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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justice | Rawls | I 3 Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems. Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. >Injustice, >Laws. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter) >Utilitarianism, >P. Singer. I 4 The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Cf. >Human Rights, >Fundamental Rights. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice. >Society/Rawls. I 5 Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. I 6 Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. I 54/55 Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. >Principles/Rawls. I 237 Natural justice/Rawls: the principles of natural justice are intended to ensure the integrity of the legal process.(1) >Natural justice. I 310 Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness"(2)(3). >G.W. Leibniz. I 311 What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. 1. Cf. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 21,26-28,57f. 2. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) ed. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353. 3. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) Hrsg. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), S. 353. Gaus I 94 Justice/Rawls/Waldron: Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(2): 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn , and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1, C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(1): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2, … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1, and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justice | Singer | Otteson I 21 Justice/SingerVsSmith, Adam/Peter Singer/Otteson: The objection to Smith that social justice raises is that his account ofjustice is too thin because it does not suffciently incorporate our obligations to others who need our help. Thought experiment: The philosopher Peter Singer (2009)(1), for example, gives us the following thought experiment. Imagine you are on your way to an important job interview. You pass by a man-made fountain and see a small child drowning in it. It is not your child, and you did not put the child in the water; but you realize that if you do not wade in to save the child, the child will drown. a) Suppose that if you do save the child, you ruin your shoes, miss your interview, and do not get your job. Singer's question: should you save the child? The obvious answer is yes, you should save the child. That's the easy part. b) The hard part is: What should we say about a person who decided not to save the child? How should we characterize his immoral inaction? Beneficence /Smith: On Smith's distinction between justice and beneficence, all we could say is that such a person was insuffciently beneficent. >Charity/Adam Smith, >Justice/Adam Smith. Otteson I 22 SingerVsSmith, Adam: But, Singer argues, that seems too weak. Should we not also be able to say that the person failed in justice - in other words, acted unjustly? The reason to call for the stronger condemnation of "injustice" is that it might also license punishment. Remember, on Smith's account, we cannot coerce beneficence. We can enforce the rules of justice, coercively if necessary, and we can punish injustice - again, coercively if necessary. >Coercion. Beneficence/Adam Smith: But Smith believes that beneficence must be "free," which entails not only that beneficent action cannot be coerced but also that failure to act beneficently may not be (coercively) punished. >Punishment. Problem: So Smith would not allow us to punish the person who fails to rescue the drowning child. Similarly, Smith would apparently also not allow us to punish people for not helping others in other situations when they could and when those others desire or even need their help. For that reason, Singer, as well as many other thinkers, criticize Smith's account for being insuffcient, for debarring important mechanisms for society to provide aid to people when private, voluntary actions are insuffcient. Otteson I 23 Adam SmithVsSinger/Otteson: Based on the account Smith gives, we can guess that, were he alive to respond, he would suggest that the charge of "insuffcient beneficence" is not as weak as Singer might suppose. Smith's argument would preclude only initiating coercive punishment against the person - no fines, no jail time. Are the actions that Smith allows us enough? Smith seems to believe that in most cases it is. Public condemnation, and the consciousness of being judged negatively by others, are, Smith believes, powerful motivating factors for human behavior. "Nature," Smith writes, "has endowed [humankin], not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves ofin other men" (TMS(2): 117). For the person who has become cognizant that his actions have not only received blame but are actually blameworthy, the guilt can be debilitating: "These natural pangs of an affrighted conscience are the daemons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the guilty, which allow them neither quiet nor repose, which often drive them to despair and distraction" (TMS(2): 118). So strong is our desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments that we become, Smith says, "mortified" when we realize others do not approve of our conduct (TMS(2): 14, 60, 116). Thin justice/SmithVsSinger: Still, is this mortification suffciently reliable for us to count on in ensuring proper beneficent conduct? Or should we have public institutions that will enforce beneficence, coercively if necessary, in addition to enforcing justice? Smith has a few more reasons to offer in support of his "thin" account of justice, to which we will return in later chapters when we take up the discussion of what Smith believes is the proper role of government. Government/solution/Adam Smith: (…) government may be tasked with enforcing justice, but (…) acting with and enforcing proper beneficence must be left to individuals and private parties. >Charity/Adam Smith, >Justice/Adam Smith. 1. Singer, Peter (2009). The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty. Random House. 2. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Justice | Smith | Otteson I 20 Justice/Adam Smith/Otteson: In his 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments(1), Adam Smith divides moral virtue into two broad categories: "justice" and "beneficence." Smith describes "justice" as a "negative" virtue, meaning that to fulfill it we must merely refrain from injuring others. By contrast, "beneficence" is a "positive" virtue, meaning that to fulfill it we must engage in positive action to improve others' situations. Beneficence includes for Smith things like charity, generosity, and friendship, things that inspire gratitude in the beneficiaries of our actions. Justice, on the other hand, requires that we do not harm or injure others; if we breach justice, then we inspire resentment in those we hurt. It turns out, Smith argues, that there are only three rules of justice: (1) the rule to "guard the life and person of our neighbor"; (2) the rule to "guard [our neighbor's] property and possessions"; and (3) the rule to "guard what are called [our neighbor's] personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others" (TMS(1): 84). Smith's argument is that if we do not kill, enslave, or molest others; if we do not steal from, trespass on, or damage another's property; and if we do not renege on voluntary contracts or promises we have made: then we will have acted with justice toward others. The just person, then, is the one who, whatever else he does, causes no harm or injury to others (…). As Smith strikingly puts it: "We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing" (TMS(1): 82). >Charity/Adam Smith, >Morality/Adam Smith, >Community/Adam Smith. Otteson I 21 Rules: Smith calls the rules of justice "sacred," which may seem an oddly strong word for an account claiming that moral virtues arise on the basis of experience and interactions among individuals. Why would he call justice "sacred"? The answer is that Smith believes that the rules of justice turn out to be necessary for any society to exist. He calls them "the foundation which supports the building" that is society, whereas he calls beneficence "the ornament which embellishes" society (TMS(1): 86). A society filled with people who fulfill the rules of justice perfectly - who, that is, never harm others in their persons, property, or promises - but who do not engage in beneficent action toward one another may not be the most inviting society in which to live. But it can survive. >Justice/Peter SingerVsSmith, >Community/Adam Smith. Government/solution/Adam SmithVsSinger: (…) government may be tasked with enforcing justice, but (…) acting with and enforcing proper beneficence must be left to individuals and private parties. >Charity/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018 |
| Values | Singer | I 87 Values/Death/Killing/Utilitarianism/P. Singer: Assuming we could fix pain and pleasure as objective values, then we have another problem: there are two ways of reducing pleasure in the world, for example: a) Eliminating the pleasure out of a being's life b) To end the life of this being. This means that we cannot automatically move from the higher rating of a pleasant life over a less pleasant one to a higher rating of a pleasant life over the alternative that is not a life. Reason: when we are dead, we do not miss the pleasurable. >Death, >Life, >Morality, >Ethics, >Norms, >Pain, >Suffering. I 88 Utilitarianism: when it comes to the multiplication of pleasure in the world, why should we not have more and more children and breed more and more animals that have a pleasant life? This is what I call the "total view". >Utilitarianism. Vs: one could object that the life of the now existing beings would be restricted for this. And the beings who have not yet been born do not exist and therefore cannot suffer or do without anything. VsVs: on the other hand, one could assume a "prior existence" from the future beings. This means that our current decisions refer to beings that do not yet exist. >Future, >Decisions. I 89 Problem: in this case, one has to deal with asymmetry when deciding, for example, whether a child who is likely to suffer extremely badly and will soon die should be born. >Abortion. Problem: both perspectives, the "overall view" and the "pre-existence" viewpoint lead to contra-intuitive consequences. I 245 Values/Consciousness/knowledge/animals/Singer, P.: are there values beyond the reach of knowing beings? >Absoluteness, >Perspective, >Metaphysical realism. I 246 Intrinsic value: is a value that is desirable in itself, as opposed to a value that something receives as a means to something else. For example, luck is an intrinsic value, money is not. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Environmental destruction/Singer, P.: If a valley is now destroyed by dam construction, one must not only consider the fate of the knowing creatures, but also the fates of the other species, most of which will die. >Animals. I 247 Utilitarianism: will in this case include the fact that the animals that would have lived there would have done so for hundreds of years to come. Ethics/Singer, P.: how far can it be extended beyond the realm of knowing beings? The ethical position I have developed in this book (P. Singer 2011(1)) is limited to knowing beings. I 248 It is difficult to extend ethics beyond this area. Problem: the concept of interest is missing when it comes to weighing up. >Interest. Another problem: without the concept of knowledge, the boundary between animate and inanimate nature is more difficult to defend. >Knowledge, >Nature. I 249 Solving/Albert Schweitzer/Singer, P.: Life/Law/Consciousness/Schweitzer: the most immediate fact of consciousness is: I am life that wants to live and I want to exist in the midst of life that wants to live... and this extends to all life in my environment, even if it cannot express itself. (A. Schweitzer 1929(2)). I 250 P. SingerVsSchweitzer: his language is misleading when he speaks of all forms of life without exception and ascribes them longing, desire, enthusiasm, pleasure and terror. Plants cannot feel any of this. Holmes RolstonVsSinger, P.: If natural selection has given an organism the traits it needs to strive for its survival, then this organism is able to evaluate something on the basis of these traits. (H. Rolston 1999)(3) P. SingerVsRolston: he does not explain why natural selection makes it possible to evaluate organisms, but not human design and creation. Should we say that solar cells, which automatically adjust to the sun, add value to the sun? >Selection, >Evolution. Life without Consciousness/Singer, P.: there is no reason to pay more respect to the physical processes that dominate animated things than to the physical processes that dominate inanimate things. If that is the case, at least it is not obvious why we should have more respect for a tree than for a stalactite. >Laws of nature, >Nature, >Life. 1. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, 2011. 2. A. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics Part II, The Philosophy of Civilization, London, 1929, pp. 246-7. 3. H. Rolston, Respect for Life: Counting what Singer Finds of no Account“, in: Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and Critics, (Oxford, 1999) pp. 247-268. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
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