Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communication | Luhmann | Baraldi I 89 Communication/Luhmann/GLU: specific operation of social systems: 1) Communication 2) Information 3) Understanding the difference between communication and information. Communication is not the same as information, it only happens when information is understood - information is a selection between what is said and unsaid. Understanding is selection between communication and information. >Understanding/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. Reese-Schäfer II 47 Society/Communication/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Special case: only society operates with communication. - There is no communication outside of society. - Therefore, it is necessary closed. - This is the only system for which this is true. - Then no observer can take an outside standpoint. >Society/Luhmann, >Observation/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/Language/Karl Bühler/Luhmann: instead of "transmission model": - unity of three components 1) Information, what it is about 2) Communication 3) Understanding Communication already existed in antiquity. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: is the idea that this triad could be dismantled into acts. - Karl Bühler: all of them are only functions. ((s) Function/(s): Is not an act.) >Speech act theory/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/LuhmannVsHabermas: communication does not serve the creation of consensus. - If that does not work, it is simply declared the norm and claimed "it was supposed to be like that." But we should not turn an impossibility into a standard. >Communication/Habermas. SchelskyVsHabermas: Does communication stop when this goal is reached? Solution/Luhmann: communication is not an act which would have to be brought under a standard - only communicating is action. Communication is open when viewed without additions like truth. - We can also say "no". - On the other hand, we do not have the opportunity to start all over again. Without any authority it is impossible.. - "No" does not terminate communication. Communication could only be terminated by misunderstanding. Communication ensues when"yes" and "no" are not yet decided. AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Competence | Chomsky | I 307 Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowledge, >Knowing how, >Capabilities. Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge). - Less than the ability to speak a language. >Speaking. --- Searle VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. >Performance. Searle VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. Searle VIII 409 Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills. old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. >Theories, >Explanation. Searle VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Competence | Searle | VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: thesis: performance is just the tip of the iceberg of competence. VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is misled: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be rather a theory of performance than one of competence - r does not see that competence is ultimately performance competence. ChomskyVsSpeech Act Theory: Chomsky suspects behaviorism behind it. >Behaviorism. SearleVs: this is not true, because Speech Act Theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. VIII 409/10 Chomsky: new: the object of study is language skills - old: we have indiscriminate sets of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Transformational grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Facts | Strawson | Horwich I 189 Facts/StrawsonVsAustin: Incorrect alignment of facts and things. Horwich I 190 Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: should go beyond the "beyond" of the statement. - But there is nothing. - This comes from Austin's need for a "truth maker". >Truthmakers. Horwich I 191 The fact that the cat is sick, is not made true by the cat, but at most by the fact that is expressed by the sentence. - Reference/Strawson: a statement: is the material corollary, not its fact. - I can possibly measure the corollary with the clock, issue etc. - Fact: pseudo-material correlate of the entire statement. Fact/Strawson: not a thing, not even a composite object. cf. >Situation. Horwich I 192 It is what the statement notes, not what it is. - Facts are not "about". >"About", >Intentionality. Horwich I 193 Facts and statements are in accordance with each other, they are made for each other, if one eliminates one, then also the other. But the world will not be poorer through that.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Seel III 104f Fact/Strawson/Seel: if we call something a fact, we think it is real like the sentence says it. - A fact is nothing more than the contents of a true belief - the alleged facts are not even from this the world. III 104/105 In contrast to actual processes facts are abstract objects - they relate to a real state, without being themselves an occurrence in the world. - E.g. the fact that Napoleon won the battle, is not the same as the battle - the images do not correspond with beings in the world. --- Strawson II 20 Facts cannot burn, they do not wither - (timeless). II 250 Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: equating fact and thing leads to equating of saying-something and relate-to-something. - Statement and sentence must not be equated. >Reference/Strawson, >Statement/Strawson, >Sentence/Strawson. II 253 Fact/thing/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: completely different types. - Fact: what is said. Thing: about what something is said. VsAustin: believes, a statement would be something in the world. - This is a confusion with the event of utterance (speech act). >Speech act. II 254 Of course facts and statements correspond, they are made for each other - Facts, fact and situations are not seen but rather recorded or summarized. >State of affairs, >Knowledge, >Recognition. II 255 E.g. being worried by facts, is not the same as being worried by a shadow. - He is worried because... II 259 Fact: already implies a discourse context - but we do not talk about this framework, also not with terms such as statement and true. >Reference system, >Discourse. --- IV 150/51 Fact/Strawson: something to determine, nothing to be described. - There are always different descriptions possible. >Descriptions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Social Theory | Habermas | III 460 Social Theory/Habermas: their main problems are: 1. the extension of the teleological concept of action, 2. the relativization of the purpose activity to a model of understanding that not only presupposes the transition from consciousness to the philosophy of language, but the communication-theoretical development and radicalization of language analysis itself. >Speech Act Theory, >HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory, HabermasVsGrice, HabermasVsBennett, HabermasVsAustin, HabermasVsLewis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cresswell | I 12 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: Speech Act Theory is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Speech Act Theory | Dummett | III (e) 204 Speech act/Dummett: Problem: you can not divide all the words into categories according to question, command, contention. Solution: not all words in a sentence are bearers of the force. >Force/Dummett, >Sense/Dummett. III (e) 207 WittgensteinVsSpeech Act Theory: No list of uniform categories such as question, command. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Habermas | III 374 Speech Act Theory/Habermas: means the first step towards formal pragmatics that extends to non-cognitive uses of linguistic expressions. >Pragmatics, >Language use, >Language behavior. III 375 HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory: however, it remains bound to the narrow ontological prerequisites of truth semantics. >Truth, >Truth Theory, >Semantics. Solution/Habermas: the inclusion of Karl Bühler's language model together with appeal and expression functions (possibly also Roman Jakobson's emphasis on the "poetic" function related to the means of representation themselves) of language.(1) III 395 Speech Acts/HabermasVsAustin/Habermas: Austin's merit is to have worked out the interaction context of institutionally bound speech acts such as betting, baptism, appointment etc.. But he confuses the picture, III 396 that he does not characterize such acts of speech as of any type other than perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts themselves are not communicative. >Language/Bühler. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. 1.J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann | AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Communication/Luhmann, >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Speech Act Theory | Tugendhat | ~ passim TugendhatVsSpeech Act Theory. I 137 TugendhatVsSpeech Acts: unsatisfactory, assumed modes, because they are just like propositional content abstract moments of sentences that we can hardly believe. - Because they are moments and not components, they are also not independent. I 239 Speech Act/Austin/Tugendhat: his merit is to have lifted the illocutionary act (meaning, claiming) as an independent, semantically relevant way. >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act, >Meaning (Intending), >Assertions, >J.L. Austin. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Statements | Strawson | Meggle I 300 According to Hungerland Presupposition/Strawson: Definition "S requires S": The truth of S is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the claim that S. E.g. "All my children are fast asleep" presupposes "I have children." David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation follows, paradoxically, that all prerequisite statements were true: it should be: S>S" and ~ S>S"; but it is also true that Sv~S. It follows: S". In other words: (~ S"> ~ (Sv ~ S))> S is analytically true in a system of divalent propositional logic. --- Horwich I 186 Statement/Strawson: ambiguous: a) Saying, speech act b) the said, the content what is true or false - the plot is not true or false. AustinVsStrawson: s are the speech acts themselves which are w/f - or truth is attributed to speech acts.(1) >Speech acts. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson I 193 Statement/Strawson: more comprehensive than assertion. I 205 Statement/Strawson: the binding part of the sentence is the sign of saying "Socrates is ..." If this "is" is seen as autonomous, then no difference between A and B anymore. >"Is", >Copula, >Identity. II 246/47 Statement/Strawson: double meaning: a) what I say, b) my saying. It is about truth, regardless of whether the utterance was made. >Utterance/Strawson. StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: truth is not to be attributed to the event. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Understanding | Luhmann | AU Cass 12 Understanding/LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already included in the communication. Otherwise, you would need the recipient as a disciplinary authority. >Understanding/Habermas, >Agreement/Habermas, >Communication/Luhmann, >Communication/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of the communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.). >Speech act theory/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 13 Understanding/action/Communication/Luhmann: LuhmannVsAction Theory: we must always begin with understanding. The communication generates in the first place in its component "understanding" the division of information and communication that makes it understanding. Without understanding we only have behavior. Understanding includes itself. - It understands that it will be understood - it understands that it is about the condition of participation in the communication, not just about a piece of world. That sounds psychologically, but it is about the communication itself. >Communication/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann, >Language/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hare, R.M. | Searle Vs Hare, R.M. | V 207 SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis: (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good" and "true" means the same in different acts. This was ignored by the traditional speech act theory). good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Cf. >statements/Hare. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Cf. >speech ac theory/Strawson. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVsSpeech act theory). |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Materialism | Verschiedene Vs Materialism | Lanz I 285 VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory: three objections: 1. In contrast to the usual theoretical entities (genes, electrons), we have direct, introspective access to our own mental states. The assumption of their existence does not seem to depend on their explanatory role. Lanz I 283 2. Sensations have qualitative characteristics that cannot be captured by causal analysis. For example, sweet/sour taste: clear qualitative difference, regardless of what their causal roles may be. (> Qualia problem). 3. (VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory): a purely causal analysis cannot explain the characteristic of intentionality. (Propositional Attitutede). Materialism uses representation theory (VsSpeech Act Theory). Stalnaker I 19 Zombie/Awareness/Stalnaker: one cannot say that there are possible worlds (poss.w.) with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. Problem: all materialists agree that there are possible worlds that the dualist calls "zombie worlds", they are even metaphysically possible! Stalnaker: but the conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility only works if one assumes that materialism is wrong. And therefore the thinkability of zombies does not provide an argument VsMaterialism. The general picture goes like this: "Consciousness": refers to a quality that we find within ourselves and that we may know because we have it. But the fact that we are conscious does not provide any particular access to the nature of that property. Stalnaker I 239 VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: simple argument against him: that it is imaginable or conceptually possible that zombies exist. Some conclude that zombies are metaphysically possible. Problem: if there are possible worlds that are physically exactly like the actual world, I 240 only that there is no consciousness, then it follows that consciousness does not supervene on the physical! VsMaterialism: if consciousness does not supervene on the physical world, materialism is wrong. I 242 Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: any materialist who believes that we are conscious beings must believe that the real world is the z-world, but deny that the z-world is a zombie world. This is the reason for A and B materialists to claim that the zombie world is metaphysically impossible: that some of the possible worlds that come into consideration as a candidate for a zombie world (the z-world) are not a zombie world. Metaphysics/Imaginability/Lücke/VsMaterialism: if this is correct, materialism can no longer defend itself against the zombie argument that tries to drive a gap between imaginability and possibility. Namely that there are possible worlds that are imaginable, but not metaphysically possible. I 243 MaterialismVsVs: each materialist will agree with all three philosophers that the z-world is not only imaginable, but also metaphysically possible. Metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: the question is not whether a situation is metaphysically possible, but whether, if it is, it is correctly described. VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: the argument against it depends decisively on whether the z-world is a zombie-world. This cannot depend on innocent talk (semantics). It is about what world we live in. Solution: we need more details about the z-world. z-World/Stalnaker: we have defined it in terms of the actual world. And since we are not omniscient, we may argue about how the actual world should exactly and physically be (and so is the z-world). But these remain empirical questions. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Searle, J.R. | Luhmann Vs Searle, J.R. | AU Cass. 12 Language/Luhmann: language is not eo ipso communication. This has to do with the fact that it takes two parties and understanding. The concept of communication just tries to bring together the parts. LuhmannVsSearle: parlance is no action, no plot! Because it always requires indeed an understanding, so that it can go on! (See also VsSpeech act theory). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Speech Act Theory | Danto Vs Speech Act Theory | I 69 DantoVsspeech act theory: sp. a. th. has failed. Danto is representationist. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Speech Act Theory | Davidson Vs Speech Act Theory | Dummett I 25 DavidsonVsSpeech Act Theory: we can do without a theory of the power of utterances. For him, it is unnecessary to describe the speech acts of asserting, asking, begging, etc. or even mention them. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann Vs Speech Act Theory | AU Kass 12 LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory, LuhmannVsSearle, LuhmannVsHabermas: Vs Theory of Communicative Action: Question: whether one shoots understanding into the unity of communication or not. If you have a concept of communication, i.e. only the communication, i.e. only what I am doing here now, then you leave understanding out of it. Then one must take corrective measures in theory: the actor, if he/she acts reasonably, is guided by the conditions of understanding. The actor does not say something that he/she knows cannot be understood. That would mean, however, that the recipient is initially excluded from the speech act (Luhmann: speech act) or the communication. And it is only as a disciplining moment that it is returned to theory. And as a subject! LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.) |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Speech Act Theory | Hintikka Vs Speech Act Theory | II 281 HintikkaVsSpeech Act Theory: this view is misguided, because there is only hope maintaining the notion of language games if you make a basic distinction between the different games that are played by the utterance of a given word in a variety of situations, on the one hand, and the games that give the word this meaning, on the other hand. II 282 However, in interesting exceptional cases they may coincide, Austin calls them the performative uses of language. (but for Wittgenstein they are exceptions). E.g. "If I say Hans has promised to marry Gretel, I’m not involved in the language game of the promise, although it is true that this "game" gives the verb "promise" its meaning. E.g. Hintikka: if I say: "for every blooming plant there is an insect that pollinates it" I’m not playing a game of flower picking and insect catching, although I have to be familiar with such games in principle in order to be able to understand this sentence. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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