Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dialectic | Plato | Bubner I 34 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Def "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial. >Dialectics/Aristotle. Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary. I 39 Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. >Kant, >Dialectic/Hegel. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language. I 111 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference. C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic. >Knowledge/Plato, cf. >Propositional logic. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sophism | Plato | Bubner I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: uses the same reasons to plead the incompleteness of dialectic, precisely because it has to do with the intersubjective speech practise. I 42 PlatoVsSophists: unmethodic. Bubner I 98 Sophism/Plato/Bubner: also the sophist cannot easily be disproved by empirical comparison. Its speeches must be examined to see if its terms match. ((s)> Coherence theory/Plato). |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sophists | Plato | Gadamer I 351 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists/Plato/Gadamer: The archetype of all empty argumentation is the sophistic question of how one can ask for something that one does not know. This sophistic objection, which Plato formulates in "Menon"(1), is significantly not overcome there by a superior argumentative resolution, but by invoking the myth of the pre-existence of the soul. Admittedly, this is a very ironic vocation, provided that the myth of pre-existence and recollection, which is supposed to solve the riddle of questioning and searching, in reality does not play out a religious certainty, but is based on the certainty of the soul seeking knowledge, which asserts itself against the emptiness of formal argumentation. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the weakness that Plato recognizes in the Logos that he does not base his criticism of the sophistic argumentation logically, but mythically. Just as true opinion is a divine favour and gift, so the search for and knowledge of the true logos is not a free self-ownership of the spirit. Justification by the myth: (...) the mythical legitimation that Plato gives to the Socratic dialectic here [is] of fundamental importance (...). If the sophism remained unrefuted - and it cannot be refuted by argument - this argument would lead to resignation. It is the argument of "lazy reason" and possesses truly symbolic significance insofar as all empty reflection leads to the discrediting of reflection in general, despite its victorious appearance. Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer; HegelVsPlato see >Reflection/Hegel. Gadamer I 415 Sophists/Language/Correctness/Truth/Plato/Gadamer: Cratylos: As always with Plato, there is (...) a factual reason why Socrates is so blind to what he refutes. >Word/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. Cratylos is not clear to himself that the meaning of words is not simply identical with the things mentioned, and he is even less clear about that this justifies the superiority concealed from the Platonic Socrates that the logos, the talking and speaking and the revelation of things carried out in it, is something different from the meaning of the meanings lying in the words - and that only here the actual possibility of language to communicate what is right, true, has its place. PlatoVsSophists: In the misunderstanding of this actual truth possibility of speech (to which by its nature falsehood, pseudo, belongs as a counter-possibility) its sophistic abuse arises. If the logos is understood as the representation of a thing (deloma), as its disclosure, without fundamentally distinguishing this truth function of speech from the meaningful character of the words, a possibility of confusion inherent in language is opened up. One can then think to have the thing in the word. >Truth/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth | Plato | Gadamer I 415 Truth/Language/Word/Correctness/Plato/Gadamer: Problem: PlatoVsSophists: In misjudging [the] actual truth possibility of speech (which belongs to the essence of falsehood, pseudo, as a counter-possibility) its sophistic abuse arises (...). If the logos is understood as the representation of a thing (deloma), as its disclosure, without fundamentally distinguishing this truth function of speech from the meaningful character of the words, a possibility of confusion inherent to language is opened up. One can then think to have the thing in the word. Gadamer I 416 Solution/Plato: (...) the truth of things [lies] in speech, i.e., however, lastly, in the meaning of a uniform opinion about things and not in the individual words - not even in the whole inventory of words of a language (...). >Word/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. It is this misjudgment that enables Socrates to refute the objections of Cratylus, which are so pertinent to the truth of the word, i.e. its meaningfulness. He plays off the use of words against him, i.e. the speech, the logos with his ability to be true and false. The name, the word, seems to be true or false inasmuch as it is used true or false, i.e. it is assigned to the being right or wrong. Such attribution, however, is no longer that of the word, but is already a logos and can find its appropriate expression in such a logos. For example, to call someone "Socrates" assumes that this person is called Socrates. >Logos/Plato. Bubner I 28 Truth/Plato: Reflections on the relationship between speaking and writing: Mediation: Truth can never coincide with the means of its representation. Truth's constant task of seeking never assured possession (VsSophists). Bubner: the dialogues are then to read what remains unspoken and hides behind irony, myth, dream, parable. >Writing/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plato | Hegel Vs Plato | Bubner I 42 PlatoVsSophists: unmethodical. HegelVsPlato: directed the same accusation against him. Do not come beyond the sophistic reasoning. "The dialectic to dissolve the particular and to produce the General is not the true dialectic. (s) stands with the only negatives). The "external reflection" had to yield to the "thing itself".But this makes the voluntary self-task of the reflection necessary! The total mediation must also include mediating itself. (Hegel. logic) --- I 77 HegelVsPlato: stopped halfway. He was moving undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectic, that means the smooth reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability stating a relationship of incompatibility. This is a translation task (of the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be done through the Socratic irony. "General irony of the world". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sophists | Plato Vs Sophists | Gadamer I 351 Sophisten/PlatonVsSophisten/Platon/Gadamer: Das Urbild aller leeren Argumentation ist die sophistische Frage, wie man überhaupt nach etwas fragen könne, was man nicht wisse. Dieser sophistische Einwand, den Plato im „Menon“(1) formuliert, wird dort bezeichnenderweise nicht durch eine überlegene argumentative Auflösung überwunden, sondern durch die Berufung auf den Mythos der Präexistenz der Seele. Das ist freilich eine sehr ironische Berufung, sofern der Mythos der Präexistenz und der Wiedererinnerung, der das Rätsel des Fragens und Suchens auflösen soll, in Wahrheit nicht eine religiöse Gewissheit ausspielt, sondern auf der Gewissheit der Erkenntnis suchenden Seele beruht, die sich gegen die Leerheit formaler Argumentationen durchsetzt. Gleichwohl ist es kennzeichnend für die Schwäche, die Plato im Logos erkennt, dass er die Kritik an der sophistischen Argumentation nicht logisch, sondern mythisch begründet. Wie die wahre Meinung eine göttliche Gunst und Gabe ist, so ist auch das Suchen und die Erkenntnis des wahren Logos kein freier Selbstbesitz des Geistes. Rechtfertigung durch den Mythos: (...) die mythische Legitimierung, die Plato der sokratischen Dialektik hier gibt, [ist] von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung(...). Bliebe das Sophisma unwiderlegt - und argumentativ lässt es sich nicht widerlegen -, würde dieses Argument zur Resignation führen. Es ist das Argument der „faulen Vernunft“ und besitzt insofern wahrhaft symbolische Tragweite, als alle leere Reflexion ihrem siegreichen Scheine zum Trotz zur Diskreditierung der Reflexion überhaupt führt. Vgl. >Reflexion/Gadamer; HegelVsPlaton: >Reflexion/Hegel. 1. Menon 80 d ff. Bubner I 37 DialekticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the effect-oriented speaker is mired in the illusion of words. (VsSophists). Bubner I 50 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists: the sophist oscillates intangibly between different beings. The diaireses (distinctions), however, do not function by themselves, but only with the use of prior knowledge. Since the diaireses (distinction of genus and species) fail with the sophists, the insight into the inappropriateness of the method grows after a number of runs. The specifying of general terms cannot handle the sophists. This leads to a reflection on the appearance which always appears different from what it is, and thus remains elusive. I 51 Logic/PlatoVsSophists: now, formal logic does not preclude pointless links. This results in the abandonment of the distinction between the philosopher and the mere sophist. I 52 PlatoVsSophists: the ratio of the linked concepts to each other possibly obscures the relation between speech and thing. Closely related to the problem of otherness. The complex relation of otherness is no longer determinable with the sophists. Thanks to his dialectical ability, the philosopher keeps track. Thus, dialectic is not a neutral method, either. I 98 PlatoVsSophists: coherence theory instead of correspondence theory: not empiricism, but incompatible concepts criticize judgment |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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