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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| System Theory | Weizenbaum | I 322 System theory/Forrester/Weizenbaum: J. W. Forrester from MIT, the spiritual father of "cybernetic system theory", noted in front of a US Congress Committee (J. W. Forrester(1)): Thesis: the human thinking is not suitable to explain the behavior of social systems. >Cybernetics, >Behavior, >Explanation. WeizenbaumVsForrester: he claims that the way Plato, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, Gandi and many others have thought about social systems is inferior to the system analysis method. According to Forrester, the problem is that human thinking is based on thought models. Forrester: a model of thought is unclear. It is incomplete. It is inaccurately worded. In addition, a thought model in an individual changes with time and even in the course of a talk ... The goals are different and remain unspoken. I 324 Forrester/Weizenbaum: claims that computer systems, in contrast to social systems, eliminate insecurity completely. But there are some behaviors that are "more desirable" than others. How are they made possible? Forrester: they are probably only possible if we have a proper understanding of the theory of dynamic systems and are prepared to submit to self-discipline and endure the constraints that must accompany the desired behaviour. WeizenbaumVsForrester/WeizenbaumVsSkinner/WeizenbaumVsSimon: in the context in which Forrester uses the expressions "system" and "dynamic", the only way to gain an understanding that alone leads to "desirable behaviours" is the method of a "scientific analysis" according to Forrester (or Skinner or the >General Problem Solver, >A. >Newell, >H. A. Simon, >Behaviorism. I 325 WeizenbaumVsForrester: For Forrester, the world literally consists of back coupling loops. I 327 Meaning/System Theory/WeizenbaumVsForrester: the systems we have investigated, have been clearly shown that meaning has been completely transformed into function. >Behavior, >Society, >Actions, cf. >Anomalous monism. 1. J. W. Forrester Testimony before the Subcommitee on Urban Growth oft he Committe on Banking and Currency oft he United states House of representatives, given in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1971, 91. Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, p 205-265. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Behaviorism | Dennett Vs Behaviorism | Münch III 370 Skinner: Vs "mentalism": DennettVsSkinner: he himself constantly used mentalist vocabulary, which he excused as "shortcuts" or that he wants to explain something to the layman. III 373: He never admits how much of expressibility he would lose. III 372 Skinner: mentalism distracts psychologists from having to search for evidence for amplication. "The world of the mind steals the show". Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Skinner, Qu. | Rorty Vs Skinner, Qu. | VI 361 Interpretation/Intention/Research/Rorty: it is a natural description, if one says, e.g., Columbus did not discover China, but America without knowing it. E.g. Aristotle did not describe a natural downward movement, but without knowing it, described the effects of gravity. E.g. Plato had, without knowing it, believed all words were names. (Or whatever premise of today's semantic interpretation seems useful to reconstruct Plato's arguments.) (>Semantic Change; >Change of Meaning). VI 362 Meaning/RortyVsSkinner, Quentin: it is quite clear that Plato meant nothing like that in the sense of Skinner. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Darwinism | Versus | Dennett I 543 ChomskyVsSkinner, ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence, ChomskyVsDarwin |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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