Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Jansenism | Gadamer | I 24 Jansenism/Truth/GadamerVsJansenism/Gadamer: It is (...) a triviality that comes out of it when it is said, for example, that you have to judge an event in its truth, take into account the circumstances (circonstances)(1) that accompany it - The Jansenists wanted to give methodical guidance with this argumentation as to the extent to which miracles have credibility. They sought to summon up the spirit of the new method in the face of an uncontrolled belief in miracles and believed that in this way they could legitimize the true miracles of biblical tradition and church tradition. >Circularity, >Evidence, >Provability, >Truth. The new science in the service of the old church - that this relationship did not promise to last is only too clear, and one can imagine what had to happen when the Christian preconditions themselves were questioned. The methodological ideal of natural science, when applied to the credibility of the historical testimonies of the biblical tradition, had to lead to quite different results, which were catastrophic for Christianity. Spinoza/Gadamer: The path from the miracle criticism in the style of the Jansenists to the historical Bible criticism is not too far. Spinoza is a good example of this. >B. Spinoza. GadamerVsSpinoza: We will show later on that a consistent application of this methodology as the only norm of spiritual-scientific truth would be tantamount to its self-absorption. >VicoVsJansenism. 1. Vgl. Logique de Port-Royal, 4e partie, chap. 13ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Miracles | Jansenism | Gadamer I 24 Miracles/Jansenism/Truth/GadamerVsJansenism/Gadamer: It is (...) a triviality that comes out of it when it is said, for example, that you have to judge an event in its truth, take into account the circumstances (circonstances)(1) that accompany it - The Jansenists wanted to give methodical guidance with this argumentation as to the extent to which miracles have credibility. They sought to summon up the spirit of the new method in the face of an uncontrolled belief in miracles and believed that in this way they could legitimize the true miracles of biblical tradition and church tradition. >Proof, >Provability, >Method. The new science in the service of the old church - that this relationship did not promise to last is only too clear, and one can imagine what had to happen when the Christian preconditions themselves were questioned. The methodological ideal of natural science, when applied to the credibility of the historical testimonies of the biblical tradition, had to lead to quite different results, which were catastrophic for Christianity. >Christianity, >Theology, >Religion, >Religious Faith. Spinoza/Gadamer: The path from the miracle criticism in the style of the Jansenists to the historical Bible criticism is not too far. Spinoza is a good example of this. >B. Spinoza, >Bible/Spinoza, >Bible Criticism/Spinoza. GadamerVsSpinoza: We will show later on that a consistent application of this methodology as the only norm of spiritual-scientific truth would be tantamount to its self-absorption. >VicoVsJansenism, >G. Vico. 1. Cf. Logique de Port-Royal, 4e partie, chap. 13ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Natural State | Rousseau | Höffe I 271 Natural State/State of Nature/Rousseau/Höffe: For Hobbes, the founder, the state of nature is a thought experiment that sketches a coexistence of already reasonable people who, however, lack law and state. RousseauVsHobbes: In Rousseau's view of the history of development(1) it becomes a primordial, "animal state". Human/Speech/Rousseau: Humans who live in this state, the animal humans, have neither language nor reason or a consciousness of death. They know neither ambition nor contempt or a need for revenge; moreover, they live without any lasting relationship. In this "true state of nature", a primordial state which, historically, is even further back than Locke's state of nature, humans have two things in common with the other living beings. Self-love: It is determined by a thoroughly positive self-love (amour de soi), which, in contrast to the antisocial self-love (amour-propre) of the civilized human being, amounts to an emotional self-sufficiency. Moreover, the human possesses a sense of existence Höffe I 272 (sentiment de l'existence). Freedom: Above all, the human is characterized by a natural freedom, an independence from his fellow men, which also includes an indifference towards them. The natural state qua primordial state does not recognise privileges that some people enjoy to the detriment of others; there are neither privileges nor discrimination. The two basic evils that destroy this ideal state are private property and the state (which protects it), "civil society". In French it says "société civile", not "société bourgoise". Rousseau's bourgeois society here, as with other authors of modern times, is not an economic bourgeois society in contrast to a civic society, but the community with the power of coercion, the state, itself. >Social Contract/Rousseau. Höffe I 274 RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: Unlike Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >Natural state/Hobbes, >Natural State/Locke, >Constitution/Spinoza, >Contract theory/Spinoza, >Democracy/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza, >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >Politics/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Religion | Rousseau | Höffe I 378 Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: {Rousseau represented a] functional state religion, called "religion civile". As with Spinoza, it focuses on the moral core of natural religion, but unlike Spinoza, it does not recognize revelation as an also-legitimate approach. RousseauVsSpinoza, RousseauVsBelief in Revelation. Belief: The core of the civil religion is a (civic) creed with which Rousseau rejects the two extremes: atheism and Christian-ecclesiastical dogmatism. State Religion/Rousseau pro Hobbes: As with Hobbes, whom Rousseau praises for combining secular and spiritual power, the confession is determined by the sovereign and consists of a "spirit of togetherness, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen and a Höffe I 279 faithful subject"(1). Admittedly, the sovereign cannot commit anyone to this faith. Banishment: But anyone who rejects it may be banished, for in accordance with his understanding of the common will, Rousseau declares that whoever inhabits the territory of the state submits to the sovereignty that reigns there. One is banished not because one is godless, but because one "resists to be with one another"(2). >Death Penalty/Rousseau. Dogmas: For the dogmas of bourgeois or civil religion, Rousseau demands simplicity, small numbers and clear formulations. HöffeVsRousseau: Although he undoubtedly fulfills these conditions, his creed is very demanding and difficult for purely secular citizens to accept. Belief/Community/Dogmas/Rousseau: It is necessary to acknowledge the existence of a deity, and to attribute omnipotence, omniscience and charity to it. One must believe in the future life, in which the righteous are happy while the wicked are punished. The social contract and the laws flowing from it must be considered sacred. Negative dogma: prohibition of intolerance. HöffevsRousseau: But because the positive dogmas may be excluded from this, tolerance is kept within limits. Civil Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: [it should] a) (...) exclude any theological claim to sole representation, since this holds too high a potential for conflict. Now the claim to exclusivity results from an - allegedly - divine revelation and its authoritative interpretation on the part of a religious community. Consequently, the civil religion must do without any revelation. (RousseauVsRevelation Religion). b) Its positive task is the foundation of political unity. The civil religion is supposed to create the inner coherence of a community, at least strengthen it and thus preserve it. VsRousseau: The criticism associated with the civil religion Höffe I 280 of the Christian Church has led to condemnations of Rousseau and his expulsion. HöffeVsRousseau: Concerns also arise systematically. For the civil religion tolerates neither atheists, whom Locke already denied the ability to be good citizens, nor the deism spread in the Age of Enlightenment, for example by Voltaire, according to which there is a deity, but he is not a person and does not intervene in the course of nature. Neutrality/RousseauVsSpinoza: Spinoza's position of a religiously neutral state is perhaps not considered by Rousseau because he doubts its ability to achieve stable internal unity. >Religion/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Constitution/Spinoza. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762, IV, 8 2. Ibid. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Simplicity | Spinoza | Holz I 38 Simplicity/Spinoza: the simple exists in the world only once, as the substance. Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the world is the infinite manifoldness of simple substances, about which there can be an infinite set of statements. >Substance, >Substance/Spinoza, >G.W. Leibniz, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking, >Reality, cf. >Complexity. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Social Contract | Hegel | Höffe I 333 Social Contract/Hegel/Höffe: Within the considerations of the contract, Hegel rejects the modern patterns of state legitimation, such as the theory of the social contract advocated by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, and also by Kant. >Social contract/Hobbes, >Social contract/Locke, >Social contract/Rousseau. HegelVsSpinoza/HegelVsHobbes/HegelVsLocke/HegelVsRousseau/HegelVsKant: For whether one accepts a contract of all with all or a contract "of all with the prince or the government" - the state is subjected to the arbitrariness of the individual(1). In truth, everyone has always lived in a state that has the rank of an end in Höfe I 334 itself. >State/Hegel, >Society/Hegel. VsHegel/Höffe: Contract theorists such as Kant would not contradict the character of an end in itself, but would probably emphasize the legitimizing and critical task of the social contract. Social Contract/Kant: As an "original contract" and as a "mere idea of reason" he submits the "touchstone of legality of every public law": The legislator may (...) give his laws only in such a way "as they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people."(2) 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820, § 75 2. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. 1793, II. Folgerung |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Contract | Rousseau | Höffe I 273 Social Contract/Rousseau/Höffe: In contrast to his contract-theoretical predecessors Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, references to the Old and New Testament no longer play a role. The confessional wars are long over, but censorship still prevails. State: The counter-model that [Rousseau] has devised for the alienated societies is the bourgeois Höffe I 274 order in the sense of a state, for which he does not develop a natural history, but only examines its justification(1). Individualism: In doing so, he follows the legitimatory individualism of his predecessors in contract theory. The final basis for the justification of a community that is nevertheless entitled to coercive powers lies with the individual concerned: Each individual must freely consent. Natural state: RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: In contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >State/Rousseau, >Human/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Because [the] basic treaty is concluded unanimously, Rousseau can, despite his first state theory thesis that every human being is born free and as master of him- or herself (>Freedom/Rousseau), put forward the fourth thesis of the legitimacy (>Justification/Rousseau) of a community with the power of coercion. Because of the unanimity, the social contract may even be considered "the freest act in the world"(2). >Freedom/Rousseau. Höffe I 277 Justification: Under Rousseau's own principle of self-preservation, the social contract is only worthy of approval if it guarantees (not only physically understood) self-preservation, at least not endangers it. >Justification/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 Wilson I 24 Social Contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity" in his social contract. E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of "collective will" in order to achieve these goals. This collective will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all of his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this collective will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. >General Will. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Spinoza | Höffe | Höffe I 238 Spinoza/Höffe: If one pays attention to the first reactions, one must consider Spinoza's advocacy for freedom a failure. Höffe I 239 The author is even accused of the greatest spiritual crime of the time: atheism. "Consequently", its dissemination is (...) prohibited. LeibnizVsSpinoza: Even the "prince of the Enlightenment", Leibniz, in a letter to the law teacher and philosopher Christian Thomasius, considers the book to be "unbearably free-thinking", but before he knows who the author is. After-effect/History of Effects: Beginning with Lessing, then Herder, Goethe and Mendelssohn, German authors appreciate Spinoza, but will base their work primarily, often even exclusively, on ethics. Both Kant and German idealism deal intensively with Spinoza. The high esteem with which the post-idealists Schopenhauer and Nietzsche regarded Spinoza continues among the great German sociologists at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), as well as Werner Sombart (1863-1941). Cf. entries for >Spinoza. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Substance | Kant | Strawson V 187 Substance/StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then it is circlular. >Circular reasoning. --- Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is according to him unique in its very nature, infinite, and indivisible. >Substance/Spinoza. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thinking conditions of the substantial unity of the world and the experience conditions of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance in which "all that one had thought to be true, has perished". This, however, reveals the actual thinking condition, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. Kant draws from this the consequence of establishing the unity of the world in the priority of thinking. The unity is then only transcendental or subjectively idealistic justified. HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to establish the unity of existence in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history. >Thinking/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Substance | Leibniz | Holz I 90 Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary being seems merely to correspond to the substance of Spinoza. In reality, it is only the concept of the totality of the inner-world facts. The notion of the being experienced includes the concept of a true totality. >Substance/Spinoza, >Totality/Leibniz. I 91 If, therefore, something is, then also is the one being of all beings and not nothing. I 112 Substance/Causality/Leibniz: Substance does not require causal action because its state is "by itself" (according to its own nature) in correspondence with the states of other substances. I 113 Their autonomy is based on the fact that, in absolute world immobility, they represent nothing more than the particular perspectively realized isomorphism of the individual and the whole. The individual is what it is only by the fact that the whole of the world is the necessary and sufficient condition of its individual being. That's why there is no need for windows. >World/Leibniz. It is not initiated from the outside, because that would be something outside the world then. The individual is always a manifestation of the whole (>Mach's principle). |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Substance | Spinoza | Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished." >Unity/Spinoza, >Appearance, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking. This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. Holz I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". >Unity and multiplicity. If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. >Reduction, >Reductionism. Holz I 62 Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). >Identity, >Self-identity, >Whole, >Totality. Adequacy does not matter here. >Adequacy. "Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori. Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza. Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite." However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals. Holz I 63 VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God. With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God. Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism. Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Realism. Höffe I 232 Substance/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendent concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts from a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). >Pantheism, >God. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Unity | Leibniz | Holz I 25 Unity/Leibniz: Leibniz emphasizes unity by saying that "something is not truly a being, which is not truly a being." I 26 Holz: The plural presupposes the singular. Unity/Monadology/Leibniz: there must be simple substances, because there are composite ones. Problem: the simple, the unified, and the individual is not to be thought of in itself, for thinking it means determining, that is, delimitations against others, defining. Plato/Parmenides: the one as one implies the other and is as one with respect to many. Marsilius Ficino: Commentary on Parmenides: "The power of otherness itself, when inserted into the ideal forms, is the negation." Being/Holz: when apart from all ontic differences, the Absolute Otherness is the logical bivalence, which corresponds ontologically to the mixing of the non-being with the being. Leibniz: "non ens cum ente confusum". I 43 Unity/experience/perception/world/Leibniz: The diversity of the world is as indisputable as it is unprovable. >Proof/Leibniz, >Provability/Leibniz, >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. The unity of this multiplicity must be gained from itself as a principle of demonstration. Thinking: for the use of thought, the decline is enough for the first positing of the identity principle. >Identity principle/Leibniz. Recognition: for this the positing itself needs a reason. >Kowledge/Leibniz. I 58 Identity/multiplicity/manifoldness/substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the origin of the identity-evidence from experience leaves the multiplicity of the given unaffected. In contrast to Spinoza, where everything is reduced to the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical in Leibniz. But: Epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: the ontological quality of the principle of identity is not found in itself, but in sense perception. The senses show that "A is A" is a proposition whose opposition "A is not A" includes a formal contradiction. The senses show that the predicate is inherent to the subject and that it is a contradiction to deny it to the predicate. Holz: this is not an irrational empiricism: the system of the truths of reason which must be necessarily valid in this possible world must be given in the facticity of this world. But the logical fact is always only given by reason in the way of deduction. I 59 This is blocked from us directly and has to be deduced first. In order that the pre-predicative evidence does not turn into the irrational, it must be justified in an ontological construct, in which identity proves to be the necessary structure of the manifold and changing world. (Reflection). I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, needs not to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by his "universal harmony". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question remains, even if we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Cf. >Substance/Spinoza, >Substance/Leibniz. I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. I 97f Unity/Leibniz: a motionless unity of the world would only be one with many qualities. I 127 Unity/multiplicity/modality/modal/Leibniz/Holz: the difference between the world in its totality and the diversity of its parts requires a modal distinction in the concept of the world. The fact that the world is, may mean that it is summed up in one point, or that it is perceived as an extended multiplicity "extensive" or "perceived". As a set of separate parts. Scholasticism: "partes extra partes". I 128 Unity: unity is a substance or an aspect of being. Multiplicity: multiplicity is a phenomenon or an appearance aspect. >Phenomena/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Spinoza, B. | Leibniz Vs Spinoza, B. | I 12 Metaphysics/Holz: Spinoza is an example of the highest level of traditional metaphysics LeibnizVsSpinoza. I 38 Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The world is the infinite diversity of simple substances; for the latter therefore, there can be an infinite number of statements. I 58 Identity/Multiplicity/Diversity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The origin of identity's evidence does not touch upon the multiplicity of the given. Spinoza, however, reduces everything on the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical formal. But: epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: The ontological quality of identity's principle is not to be found in itself but in the sensory perception. The senses let see that "A is A" is a sentence, and that the opposite of it, "A is not A", is a formal contradiction. The senses show that the predicate lives in the subject, and that is a contradiction to deny this. Holz: However, this is not irrational empiricism: the system of vérités de raison [Vernunftwahrheiten], which necessarily pertain in this possible world, must be possible in the facticity of this world. But the logical in the facticity is only perpetually given by reason in the course of deduction. I 59 We do not have a direct access to it. It must be deduced at first. In order to not have pre-predicative evidence transform into irrationality, deduction needs to be firstly grounded in an ontological construction. This is done by identity which shows itself to be the necessary structure of a diverse and changing world. (Reflection). I 63 VsSpinoza: For Spinoza, the problem cannot be solved if one accepts the existence of the individual. He solves the problem or rather it does not appear in his field of vision because for him the human is formed from particular modifications of God's attributes. As such, the Cartesian doubt is not considered. The ego cogitans becomes a mere appearance, it is an annex to the self-assured unity of God. Thus, Spinoza turns back to the realism of the Middle Ages. Thus, facticity's rationality cannot be established. I 73 LeibnizVsSpinoza: World's unity is its structure, not a substance, which defines everything. I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: However, it is necessary that the ultima ratio is a reason and not a plurality, because the reason is the structure of the whole. Therefore, Leibniz does not need to sacrifice the plurality of things in order to come to a single and only world [die eine und einzige Welt]. Instead of Spinoza's substance, there is the "harmonie universelle". I 90 Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary ens [Seiende] only seems to correspond to Spinoza's substance. In reality, it is only the term for the totality of the inner-worldly [innerweltlich] facts. (Holz: " All that is the case" ["Alles, was der Fall ist"]; Wittgenstein). Der Begriff des als seiend Erfahrenen schließt den Begriff der wirklichen Totalität ein. I 91 Therefore, if something is, then the one is the being of all, and not of nothing.[Wenn daher etwas ist, dann ist auch das eine Sein aller Seienden und nicht nichts.] |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Spinoza, B. | Rorty Vs Spinoza, B. | II (e) 104 World/Mind/Matter/Spinoza/Rorty: two equally valid ways of describing the world: one in terms of matter, then in terms of the mind. The order based on the connection of the corpuscles is the same as the order and connection of our ideas. The mind only knows as long as the body is well and vice versa. "We know God all the more, the more we understand individual things." SpinozaVsSocrates: we should not, like Socrates, be discouraged by the fact that there are no teleological explanations for natural events. II (e) 105 The Spirit of God is no more and no less than the comprehension of all relations between individual things. RortyVsSpinoza: as soon as the ways of description are recognized as equivalent, the idea of the natural order is in danger. Also both ways of description can be illusory. >Description Levels. Thus entering the slippery slope down to Kant's unrecognizable thing in itself. Ultimately, the relativism of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Spinoza, B. | Strawson Vs Spinoza, B. | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein/Strawson/Rorty: thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting in res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect/VsSpinoza: "Two aspects". That is okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Spinoza, B. | Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. | Leibniz I 31 Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger. --- I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking. Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic. HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history. Rorty II 112 Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Mind | Rorty, R. | I 28 Wittgenstein / Strawson / Rorty thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting into res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect / VsSpinoza "two aspects". That s okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Truth | Spinoza, B. | Rorty II 112 Wahrheit/Spinoza: These erkennen wir, wenn wir sie sehen. - HegelVsSpinoza. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
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