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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics | Aristotle | Gadamer I 317 Ethics/Aristotle/Gadamer: [Aristotle is concerned with] the correct measurement of the role that reason has to play in moral action. [This is the problem of the relationship between the general and the particular.] Gadamer: (...) what interests us here [is] that it is a matter of reason and of knowledge that are not detached from an existence that has become, but are determined by it and are decisive for it. AristotleVsSocrates/AristotleVsPlato: Through his restriction of the Socratic-Platonic "Intellectualism" in the question of the good, Aristotle, as is well known, becomes the founder of ethics as a discipline independent of metaphysics. By criticizing the Platonic idea of the good as an empty generality, he poses the question of the human good to it, the good for human action. In the direction of this criticism, the equation of virtue and knowledge, of "arete" and "logos" as it underlies the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of virtue proves to be an exaggeration. Aristotle brings them back to the right measure by showing the orexis as the supporting element of man's moral knowledge, the "striving" and its shaping into a fixed attitude (hexis). The concept of ethics already bears in its name the reference to this Aristotelian foundation of the "arete" in practice and "ethos". >Humans/Aristotle. Gadamer I 318 (...) Aristotle [confronts] "ethos" with "physis" as an area in which there is no irregularity, but which does not know the regularity of nature, but rather the changeability and limited regularity of human statutes and human behaviour. >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Humans/Aristotle. Gadamer I 319 Knowledge/Aristotle: remains Socratic in so far as he records knowledge as an essential moment of moral being (...). 1. Eth. Nic. A4. (But cf. my vol. 7 of Ges. Werke proposed academic paper: „Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles“). Adorno XIII 226 Mesotes/Ethics/Aristotle/Adorno: the ideal of the middle is an all-Greek ideal. One finds it formulated in Aristotle's theory of virtue, for example the bravery as the middle between cowardice and foolishness. Generally formulated this is in the category of mesotes, the middle measure. As an ethical ideal, it reappears in apathia, the state of apathy, in which one is independent of pain, and no longer knows any affects. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Euthyphro | Geach | I 36f Euthyphro: GeachVsSocrates: Questions of fact are not necessarily decidable. - Moral questions are not undecidable in principle. Eutyhphron: GeachVs Socrates: E.g. decisions are as important as definition. >Definition. I 38 Euthyphro/Geach: correct: (1) What is pious is loved by the gods, because it is pious. - ((s) a = b because a - (what is __ is --)). correct: (2) What is beloved by the Gods is loved by the God, because it is loved by the Gods. - ((s) b = b because b - (what is __is, __)). wrong: (3) What is beloved by the Gods is loved by the Gods because it is beloved of God. (circular). - ((s) b = b because b'(what is __, is__)). wrong: (4) What is pious is pious, because it is loved by the Gods. - (s) a = a because b (or because b'!) - (what is __ is __)). >Circular reasoning. I 39 Euthyphro/Geach: Identity/Leibniz Principle: the principle breaks in contexts which are not purely extensional. >Leibniz principle, >Extensionality. It provides opaque contexts: e.g. I beat him because he was my father (because he hit me). - The truth value can differ, although it is the same man. >Opacity, >Truth value, >Reference, >Identification. The falsity of the first sentence does not guarantee that another man is meant. False: that pious acts and humans are not the same classes as those who are loved by God. Wrong solution: John Stuart Mill: God-loved/religious: same denotation/different connotation: This distinction cannot be attributed to Plato. >Connotation, >Plato. Plato: pious: is a form - God-loved: is not a form. Wrong solution: use: explanation: active/passive: e.g. a thing is carried because someone carries it. This is wrong. Wrong: someone carries a thing because it is carried. Geach: this is true. But this cannot be attributed to Plato. I 41f Euthyphro/Geach: McTaggart: instead of "because" (causal but opaque) "in view of" (not causal). GeachVsMcTaggart: missing causality does not rule out error. I do not admire someone in terms of my own belief. - Not even gods. Geach: the attitude is already the reason, but it does not provide the property. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Good | Socrates | Gadamer I 317 Good/The Good/Socrates/Gadamer: AristotleVsSocrates: By his limitation of the Socratic-Platonic "intellectualism" in the question of the good, Aristotle, as is well known, becomes the founder of ethics as a discipline independent of metaphysics. By criticizing the Platonic idea of the good as an empty generality, he confronts it with the question of the human good, the good for human action. >Generality/Aristotle. In the direction of this critique, the equation of virtue and knowledge, of "arete" and "logos" as they underlie the Socratic-Platonic virtue doctrine, are an exaggeration. Aristotle brings them back to the right measure by showing the orexis as the supporting element of humans's moral knowledge, the "striving" and its shaping into a firm attitude (hexis). The concept of ethics carries already in its name the reference to this Aristotelian foundation of the "arete" in practice and "ethos". Gadamer I 318 Teaching of Ideas/AristotleVsSocrates: Aristotle emphasizes, in contrast to the doctrine of goodness determined by Platonic ideology, that "practical philosophy" cannot be about accuracy of the highest order, as the mathematician carries it out. >Ethics/Aristotle, >The Good/Aristotle. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Justice | Nietzsche | Höffe I 379 Justice/Nietzsche/Höffe: For a virtue as traditional as justice, one might expect from Nietzsche, the moral critic and enlightener, that he either directly rejects it or exposes it as an illusion, for example, as only apparent impartiality that in reality serves the interests of the rich or powerful. The opposite is the case. Justice/Dühring: Thesis: (...) the philosopher, natural scientist and economic theorist Karl Eugen Dühring, derives justice from an emotional prejudice, the resentment of the weak. NietzscheVsDühring: Nietzsche vehemently contradicts this. On the contrary, he says, it is the powerful who, by institutionalizing law and justice, put a stop to the "excesses of reactive pathos". Genalogy of morals (1): "If even under the onslaught of personal injury, mockery, and suspicion I do not cloud the high, clear, equally deep as mild-looking objectivity of the just, the judging eye, well, that is a piece of perfection and supreme mastery on earth". 1. F. Nietzsche, Genealogie der Moral, 2. Abhandlung, Nr. 1 Ries II 52 Justice/NietzscheVsSocrates/Socratic virtues/Nietzsche: Wisdom, temperance, justice, bravery: all of their origins are animalistic. The practices demanded of a refined society: avoiding the ridiculous, the conspicuous, the arrogant, the presumptuous, the assimilating, the reducing, finding everything down to the animal kingdom. >Socrates/Nietzsche. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Literature | Nietzsche | Danto III 74 Literature/Nietzsche/Danto: According to Nietzsche, Euripides killed the tragedy. NietzscheVsEuripides, NietzscheVsSocrates. >Socrates/Nietzsche. Euripides: Nietzsche characterizes him as an essentially rational person, who was plunged into deep confusion by what he saw as irrational accessories in the dramas of his predecessors.(1) Danto III 75 For Nietzsche, Euripides was nothing more than a mask from which a power spoke that had emerged for the first time: Socrates. Def Socratism/Aesthetics/Nietzsche: Nietzsche blames the triumph of Socratism almost exclusively for an artistic catastrophe of gigantic proportions: for the death of the tragedy by the spirit of reason. This means that an ideal of artistic naturalism had emerged, and Nietzsche called his guiding principle the "aesthetic Socratism": "Everything must be understood in order to be beautiful".(2) >Naturalism, >Beauty. Right/Correctness/Socrates: Socrates asks in the Politeia whether it can have any value if you do not know why you are right: he could be a blind man who found the right way purely by chance. Danto III 76 NietzscheVsEuripides: his tragedies would be equivalent to art that is only "imitated".(3) >Art/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III, p. 78f 2. Ibid. p. 81f 3. Ibid. p. 71f |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Adorno | XIII 160 Metaphysics/Adorno: while the conceptual pair rationalism/empiricism is epistemological, the conceptual pair of materialism/spiritualism is metaphysical in the sense that, according to fundamental determinations, primordial principles are sought before their epistemological reflection. >Epistemology/Adorno, >Rationalism, >Empiricism/Adorno. XIII 162 Metaphysics/Adorno: he is not content with what is given in experience, but places the emphasis on the difference between appearance and essence. >Essence, >Appearance. Appearance/Hegel/Adorno: For Hegel the essence must appear.(1) Metaphysics/Aristotle/Adorno: Aristotle, from whom the expression metaphysics also comes, addresses the question of how the essence appears. >Metaphysics/Aristotle, >Aristotle. Metaphysics/Adorno: he opposes the epitome of facts in principle with another, but without asserting that it is as the theologies are concerned with their deities. AristophanesVsSocrates: calls his philosophy a cloud-cuckoo-land as a realm of utopia, or even clouds, as the concept of a being and a non-being at the same time. >Socrates. XIII 165 Metaphysics/Adorno: the epistemological concepts to which our thinking sees itself constrained to, make up, at the moment when they become independent, since they cease to be mere reflections of our thought, and are posited as if they were principles in themselves, the subject of metaphysics. >Epistemology/Adorno. >God, >Existence, >Being. XIII 166 Metaphysical Questions: For example, the questions about God, about freedom, the immortality of the soul, the true being, the nature of the reason, and the question of why something is at all, and not rather nothing. Metaphysics/Adorno: it cannot be a positive doctrine of any of its being-contents. If it refers to the question of principles or essences, then one should not assume them onself in advance. >Essence, >Content, >Essentialism, >Circularity. 1. G. W. F. Hegel. Philosophie der Logik, Bd. II |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Socrates | Nietzsche | Danto III 77 Socrates/NietzscheVsSocrates/Nietzsche/Danto: Not only has Socrates caused the decline of the Greek tragedy for Nietzsche, it also marks a turning point in the history of humanity. Both are inseparable. The tragic art of Attica was a reaction to the pessimistic conception of nature, which the Greeks originally represented and by means of which they were able to transform their fears, ie. could live at all. Curiously enough, Socrates pursued the same goal or at least contributed to its achievement. The view goes back to him that the universe is completely understandable.(1) >Tragedy/Ancient Philosophy. Rationality/Nietzsche: Nietzsche does not speak out against rationality at any point. Danto III 78 It is only directed against Socrates' limited understanding of reason (or science and logic): against the view it would show the only way to achieve human performance. Danto III 85 Art/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche later, however, represents the mistrust towards the artist, which Nietzsche had criticized in Socrates, himself.(2) >Art/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III, S. 95. 2. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KGW IV, 2 S. 144. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
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| Spinoza, B. | Rorty Vs Spinoza, B. | II (e) 104 World/Mind/Matter/Spinoza/Rorty: two equally valid ways of describing the world: one in terms of matter, then in terms of the mind. The order based on the connection of the corpuscles is the same as the order and connection of our ideas. The mind only knows as long as the body is well and vice versa. "We know God all the more, the more we understand individual things." SpinozaVsSocrates: we should not, like Socrates, be discouraged by the fact that there are no teleological explanations for natural events. II (e) 105 The Spirit of God is no more and no less than the comprehension of all relations between individual things. RortyVsSpinoza: as soon as the ways of description are recognized as equivalent, the idea of the natural order is in danger. Also both ways of description can be illusory. >Description Levels. Thus entering the slippery slope down to Kant's unrecognizable thing in itself. Ultimately, the relativism of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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