation as an explanation for skills. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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